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The youth justice family group conference (FGC) is a statutory decision making process 
whereby the young person, their family/whanau, state officials and the victim of the offence 
come together to decide on a response to offending by that young person. The FGC is an 
integral part of the youth justice system, involving thousands of young people and their 
families each year. 
There is a considerable amount of literature available on the youth justice FGC, most notably 
in regard to the purported restorative justice nature of the process. However, for a legal 
process which involves so many young people on a daily basis, there is little information 
available on the due process rights of young people in the FGC. This thesis seeks to remedy 
this gap in the research knowledge. 
Firstly, this thesis establishes the theoretical framework for the rights of the young person in 
the youth justice system. The historical context and theoretical justification for these rights is 
considered, and the benchmarks for rights coming from international and national human 
rights standards are identified. A key theoretical issue is the application of rights to the FGC. 
It is argued that although the FGC differs in format from the adversarial criminal process, it 
remains a state process involved in resolving a breach of the criminal law, and thus the young 
person's rights should be safeguarded. 
Secondly, this thesis evaluates legislation, policy and practice relating to the rights of the 
young person in the FGC. Three key areas of rights are considered: legal assistance, how the 
offence is proved, and outcomes of the FGC. Reference is made to practice examples derived 
from observation of the FGC in two centres in New Zealand. 
Finally, as the FGC is certain to remam an integral part of the youth justice system, 
recommendations are made as to how legislation and practice could be improved to better 
safeguard the rights of young people in this process. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand youth justice system has been described as 'world leading' 1 and a 'new 
paradigm' .2 The youth justice family group conference has been referred to as the 'jewel in 
the crown' of this youth justice system.3 This thesis will give a fresh perspective on this much 
discussed process by analysing the rights of young people in the youth justice family group 
conference. 
The term 'youth justice family group conference'4 refers to a statutory process whereby the 
young person, their family members, state officials (such as the facilitator and police officers), 
the victim of the offence, and others such as lawyers and social workers, come together to 
make decisions relating to alleged or proved offending by that young person. About 9,000 of 
these events take place every year, thus involving thousands of young people and their 
families. 5 Family group conferencing was first introduced in New Zealand in 1989, but is now 
an increasingly popular response to offending by youth. Broadly similar models are in use in 
some Australian states, as well as in Europe. In New Zealand, the youth justice FGC is used 
principally as a diversionary measure and as a sentencing aid for Youth Court Judges, thus 
delegating a large measure of power over responses to offending by young people from the 
state to the family and wider community. Due to the opportunity for victim involvement, the 
youth justice FGC in New Zealand has become almost synonymous with restorative justice.6 
1 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becraft, 'Youth Justice Family Group Conferences: A Quick 'Nip and 
Tuck' or Transplant Surgery: What would the Doctor Order in 2006?' Paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Family Group Conference, Coming Home, Te Hokinga Mai, Wellington, New Zealand, 
November 2006. 
2 Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, 'Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: A New Paradigm' (1993) 26 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 81. 
3 Judge Carolyn Henwood, quoted in Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becraft, 'Youth Justice Family 
Group Conferences: A Quick 'Nip and Tuck' or Transplant Surgery: What would the Doctor Order in 2006?' 
Paper presented at the International Conference on the Family Group Conference, Coming Home, Te Hokinga 
Mai, Wellington, New Zealand, November 2006. 
4 Hereinafter 'FGC' or 'youth justice FGC' in the text. 
5 See Chapter 5(III). 
6 Restorative justice is a model of justice which seeks generally to repair the harm caused to the victim by the 
offending and to effect reconciliation between offender and victim, and reintegration of the offender to the 
community. This is addressed in detail in Chapter 7(II) and 13(IV). 
1 
Empirical studies have reported positive effects in terms of re-offending rates, family and 
community involvement and cultural appropriateness.7 
Despite the existence of a significant body of literature relating to the youth justice FGC, 8 
there is a distinct lack of legal commentary, in spite of the fact that, as Judge Inglis QC 
remarked in Police v L, the legislative provisions governing the FGC 'might almost have been 
deliberately drafted so as to promote obscurity and to daunt even the most experienced 
lawyer' .9 The issue of rights in restorative justice processes generally has attracted a high 
level of theoretical debate, 10 and some concerns have been raised about rights in family group 
conferencing. 11 Nonetheless, for a process which involves so many young people and can 
potentially involve thousands of dollars reparation, and tens of hours of community work, 
there is little information available about legal aspects of the New Zealand youth justice FGC. 
This thesis makes a contribution to the research knowledge relating to the New Zealand youth 
justice FGC, and makes recommendations about how the rights of the young person could be 
better protected. In addition, this thesis makes a wider contribution to the subject of the rights 
of the young person in the youth justice system generally, by analysing the theoretical 
framework for the rights of the young person in the New Zealand youth justice system, 
7 Gabrielle Maxwell, Venezia Kingi, Jeremy Robertson, Allison Morris, and Chris Cunningham, Achieving 
Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004). 
Hereinafter Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: 
Ministry of Social Development, 2004). 
8 In a New Zealand context, Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final 
Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004), Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, 
Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 
1993). More generally see e.g. Joe Hudson, Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell, and Burt Galaway (eds.), 
Family Group Conferences: Perspectives on Policy and Practice (New South Wales: The Federation 
Press/Criminal Justice Press, 1996), Allison Morris, and Gabrielle M Maxwell, (eds.), Restorative Justice for 
Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation and Circles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
9 Police v L (1991) 8 FRNZ 123, 125. 
10 E.g. Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, Andrew Ashworth, 'Some Doubts About Restorative Justice' (1993) 4 Criminal Law Fontm 
277, John Braithwaite, 'Setting Standards for Restorative Justice' 42 British Journal of Criminology 563, Jim 
Dignan, 'Towards a Systemic Model of Restorative Justice: Reflections on the Concept, its Context and the 
Need for Clear Constraints' in Andrew von Hirsch, Julian Roberts, Anthony E Bottoms, Kent Roach, and Maria 
Schiff (eds.), Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003). 
11 E.g. Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), Nessa Lynch, 'Respecting Legal Rights in the New 
Zealand Youth Justice Family Group Conference' (2007) 19 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 75. 
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especially the legal status and application of international standards for youth justice to the 
New Zealand legal system. 
II. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
The purpose of the first three chapters is to establish the rights framework against which the 
rights of the young person in the FGC can be evaluated. Chapter 2 sets the context for this 
research, discussing the evolution of youth justice legislation and policy in New Zealand, with 
a particular focus on the rights of the young person. There is discussion of the principles 
underpinning the governing legislation. Chapter 3 argues the importance of rights, setting out 
the theoretical justification for the rights of children and young people in the youth justice 
system, and sets out as a theoretical frame of reference the dual status of the child or young 
person, as accused or offender, and young person. Chapter 4 establishes the benchmarks for a 
rights based approach to youth justice, considering what rights children and young people 
have in the youth justice system, and analysing the sources of rights for the child or young 
person ( coming from international and national human rights standards. as well as the 
governing legislation itself). 
The next three chapters consider the youth justice FGC, and the theoretical principles 
concerning the application of rights to this model of justice. Chapter 5 discusses the operation 
of the youth justice FGC; setting out the powers and functions of the FGC, as well as the 
operation of the conferencing schemes of other jurisdictions, which are used as points of 
comparison in this research. Chapter 6 discusses typical practice and procedure at the youth 
justice FGC, drawing on observation of FGCs carried out in two centres in New Zealand. 
Chapter 7 is the theoretical 'hinge' of this thesis, considering why rights should apply to this 
particular process, and refuting the key arguments made against the need for rights in this type 
of process. 
The main body of this thesis is concerned with the analysis of three key areas of rights in the 
context of the FGC process, i.e. legal assistance, how the offence is proved, and the sanctions 
which result. Chapters 8 and 9 consider the right to legal assistance in the FGC process, 
discussing why legal assistance is particularly important in the FGC process and analysing the 
level of access to legal assistance at the FGC. The particular situation of the intention to 
charge FGC is highlighted, where young people rarely have access to legal assistance. 
Chapter 9 then considers the quality of the right of legal assistance, in particular whether a 
3 
best interests approach is taken by Youth Advocates, and whether the particular format of the 
FGC requires a different style of legal representation. 
Chapters 10 and 11 consider how the offence is established at the youth justice FGC. Chapter 
10 analyses the unusual process for proving the offence, in particular whether the admission 
of the offence at the FGC equates to an acceptance of legal guilt. Chapter 10 is principally 
concerned with the wider context of the legislative mechanisms, with a particular focus on the 
divergent approach evident from the case law. Chapter 11 then moves to the specific and 
examines practice and procedure relating to admissions at the FGC. 
Chapters 12 and 13 discuss FGC outcomes. Chapter 12 is concerned with the powers of the 
FGC to impose sanctions, and criticises the lack of limits on those sanctions. Chapter 13 is 
concerned with the objectives of the FGC and the implications for the rights of the young 
person, in particular the increasing orientation of the youth justice system towards restorative 
justice, and the blurring of lines between care and protection and youth justice 
The final chapter entitled 'The Way Forward' draws together the recommendations which are 
made throughout this thesis. Recommendations, including draft legislative and policy changes 
are made in relation to safeguards for the rights of the young person in the FGC, as well as 
commentary on the future direction of the youth justice system. The thesis is accurate as of 16 
December 2008, though the newly elected government has signalled its intention to reform 
the youth justice system. 
III. AN OTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
This introductory chapter necessarily concludes with a note on terminology. The title of this 
thesis is 'The Rights of the Young Person in the New Zealand Youth Justice Family Group 
Conference'. It is thus important to define the term 'young person' before proceeding. 
Across the New Zealand legislative sphere, there is a confusing array of terms used to 
describe those aged less than eighteen years. The term 'young person' has a statutory meaning 
under the legislation governing youth justice, the Children, Young Persons and Their Families 
Act 1989. There is a legislative distinction between children (those aged ten years or more, 
but less than fourteen years) and young people (those aged fourteen years and over but less 
4 
than seventeen years). 12 However, the Care of Children Act 2004 defines 'child' as 'a person 
under the age of eighteen years' .13 Similarly, the Children's Commissioner Act 2003 defines a 
child as a person under the age of eighteen. 14 The major rights benchmark for this research 
( the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child) uses the term children to describe 
all those under eighteen years unless the age of majority is assumed earlier under the law of 
that state.'5 In New Zealand, the age of majority is twenty. 16 A recent discussion document on 
reform of the youth justice system had the title Safeguarding Our Children: Updating the 
Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1989), even though it clearly referred to what 
are legally 'young people' (i.e. those aged between fourteen and seventeen years of age. 17 
Similarly, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act provides for the right, in the case of a 'child' in 
the criminal justice system, to be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the 'child's' 
age, 18 although under the CYPF Act, 'children' may not be prosecuted except in cases of 
homicide. It seems unlikely that Parliament meant to confine this section to these exceptional 
occurrences where children are tried for murder and manslaughter. 
The situation is complicated further when one looks further afield. The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child is an important benchmark for rights and uses the term 'child' to refer to 
all those aged less than eighteen years. 19 Other similar jurisdictions refer to all those under 
eighteen years as 'children' .20 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the literature speaks of 
'children's rights' and the subject area is 'children's rights' .21 
12 s 2(1), Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (Hereinafter CYPF Act in the text). 
13 s 8, Care of Children Act 2004. 
14 s 4, Children's Commissioner Act 2003, s 13 of this Act excludes certain investigations under the CYPF Act 
from this definition. 
15 Article 1, Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
16 s 4(1), Age of Majority Act 1970. 
17 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
18 s 25(i), New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
19 Article 1, Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
20 E.g. the Children Act 200l(Ireland), the Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW). 
21 E.g. the International Journal of Children's Rights. 
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This array of terms posed some problems with maintaining a consistent terminology 
throughout this thesis. Although the term 'child' is frequently used in the youth justice 
literature to describe those aged less than eighteen years,22 to use the term 'child' as a 
collective term in New Zealand would be likely to be considered pejorative by older 
teenagers.23 Therefore, it was decided to adhere to the legislative definitions in the CYPF Act, 
using the terms 'young person' and 'child' in their specific statutory contexts,24 and the 
collective term 'children and young people' when referring to both groups. 25 
22 See e.g. Kathryn Hollingsworth, 'Judicial Approaches to Children's Rights in Youth Crime' (2007) 19 Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 42. 
23 Nessa Lynch, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: A Children's Rights Perspective' (2008) 8 Youth Justice 215. 
24 The substantive chapters. 
25 Chapters 1 to 7. 
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CHAPTER Two: SETTING THE CONTEXT -
RIGHTS AND THEY OUTH JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
The road to penal reform, like the road to hell, is paved with good intentions .... 26 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse the rights of young people in the context of a 
particular legal process: the youth justice FGC. This will involve the intertwining of a number 
of strands, such as children and young people's rights, human rights law, and youth justice. 
This chapter will set the context for this research, setting out the historical context for the 
rights of children and young people in the criminal justice system and the evolution of youth 
justice legislation and policy in New Zealand. 
The history of youth justice in a general sense,27 and in a specific New Zealand context, is 
well rehearsed.28 This chapter will look at how the broad themes of youth justice policy have 
affected the rights of children and young people. In the second part of this chapter, the 
discussion will move to the New Zealand context. The reform process which led to the current 
legislation will be considered. Problems with previous youth justice legislation will be 
identified, especially concerns about the rights of children and young people. The current 
legislation governing youth justice will also be discussed and its key features, such as 
diversion, family involvement in decision making and the separation of care and protection 
from youth justice, considered. 
26 Jim Dignan, 'Towards a Systemic Model of Restorative Justice: Reflections on the Concept, its Context and 
the Need for Clear Constraints' in Andrew von Hirsch, Julian Roberts, Anthony E Bottoms, Kent Roach and 
Maria Schiff (eds.), Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2003), 135. 
27 See generally John Muncie, Gordon Hughes, and Eugene McLaughlin (eds.), Youth Justice: Critical Readings 
(London: Sage, 2002), Harry Hendrick, 'Histories of Youth Crime and Justice' in Barry Goldson and John 
Muncie (eds.), Youth Crime and Justice (London: Sage Publications, 2006). 
28 John A Seymour, Dealing With Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976), Allison Morris, and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and 
Practice (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1987), Emily Watt, A History 
of Youth Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Principal Youth Court Judge's Office, 2005) available at 
www.justice.govt.nz/youth/history (last viewed 12 January 2008). 
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The chapters which follow will set out the framework of rights with which the youth justice 
FGC will be analysed. The purpose of this chapter is to set the historical and policy context. 
The operation of the youth justice system and the theoretical basis of the youth justice FGC 
itself are the subject of separate chapters.29 
IL EARLY YOUTH JUSTICE 
A. Introduction 
As a starting point, it is instructive to outline historical attitudes towards children and young 
people involved in the criminal justice system. Debate around how such children and young 
people should be treated and what rights they should have, is still divided between the view of 
the child or young person as a dependent being who needs protection, and the opposing view 
of the child or young person as an autonomous individual. A discussion of how these 
ideologies developed will frame their relevance to the moral and ethical justifications for 
children and young people's rights (which will be analysed in a later chapter).30 
B. Early Common Law Views on the Personhood of Children and Young People 
Historically, the principal characteristic of children and young people is their powerlessness.31 
In the eyes of the common law, a child or young person without an interest in land scarcely 
existed.32 Children and young people were in effect, the chattels of their father and derived 
their legal status from him. Up until the nineteenth century, the doctrine of patria potestas had 
the effect of allowing fathers to mistreat their offspring with impunity. The characteristics of 
this doctrine included: the autonomy of the household ruled by the father, actual ownership of 
the child or young person, filial piety and the diminished relationship between the child or 
young person and the state.33 The common law focused on the legal status of the father as head 
of the household rather than the rights of individual members of that household. It was from 
him that the other members of the family derived their status. Any actionable rights at law 
29 See Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
30 See Chapter 3. 
31 The most famous study of children and young people's status in history is Philippe Aries, L'enfant et la vie 
familiale sous l'Ancien Regime (Centuries of Childhood) (R Baldick, trans.) (London: Cape, 1964). Aries argues 
that the Middle Ages lacked any significant or detailed concept of childhood. There was little or no effort to 
create a separate world for children and young people insulated from the adult world. See also Margaret Mead 
and Martha Wolfenstein (eds.), Childhood in Contemporary Cultures (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1955). 
32 Kerry O 'Halloran, The Welfare of the Child - The Principle and the Law (London: Ashgate Publishing, 1999). 
33 R Helmholz, 'And Were There Children's Rights in Early Modern England?' (1993) 1 International Journal 
of Children's Rights 23. 
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belonged to the father. The justification for the subjugation of children and young people is 
that they were considered not to have a will of their own, and thus not capable of self-
determination.34 Children and young people were seen as lacking any personal identity and 
possessing little value. As Eekelaar correctly points out, the earliest forms of children and 
young people's rights emerged not to protect the children and young people themselves or to 
recognise the child or young person as an individual of moral worth, but to further the 
interests of others (usually the interests of the father or the protection of the community's 
conventions and norms).3s Thus, for example, the legal enforcement of parental support 
obligations in the sixteenth century arose not out of a desire to further the welfare of the child 
or young person, but from a desire to avert the threat of social instability which would arise 
out of increased unemploymen1.36 According to Breen, the father's rights doctrine 'ultimately 
gave way to the standard of the best interests of the child' .37 The best interests standard 
evolved to place limits on men's power over children and young people, as the child or young 
person's father was the sole legal guardian of the child or young person.3s 
In the criminal law sphere, the only recognition of childhood as a distinct period of life was 
the doli incapax principle.39 Apart from this legal principle, there was no separate criminal 
justice system for youth. Even up until the mid-nineteenth century, older young people were 
subject to capital punishment, corporal punishment and imprisonment on the same basis as 
34 Angel R Colon and Patricia A Colon, A History of Children: A Socio-Cultural Survey Across Millennia 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001). 
35 John Eekelaar, 'The Emergence of Children's Rights' (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161. 
36 John Eekelaar, 'The Emergence of Children's Rights' ( 1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161, 166-169. 
See also Mary Ann Mason, From Father's Property to Children's Rights - The History of Child Custody in the 
United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 24-25, where the author discusses the English Poor 
Law Act of 1576. This Act provided that the mother and father of an illegitimate child had to pay for its 
upbringing, thus relieving the public purse of the burden. This change was obviously brought about as an 
economic measure rather than with the child's best interests in mind. 
37 Claire Breen, The Standard of the Best Interest of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002), 
16. 
38 Stephen M Cretney, Judith M Masson and Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Principles of Family Law (71h Edition) 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), 635. 
39 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Strahan: London, 1809). This legal principle held 
that there was an irrebutable presumption that children under the age of seven were incapable of forming the 
necessary intent for a criminal act. Those between the ages of seven and fourteen were held to be incapable of 
forming criminal intent, but this could be rebutted by demonstrating that the child comprehended the nature of 
the act and that it was wrong. Children over the age of fourteen were held liable under the same legal principles 
as adults. See also Andrew Ashworth, 'Making Criminals out of Children: Abolishing the Presumption of Doli 
Incapax' (1998) 16 Criminal Justice 16. 
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adults.4° Furthermore, the separate sentencing of adult and youth off enders is a relatively 
recent development. Early nineteenth century criminal justice saw little disparity between 
youth offenders and adult offenders. Classical criminology viewed deterrence as the object of 
sanctions.~1 Accordingly, there was little or no legal recognition of the different needs and 
capacities of children and young people in the justice system. 42 
C. Early New Zealand Youth Justice Statutes 
The first statutes governing youth justice in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand were 
enacted in reaction to the prevailing social conditions, which meant that there were escalating 
numbers of abandoned, criminal and neglected young people.43 The first of these statutes (the 
Neglected and Criminal Children Act 1867) attempted to distinguish between criminal youth 
and 'unfortunate' neglected youth, however the distinction remained 'blurred' both in theory 
and practice.44 Under this statute, children and young people who broke the law were to be 
dealt with primarily through a system of industrial schools and reformatories, but only the 
industrial schools were actually built.45 These legislative changes did mark the beginnings of 
state intervention into work which in previous times was carried out by churches and 
charitable organisations.46 A similar system of institutions was established in England and 
40 See Anthony M Platt, The Child Savers (Chicago/ London: University of Chicago, 1969), 184, where the 
author details some examples of how children and young people were harshly dealt with by the criminal courts 
in nineteenth century England. Quoting BEF Knell, 'Capital Punishment' (1965) 5 British Journal of 
Delinquency 206, Platt points to the fact that although there are records of many children and young people 
being sentenced to death for trivial property crimes, the number on which the death sentence was actually carried 
out is much smaller. 
41 The criminal justice system was still based on classical criminological thinking, that is that the offender had 
made a rational choice to commit the crime, weighing up the benefits and disadvantages of the criminal act. 
Therefore the punishment for the crime must be harsh enough to deter the offender and others from choosing to 
commit the crime again. See generally George B Vold, Thomas J Bernard, and Jeffrey B Snipes, Theoretical 
Criminology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th Edition, 2002). 
42 See further Harry Hendrick, 'Histories of Youth Crime and Justice' in Barry Goldson and John Muncie (eds.), 
Youth Crime and Justice (London: Sage Publications, 2006). 
43 John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976), 6. 
44 John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976). 
45 John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976), 7. 
46 Allison Morris and Henry Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 23 and John 
A Seymour Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal Research 
Foundation, 1976), 6-7. 
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Wales with the aim of reforming 'criminal' youth.47 Morris and Giller note that reform 
interventions in England and Wales at the time were frequently 'unrelated to the nature of the 
juvenile's offence',48 and the emphasis in both jurisdictions was on work and moral 
education.49 
The first comprehensive legal recognition of children and young people as a different and 
separate class of criminal accused came with the Juvenile Offenders Act of 1906. There had 
previously been some modifications in criminal procedure through the practice of magistrates, 
but before the 1906 legislation there were few formal legal rules distinguishing youth accused 
from adult accused.5° Children and young people were 'not recognised as a distinct group of 
offenders' .51 There was the doli incapax rule, which held that children under seven were 
incapable of forming the necessary mens rea for the purposes of criminal prosecution, but 
those aged between seven and fourteen years of age could be prosecuted if the necessary mens 
rea was demonstrable. The stated purpose of the Juvenile Offenders Act 1906 was to 
differentiate between children and young people and adults in the procedure which 
magistrates should follow. Special separate magistrate hearings for children and young people 
under sixteen years of age were established,52 and proceedings could be held in camera.53 In 
reality, it is likely that the Juvenile Offenders Act 1906 did little more than formalise the 
practice of magistrates in having special procedures for young defendants.54 
47 Reformatory Schools Act 1854, Industrial Schools Act 1861. 
48 Allison Morris and Henry Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 25. 
49 In 1873 the Neglected and Criminal Children Act was amended so that industrial school authorities could 
apply to have the power of guardianship over their charges while the Industrial Schools Act 1882 increased the 
number of options available to the authorities in dealing with young people who broke the law. 
50 Allison Morris, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand' (2004) 31 Crime & Justice 243, 248. 
51 Allison Morris, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand' (2004) 31 Crime & Justice 243, 247. 
52 s 3(2), Juvenile Offenders Act 1906. 
53 s 4, Juvenile Offenders Act 1906. 
54 John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976), 29. 
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Ill. THE WELFARE APPROACH To YOUTH JUSTICE 
A. The Child Saving Movement 
Significant changes in the law's view of the youth offender did not occur until the late 
nineteenth century,ss when the initial signs of a children's rights discourse were observed. The 
phrase 'children's rights' was first mentioned in an article as early as 1852,s6 but it was not 
until the end of the nineteenth century that a social reform movement around children and 
young people developed, including the enactment of child labour laws, the establishment of a 
compulsory education system and, notably, the beginnings of a modem youth justice system. 
Separate youth justice systems were established in roughly the same period in the United 
States,s1 Australia,ss and Great Britain.s9 Changes in the traditional character of family life 
added impetus to the movement; the economic benefit of the child or young person had 
lessened as less agricultural work was done by hand, women and children and young people 
were increasingly regarded as separate entities rather than the chattels of the husband or 
father, and the state was beginning to encroach on areas traditionally regarded as falling 
within the sphere of family privacy. In an American context, the most famous of the 'child 
savers' were the middle class women of the Chicago Woman's Club who supported youth 
court legislation and raised awareness of child welfare issues.60 The 'child-saving' movement 
saw children and young people as beings that needed to be protected due to their vulnerability 
and powerlessness. It had a strongly protectionist origin, justifying legal reform on the basis 
that children and young people needed to be protected from themselves and others, rather than 
promoting their capacity for self-determination. The perception of children and young people 
55 David Hodgson, 'The Historical Development and "Internationalisation"' of the Children's Rights Movement' 
(1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 252. 
56 Slogvolk, 'The Rights of Children'(l852) 36 Knickerbocker 489, cited in MDA Freeman, 'The Limits of 
Children's Rights' in MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds.), The Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: 
Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 29. 
57 The first court specifically for juveniles was established in Illinois in 1899 by the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. 
See further Anthony M Platt, The Child Savers (Chicago/ London: University of Chicago, 1969), 140. 
58 1895 (South Australia), 1905 (New South Wales), 1906 (Victoria), 1907 (Queensland), 1907 (Western 
Australia), 1918 (Tasmania). See Chris Cunneen and Rob White, Juvenile Justice: Youth and Crime in Australia 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch 1. 
59 In the period immediately after the introduction of the Children Act of 1908. 
60 Robert Sunley, 'Early Nineteenth- Century American Literature on Child Rearing' in Margaret Mead and 
Martha Wolfenstein (eds.), Childhood in Contemporary Cultures (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1955). 
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had shifted from being the property of their parents to dependent beings whose successful 
transition to adulthood depended on guidance and protection.61 
In the criminal justice context, a welfare based approach to the disposition of youth offending 
cases became more prevalent at the end of the nineteenth century. In essence, welfare based 
youth justice aimed to treat and cure the delinquent youth rather than to punish. The 
characteristics of the welfare model of youth justice are informality, lack of due process and a 
high degree of discretion in the name of 'best interests'. The theoretical justification for this 
stemmed from the doctrine of parens patraie. 62 Although the concept of parens patraie was 
originally used in the Middle Ages to protect land tenure rights, in the criminal law sphere the 
doctrine permitted coercive court action for neglected or delinquent children or young people. 
The increased focus on the rehabilitation and welfare of the youth offender was also 
influenced by the rise of positivist criminology. Classical criminology had dominated thinking 
up until the mid-nineteenth century. Based on the writings of authors such as Cesare 
Beccaria63 and Jeremy Bentham,6-1 classical criminology viewed criminal behaviour as a 
rational choice by the individual. In contrast, positivist criminology sought other explanations 
of offending behaviour, for example characteristics of the offender's personality or his/her 
environment.65 These theories were advanced through the recently developed disciplines of 
psychology and sociology.r.6 Belief in the moral degeneracy of the offender was fundamental 
and the emphasis was on the malleability and reformation of the child or young person's 
character rather than punishment or accountability. Crime was a disease that could be cured.61 
This period also saw the establishment of the first separate penal institutions and reformatory 
61 For an English perspective on the 'child-saving' movement, see Robert Harris and David Webb, Welfare, 
Power, and Juvenile Justice (London: Tavistock Publications, 1987), ch 1. 
62 The English law concept of parens patriae was historically applied by the Courts of Chancery. It allowed the 
Crown to exercise its paternal prerogative to declare a child to be a Ward of the Crown, when the child's parents 
were deemed to have failed to maintain the child. See Sanford J Fox, 'Juvenile Justice Reform: A Historical 
Perspective' (1970) 22 Stanford Law Review 1187. 
63 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (trans. Henry Paolucci) (Jndianpolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1963). 
64 Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (H.L.A. Hart ed.) (London: Athlone Press, 1970). 
65 David Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies (Aldershot: Gower Publishing 
Company Limited, 1985). 
66 David Garland, 'British Criminology before 1935' (1988) 28 British Journal of Criminology 131. 
67 Allison Morris and Mary Mcisaac, Juvenile Justice? (London: Heinemann, 1978), 5. 
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schools for children and young people.68 The first court specific to youth offenders was 
established in Illinois in the United States of America in 1899.69 Across the common law 
jurisdictions, these new youth courts discarded the adversarial processes and rigid procedural 
rules of the traditional criminal court. Instead, the state would intervene through means of 
treatment (for example institutionalisation) to ensure that the delinquent child or young person 
received care and guidance. 
B. Welfare Based Youth Justice in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the Child Welfare Act 1925 established the Child Welfare Branch which was 
to be a branch of the Education Department. This agency was given responsibility for the 
supervision of youth offenders as well as youth who were in need of care and protection. A 
separate Children's Court was provided for in the legislation. The Children's Court was to 
have separate hearings in separate premises,70 and was to be presided over by magistrates who 
were suited by means of experience and personality to deal with children and young people. 
Press reports on proceedings in the Children's Court could be published only with the consent 
of the magistrate and publication of the child or young person's name was prohibited. 
While preceding legislation ( e.g. the 1906 Juvenile Offenders Act) was concerned with 
adapting the existing criminal law for the purposes of young offenders, the Child Welfare Act 
1925 appears to have different objectives, notably the re-classification of criminal youth to 
youth in need of state assistance. Factors influencing the welfarist philosophy included 
concern about numbers of street youth and the growth in philanthropic movements. Similar 
conditions in the United States had inspired the American child saving movement.71 Before 
the Child Welfare Act of 1925, the direction of youth justice legislation in New Zealand was 
closely aligned with that of England and Wales. Seymour argues that the 1925 Act was more 
in line with developments in the United States, and notes that John Beck (Child Welfare 
68 The first separate penal institution for children was established in Parkhurst, England in 1842. Julia Fionda, 
'Youth Justice' in Julia Fionda (ed.), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
69 Nicholas MC Bala and Rebecca J Bromwich, 'Introduction: An International Perspective on Youth Justice', in 
Nicholas MC Bala, Joseph P Hornick, Howard N Snyder and Joanne J Paetsch (eds.), Juvenile Justice Systems -
An International Comparison of Problems and Solutions (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 2002). 
70 s 28, Child Welfare Act 1925. 
71 Allison Morris, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand' (2004) 31 Crime & Justice 243, 248-249. 
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Superintendent) had visited the United States and reported on practice there. 72 This visit may 
have influenced the direction taken by the Child Welfare Act 1925. 
The new Children's Court had jurisdiction over children and young people who came to the 
notice of the authorities, but little distinction was drawn between those who were offending 
and those who were in need of care and protection. In the welfare- based youth justice system, 
the young offender is perceived as being in need of assistance and the offending behaviour is 
seen as a symptom of various deficiencies such as poverty. Children and young people are not 
regarded as making a rational choice to commit a crime; rather they are products of their 
environment. Reform and re-education of the child or young person are broadly the aims of 
the system rather than the administration of a proportionate response to the offence. The state 
does not seek to punish the young offender, but rather to rehabilitate and mould him or her 
into a functional member of society. The courts were to take a broader approach that children 
and young people who were offending were in need of guidance and rehabilitation.73 One of 
the distinguishing characteristics of a welfare type approach apparent in the Child Welfare 
Act 1925 is the provision for a non-specific complaint system meaning that a child or young 
person could be brought into the court's jurisdiction even if there was no specific offence 
involved.74 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Early international recognition of children and young people's rights was also firmly centred 
on welfare rights (essentially the right to protection, shelter and sustenance), and the 
protection of children and young people's interests as determined by adults. Although the 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child adopted by the Fifth Assembly of the League of 
Nations in 1924 was the first formal international recognition of the existence of children's 
rights,75 the ideology remained protectionist, concerned with promoting welfare rather than 
self-determination. This document was enacted in the context of post-World War One, and so 
was concerned almost solely with children and young people's material needs. Its five 
72 John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976), 32. 
73 John A Seymour, Dealing With Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976), 31. 
74 s 31, Child Welfare Act 1925. 
75 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, adopted Sept. 26, 1924, League of Nations O.J. Spec. 
Supp. 21, at 43 (1924), hereinafter the 1924 Declaration in the text. 
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principles emphasised the welfare and protection of the child or young person,16 and there was 
no mention of a right to self-determination. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
almost completely ignored children and young people.n The 1959 United Nations Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child again emphasised the duties that mankind owed to children and 
young people.1s There is significant overlap with the 1924 Declaration in that the emphasis is 
firmly on welfare and protection of the child or young person. There was no mention in the 
ten articles of self-determination or autonomy for children and young people, or any 
recognition that the child or young person's views might be important. 
The 1924 Declaration appears to place the duty of ensuring the child or young person's 
welfare on adult men and women rather than on the state; ' ... men and women of all nations, 
recognising that mankind owes to the child the best it has to give, declare and accept it as their 
duty ... '. Children and young people were not seen as individual right holders but as beings 
deserving of protection and good treatment. Conversely, the 1959 Declaration states that: 
[the child can] enjoy for his own good and for the good of society the rights and freedoms herein set 
forth, and calls upon parents, upon men and women as individuals, and upon voluntary organizations, 
local authorities and national Governments to recognize these rights.79 
The 1959 Declaration thus represents the beginning of a conceptual shift to a view of the child 
or young person as a subject of international law capable of possessing rights and freedoms. 
While none of these early international rights instruments expressly mentioned youth justice, 
they represented the first steps in the formation of a set of international norms concerned with 
minimum standards for state treatment of children and young people. Despite this the 
emphasis remained on the child or young person's quality of life rather than the recognition of 
him or her as a person. Further, the 1959 Declaration had limited legal status, and so did not 
attempt to impose legal obligations on States Parties. However, the fact that it was adopted 
76 'The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be nursed; the child that is backward must be 
helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succoured' 
1924 Declaration, Part II. 
77 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). See Article 25 
(2) 'Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of 
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.' 
78 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 1386 (XIV). 14 U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959), hereinafter 1959 
Declaration. E.g. the Preamble: 'Whereas the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs 
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth' and Principle 2: 
'The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other 
means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal 
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration'. 
79 Preamble to the Declaration on the Rights of the Child [author's italics]. 
16 
"---,' 
unanimously 'accords it greater weight' ,so than other General Assembly Declarations because 
of the implicit moral approval by the member states. Its wording is outdated and its principles 
are vague, sometimes to the point of idealism.81 Nonetheless, the 1959 Declaration had begun 
the process of re-conceptualising the personhood of the child or young person in international 
law.so 
V. PROBLEMS WITH WELFARE BASED YOUTH JUSTICE 
A. Some Negative Effects of Welfare- Based Youth Justice 
At the least, the welfare-based system recognised that children and young people needed 
protection due to their vulnerability. Nonetheless, as Platt stresses, the shift in emphasis 
towards the welfare model was not necessarily a positive one for children and young people. 
He rightly points out that the welfare approach emphasised the child or young person's 
dependence.s3 The state was to be a parent to the delinquent youth and had the power to make 
paternalistic judgements on the suitability of the child or young person's home environment. 
In short, 'kindness could nip crime in the bud' .84 Positivism justified interventions which 
sought to reform the child or young person's character. As Garland notes: 
The proper treatment of offenders required individualised, corrective measures carefully adapted to the 
specific case or the particular problem - not a uniform penalty mechanically dispensed. One needed 
expert knowledge, scientific research, and flexible instruments of intervention, as well as a willingness 
to regulate aspects of life which classical liberalism had deemed beyond the proper reach of 
govemment.ss 
The best ( and oft quoted) example of the culture and goals of the early twentieth century 
youth justice is in the discussion of an American judge, Judge Mack. He stated that the 
problem for the judge dealing with a youth offender was not: 
80 Geraldine van Bueren, International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), 13. 
81 See e.g. Principle 5, 'The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love and 
understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, 
in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, 
save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society and the public authorities shall have 
the duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those without adequate means of support. 
Payment of State and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is desirable'. 
82 David Hodgson, 'The Historical Development and "Internationalisation" of the Children's Rights Movement' 
(1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 252,261. 
83 Anthony M Platt, The Child Savers (Chicago/ London: University of Chicago, 1969), 176. 
84 Robert Harris and David Webb, Welfare, Power, and Juvenile Justice (London: Tavistock Publications, 1987), 
15. 
85 David Garland, The Culture of Control- Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 40. 
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[has] this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but what is he, how has he become what he is and 
what best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career. It 
is apparent at once that the ordinary legal evidence from a criminal court is not the sort of evidence to 
be heard in such a proceeding.s6 
This is a classical re-statement of youth justice philosophy m that period. The avowed 
purpose of betterment of the child or young person's character was not to be hampered by 
procedural rules. Although the stated goal of the reform schools and correctional institutions 
was rehabilitation, the result was often longer terms of imprisonment and reinforcing of 
traditional societal values. Reform schools were not considered places of punishment, rather 
of re-education. Penalties had a wide range: from court supervision to institutionalization for 
the duration of minority status. In the New Zealand context, actions taken 'in the best 
interests' of children and young people led to many, predominantly Maori children and young 
people being sent to institutions by the courts until they were twenty, often for minor 
offences.s1 
B. Re Gault 
The United States was arguably the jurisdiction to most thoroughly endorse the welfare 
approach to youth justice,ss and thus provided the context for a series of important judicial 
decisions involving the rights of children and young people in the criminal justice system. 
The welfare approach was seen by its proponents as an improvement on the classical justice 
model as it sought to treat children and young people rather than punish them. Did the welfare 
approach really improve the lot of the child or young person involved in the criminal justice 
system? At best the classical justice model was required to follow some basic rules of 
criminal procedure. In the welfare model, a youth offender could potentially be committed to 
a residential institution until age of majority without the benefit of established procedural 
rules.89 Some courts had begun to apply the welfarist philosophy with 'such enthusiasm that 
the procedures ceased to bear any resemblance to those generally prevailing in a court of 
law' .9° In the case of Re Gaulf,91 the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the 
86 Judge Julian Mack, 'The Juvenile Court' (1909) 23 Harvard Law Review 104. 
87 John Seymour, Dealing With Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976). 
88 Thomas J Bernard, The Cycle of Juvenile Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 5. 
89 For an account of the injustices suffered by children and young people in Britain under the welfare model of 
juvenile justice see Laurie Taylor, Ron Lacey and Denis Bracken, In Whose Best Interests? (Nottingham: The 
Cobden Trust/MIND, 1980). 
90 Leslie Sebba, 'Juvenile Justice Policy: Mapping the Criteria' in MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds.), The 
Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 237. 
18 
/', 
young defendant's right to fairness and due process in such a case.n The youth court which 
was under attack in Re Gault was the descendant of the child-saving movement. It had 
removed children and young people from the adult court to a court with an emphasis on social 
and psychological theory, disregarding procedural protections in favour of paternalistic 
intervention.93 This had resulted in a 'deprivation of due process based on the promise of a 
treatment that was often highly punitive' .9~ The Supreme Court held that children and young 
people were persons under the Constitution and thus were capable of possessing the rights of 
due process enshrined in the Constitution, such as the right to be represented by counsel, the 
right to remain silent and the right to confront witnesses. Re Gault exposed the operation of 
the youth justice system to be 'inconsistent and unpredictable' .9s The welfare model was 
exposed as not necessarily being a more lenient option as rehabilitation often had a higher 
price than an ordinary criminal sanction. As the rights culture developed, there was criticism 
of the welfare model for indeterminacy, intrusiveness, paternalism and violation of due 
process rights, and the Supreme Court endorsed this criticism. A subsequent Supreme Court 
decision added to the strength of the Re Gault judgment by holding that the young offender 
must be proved to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as is the case when an adult offender is 
tried.96 
C. Reactions to the Welfare Approach in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, there were comparable efforts to counter the potentially harsh effects of the 
welfare approach embodied in the 1925 Child Welfare Act. There were a number of 
91 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was a fifteen year old boy who was picked up by the Police and taken to 
the police station accused of making an obscene phone call. His parents were at work at the time. Neither Gault 
nor his parents were given any description or notice of the charges. He had no legal representation until after the 
adjudication. There was no record of the hearing and the accused did not get an opportunity to confront 
witnesses. The boy received an indeterminate sentence for the crime of making an obscene phone call. The same 
offence if committed by an adult would have resulted in a $50 fine or a term of two months imprisonment. 
92 See also In re Coyle, 132 Ind. App. 217,219, 101 N.E. 2d 192, 193 (1951), Kent v United States, 383 U.S. 541 
(1966), McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), Barry C Feld, 'Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of 
Procedure for the Juvenile Courts' (1984) 69 Minnesota Law Review 141. 
93 Martha Minow, 'What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?' (1995) 80 Minnesota Law Review 267,279. 
94 Gary B Melton, 'Taking Gault Seriously: Towards a New Juvenile Court' (1989) 68 Nebraska Law Review 
146, 160. 
95 Cynthia Price Cohen, 'An American Perspective' in Bob Franklin ( ed.), The Handbook of Children's Rights -
Comparative Policy and Practice (London: Routledge, 1995), 168-169. Price Cohen also comments that the 
granting of full 'adult rights' to young offenders may also have had the undesirable side effect of moving some 
youth offender cases for hearings in adult court. 
96 In re Winship [1970] 397 US 358. 
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amendments in the decades following the 1925 Child Welfare Act that may be categorised as 
reactions to the lack of legal safeguards in the legislation. The 1948 Child Welfare 
Amendment Act abolished the non-specific complaints system contained in the 1925 Child 
Welfare Act.97 From then on a charge had to be proven before the Children's Court before any 
action could result. The Child Welfare Amendment Act 1960 conferred a right of appeal 
against decisions of the Children's Court, which had not previously existed.98 These 
amendments are some evidence of progressive attempts to ensure that some elements of due 
process existed, at least in theory. 
VI. THE PATH TOY OUTH JUSTICE REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND 
A. Introduction 
Terms such as 'world renowned' 99 and 'new paradigm' 100 are frequently used in connection 
with the current New Zealand youth justice system. The reform process which resulted in this 
legislation, and the problems which drove this reform, will now be discussed. Especially 
important for the purposes of this research is any concerns expressed about the rights of 
children and young people under the previous legislation, and during the reform process. 101 
B. The Children and Young Persons Act 1974 
The terms welfare or justice models are 'shorthand' methods of describing these two foremost 
approaches to offending by children and young people in modem criminology. 102 The welfare 
and justice categorisations remain a 'conceptual tool' 103 for academic study. While the 
97 s 16(1), Child Welfare Amendment Act 1948. 
98 s 2, Child Welfare Amendment Act 1960. See further John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New 
Zealand: the System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1976), 40 for discussion on the 
Supreme Court ruling that no such right existed under the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. 
99 Judge Andrew Becraft, 'Youth Justice Family Group Conferences: A Quick "Nip and Tuck" or Transplant 
Surgery - What would the Doctor Order in 2006' Paper presented at the International Conference on the Family 
Group Conference -Coming Home, Te Hokinga Mai, Wellington, New Zealand 27-29 November 2006. 
100 Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, 'Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: A New Paradigm' (1993) 26 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 81. 
101 See also Chapter 13(1II) for more detailed discussion on the evolution of the legislative and policy principles 
underpinning youth justice outcomes. 
102 Christine Alder and Joy Wundersitz, 'New Directions in Juvenile Justice Reform in Australia' in Christine 
Alder and Joy Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced 
Optimism? (Canberra: Australian Studies in Law, Crime and Justice, 1994). 
103 Christine Alder and Joy Wundersitz, 'New Directions in Juvenile Justice Reform in Australia' in Christine 
Alder and Joy Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced 





classifications are 'somewhat crude and oversimplified', 104 they have a practical use in 
demonstrating the policy changes that took place. The welfare approach to youth justice is the 
defining characteristic of twentieth century youth justice statutes in New Zealand. Conversely, 
the recognised characteristics of a justice approach are due process, formalism, reliance on the 
adversarial process and an emphasis on legal procedure. 105 
Morris and Young stress that it is impossible to file the Children and Young Persons Act 197 4 
neatly into either the welfare or the justice category, but the legislation appears broadly 
welfarist in its intent. The single jurisdiction over care and protection and criminal matters 
remained. The system had a rehabilitative focus. In addition, section 4 of the 197 4 Act 
provided that: 
any Court which or person who exercises in respect of any child or young person any powers conferred 
by this Act shall treat the interests of the child or young person as the first and paramount 
consideration ... 
There were also elements of a justice approach. For example, there was prov1s10n for 
children and young people to be legally represented and a requirement that the criminal 
standard of proof be met. 106 Despite these efforts to introduce safeguards for the rights of 
young people, the welfare approach persisted. The new Children and Young Person's Court 
had jurisdiction over children and young people who came to the notice of the authorities, but 
little distinction was drawn between those who were offending and those who were in need of 
care and protection. The courts were to take a broader approach that children and young 
people who were offending were in need of guidance and rehabilitation.107 
C. Key Stages in the Reform Process 
Within ten years of the enactment of the Children and Young Persons 1974, plans for reform 
of the law relating to children and young people had already begun. Key stages in the reform 
process were: 
104 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 3. 
105 Jane Pickford, 'A New Youth Justice for a New Century?' in Jane Pickford (ed.), Youth Justice: Theory and 
Practice (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000). 
106Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
107 Sir Christopher Parr, Minister of Education NZPD, Vol. 206, 1925, 585 (quoted in John Seymour, Dealing 
With Young Offenders in New Zealand - The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1976), 
31). 
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• 1984: A Working Party was convened by Minister Ann Hercus within the 
Department of Social Welfare, 108 
• 1986: The Children and Young Persons Bill was tabled in Parliament, 
• 1987: The second Department of Social Welfare Working Party was formed, 109 
• 1989: The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Bill was tabled m 
Parliament, 
• May 1989: The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act came into force. 
The reform process was a lengthy one. Extensive public consultation was carried out, 
especially with Maori and Pacific peoples. 110 The care and protection provisions of the 
legislation were the most contentious, especially in relation to mandatory reporting of child 
abuse. 111 
D. Key Factors Driving Reform 
There were a number of factors driving reform of the law relating to children and young 
people. Some (social and political factors such as neo-liberalism and Maori nationalism112) 
were unique to New Zealand. Other factors, (lack of due process rights for young people), 
were a result of the perceived failure of welfare based youth justice and were mirrored in 
other jurisdictions.113 The social context of the legislative reforms has been extensively 
addressed elsewhere,114 but it is useful for the purposes of this research to outline the problems 
with the previous system in order to compare the present legislation.115 
108 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 
109 Department of Social Welfare, Review of the Children and Young Persons Bill: Report of the Working Party 
on the Children and Young Persons Bill (Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1987). 
110 See e.g. submissions SS/89/303 - SS/89/325, Papers received at the National Hui held at Ruatoki on 7/8 
April 1988, SS/89/287 - SS/89/292, Papers received at Auckland Pacific Island Consultation on 19/20 April 
1988. 
111 Mike Doolan, 'The Youth Justice- Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The 
Youth Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993) 
112 See further Gabrielle M Maxwell, Ian B Hassall and Jeremy P Robertson (eds.), Toward a Child and Family 
Policy for New Zealand (Wellington: Office of the Commissioner for Children, 1990). 
113 ~ee further Nicholas M Bala et al (ed.) Juvenile Justice Systems: An International Comparison of Problems 
and Solutions (Toronto, Thompson Educational Systems, 2002). 
114 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), Mike Doolan, 'The 
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1. The mono-cultural nature of the youth justice system 
There were concerns about the mono-cultural nature of the youth justice system ( and indeed 
the criminal justice system in general).116 Similar concerns about the appropriateness of the 
youth justice system for Indigenous young people were being expressed in other jurisdictions 
with similar colonial backgrounds like Australia117 and Canada. 118 The youth justice system 
(like the care and protection process) was run mainly by professionals and decision makers 
who were generally white and well educated, 119 while there was an over-representation of 
Maori young people in both care and protection and youth justice proceedings. 120 There were 
concerns regarding the treatment of young offenders in residential placements (Maori and 
non-Maori), with allegations of harsh treatment and racism emerging. 121 The 1988 Puao-te-
ata-tu (Daybreak) Report, for example, found evidence of institutional racism within the 
Department of Social Welfare. 122 There were calls for recognition of the importance of the 
family structure to Maori, as well as recognition that the paramountcy of the young person's 
Youth Justice- Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The Youth Court in New 
Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993). 
115 See also Chapter 13(III). 
116 Moana Jackson, The Maori and the Criminal Justice System - A New Perspective, He Whaipaanga Hou 
(Wellington: Department of Justice, 1988). 
117 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission and Australian Law Reform Commission, Seen and 
Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process. Report No. 84 (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commission, 1997), Harry Blagg, 'A Just Measure of Shame? Aboriginal Youth and 
Conferencing in Australia' (1997) 37 British Journal of Criminology 481, Joy Wundersitz, 'Aboriginal Youth 
and the South Australian Juvenile Justice System: Has Anything Changed?' Paper presented at the Australian 
Institute of Criminology Conference: Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice: Toward 2000 and Beyond, Adelaide, 
Australia, 1997. 
118 Kathryn Campbell (ed.), Understanding Youth Justice in Canada (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada, 
2005), Antony N Doob and Jane B Sprott, 'Youth Justice in Canada' (2004) 31 Crime & Justice 185. 
119 Mike Doolan, 'Youth Justice Reform in New Zealand' in Julia Vernon and Sandra McKillop (eds.), 
Preventing Juvenile Crime (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991), 123. 
120 Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, Puao-te-ata-tu 
- The Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social 
Welfare (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1988). 
121 Ian Hassall, 'Origin and Development of Family Group Conferences' in Joe Hudson, Allison Morris, 
Gabrielle Maxwell and Burt Galaway (eds.), Family Group Conferences: Perspectives on Policy and Practice 
(New South Wales: The Federation Press/Criminal Justice Press, 1996), 22. 
122 Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare Puao-te-ata-tu 
- The Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social 
Welfare (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1988). 
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interests may not be culturally appropriate for Maori. 123 Public criticism of the 1986 Children 
and Young Persons Bill centred on the mono-cultural approach of the care and protection 
provisions, and the failure to minimise official intervention into the lives of young people and 
their families as had been promised. 124 
Families (Maori and non-Maori) were generally disempowered from decision making around 
their children and young people.125 Policy imperatives such as a desire to provide a culturally 
appropriate forum for Maori young people who were offending and the desire to empower 
families in decision making were key factors in the development of the FGC model. Also 
relevant were the neo-liberal policy imperatives of reducing state spending and delegating to 
non-state bodies.126 
2. Decline of welfare based youth justice 
There was evidence of a loss of confidence by professionals in the goals of welfare based 
youth justice, especially diversion from formal criminal prosecution and rehabilitation. It was 
apparent that the police had little confidence in the diversionary mechanisms established by 
the Children and Young Persons Act 1974, as they were found to be bypassing diversion and 
using arrest to ensure prosecutions in cases where they felt it was necessary. 127 An avowed aim 
of the pre-1989 youth justice system was to lessen the number of young people appearing 
before the criminal courts. However, as the 1984 Review of the Children and Young Persons 
Act reported, the proportion of young people apprehended who later ended up appearing 
before the Children and Young Persons Court had actually increased. 128 Costly rehabilitative 
123 Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, Puao-te-ata-tu 
- The Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social 
Welfare (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1988). 
124 Mike Doolan, 'Youth Justice Reform in New Zealand' in Julia Vernon and Sandra McKillop (eds.). 
Preventing Juvenile Crime (Canberra, Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991), 123. 
125 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 
126 See generally Bronwyn Dalley and Margaret Tennant, Past Judgement: Social Policy in New Zealand History 
(Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2004). 
127 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1987). 
128 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 37. 
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programs had limited success rates and this created pessimism about the goal of treatment. 129 
As a result there was a perception amongst both youth justice professionals and the wider 
public that the system was failing to hold young offenders properly accountable for their 
offending. 130 
3. The rights of young people 
Thirdly, and most importantly for the purposes of this research, the welfarist philosophy of 
the Children and Young Persons Act 197 4 saw little need for legal safeguards as it was 
assumed professionals would have the young person's best interests at heart. Under the 
welfare-focused approach due process rights were seen as an impediment to measures taken in 
the best interests of the young person. 131 The informality and secrecy, combined with a lack of 
records, led to unease that there was little accountability for the actions of professionals. 132 In 
regard to diversionary schemes under the 1974 Act, it was clear that alternatives to court 
could themselves pose significant problems for young people, since they were left exposed to 
the full weight of the coerciveness of the youth justice system without the benefit of 
independent advice or proper legal representation. 133 
As for the practice of the Children and Young Person's Court, legal assistance was reported as 
being of poor quality and inappropriate for young people in many cases. 134 Inexperienced 
criminal counsel were found to be using the Children and Young Persons Court as a training 
ground. 135 Moreover, an evaluation of the system by Morris and Young found that the 
Children and Young Persons Court was failing to fulfil its duty to use simple and 
129 Lode Walgrave, 'Towards restoration as the mainstream in youth justice' in Elizabeth Elliot and Robert M 
Gordon (eds.), New Directions in Restorative Justice: Issues, Practice, Evaluation (Devon/ Oregon: Willan 
Publishing, 2005), 6. 
130 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 
131 Wanda Mohr, Richard J Gelles and Ira M Schwartz, 'Shackled in the Land of Liberty: No Rights for 
Children' (1999) 564 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 37, 39. 
132 John Muncie and Barry Goldson, 'England and Wales: The New Correctionalism' in John Muncie and Barry 
Goldson (eds.) Comparative Youth Justice (London, Sage Publications, 2006). 
133 Kenneth Polk, 'Family Conferencing: Theoretical and Evaluative Concerns' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994). 
134 Terrence Loomis, An Evaluation of the Children's Advocate Scheme Pilot in the Auckland Children and 
Young Persons Court (Auckland: The Social Research and Development Trust, 1985). 
135 Terrence Loomis, An Evaluation of the Children's Advocate Scheme Pilot in the Auckland Children and 
Young Persons Court (Auckland: The Social Research and Development Trust, 1985). 
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comprehensible terms to explain procedure to the young person. Young people frequently did 
not understand what had happened during the hearing of their case and felt excluded from 
proceedings, 136 while families found the formality of the process alienating. 137 
Moving to youth justice outcomes, at one end of the scale, there was not enough of a range of 
sanctions available for young people who committed minor offences. 138 On the other end, due 
to the fact that there was generally less of a focus on the offence that the young person had 
committed and more consideration of the general situation of the young person, 
disproportionate sanctions such as the indeterminate guardianship order were overused. The 
1984 Working Party stressed that 'an offence by a young person should not be used ... to 
justify the taking of extended powers over the young person's life for the purposes of 
rehabilitation' .139 The child or young person was worse off than an adult suspect or defendant 
in the same position. Accordingly, the 1984 Working Party recommended that children and 
young people 'should receive the same due process protections as adults, should be dealt with 
predictably and should receive a disposition similar to that imposed on other juveniles 
committing the same offence' .140 
VII. THE PRESENT LEGISLATION 
A. Introduction 
The result of the drawn-out reform process was the Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989.141 The CYPF Act was enacted on 1 May 1989. It is a wide-ranging and 
lengthy piece of legislation which deals both with children and young people in need of care 
and protection and those who are offending. This section will analyse the theoretical 
principles underpinning the current legislation. The operation of the legislation and the place 
136 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington, 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 104-106. 
137 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington, 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 100. 
138 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington, 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons 
Legislation - Public Discussion Paper (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 
139 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 35. 
140 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 35. 
141 As noted in Chapter 1, this is abbreviated to CYPF Act in the text. 
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,....--, 
of the youth justice FGC within its structure is discussed in a separate chapter, 142 as is practice 
and procedure at the FGC. 143 
B. The Principles Underpinning Youth Justice 
The CYPF Act gives a legislative base to a 'comprehensive set of general principles', 144 which 
are to guide generally the exercise of powers in relation to young people (section 4) and more 
particularly the operation of the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act (section 208). The 
CYPF Act was unique at the time in codifying the principles on which the youth justice 
system is to be based, although statements of principles now appear in the youth justice 
legislation of other jurisdictions.145 In addition, statements of principles are now increasingly 
common in other types of New Zealand legislation. 146 In section 208, the CYPF Act provides a 
distinct set of principles or 'signposts' to guide youth justice.147 
1. Content of the guiding principles 
The specific principles guiding youth justice provide that: 
• Criminal proceedings should not be commenced with the sole purpose of 
providing welfare assistance to the child or young person or their family, 148 
• Any sanctions imposed on children or young people should seek to promote their 
development within their families and take the least restrictive form appropriate in 
the circumstances, 149 
• Any measures for dealing with offending should seek to strengthen the family and 
to foster the ability of families to deal with off ending by their children and young 
people,150 
142 Chapter 5. 
143 Chapter 6. 
144 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice- Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 7. 
145 See for example s 96 of the Children Act 2001 (Ireland), s 3 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002 
(Canada), s 3 of the Young Offenders Act 1993 (South Australia), ands 3 of the Young Offenders Act 1997 
(New South Wales). 
146 See for example s 7 of the Sentencing Act 2002. 
147 Mike Doolan, 'The New Youth Justice-Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The 
Youth Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 25. 
148 s 208(b), CYPF Act. See Chapter 13(V)(C). 
149 s 208(f)(i) and (ii), CYPF Act. See Chapter 13(V). 
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• Children and young people should be diverted from the formal criminal justice 
system unless it is in the public interest not to, 151 
• Measures imposed should have due regard to the interests of victims of offences, 152 
• Age is to be a mitigating factor in deciding whether sanctions should be imposed 
and what those sanctions should be,153 
• Unless public safety is at issue, children and young people who commit offences 
should be kept in the community,154 
• The vulnerability of children and young people entitles them to special protection 
during the investigation of offences.155 
Relevant also are the General objects, principles, and duties which deal with all sections of 
the CYPF Act, both youth justice and care and protection. Section 4(±) of the CYPF Act states 
that one of the objects of the legislation is to ensure that where young people commit offences 
that they are 'held accountable, and encouraged to accept responsibility, for their behaviour' 
and also that they are dealt with in a manner that acknowledges their needs and gives them an 
opportunity to develop in 'responsible, beneficial, and socially acceptable ways'. Section 5 
provides additional guiding principles for the exercise of powers under the CYPF Act 
including emphasising the value of family participation and support for any decisions made, 156 
due consideration to the wishes of the young person, 157 and the importance of implementing 
decisions within a time frame appropriate to the young person's sense of time. 158 
150 s 208(c)(i) and (ii), CYPF Act. See Chapter 7(IV). 
151 s 208(a), CYPF Act. See Chapter S(II) on the operation of the youth justice system. 
152 s 208(g), CYPF Act. See Chapter 13(IV). 
153 s 208(e)(i) and (ii), CYPF Act. 
154 s 208(d), CYPF Act. 
155 s 208(h), CYPF Act. Nessa Lynch, 'Young Suspects' (2008) New Zealand Law Journal 357. 
156 s S(a) and (e), CYPF Act. See Chapter 7(IV). 
157 s S(d), CYPF Act. 
158 s S(f), CYPF Act. 
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2. The value of guiding principles159 
In relation to the actual worth of setting out guiding principles for legislation, one submission 
during the consultative process for the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Bill was 
' ... sceptical as to the value of enshrining objects and principles in legislation. As there is no 
means of interpreting or applying these principles to individuals cases they are in danger of 
becoming window dressing' .160 In practice, however, the guiding principles routinely form the 
basis of decisions in the Youth Court.161 In Police v H (a young person), 162 it was stated that 
there is no doubt but that exercise of powers are to be guided by sections 5 and 208. In 
addition, the guiding principles formed one of the principal benchmarks for the two major 
evaluations of the New Zealand youth justice system. 163 
The CYPF Act states that FGC participants must have regard to the guiding principles when 
making decisions. 164 However, even a perfunctory consideration of these guiding principles 
reveals apparently contradictory objectives. For example, can young people be held 
accountable and their needs addressed at the same time? Can the interests and needs of the 
victim of the offence be accommodated at the same time as imposing the least restrictive 
sanction that must also promote the wellbeing of the young person? A 1987 Department of 
Social Welfare Report acknowledged the task which the legislation faced in reconciling 
'frequently incompatible' views, including whether the justice or the welfare model should 
prevail in relation to responses to youth offending and state intervention versus family 
autonomy. 165 Is a justice type approach irreconcilable with addressing the needs of the 
offender? It is a relatively simple matter to separate offending and care and protection. But it 
is more difficult to reconcile the contradictory expectation that the FGC plan is to hold the 
159 The collective term 'guiding principles' is used in the text to refer to the provisions of s 208, CYPF Act as 
well as s 4 and 5, CYPF Act. 
160 Youth Law Project, Submission on Working Party Report on Children and Young Persons Bill 18/02/1988, 
SS/89/270. 
161 Police v P [2006] DCR 120, Police v D [2002] DCR 897, R v T [1996] FRNZ 705, R v Irwin (1991) 9 FRNZ 
487 (HC). 
162 [2004] DCR 97. 
163 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture- Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1993), Gabrielle Maxwell et al Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth 
Justice Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004). 
164 s 260(2), CYPF Act. 
165 Department of Social Welfare, Review of the Children and Young Persons Bill: Report of the Working Party 
on the Children and Young Persons Bill (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1987), 6. 
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young person accountable and address needs. 166 It must be noted here that conflicting 
objectives are inevitably present in youth justice systems. In particular, tensions will always 
exist between the need to safeguard the future wellbeing of the young person and the public 
interest in holding young people accountable for crimes.167 The relationship between the rights 
of the young person and these other considerations will be explored throughout this thesis. 
C. Key Features of Youth Justice under the CYPF Act 
Earlier in this chapter, the historical context for this research was set by discussing the 
evolution of youth justice legislation and policy in New Zealand and comparable 
jurisdictions. The terms 'welfare' and 'justice' are used as rough categorisations for the two 
foremost models of youth justice. As discussed, each model of youth justice has been attacked 
on the grounds that the rights of young people are not properly safeguarded. The positioning 
of the CYPF Act within the welfare to justice spectrum generally will now be considered. 
These underlying policy consideration and the implications for the rights of the young person 
are considered in more detail in the chapter dealing with FGC outcomes. 168 
l. Welfare or justice? 
While the Children and Young Persons Act 197 4 dealt with care and protection and offending 
cases in a similar welfare based manner,169 the CYPF Act makes a strict delineation between 
children and young people in need of care and protection110 and those who are offending. 
166 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1993), 179. 
167 Malcolm Hill, Andrew Lockyer and Fred Stone, Youth Justice and Child Protection (London/Philadelphia: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2006). 
168 See Chapter 13, especially V. 
169 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1987). 
170 s 14 of the CYPF Act defines a child or young person who is in need of care and protection as 
'(a) The child or young person is being, or is likely to be, harmed (whether physically or emotionally or 
sexually), ill-treated, abused, or seriously deprived; or 
(b) The child's or young person's development or physical or mental or emotional wellbeing is being, or 
is likely to be, impaired or neglected, and that impairment or neglect is, or is likely to be, serious and 
avoidable; or 
(c) Serious differences exist between the child or young person and the parents or guardians or other 
persons having the care of the child or young person to such an extent that the physical or mental or 
emotional wellbeing of the child or young person is being seriously impaired; or 
( d) The child or young person has behaved, or is behaving, in a manner that-
(i) Is, or is likely to be, harmful to the physical or mental or emotional wellbeing of the child or young 
person or to others; and 
(ii) The child's or young person's parents or guardians, or the persons having the care of the child or 
young person, are unable or unwilling to control; or 
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Section 208(b) of the CYPF Act sets out the principle that criminal proceedings should not be 
instituted with the sole purpose of advancing the welfare of the child or young person or their 
family. Section 284 prevents the Youth Court from ordering supervision, community work, 
supervision with residence, supervision with activity or transfer to the District Court for 
sentencing on the sole grounds that the young person is in need of care and protection. The 
Youth Court is entirely separate from the Family Court and so care and protection 
proceedings are differentiated from criminal proceedings. Care and protection issues are not 
to be pursued in the youth justice forum. 171 As Maxwell and Morris argue' ... the New Zealand 
system attempts to move some way towards a justice approach without abandoning the desire 
to achieve positive outcomes for young people who offend' .172 
Section 4 (f) of the CYPF Act sets out principles for dealing with children and young people 
who commit offences. The first clause states that such children or young people must be held 
accountable and encouraged to accept responsibility. The second clause states that their needs 
must be acknowledged so that they can be encouraged to develop in 'responsible, beneficial, 
and socially acceptable ways'. Principal Youth Court Judge Becroft refers to these twin 
objectives as addressing the need and the deed. 173 This approach of addressing both the need 
and the deed was a novel concept in youth justice. Previous responses to offending by young 
( e) In the case of a child of or over the age of 10 years and under 14 years, the child has committed an 
offence or offences the number, nature, or magnitude of which is such as to give serious concern for the 
wellbeing of the child; or 
(f) The parents or guardians or other persons having the care of the child or young person are unwilling 
or unable to care for the child or young person; or 
(g) The parents or guardians or other persons having the care of the child or young person have 
abandoned the child or young person; or 
(h) Se1ious differences exist between a parent, guardian, or other person having the care of the child or 
young person and any other parent, guardian, or other person having the care of the child or young 
person to such an extent that the physical or mental or emotional wellbeing of the child or young person 
is being seriously impaired; or 
(i) The ability of the child or young person to form a significant psychological attachment to the person 
or persons having the care of the child or young person is being, or is likely to be, seriously impaired 
because of the number of occasions on which the child or young person has been in the care or charge 
of a person (not being a person specified in subsection (2) of this section) for the purposes of 
maintaining the child or young person apart from the child's or young person's parents or guardians' 
171 s 208(b), CYPF Act. 
172 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1993), 2. 
173 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Justice - The New Zealand Experience Past Lessons 
and Future Challenges'. Paper presented at Australian Institute of Criminology/ NSW Department of Juvenile 
Justice Conference: Juvenile Justice: From Lessons of the Past to a Road for the Future, Sydney, 1-2 December 
2003, 10. 
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people tended (as in most common law jurisdictions) to concentrate on either the need or the 
deed. 174 
2. Diversion and decarceration 
The principle of diversion underpins the CYPF Act. The term 'diversion' has multiple 
meanings in youth justice. 175 Diversion can mean that no action is taken against the child or 
young person at all, e.g. when an immediate street warning is given by a police officer in 
respect of a incidence of offending. Diversion can mean avoiding formal criminal justice 
interventions like arrest and court appearances in favour of more informal processes like the 
FGC. Diversion can mean avoiding the use of custodial sanctions in favour of a community-
based alternative. Doolan summarises the principle of diversion as the avoidance of formal 
interventions and if such formal interventions cannot be avoided, the minimisation of harmful 
impact.176 Maxwell and Morris have defined diversion and decarceration in the New Zealand 
context as meaning 'practice with respect to limiting the appearance of young people in court 
and restricting the use of residential or penal establishments for young people' .177 
The benefits of diversionary practice have been recognised in New Zealand and overseas for a 
considerable period of time. 178 Diversion of children and young people away from court 
appearances reduces the negative effects of involvement in formal justice processes. 179 
Principal among these negative effects is the effect of stigmatising the child or young person 
by labelling him or her as a criminal.180 Diversion of children and young people from custodial 
sanctions reflects research that suggests that such sanctions do not prevent recidivism.181 
174 See further Chapter 13(V)(C). 
175 Allison Morris and Henry Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice (Kent: Croom Helm Ltd, 1987), 137. 
176 Mike Doolan, 'The Youth Justice-Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea, The Youth 
Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 25. 
177 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency, 1993), 173. 
178 John A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976). 
179 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 62. 
180 Allison Morris and Henry Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987), 138. See 
Chapter 10, V. 
181 DA Andrews, Ivan Zinger, Robert D Hodge, James Bonta, Paul Gendreau, and Francis T Cullen, 'Does 
Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis' (1990) 28 
Criminology 369 
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Custodial sanctions may carry the risk of actually increasing recidivism due to association 
with other young offenders.182 Doolan states that such 'costly therapeutic programmes that 
congregated young off enders, particularly in residential settings, emerged as part of the 
problem' .183 In other jurisdictions, residential institutions for young offenders have been 
described as 'schools for crime that corrupted the innocent and confirmed the redeemable in 
the path of chronic criminality' .184 There is also a pecuniary benefit in reducing the use of 
expensive court processes and residential institutions in favour of cheaper community based 
altematives.185 Diversion has been shown to be a cost effective method of dealing with 
offending by children and young people when compared to the formal court system. 186 
It is evident that New Zealand has been successful in establishing a comprehensive statutory 
diversion scheme where the majority of children and young people coming to notice of the 
police will be dealt with without recourse to prosecution. 187 Even when a young person is 
prosecuted in the Youth Court, there is a strong legislative presumption against the use of 
formal orders or custodial sentences. 188 Practice at the Youth Court is indicative of 
decarceration with custodial sentences having dropped sharply in the years following the 
introduction of the CYPF Act. 189 
182 John Braithwaite, 'What is to be done about Criminal Justice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The 
Youth Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 
33. 
183 Mike Doolan, 'The Youth Justice-Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The 
Youth Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 20. 
184 Franklin E Zimrig, 'The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice' (2000) 88 California Law Review 
2477, 2481. 
185 Allison Morris and Henry Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987), 139. 
186 Steven Patrick and Robert Marsh, 'Juvenile Diversion - Results of a Three Year Experimental Study' (2005) 
16 Criminal Justice Policy Review 59. 
187 In 2006, 29% of cases coming to notice are dealt with through prosecution, and about one third of these 
prosecutions will result in as 282 discharge (as if the charge was never laid). Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics 
in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). These figures are the latest available as 
of October 2008. The 2007 figures have been delayed and are not expected until early 2009 (Personal 
communication from the Ministry of Justice, November 2008). 
188 s 290 and s 208(d), CYPF Act. 
189 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
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3. Restorative justice 
Due to the potential for involvement by the victim, potentially leading to reconciliation and 
repair of harm between the victim and the offender, the youth justice system in New Zealand 
is held out as an example of restorative justice in practice.190 A succinct definition of 
restorative justice is that provided by the United Nations, which describes restorative justice 
as: 
any process in which the victim and the offender, and, where appropriate, any other individuals or 
community members affected by a crime, participate together actively in the resolution of matters 
arising from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator. Restorative processes may include 
mediation, conciliation, conferencing and sentencing circles.191 
Restorative justice and its implication for the rights of the young person 1s discussed m 
greater detail in later chapters.192 
4. Family decision making 
As noted, the reform process leading up to the CYPF Act had identified the empowerment of 
families as a key policy imperative. Section 4 sets out the object of the 1989 Act as the 
promotion of the wellbeing of children, young people and their families. Any measures 
imposed in respect of offending should seek to strengthen the family group193 and 'foster the 
ability' of family groups to devise their own means of dealing with offending by their 
children and young people.194 Any sanctions imposed should 'take the form most likely to 
maintain and promote the development of the child or young person within his her family' .195 
In contrast to previous models of youth justice which were likely to intervene and take over 
the role of the family when the child or young person was engaged in the commission of 
criminal offences ( e.g. through placement in residential institutions or the use of the 
indeterminate guardianship order), the New Zealand system now seeks to give increased 
19° FWM McE!rea, 'Restorative Justice: The New Zealand Youth Court: A Model for Development in Other 
Courts' (1994) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 33, Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, 'Restorative 
Justice in New Zealand: Family Group Conferences as a Case Study' (1998) 1 Western Criminology Review 1, 
available online at http://wcr.sonoma.edu/vlnl/morris.html (last viewed 13 April 2008), Gabrielle Maxwell and 
Allison Morris 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: Restorative Justice in Practice' (2006) 62 Journal of Social 
Issues 239. 
191 Economic and Social Council, Basic principles on the use of restorative justice programmes in criminal 
matters (2002) E/2002/INF/2/Add.2. 
192 See Chapter 7(11) and 13(IV). 
193 s 208(c)(i), CYPF Act. 
194 s 208(c)(ii), CYPF Act. 
195 s 208(f)(i), CYPF Act. 
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responsibility to families for dealing with offending by their children and young people. 196 
This idea of a partnership between families and state agencies in dealing with offending by 
children and young people is a 'novel' one. 197 Maxwell et al state that 'The intention of the 
legislation is to enable families to influence outcomes', 198 and the integral part that the FGC 
plays in the youth justice system results in a transfer of state power to the family and wider 
community. In the FGC process, the ( extended) family can have direct input and take 
responsibility for formulating a plan to deal with offending by their children and young 
people. 199 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set the context for this research by considering the historical context of rights 
in youth justice and discussing the evolution of youth justice policy in New Zealand. It is 
apparent that welfare based youth justice was the dominant theme in New Zealand legislation 
for most of the twentieth century. Rights issues such as lack of checks on discretion, and lack 
of restrictions on youth justice outcomes were identified in the reform process leading up to 
the CYPF Act. The availability and quality of legal assistance for young people in the 
Children and Young Person's Court was also criticised. It is useful to identify these issues in 
order to compare the operation of the current system. 
The CYPF Act 1989 was innovative and unique at the time of enactment, e.g. in providing for 
statutory diversion and the involvement of family members in the decision making process. 
Having set the historical and policy context for this research, the next two chapters will 
establish the rights framework which will be used to evaluate the youth justice FGC. 
196 s 208(c)(ii), CYPF Act. 
197 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 11. 
198 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 21. 
199 See Chapter 7(IV). 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
RIGHTS 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical foundation of children and young people's rights 1s a wide rangmg and 
frequently contentious subject, which could occupy a doctoral thesis (or several) easily.200 
However, the rights of young people who are over the age of criminal responsibility in the 
youth justice sphere2°1 are generally less contentious than those of younger children. As will 
be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, it is generally accepted in New Zealand that 
children and young people over the age of criminal responsibility have the same due process 
rights as adults in similar situations, when being questioned by the police, prosecuted or 
sentenced in the court system.202 The issue of application of rights arises more when the matter 
is disposed of outside the formal judicial system, e.g. through the youth justice FGC. The 
application of existing rights standards to the different model of the youth justice FGC, rather 
than the theoretical foundations of the rights of children and young people ab initio, is the key 
theoretical issue to be addressed by this research. Chapter 7 discusses these issues in detail. 
Nonetheless, in any analysis pertaining to rights, it is necessary to have some discussion on 
the general theoretical context of rights, thus this chapter will consider the application of 
prevailing theories of rights to the child or young person. The key purpose is to provide a 
theoretical frame of reference for the discussion of the sources of rights for children and 
young people in the youth justice system,2°3 and specific issues addressed in the substantive 
chapters. 204 
20° For an overview see e.g. Philip Alston, John A Seymour and Stephen Parker (eds.), Children, Rights and the 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), Julia Fionda (ed.), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001), Bob Franklin (ed.), The Handbook of Children's Rights - Comparative Policy and Practice 
(London: Routledge, 1995), MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds.}, The Ideologies of Children's Rights 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992). 
201 Those participating in the youth justice FGCs under discussion range from fourteen to seventeen years of age. 
See Chapter 6(11). 
202 Nessa Lynch, 'Young Suspects' (2008) New Zealand Law Journal 357. 
203 Chapters 4 and 7. 
204 See e.g. discussion of the 'best interests' model of legal representation for young people (Chapter 9(II) and 
III), individual rights in the context of the communitarian model of restorative justice (Chapter 7(11)) and 
individual rights in the context of the welfare model of youth justice (Chapter 13(IV)). 
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II. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RIGHTS 
A. Introduction 
The existence of individual rights is the cornerstone of liberal political theory.205 In any 
discussion about rights, it is first essential to consider what it means to possess a 'right'. There 
are two competing theories on the subject of what it means for an individual to have a right,206 
and both have been applied to the debate surrounding children and young people's rights. One 
of these theories is commonly referred to as the will or choice theory,207 the other as the 
welfare or interest theory.208 
B. Application of the Will Theory 
The will theory holds that an individual must be competent to make choices in order to 
possess rights. The will theory views rights as the protected exercise of choice, or, in other 
words. the power to enforce or waive the duty that the right in question entails. So, if the right 
in question accords me the right to have the free services of a lawyer, the will theory sees this 
right as the power to enforce the duty of someone to provide me with these services. 
Consequently, only those capable of claiming or waiving a right can be bearers of such a 
right. Effectively, the will theory views rights as normative powers to determine the duties of 
others.209 The will theory establishes competence as a prerequisite for autonomy, and 
consequently for entry to the category of rights holders. It is often argued that 'the constantly-
recurring fundamental argument for denying children and young people autonomy and rights 
is their alleged incompetence in making informed decisions' .210 Some argue that the relatively 
slow development of children and young people's mental capacity renders the majority of 
children and young people unfit to take complete responsibility for their own decisions until 
205 See generally Jeremy Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
206 Matthew H Kramer, NE Simmons and Hillel Steiner (eds.), A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
207 HLA Hart, 'Bentham on Legal Rights' in AWB Simpson (ed.), Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence, Second 
Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), see also Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 
208 Neil McCormick, 'Children's Rights: A Test Case for Theories of Right' in Neil McCormick, Legal Rights 
and Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), Joseph Raz, 'Legal Rights' (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1, 13. Raz states that 'a law creates a right ifit is based on and expresses the view that someone 
has an interest which is sufficient ground for holding another to be subject to a duty'. 
209 Ferdinand Schoeman, 'Childhood Competence and Autonomy' (1983) 12 Journal of Legal Studies 267. 
210 Eugeen Verhellen, 'Changes in the Image of the Child' in MDA Freeman, and Philip Veerman, (eds.), The 
Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 80. 
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they reach mid adolescence.211 This type of argument relies mainly on the work of the 
developmental psychologist Piaget. Piaget laid out clearly defined stages of cognitive 
development in children and young people. He believed that these stages 'are ordered 
temporally and arranged hierarchically along a continuum from infantile 'figurative' thought, 
which has a relatively low status, up to adult, 'operative' intelligence, which has a high 
status'.212 Aspects of Piaget's work has fallen out of favour in recent times as experts raise 
objections to the idea of a universal measure of child developmental stages.213 Even very 
young children are now considered to be capable of displaying decision making abilities, with 
one recent article even arguing that premature babies could be considered as agents.214 
Federle has discussed the shortcomings of rights theories in the context of children and young 
people's rights, 215 and reiterates the difficulty that the will theory has in accommodating the 
rights of children and young people, as some consider them to lack the capacity which is 
necessary to exercise or waive a choice.216 But what is competence in terms of exercising a 
right? Is it Gillick competency,217 i.e. that the child or young person in question had sufficient 
intelligence, maturity and understanding to weigh up the pros and cons of the decision?218 Is it 
criminal competency? To be deemed to be competent in a criminal sense is to be deemed 
capable of making a choice to do an act which is legally wrong. The age of criminal 
responsibility in New Zealand is ten years of age,219 however those aged less than fourteen 
cannot be prosecuted for criminal offences except manslaughter and murder, and only then 
when it can be proven that the child knew that what he or she did was wrong.220 This 
211 L Fox Harding, Perspectives in Child Care Policy (London: Longman, 1997), ch 5. 
212 Allison James, Chris Jenks, and Alan Prout, Theorizing Childhood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 18. 
213 Allison James, Chris Jenks, and Alan Prout, Theorizing Childhood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) ,18-19 
214 Priscilla Anderson, Joanna Hawthorne and Margaret Killen, 'The Participation Rights of Premature Babies' 
(2005) 13 International Journal of Children's Rights 31. 
215 Katherine Hunt Federle, 'Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of Children' (1995) 
68 Temple Law Review 1585. 
216 Katherine Hunt Federle, 'Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of Children' (1995) 
68 Temple Law Review 1585, 1590. 
217 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986) AC 112. 
218 See also Peter Parkinson, 'The Gillick Case - Just What Has It Decided?' ( 1986) 16 Family Law 11, John 
Eekelaar, 'The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: The Role of Dynamic Self-Determinism' (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and the Family 42. 
219 s 21, Crimes Act 1961. 
220 s 22(1 ), Crimes Act 1961. 
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presumption of doli incapax for children under fourteen was well established in the common 
law since the seventeenth century.221 Young people aged fourteen and over can be prosecuted 
for all types of offences, both in the youth justice system, and in the adult criminal justice 
system, and from the age of fifteen can be sentenced to an adult prison.222 Those who would 
deny that a child or young person in this situation should not have rights because the child or 
young person does not have the capacity to possess such rights are surely on shaky theoretical 
foundations. 
However, if the will theory is the preferred theory of rights for the child or young person in 
the youth justice system, this fails to take into account the immaturity of children and young 
people, which is the reason for having a separate youth justice system with reduced penalties 
for offending. The legal rights of children and young people in many jurisdictions remain as 
one writer puts it: 'a confusing accumulation of inconsistencies' .223 There are significant 
anomalies in the way the law views the child or young person accused or convicted of 
committing a criminal offence with how it views the child or young person in the family and 
wider society. The law views the child or young person as a vulnerable being deserving of 
protection and largely incompetent to make decisions until he or she comes in conflict with 
the criminal law.224 Then the child or young person appears to undergo a legal transformation 
into an individual capable of making rational and informed choices.225 This attitude is most 
prevalent in the United States where young people are increasingly treated as adults when 
being prosecuted and punished for off enc es, 226 but is not confined to that jurisdiction. This 
divergence in the law's view on children and young people raises some important questions. 
221 Stephen Bandalli, 'Children, Responsibility and the New Youth Justice' in Barry Goldson (ed.), The New 
Youth Justice (Dorset: Russell House, 2000). However the protections of doli incapax have now been reduced in 
England and Wales. See further Paul Cavadino, 'Goodbye Doli, Must We Leave You?' (1997) 9 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 156. 
222 For a detailed description of the operation of the youth justice system, see Chapter 5. 
223 Jacqueline Cuncannon, 'Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children' (1997) 
51 Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 273, 282. 
224 Kathryn Hollingsworth, 'Judicial Approaches to Children's Rights in Youth Crime' (2007) 19 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 42. 
225 Michelle India Bairds and Mina B Samuels, 'Youth, Family and the Law: Defining Rights and Establishing 
Recognition: Policy Review: Justice For Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in the United States' (1996) 5 
Journal of Law and Policy 177. 
226 Randall T Salekin, 'Juvenile Transfer to Adult Court: How Can Developmental and Child Psychology Inform 
Policy Decision Making' in Bette L Bottoms, Margaret Bull Kovera and Bradley D Mc Auliff, Children, Social 
Science, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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Is there a double standard for a child or young person accused or convicted of a criminal 
offence? Are children and young people considered 'most competent when they are most 
delinquent?' 227 In considering a child or young person to be capable of being considered 
criminally responsible, the law must view the child or young person to be a rational actor.228 
According to Cun cannon, there is a 'growing acceptance that adolescents possess sufficient 
competence and legal capacity to be held criminally responsible' .229 At present there would 
seem to be no consistency between the age at which children and young people are granted 
full adult rights and the age at which children and young people will be held criminally 
responsible for delinquent actions. 
Sociologists talk of the 'individualisation' of childhood; the 'rise of childhood agency' .230 The 
situation remains that this change affects different groups of young people differently, as 
Nasman has commented, 'children are identified, registered, evaluated and treated as 
individuals in some contexts as adult citizens but in others not' .231 There has also been debate 
as to whether the increased focus on autonomy rights for children and young people in other 
spheres such as family law and medical decision making might disadvantage the child or 
young person in the criminal law sphere. In a recent book, Guggenheim states his belief that 
the changing image of children and young people from vulnerable to competent and 
autonomous has worsened the lot of the young offender as society increasingly views such 
children and young people as sophisticated and culpable.232 Other commentators have 
expressed similar views, Dolgin argues that: 
only because children are no longer widely and clearly distinguished morally and psychologically from 
adults, have society and the law become willing to entertain proposals to hold some children fully 
227 Jacqueline Cuncannon, 'Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children' (1997) 
51 Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 273, 291. 
228 See further: Stephanie J Millet, 'The Age of Criminal Responsibility in an Era of Violence: Has Great Britain 
Set a New International Standard' (1995) 28 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 295 and Lisa Micucci, 
'Responsibility and the Young Person' (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 277. 
229 Jacqueline Cuncannon, 'Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children' (1997) 
51 Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 273, 276. 
230 Allison James, Chris Jenks and Alan Prout, Theorizing Childhood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 6. 
231 Elisabet Nasman, 'Individualisation and Institutionalisation of Childhood in Today's Europe' in Jens 
Qvortrup, Marjatta Bardy, Giovanni Sgritta and Helmut Wintersberger (eds.), Childhood Matters (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1994). 
232 Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong With Children's Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2005), ch 8, especially 258 -264. 
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responsible for their conduct.233 
There may be some truth to this statement. Children and young people in general are now 
perceived as more sophisticated and less innocent than in previous times, 234 though these 
changes in the perception of young people are probably not so much related to the recognition 
of young people's legal and autonomy rights, rather to changing societal attitudes. 
Unfortunately Guggenheim - in what Freeman has described as a utilitarian analysis235- uses 
this as part of the argument towards his conclusion that it would be better for society as a 
whole if young people did not have rights at all.236 
Young offenders are more commonly held to adult standards than their non-delinquent 
counterparts. It seems society is willing to hold children young people responsible for 
criminal acts before it is willing to confer rights on them. Is it that young offenders must take 
on the liabilities of both worlds ( childhood without its protections, adulthood without its 
freedoms and rights)? Minow has suggested that some recent developments in criminal justice 
would surprise and probably dismay the child liberationists from the l 960s/1970s.237 For 
example, young offenders (especially in the United States) are increasingly being treated as 
adults in terms of prosecution, sentencing and procedure.238 The US Supreme Court has gone 
as far as to deny that carrying out the death penalty on an offender who committed his crime 
as a minor, constituted a cruel and unusual punishment.239 As Fionda notes: 
In the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, children who commit 
crimes have been increasingly viewed, and therefore treated, as though they are fully competent, aware 
of the significance and repercussions of their actions and mature enough to accept responsibility for 
them in the form of a proportionate punishment. The notion of children as objects of concern, as lacking 
competence to think their actions through and as capable of outgrowing their troublesome and immature 
233 Janet L Dolgin, 'The Age of Autonomy: Legal Re-conceptualizations of Childhood' (1999) 18 Quinnipiac 
Law Review 421,440. 
234 Kay S Hymowitz, Ready or Not: What Happens When We Treat Children as Small Adults (New York: Free 
Press, 1999). 
235 MDA Freeman, 'Review Essay: What's Rights with Rights for Children' (2006) 2 International Journal of 
Law in Context 89. 
236 Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong With Children's Rights (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 
2005). 
237 Martha Minow, 'What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?' (1995) 80 Minnesota Law Review 267, 290-
230. 
238 Sanjeev Anand, 'Crafting Youth Sentences: The Roles of Rehabilitation, Proportionality, Restraint, 
Restorative Justice and Race under the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 943. 
239 Stanford v Kentucky 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
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behaviour has, to some extent been sidelined in the quest for a politically expedient and therefore highly 
retributive response to youth crime.240 
In summary, if the will theory holds that rights depend on the capacity to exercise rights, then 
the child or young person accused of a criminal offence - if he or she is deemed competent to 
commit a criminal offence - must be competent to exercise a right. However, the clear 
problem with saying that children and young people have the same rights as adults in the 
criminal justice system, is the corollary argument that children and young people should have 
the same responsibilities for offending. Children and young people obviously do not have the 
same maturity and attributes as adults. This is the basis for treating children and young people 
in a separate youth justice system. 
B. Application of the Interest Theory 
The interest theory would view a right as the protection of an interest of sufficient importance 
to impose on others certain duties in order to permit the right holder to enjoy that right. 
Taking again the example of a right to the free services of a lawyer, the interest theory would 
view this right as my possessing an interest in having free legal advice which is important 
enough for others to be under an enforceable duty to provide me with such services. If the 
interest theory prevails, children and young people have interests that can be protected by 
rights. According to the interest theory, while all humans have interests that need to be 
protected, some humans (children and young people, the disabled, and the unconscious) do 
not have the capacity to exercise choice. Prima facie, the interest theory would appear 
preferable for younger children because it allows the idea of children and young people's 
rights without reference to their power to obligate others, which must depend on competence 
to make choices. But can actions taken solely in the furtherance of a child or young person's 
interests properly acknowledge the moral worth of the child or young person?241 Some 
children or young people, especially younger children, may lack the fully developed cognitive 
abilities e.g. the appreciation of consequences, and it is correct to say that most children and 
young people are in need of protection due to their vulnerability and their lesser capacities. 
The foremost criticism of the interest theory is that the arguments presented for denying 
children and young people rights could just as easily be used to deny the same rights to 
240 Julia Fionda, 'Youth and Justice' in Julia Fionda (ed.), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001), 77. 
241 See Chapter 9(1II)(C). 
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sections of the adult community.242 Children and young people are not unique in lacking 
certain cognitive abilities. If competence, experience or understanding was the test, Freeman 
says, many adults could be denied rights.243 
I. Protection a basis for rights 
Some commentators follow what Rogers and Wrightsman would describe as the nurturance 
orientation.244 These believe that society must protect children and young people from harm, 
and decisions involving children and young people should be determined by their best 
interests. What is deemed desirable for children and young people is decided by authority 
figures such as parents, caregivers, social workers and the judiciary. The protectionist sees a 
duty to create rights for children and young people based on their lesser abilities and 
capacities which leave them weaker and more vulnerable than adults. The purpose of the 
rights is to protect the right-holder's interests.245 Although Federle concedes that 'rights for 
excluded groups evolve from paternalistic notions of the need to protect the weak and care for 
the ignorant to fuller accounts that recognise autonomy and competence, for this has been the 
experience of women and minorities', 246 it is plain that the legal status of children and young 
people is different from other oppressed groups seeking to have their rights recognised or 
vindicated. According to O'Neill, the fundamental difference between oppressed groups such 
as people of colour and women, and children and young people, is that children and young 
people's powerlessness is transitory.247 While her 'main remedy' for children and young 
people's powerlessness and dependency is for them to 'grow up' ,248 this is clearly an 
unsatisfactory remedy. 
242 MDA Freeman, 'Taking Children's Rights More Seriously' in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John 
Seymour (eds.), Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 64 -66. 
243 MDA Freeman, 'Limits of Children's Rights' in MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds.), The Ideologies of 
Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 35-36. 
244 CM Rogers and LS Wrightsman, 'Attitudes Towards Children's Rights: Nurturance or Self Determination?' 
(1978) 34 Journal of Socia!Issues 59. 
245 See Chapter 9(III)(C). 
246 Katherine Federle, 'Rights Flow Downhill' (1994) 2 !nternational Journal of Children's Rights 343, 344. 
247 Onora O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives' in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John Seymour 
(eds.), Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 24. 
248 Onora O'Neill, 'Children's Rights and Children's Lives' in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John Seymour 
(eds.), Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 38-40. 
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Significantly though, viewing children and young people's rights solely as interests that need 
to be protected inevitably results in paternalistic interventions which promote the child or 
young person's dependence and incapacity. On the merits of the 'protection of interests' 
theory in relation to children and young people, Federle suggests that this theory may promote 
the powerlessness of children and young people by propagating a 'caretaker ideology' .249 
Federle emphasises that the court's interpretation of what is in children and young people's 
interests has 'actively' disadvantaged children and young people. 250 This can be directly 
related to the unfair and indeterminate treatment which may occur when the justice system 
has the youth offender's 'best interests' as its avowed purpose. 251 Benevolent though the aim 
may be, actions taken by authority in the furtherance of the child or young person's interests 
have the potential to be indeterminate and unfair.252 
2. The 'caregiver' ideology 
Another strain of the protectionist ideology holds that children and young people's care-givers 
will adequately safeguard their needs and interests, and thus there is no need for children and 
young people to have rights. These would take a laissez-faire attitude that the parents or other 
adults in charge of the child or young person will have the child or young person's best 
interests at heart. This argument is commonly applied in the debate surrounding family 
autonomy in family law proceedings but also has relevance to youth justice. In their series of 
books, Goldstein, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit argue that childhood is a time of dependency 
and incompetence; and are in favour of giving parents far-reaching autonomy in decisions 
regarding their children and young people.253 Their views have been criticised as placing 
limitations on state intervention which could be detrimental in the cases of children and young 
people who are being abused or neglected.254 The non-interventionist stance can be traced to 
249 Katherine Federle, 'Rights Flow Downhill' ( 1994) 2 International Journal of Children's Rights 343, 344. 
25° Katherine Hunt Federle, 'Children, Curfews and the Constitution (1995) 73 Washington University Law 
Quarterly 1315. Federle discusses how courts in the United States have permitted significant intrusions in the 
lives of children and young people (e.g. curfews) on the basis of protection of the child or young person's 
interests. 
251 For a critique of the 'best interests' standard see Janet Weinstein, 'And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best 
Interests of Children and the Adversarial System' ( 1997) 52 University of Miami Law Review 79. 
252 See Chapter 2(V)(A), and Chapter 13(V). 
253 Joseph Goldstein, Sophie Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert Solnit, The Best Interests of the Child- The Least 
Detrimental Alternative (Revised Edition) (New York: The Free Press, 1996). 
254 See e.g. MDA Freeman, 'Freedom and the Welfare State: Child-Rearing, Parental Autonomy and State 
Intervention' (1983) Journal of Social Welfare Law 70. 
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common law ideas of the inviolability of the family which was discussed earlier in this 
thesis.255 
This non-interventionist ideology can be construed as viewing the child or young person not 
as an individual right-holder but as a part of a broader familial and societal rights network.256 
This construction could have a number of effects on the child or young person in the youth 
justice system. On one hand, the 'caretaker' ideology can affect the child or young person's 
participation in proceedings (in formal judicial proceedings or informal events such as the 
youth justice FGC) as the proceedings become a discussion between adults on how best to 
manage the child or young person's offending behaviour. This has been consistently observed 
in studies of youth court dispositions. For instance, in Naffine's study of youth courts in 
Australia, the author's 'overwhelming impression' of the proceedings was that of 
administrative efficiency: 'with experts running the matter, it is possible to proceed with the 
aid of a sort of legal shorthand ... the norm is for defendants to remain completely silent' .257 
The construct weakens the child or young person as an individual. It is suggested that 
restorative justice holds similar views in relation to individualism, viewing the youth offender 
less as an individual and more as a member of his or her (extended) family and community.258 
While there is undeniably a benefit in involving the child or young person's family and 
community in dealing with a child or young person's offending, it is vital not to lose sight of 
the child or young person as an individual right-holder.259 The interrelationship in the CYPF 
Act between the rights of the child or young person and the rights of other groups such as the 
family of the child or young person and the victim of the offence, is discussed more fully in a 
later chapter.260 
255 Chapter 2(II)(B). 
256 See also Jennifer Nedelsky 'Re-conceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities' (1989) 1 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 7. 
257 Ngaire Naffine, 'Children in the Children's Court: Can There be Rights Without a Remedy' in Philip Alston, 
Stephen Parker and John Seymour (eds.), Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 90. 
See also Peter Marguiles, 'The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child's Competence in Context' (1996) 64 Fordham Law 
Review 1473. See Chapter 6(V). 
258 See Chapter 7(11), and Chapter 12(IV). 
259 See Chapter 7(IV). 
260 See Chapter 4(IV)(C). 
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That is not to deny the importance of moral values in a child or young person's life. Wardle 
has warned of the dangers of the overuse of the rhetoric of rights in relation to children and 
young people and is critical of those who hold a 'mystical belief in the powers of rights.261 
Feminist thought views rights as being premised on relationships and interdependence rather 
than creating conflict and promoting individualism. 262 Many feminist commentators reject the 
notions of autonomy and individual rights in favour of discussion which focuses on 
relationships and interdependence.263 There has been some debate as to whether children and 
young people's needs and interests are served best by the legalistic nature of rights at all. 
There is a clear parallel here with the kinds of arguments mounted against the need for rights 
in potentially restorative processes such as the youth justice FGC. Some argue that these 
processes have a higher purpose such as reconciliation and re-integration, thus rights are not 
needed.264 Further, it is argued that such processes are family-based and communitarian, and 
thus individual rights are not needed.265 
Ill. A THEORETICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE: THE DUAL STATUS OF THE CHILD OR 
YOUNG PERSON IN THE YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The above discussion has examined the application of the prevailing theories of rights to the 
situation of the child or young person in the youth justice system. Under the will theory, if a 
child or young person is competent in a criminal sense, it should follow that the child or 
young person must be competent in the sense of exercising a right. If this is true, a child or 
young person considered to have infringed the criminal law should not be any worse off in 
terms of rights than an adult in the same situation. As Sebba has commented: 
to posit that the rights of minors in the justice system should be examined from the perspective of 
general principles of rights is not necessarily to argue that juveniles are to be equated with adults, but 
rather that the same philosophical framework be adopted ab initio.266 
261 Lynn D Wardle, 'The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children' (1996) 27 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 321, 322. 
262 Francis Olsen, 'Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child' (1992) 6 International Journal of Law and the Family 192. 
263 Martha Minow, 'Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights' (1986) 9 
Harvard Women's Law Journal I. 
264 See Chapter 7(11). 
265 See Chapter 7(III). 
266 Leslie Sebba, 'Juvenile Justice Policy: Mapping the Criteria' in MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds.), 
The Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 242 [italics in original]. 
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The child or young person considered to have infringed the criminal law must then be 
guaranteed at least the same protections accorded to an adult in the same situation ( the right to 
legal counsel, the right to be heard, the right to present a defence, the presumption of 
innocence and so forth). 267 
However, that is not to deny the child or young person extra rights based on his or her 
characteristics as a child or young person, e.g. immaturity and vulnerability. As was discussed 
in the preceding chapter, the welfare orientated youth court was meant to be non-adversarial 
in nature and had a broad discretion to facilitate understanding of the child or young person 
and his or her circumstances.268 But, welfare-orientated youth justice with its 'best interests' 
approach often led to indeterminate sanctions and lack of participation by the child or young 
person. In reality, welfare focused systems embraced the protectionist ideology to the point 
that it did not resemble a criminal court in any shape or form. A 'kangaroo court' is how one 
of the presiding Justices in Re Gault described it.269 As Federle illustrates, young people 
generally have not been advantaged by paternalistic behaviours on the part of the state.270 
Procedural due process is a right of protection for the child or young person against the abuse 
of unchecked state ( adult) power. The important issue is that the child or young person is not 
disadvantaged in terms of rights simply by being a child or young person. An analogy may be 
drawn with international human rights law: although children and young people may have 
additional rights based on their characteristics as children or young people, their basic rights 
as persons are not affected.271 
Some have questioned whether the child or young person who commits a criminal offence 
should be regarded primarily as a child or young person, or as an off ender. 272 Is such a 
distinction necessary? On th one hand, it is vital to ensure that children and young people 
accused or convicted of a criminal offence are not worse off than an adult in the same 
situation by virtue of being a child or young person ( e.g. by receiving a harsher sentence than 
267 See Chapters 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 12 and 13. 
268 See Chapter 2(V). 
269 Per Fortas Jin re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967), 7-8. See Chapter 2(V)(B). 
27° Katherine Hunt Federle, 'Is There a Jurisprudential Future for the Juvenile Court?' (1999) 564 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 28, 35. 
271 Article 41 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the 'savings clause'). See Chapter 4(III)(B)(6). 
272 Barry Anderson, 'The Criminal Justice Acts' in Bob Franklin (ed.), The Handbook of Children's Rights -
Comparative Policy and Practice (London: Routledge, 1995), 57. 
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an adult would for the same offence or not being permitted to speak in his or her own 
defence). On the other hand, there must be recognition that children and young people have 
different needs due to their innate vulnerability and immaturity. As Freeman has stated, 'to 
take children's rights seriously requires us to take seriously nurturance and self-
determination'. 273 The youth justice system should not have to choose between protecting 
children and young people and protecting their rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the general theoretical foundations of the rights of children and 
young people. As noted, it is the application of existing rights standards to the different model 
of the youth justice FGC which is the focus of this research, rather than an in depth analysis 
of the theoretical foundations of the rights of children and young people. Nonetheless, it is 
important to have a theoretical frame of reference to lead into the discussion of the sources of 
rights for children and young people, which is the subject of the next chapter. The application 
of the prevailing theories of rights to the particular situation of the child or young person, and 
the shortcomings of these theoretical approaches was considered. The theoretical approach 
which will be used here is the concept of the child or young person in the youth justice system 
as having a dual status as accused/offender and child or young person. The child or young 
person should not be any worse off in terms of rights than an adult in the same situation, but 
should be entitled to extra protections based on his or her status as a child or young person. 
273 MDA Freeman,'The Limits of Children's Rights' in MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman (eds.), The 
Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 98 [author's italics]. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: BENCHMARKS FOR THE 
RIGHTS OF THEY OUNG PERSON IN THE 
YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM 
State-sanctioned human rights are vital for regulating the tyrannies of informal justice' 274 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter has set out the theoretical foundations of children and young people's 
rights and argued the importance of such rights. This chapter will set out the rights standards 
which will be used to evaluate the youth justice FGC. There is a distinct lack of commentary 
on the rights of children and young people in the youth justice system in New Zealand, with 
the exception of the official non-governmental reports to the United Nations Committee on 
the Rights of the Child.275 Therefore it is necessary to discuss rights standards in more detail 
than originally envisaged at the initial stages of this research, including their legal status in 
international and domestic law. 
Sources of rights for the child or young person in the youth justice system are in three 
categories, which will be considered separately. The first category of rights is those rights 
derived from international law to which New Zealand has agreed to be bound. This 
encompasses relevant provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and as well as the specific human rights convention for children and young people: the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The standards for youth justice contained in 
the non-binding standards such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules on the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice are also pertinent. This chapter will set out the legal status 
of these international instruments, as well as their application to the child or young person in 
the New Zealand youth justice system. The second category of rights is those derived from 
274 John Braithwaite, 'Setting Standards for Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 563, 
577. 
275 E.g. Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Children and Youth in Aotearoa 2003 (Wellington, Action for 
Children and Youth Aotearoa 2003), Second Periodic Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, (2003) CRC/C/93/ Add.4. Action for Children in Aotearoa, The Non-Governmental Organisation 
Report to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (Auckland: Youth Law Project, 1996). See 
also Nessa Lynch, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: A Children's Rights Perspective' (2008) 8 Youth Justice 215. 
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domestic human rights legislation: the Bill of Rights Act 1990. The legal status of the rights 
contained in this Act will be discussed, as well as their application to the particular situation 
of the child or young person in the youth justice system. The third category is the young 
person's rights within the theoretical framework of the CYPF Act. Specific rights are the 
subject of the substantive chapters, but a general overview will be given here of the rights 
framework in the CYPF Act. 
The framework of rights explored in this chapter will provide the benchmarks against which 
the youth justice FGC can be evaluated from a rights perspective. It will be apparent from an 
examination of these rights standards that most were drafted with the formal adversarial ( or 
inquisitorial) criminal process in mind. One of the key theoretical issues in this thesis is the 
application of rights standards to the extra-judicial criminal process represented by the FGC. 
This issue is considered in a separate chapter,276 and in the context of the specific areas of 
rights that are analysed in the substantive chapters. 
II. RIGHTS DERIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Application of General Human Rights Instruments 
Relevant here are certain sections of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is the United Nations' post-war declaration on the rights of mankind. m It sets out the rights 
enjoyed by all human beings based on the 'dignity and worth of the human person' .278 People 
share certain immutable characteristics that are typical of all members of the human race. 
Article 1 of the UDHR states that all humans are equal in dignity and rights, and children and 
young people as young humans would fall within this definition.219 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codifies the rights set out in the 
UDHR, and, unlike the UDHR is legally binding on States Parties.280 New Zealand signed the 
276 Chapter 7. 
277 G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). Hereinafter UDHR in the text. 
278 Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
279 Hans-Joachim Heintze, 'Children's Rights within Human Rights Protection' in MDA Freeman and Philip 
Veerman (eds.), The Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 72. 
280 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI). 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16) at 52. U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. Hereinafter ICCPR in the text. 
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ICCPR on 12th November 1968 and ratified it on 28th December 1978. One of the purposes of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was to incorporate the protections of the ICCPR into 
domestic law.281 The Preamble to the ICCPR also extends its protections to all members of the 
human race based on the 'inherent dignity' and the 'equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family'. Children and young people in the criminal justice system (as 
members of the human family) possess the rights of due process enshrined in the ICCPR. 
These include basic rights of criminal procedure like the presumption of innocence, 282 the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained,283 and the right to appeal to a higher authority.284 
In addition to the rights accorded to all persons in the criminal justice system, the ICCPR also 
provides some specific rights for children and young people, and was the first international 
human rights convention to impose an express obligation on States Parties to provide a 
separate and different procedure for children and young people involved in the criminal 
justice system. Article 10 .2(b) provides that 'children' accused of criminal offending must be 
separated from adult accused and that their cases must be determined as promptly as possible. 
Article 10.3 mandates that child offenders be treated separately from adults and in a manner 
suitable to their age and maturity. What is the definition of child or juvenile in the ICCPR? 
There is no definition supplied in the ICCPR, but the Human Rights Committee is of the 
opinion that all those under the age of eighteen years should be treated as juveniles.285 Article 
14.4 then states that 'in the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take 
account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation' .286 
B. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1. Introduction 
As was explored in Chapter 2, early international law concerning children and young people 
was firmly based on a care and protection ideology and was not legally binding.287 1979 was 
281 See the Preamble which states that it is 'An Act .. (b) To affrrm New Zealand's commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'. 
282 Article 14(2), ICCPR. 
283 Article 9(1), ICCPR. 
284 Article 14(5), ICCPR. 
285 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.9: Humane Treatment of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty 
(Art.JO) UN Doc. A147/40, 1982. 
286 See further Chapter 13(II). 
287 See Chapter 2(IV). 
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the International Year of the Child and the publicity it gained gave an impetus to the adoption 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child288 in 1989. The CRC stands out 
from other human rights standards as having reached 'virtual universality' .289 The CRC moved 
beyond protection rights, providing for over forty different rights, not only civil and political 
rights but also social, economic, cultural and humanitarian rights.290 The CRC 'assumes that 
the child is not merely an object of solicitude and care. [Rather] the child is a subject of 
fundamental rights and basic liberties. ' 291 
2. The relationship with other human rights instruments 
The CRC contains many rights that have been set down in previous human rights instruments 
such as the presumption of innocence. 292 It also recognises additional rights, for instance the 
right to be heard and the right to participate.293 Conversely, the ICCPR contains some rights 
which are not found in the CRC, such as the prohibition on double jeopardy.294 
Given the existence of this child and young person-specific rights instrument, does this mean 
that the rights applying to all human beings which are codified in general human rights 
documents such as the ICCPR no longer apply to children and young people? Frances Olsen 
has commented that rights for women and children and young people are usually seen as 
'complementary, not as zero sum game' .295 The question then arises as to what greater legal 
288 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49) 
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990. Hereinafter CRC in the text. 
289 Rebecca Rios-Kohn, 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Challenges' (1998) 5 
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty 139, 140. All but two (the United States and Somalia) of the world's 
nations have either signed or ratified the Convention. The United States participated fully in the drafting process 
of the CRC and became a signatory in February 1995; however the CRC has not yet been transmitted to the 
Senate by the White House to facilitate the commencement of the ratification process. See further Paula Donnolo 
and Kim K Azzarelli, 'Ignoring the Human Rights of Children: A Perspective on America's Failure to Ratify the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1996) 5 Journal of Law and Policy 203. 
290 Dominic Mc Goldrick, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1991) International 
Journal of Law and the Family 132, 158. 
291 Adam Lopatka, 'An Introduction to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1996) 6 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 251, 254. 
292 Article 2(b)(i), CRC. 
293 Article 12, CRC. 
294 Article 10, ICCPR. 
295 Francis Olsen, 'Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child' (1992) 6 International Journal of Law and the Family 192, 196. 
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protection is afforded to the child or young person by the CRC, as most of the standards 
contained there are simply a restatement of those found in other human rights instruments. 
The CRC affirms the application of existing human rights standards to children and young 
people.296 Lopatka states that: 
A grant to the child of certain additional human rights that are specific to him or her, or adjustment of 
the rights due to all the child's properties, is by no means exceptional in the system of promotion and 
protection of human rights ... certain additional human rights have been granted to these groups of 
persons who are weaker than the others for a variety of reasons.297 
Thus the provision of extra rights for children and young people on the basis of their special 
characteristics ( e.g. immaturity and vulnerability, as recognised in the Preamble to the CRC) 
does not negate the rights that they possess as human persons. The fact that children and 
young people have special rights does not mean that the generally recognised rights cease to 
apply. According to Heintze, 'the duplication of the language from prior instruments should 
not automatically distract from the promotion of the human rights of children' .298 Article 40, 
which sets out the rights of the child or young person alleged or accused of infringing the 
criminal law begins with the phrase; 'having regard to the relevant provisions of international 
law'. Does this mean that any provisions of the CRC must conform to the other provisions of 
international law? The answer lies in Article 41 of the CRC which may be described as a 
'savings' clause. It states that: 
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realization of the rights of the child and which may be contained in: 
(a) the law of a State Party; or 
(b) International Law in force for that State. 
This clause is a common feature of international human rights instruments,299 and reflects a 
concern by States Parties that child-specific protections would not derogate from the 
protections agreed to by States Parties in the ICCPR.300 The purpose of such a clause is to 
ensure that human rights instruments specific to a group are not used by States Parties as a 
296 Melinda Jones, 'Myths and Facts Concerning the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Australia' (1999) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 28. 
297 Adam Lopatka, 'The Rights of the Child Are Universal' in MDA Freeman and Philip Veerman ( eds.), The 
Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 49. 
298 Hans-Joachim Heintze 'Children's Rights within Human Rights Protections' in MDA Freeman and Philip 
Veerman (eds.), The Ideologies of Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), 74. 
299 For example Article 5.2 of the ICCPR and Article 60 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
300 See the travaux preparatoires of the Convention at UN Docs. E/CN.4/1983/62, paras 14-17; E/CN .4/1989/48, 
paras 623-625. 
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basis for 'denying or limiting other more favourable or more extensive' rights already 
provided for the individual under international or national law. 301 
3. Legal status of the CRC in international law 
The CRC represents the first human rights treaty specifically concerned with the rights of 
children and young people.302 At the time of the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child a 
majority of United Nations Member States had opposed the introduction of a binding treaty,303 
and so the resulting document was not legally binding. With the introduction of the CRC, 
international law shifted to an approach which holds governments legally accountable. 304 The 
CRC is a treaty based instrument and is therefore legally binding on States Parties who 
undertake to fulfil its obligations. However, the only international implementation mechanism 
provided for in the CRC is the system of periodic reporting by States Parties to the relevant 
human rights treaty body, the Committee on the Rights of the Child.305 The Committee's 
procedures are cumbersome and are not readily adaptable to emergency situations. There is no 
provision for ad hoc recommendations, nor is there a mechanism for individual complaints to 
be brought before the Committee. The CRC presently has only two monitoring mechanisms 
available: the monitoring treaty body that receives reports, and the provision of technical 
assistance. Once the reports are received and reviewed,306 the Committee simply makes 
suggestions and other forms of constructive criticism to the State Party. This method of 
assuring compliance is limited by the signatories' willingness to comply.307 It does not 
301 Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 713. 
302 The ICCPR contained some references to the administration of youth justice. Article 10.2 provides for the 
separation of accused youth from adult accused and for speedy adjudication in their cases. Article 14.4 provides 
that the trial procedures for youth should take the age of the youth into account and emphasize their 
rehabilitation. 
303 Geraldine Van Bueren, International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1998), 13. See Chapter 2(1V). 
304 David A Balton, 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Prospects for International Enforcement' (1990) 
12 Human Rights Quarterly 122. 
305 See http://www.unicef.org/crc/monitoring.htm (last viewed 13 'November 2008). Hereinafter the Committee 
in the text. 
306 These reports must detail the 'measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the 
CRC] and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights.' (Article 44 (i)) States Parties must also 
'indicate factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the degree of fulfilment of the obligations under the present 
Convention.' (Article 44.2)). 
307 See generally Michael O'Flaherty, Human Rights and the United Nations: Practice before the Treaty Bodies 
(2"d Edition) (Dordrecht: Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, 2002). 
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actually punish non-compliance with the CRC or force compliance in the future, though 
compliance is 'requested' by the Committee. Moreover, there is no provision that allows for 
complaints from third parties regarding violations of the CRC, whether by individuals or 
organizations within or outside of that state. In carrying out its work, the Committee does not 
take a confrontational approach but rather seeks to engage States Parties in a constructive 
dialogue with a view to critically assessing the situation of children and young people and 
encouraging cooperation for implementation of the CRC.308 Indeed, the essential aim of the 
international monitoring process is not to replace but to strengthen the national capacity to 
ensure and monitor the realization of children and young people's rights.309 
The individual communication procedure, as provided by the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,310 and 
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,311 allows individuals alleging human rights violations by a State Party (and not 
attributable to an individual) to lodge complaints to the monitoring body ( e.g. the Human 
Rights Committee for the ICCPR). However, the CRC did not provide for an individual 
communications procedure, as the function of the Committee is only to engage in a continued 
constructive dialogue with States Parties. The Committee is not a court and does not intervene 
in individual cases. It is, therefore, at the national level that the implementation of the CRC is 
most critical and that the role of the judiciary is fundamental. 312 Although reports to the 
Committee show that in many countries the ratification of the CRC has brought about 
legislative reform and other important measures, the only option currently available is for an 
individual to claim his or her rights under the CRC through the domestic courts.313 The weight 
308 See further Nigel Cantwell, 'Monitoring: Back to Basic Questions' in Eugeen Verhellen (ed.) Monitoring 
Children's Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 67. 
309 General Guidelines Regarding Reports (UN document CRC/C/58) (Adopted by the Committee at its 343rd 
meeting, 11 October 1996). 
310 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. 
311 G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force 
June 26, 1987. 
312 Rebecca Rios- Kohn 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Challenges' (1998) 5 
Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty 139, 158. 
313 In at least thirteen legal systems, the courts have cited the CRC in legal opinions. These include: Australia, 
Canada, England and Wales, Federal Republic of Gennany, France, India, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, South Africa and the United States of America. See Jonathon Todres, 'Emerging Limitations 
on the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Early Case Law' ( 1998) 30 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 159, 268. 
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that a national court can accord the CRC depends upon the legal system of the state regarding 
the use of international law, the applicable national laws, and the willingness of domestic 
courts to hear arguments based on international human rights laws.314 The Committee is also 
not empowered to impose sanctions on States Parties who are in contravention of the CRC.315 
The CRC is a significant milestone, but it is unrealistic to expect poorer countries to ensure 
that their national youth justice systems comply with the CRC when a large proportion of 
them struggle to vindicate their children's basic right to life and adequate nutrition. In 
addition, the majority of developed countries have not yet implemented the provisions of the 
CRC.316 
4. Legal status of the CRC in New Zealand 
The CRC was signed by New Zealand on 1st October 1990 and ratified on 12th March 1993 
(subject to three formal reservations).317 New Zealand has not formally incorporated the CRC 
into domestic law.318 Given the lack of legal commentary on the subject of the CRC in New 
Zealand,319 it is necessary to discuss its legal status. 
The traditional view of unincorporated international human rights treaties in New Zealand is 
that which was expressed by Lord Atkin in Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney General 
for Ontario.320 As Geiringer explains this view envisages: 
[an] orthodox "dualist" conception of the relationship between international and domestic law in which 
the two are envisaged as independent and largely unconnected legal systems. The primary rationales for 
dualism are the doctrines of separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty. Treaty making is, in 
New Zealand's constitutional tradition, a function of the executive government. The power to enact 
314 See further David P Stewart, 'Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1998) 5 Georgetown 
Journal on Fighting Poverty 161. 
315 See http://www.unicef.org/crc/monitoring.htm (last viewed 11 October 2008). 
316 See Thomas Hammerberg, 'The Convention on the Rights of the Child - and How to Make it Work' (1990) 
12 Human Rights Quarterly 97 and Ursula Kilkelly, 'The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child- An 
Evaluation in the Light of the Recent UK Experience' (1996) 8 Child and Family Law Quarterly 105. 
317 See the text of New Zealand's reservations at http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty15_asp.htm (last 
viewed 11 November 2007). The third reservation is the only one directly related to youth justice. New Zealand 
has reserved the right to mix juveniles and adults in correctional facilities. 
318 There has been some incorporation in the Care of Children Act 2004. For more detail on the relationship 
between international law and domestic law in New Zealand see the Law Commission Report, A New Zealand 
Guide to International Law and Its Sources (Wellington: Law Commission, 1996). 
319 See generally Nessa Lynch, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: A Children's Rights Perspective' (2008) 8 Youth 
Justice: An International Journal 215. 
320 [1937] AC 326,347. 
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laws is, on the other hand, the province of Parliament. Accordingly, for treaty obligations entered into 
by the executive to be given force of law within New Zealand, those obligations must, in keeping with 
orthodox doctrine, be "transformed" through a process oflegislative implementation.321 
Some later judgments may counter this traditional dualist view of the legal status of the 
CRC's provisions.322 The CRC has been cited in argument in the New Zealand courts, 
principally in family law and immigration law cases, most notably by the Court of Appeal in 
the Tavita case.323 The case involved a judicial review of an immigration removal warrant 
served against a Western Samoan overstayer. The man concerned had married a New Zealand 
resident, with whom he had a child. The child was automatically a New Zealand citizen by 
virtue of being born in the country. The applicant was the child's primary caregiver and cited 
Article 9 of the CRC, which inter alia, maintains the child or young person's right not to be 
separated from his or her parents (except by competent authorities).324 In the course of the 
judgment, there was discussion of the status in domestic law of New Zealand's international 
obligations (such as the CRC) where the President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke 
( as he then was) stated that: 
a failure to give practical effect to international instruments to which New Zealand is a party may 
attract criticism. Legitimate criticism should extend to the New Zealand Courts if they were to accept 
the argument that, because a domestic statute giving discretionary powers in general terms does not 
mention human rights, norms or obligations, the executive is necessarily free to ignore them.325 
Geiringer argues that Tavita represented 'a new era in the judicial use of international human 
rights' 326 (it was of course an interim decision). However, in subsequent cases with similar 
factual scenarios, the courts appear reluctant to rule conclusively on the status of 
unincorporated human rights treaties like the CRC.327 Notable though, is the fact that the New 
321 Claudia Geiringer, 'Tavita and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and 
Administrative Law' (2004) 21 New Zealand Universities Law Review 67, 60 [internal references omitted]. 
322 Mark Henaghan, 'New Zealand and the Convention: A Lack of Balance' in MDA Freeman ( ed.), Children's 
Rights: A Comparative Perspective (Brookfield, USA: Aldershot, 1996), 170. 
323 Tavita v Minister of Immigration and Attorney General [1994] NZFLR 97. 
324 It turned out that the decision to issue a warrant for the applicant's removal had been made before the birth of 
the child so the CRC was not relevant at the time. The case was adjourned to allow the Minister oflmmigration 
to re-consider the case in the light of the child's New Zealand citizenship. 
325 [1994] NZFLR 97, 107. 
326 Claudia Geiringer, 'Tavita and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and 
Administrative Law' (2004) 21 New Zealand Universities Law Review 67, 67. See also Andrew Butler and Petra 
Butler, 'The Judicial Use ofinternational Human Rights Law in New Zealand' (1999) 29 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 173. 
327 Rajan v Minister of Immigration [1996] 3 NZLR 543; Puli 'vea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 3 NZLR 
538. 
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Zealand Immigration Service and the Removal Review Authority appear to have proceeded 
on the basis that Tavita is good law.328 In a similar vein to Tavita is the Australian case of 
Teoh. 329 
Cooke P is quoted above in Tavita as warning that 'a failure to give practical effect' to the 
conventions which New Zealand is party might attract criticism.330 What does giving 'practical 
effect mean'? The Court's statement in Tavita and the citing of the CRC in a number of other 
cases involving children and young people,331 may be indicative of a more rights based 
approach to children and young people by the courts and a recognition that children and 
young people must be considered as principals in cases involving them. In the case of Re the 
W Children, Judge Inglis QC described the CRC as a 'useful touchstone' which was 
'legitimate, even essential to fall back on ... when the Court was required to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of the child were recognised and protected' .332 The Judge appeared to 
consider the CRC as not truly determinative but as a guiding principle. 
In New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association Inc v Attorney-General, Keith J stated that it was 
a 'presumption of statutory interpretation' that in 'so far as its wording allows legislation 
should be read in a way which is consistent with New Zealand's international obligations'. 333 
Although the Bangalore Principles referred to the duty of the judiciary to interpret and apply 
the law in the light of the universality of human rights,334 the judiciary's approach to the status 
328 See Removal Review Authority decisions at www.removalreviewauthority.govt.nz (last viewed 21 August 
2007) e.g. Removal Appeal Nos 46278, 46284, 46285. 
329 A Malaysian national facing deportation proceedings from Australia argued that the CRC would have to be 
taken into account as deportation would have a negative effect on children and family life. Although Australia 
had not incorporated the CRC, the Australian High Court stated; 'The provisions of an international convention 
to which Australia is a party, especially one which declares universal fundamental rights, may be used by the 
courts as a legitimate guide in developing the common law ... A cautious approach to the development of the 
common law by reference to international conventions would be consistent with the approach which the courts 
have hitherto adopted to the development of the common law by reference to statutory policy and statutory 
materials. Much will depend upon the nature of the relevant provision, the extent to which it has been accepted 
by the international community, the purpose which it is intended to serve and its relationship to the existing 
principles of our domestic law ... ' Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) CLR 273 para 28, 
per Mason CJ and Deane J. 
330 [1994] NZFLR 97, 107. 
331 H v F (1993) FRNZ 486, H v Y [2005] NZFLR 152. Older cases citing the CRC are listed in paras 127-132 of 
the Second Periodic Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/93/Add.4. 
332 [1994] 12 FRNZ 548,558. 
333 [1997] 3 NZLR 268,289. 
334 Bangalore Principles adopted at the Commonwealth Judicial Colloquium, Bangalore, India, 1998. See 
commentary at (1998) 14 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1196. See also Justice Michael Kirby, 'The Australian 
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of the rights contained in the CRC remains ambiguous. New Zealand's relationship with 
international human rights law was arguably advanced by increased rights consciousness due 
to the enactment of the NZBOR Act in 1990.335 
In contrast to these family law cases, the CRC is rarely cited in youth justice cases.336 In a 
recent unreported High Court decision, Gendall J stated that 'it is beyond doubt that 
sentencing Courts in New Zealand must have regard to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child' .337 In addition, in Police v H (a young person), Thorburn DCJ recognised 
the importance of the CRC, arguing that 'having ratified the Articles of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, New Zealand's alignment with that international instrument would 
generally be conveying the message to the community of nations that special protections and 
procedures for juveniles are in the public interest' .338 Overall though, there is little mention of 
the CRC's youth justice provisions. in the case law. Of course, most offending by young 
people is resolved outside the court system,339 and Youth Court cases are largely unreported. 
5. What are the characteristics of a CRC compliant youth justice system? 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the rights framework which will be used to evaluate a 
particular legal process (the youth justice FGC) from a rights perspective. The main body of 
this thesis will be taken up with analysing the three key areas of rights (legal assistance, how 
the offence is established, and sanctions resulting from the FGC) using the international and 
national rights standards set out here. Thus the applicable provisions of the CRC will be 
analysed in greater detail in their specific context. Nonetheless, it is useful to give a broad 
overview here of what constitutes a CRC compliant youth justice system.340 
Use oflnternational Human Rights Norms: From Bangalore to Balliol - A View from the Antipodes' (1993) 16 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 363. 
335 Claudia Geiringer, 'Tavita and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and 
Administrative Law' (2004) 21 New Zealand Universities Law Review 67. 
336 Superior court decisions where the CRC has been cited include Attorney General v Youth Court at Manakau 
[2007] NZFLR 103 (delay) and R v H 20/07/02, CA 215-02 (rights of young person when being questioned by 
Police). 
337 Martin v Police 19/03/07, Gendall J, HC Wellington CRl-2006-485-163, para 10. 
338 [2004] DCR 97. 
339 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
340 See further Nessa Lynch, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: A Children's Rights Perspective' (2008) 8 Youth 
Justice 215, Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, 
Eugeen Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans, and Mieke Verheyde (eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the 
Child (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 
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Article 40 of the CRC is the key provision dealing with the rights of children and young 
people in the youth justice system. Essentially, the child or young person is afforded the same 
basic rights as an adult in the criminal justice system. These include the presumption of 
innocence, the prohibition on retrospectivity and the right to legal assistance.341 The child or 
young person then has certain extra rights based on his or her status as a child or young 
person, e.g. the CRC requires that the best interests of the child or young person should be a 
primary consideration in all matters affecting them.342 The recent General Comment issued by 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child provides specific guidance on the rights of the child 
or young person in the youth justice system.343 The General Comment reiterates the 
importance of key principles of the CRC such as non-discrimination and best interests.344 
Further guidance was also provided by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in relation to 
contemporary youth justice processes, taking into account the increase in the prevalence of 
non-court dispositions, and the development of interventions such as restorative justice and 
family group conferencing. International standards for youth justice were generally 
formulated before the spread of more informal methods of dealing with offending like the 
youth justice FGC. Approaches like the FGC emphasise: 
[the]importance of participation and outcome, rather than the process as an end in itself. Nevertheless, 
international human rights law does set out minimum standards applicable to all criminal justice 
models, including restorative justice. These standards are now quite specific and include fundamental 
rights such as security of person and due process. Any model that relies upon criminal proceedings and 
sanctions and that fails to comply with these standards will be incompatible with international human 
rights law, whatever its aim.345 
Above all the Committee on the Rights of the Child emphasises that when the child or young 
person is diverted from formal judicial proceedings, human rights and legal safeguards must 
always be respected.346 
341 Article 40, CRC. 
34
-
2 Article 3, CRC. 
343 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007 
344 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights injuvenilejustice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007 
345 Kate Akester, Restoring Youth Justice - New Directions in Domestic and International Law and Practice 
(London: Justice, 2000), 13. 
346 Article 40.3(b), CRC. See especially Chapter 11. 
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6. Can the CRC's general principles limit rights? 
As noted, the CRC obliges States Parties to ensure that children and young people have 
certain rights when they are accused or convicted of a criminal offence. Are these rights 
absolute in all situations? The CRC provides certain guiding principles to aid interpretation 
of the CRC's provisions. Article 3 is central in the interpretation of the CRC. It requires that 
the best interests of the child or young person be a primary consideration in all actions and 
proceedings concerning children and young people.347 This has been taken to indicate that the 
best interests of the child or young person are a consideration of 'first importance among 
other considerations, but that they do not have absolute priority above other considerations' .348 
The definitions and application of this standard has provoked much debate.349 For example, 
could States Parties interpret this to mean that the right of the child or young person to legal 
representation was not in the child or young person's best interests?350 Van Bueren has 
suggested that 'the rights in the CRC may be used as signposts by which the best interests of 
the child may be identified. ' 351 So would there be a presumption that the rights in the CRC are 
in the best interests of the child or young person? Does the CRC provide the 'broad ethical or 
value framework that is often claimed to be the missing ingredient which would give a greater 
degree of certainty to the content of the best interests standard'? 352 Alston comments that the 
use of the phrase 'a primary consideration' rather than 'the primary consideration' means that 
the best interests standard has not been completely rejected but rather it permits a certain 
flexibility that would allow other people's interests to prevail in certain extreme cases.353 
347 In the New Zealand case law see Hullia v Chief Executive Department of Labour [1999] NZAR 412, Huang 
Xiao Qiong v Minister of Immigration [2007] NZAR 163. 
348 Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 91. 
349 Philip Alston (ed.), The Best Interests of the Child - Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), Claire Breen, The Standard of the Best Interest of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2002). 
350 See Chapter 9(III). 
351 Geraldine van Bueren, International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1998), 48. 
352 Philip Alston and Bridget Gilmour-Walsh, The Best Interests of the Child: Towards a Synthesis of Children's 
Rights and Cultural Values (Florence: UNICEF, 1996), 2. 
353 Philip Alston, 'The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights' in Philip 
Alston (ed.), The Best Interests of the Child- Reconciling Culture and Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), 13. See also Chapter 13(IV)(C)(3). 
61 
Article 4 forms the basis of a State Party's obligations when it accedes to the CRC. States 
Parties are to undertake 'all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognised in this Convention'. Lesser standards are set for 
'economic, social and cultural rights' in regard to which States Parties are only obliged to 
'undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources'. It follows that 
the more onerous obligations, applicable to all rights other than economic, social and cultural 
(i.e. civil and political rights) are not subject to availability ofresources.354 
Further, Article 5 of the Convention obliges States Parties to: 
... respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the members if the 
extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally 
responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, 
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognised in the present 
Convention. 
What does this mean? This Article's intention is the recognition of the role that parents have 
in guiding the child or young person in his/her exercise of rights. But, in practice, those 
responsible for providing guidance for the child may have an interest in the child or young 
person not exercising their rights or exercising them in a certain way. For instance, a parent 
may believe that legal advice is not necessary in the youth court system because of a belief 
that outcomes will be benign. The word 'appropriate' introduces an objective element.355 The 
relationship between the rights of the young person and the rights of the family under the 
CYPF Act is considered later in this chapter. 
Eekeelar poses the question: can any of these principles 'cut down on the substance of the 
specific rights inasfar as such rights are delineated in the Convention'?356 His answer is that 
they cannot. Article 41 of the CRC confirms Eekelaar' s view. It states: 
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the 
realization of the rights of the child and which may be contained in: 
(a) The law of a State party; or 
(b) International law in force for that State. 
354 See further Jonathon Todres, 'Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law' (1998) 30 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 159, 177. 
355 Philip Alston, 'The Legal Framework of Convention on the Rights of the Child' (1992) 91/2 United Nations 
Bulletin of Human Rights: The Rights of the Child, 1, 13. 
356 John Eekeelar, 'Importance Of Thinking That Children Have Rights' in Philip Alston, John A Seymour and 
Stephen Parker (eds.), Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 233. 
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This clause mandates that the CRC must not disadvantage the child by allowing States Parties 
a 'get-out clause' from their obligations under other human rights conventions such as the 
ICCPR. 
C. The 'Beijing Rules' 
In the youth justice sphere, the provisions of the CRC are complemented by the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.357 These Rules are not a legally 
binding treaty of themselves, being simply United Nations recommendations on minimum 
standards for national youth justice systems. The Beijing Rules were formulated before the 
CRC was signed. Nonetheless, some of the Beijing Rules are re-statements of binding 
international standards. For example, Rule 7.1 affirms the presumption of innocence which at 
the time was internationally recognised by both Article 11 of the UD HR and Article 14 of the 
ICCPR, and was later included in Article 40.2(a)(i) of the CRC. In addition, the Beijing Rules 
may provide more detail on the content ofrights contained in the CRC. For example, the CRC 
requires that where possible, States Parties divert children and young people from judicial 
proceedings.358 The Beijing Rules then provide more detailed guidelines on such diversion 
schemes, e.g. by recommending that children and young people should freely consent to 
involvement in diversion.359 The Beijing Rules provide principles on which national youth 
justice systems should operate,360 which are general enough to be applicable to differing 
national legal systems and codes. Other human rights instruments provide guidelines for the 
prevention of youth offending,361 and standards for the treatment of children and young people 
in detention.362 What of the effect of the Rules on domestic New Zealand law? The Beijing 
357 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, Annex, 40 
U.N. GAOR Supp.No.53, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985). Hereinafter the Beijing Rules. 
358 Article 40, CRC. 
359 Rule 11.3, Beijing Rules. 
360 Geraldine van Bueren, International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1998), ch 7. 
361 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines) G. A. res. 
45/112, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 201, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990). 
362 United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty G.A. res. 45/113, annex, 45 
U.N GAOR Supp. (No.49A) at 205, U.N Doc. A/45/49 (1990). 
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Rules are technically 'soft law' and thus are not binding on states. 363 However, Van Bueren 
has commented that: 
One of the extraordinary but unchallenged extensions of the UN Committee [ on the Rights of the 
Child] 's mandate is in relation to the legal force it ascribes to the three sets of UN Rules. Rather than 
seeing them as mainly non-binding per se, States appear to have accepted without comment the 
application of the rules to the child criminal justice system.364 
D. The Value of International Law for the Child or Young Person 
Freeman has stressed the importance of the CRC as being 'the fullest legal statement of 
children's rights to be found anywhere' .365 He goes on to argue that 'no international 
convention before or since has so ignited world opinion' .366 In terms of the rights of the child 
or young person in the youth justice system, international law is specifically designed to be 
general enough to cover differing legal systems and cultures. Nevertheless, international law 
does stress the importance of a minimum guarantee of rights, including due process rights and 
the expectation of proportionate, fair and rational sanctions. As noted, enforcement 
mechanisms are cumbersome and international law must be implemented and supported by 
States Parties to attain its full purpose. The gaps between law and practice are often wide and 
rights are useless without services to back them up. The situation in many countries remains 
that children and young people in the criminal justice system are suffering the worst of both 
worlds: they are not accorded the full selection of rights which adult offenders possess, nor 
are they accorded the considerations extended to children and young people in civil law 
proceedings. 367 
Moving to the specific New Zealand context, the status of the CRC in domestic law remains 
interpretative rather than definitive. Nonetheless, the CRC has a vital role in providing a 
benchmark against which the New Zealand youth justice system can be measured.368 The 
reporting process to the Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified a number of 
363 Eugeen Verhellen and Geert Cappelaere 'United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency: Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency or Promotion of a Society which Respects Children too? 
(1996) 4 International Journal of Children's Rights 57. 
364Geraldine Van Bueren 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans and Mi eke Verhey de ( eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the Child 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 3. 
365 MDA Freeman, 'The Future of Children's Rights' (2000) 14 Children & Society 277, 277. 
366 MDA Freeman, 'The Future of Children's Rights' (2000) 14 Children & Society 277, 278. 
367 Barry Anderson, 'The Criminal Justice Acts' in Bob Franklin (ed.), The Handbook of Children's Rights -
Comparative Policy and Practice (London: Routledge, 1995), 57. 
368 Nessa Lynch, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: A Children's Rights Perspective' (2008) 8 Youth Justice 215. 
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,-." 
major rights issues with the system - including a low age of criminal responsibility, mixing of 
adults and youth in custodial institutions and lack of meaningful participation by children and 
young people.369 The alternative report submitted by a coalition of New Zealand NGOs has 
been particularly useful in identifying deficiencies in legislation and practice.370 
Proposals to enact the CRC into domestic legislation or to enshrine its importance in the 
youth justice legislation have not been successful.371 Thus, although the CRC is 'very 
persuasive' ,372 it cannot override legislation. In its reports to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, New Zealand has stated that it 'takes its obligations under United Nations human 
rights machinery seriously' and reiterates its 'strong commitment to ensuring that the rights of 
children are protected' .373 At a policy level, the profile of the CRC has been raised in recent 
years, with a five year work plan towards compliance developed.374 
In relation to the use of the CRC as a benchmark for improving practice, the legislation 
governing youth justice - the CYPF Act- is currently under review by the Ministry of Social 
Development. The Discussion Document relating to the review emphasises the importance of 
ensuring that any legislative developments reflect New Zealand's commitments under the 
CRC.375 International standards such as the CRC provide clear benchmarks for legislation and 
practice, especially as New Zealand lacks the protections of a written constitution or a 
European Convention on Human Rights. Unlike children and young people in European 
369 New Zealand Government (1997) Initial Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
CRC/C/28/Add. 3, New Zealand Government, (2003) Second Periodic Report of New Zealand to the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/93/Add.4. The Third and Fourth Periodic Report has been submitted, but a 
date for hearings has not yet been scheduled. New Zealand Government (2008) Third and Fourth Periodic 
Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC!C/NZL/4. 
370 Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Children and Youth in Aotearoa 2003 (Wellington: Action for 
Children and Youth Aotearoa, 2003). 
371 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act 1989: Overall Summary of Submissions (Wellington: Allen and Clarke Policy and Regulatory 
Specialists, 2007). 
372 New Zealand Government, (2003) Second Periodic Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, CRC/C/93/Add.4., para 123. 
373 New Zealand Government (1997) Initial Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
CRC/C/28/Add. 3., para 7. 
374 Ministry of Youth Development, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Five-Year Work 
Programme 2004 to 2008 (Wellington: Ministry of Youth Development, 2004). 
375 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding Our Children: Updating the Children, Young Persons and 
Their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007), 16. 
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countries, children and young people in New Zealand are unable to take cases to an 
international human rights body. There is a developing jurisprudence around the rights of 
children and young people under the ECHR, which acts as a useful check on the actions of 
states.376 There is of course no individual right of petition to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child. 
E. Concluding Remarks 
This section has considered international standards for the rights of children and young people 
in the youth justice system. Children and young people have the same minimum guarantees as 
adults in the criminal justice system. Rights such as the presumption of innocence, the 
prohibition on retrospectivity and the right to legal assistance are guaranteed under the ICCPR 
and the CRC. The CRC contains extra rights for children and young people, such as the right 
to participate and the right to be heard in matters affecting the child or young person. 
As the CRC is to be an important benchmark for this research, the legal status of the CRC in 
both international and domestic law was considered. The CRC is a binding international legal 
instrument to which New Zealand has agreed to be bound. The legal status of the CRC 
remains ambiguous in New Zealand, but the status of the CRC is improving. The CRC is 
increasingly being used as a benchmark for government policy and the Government is making 
efforts to ensure that legislation is in compliance. 
III. RIGHTS DERIVED FROM DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
A. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was enacted in 1990.377 It is domestic human rights 
legislation, reflecting 'rights and freedoms long established in the Anglo-New Zealand 
tradition' .378 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had an influence on the drafting of 
the NZBOR Act.379 The Preamble of the NZBOR Act describes its purpose as the affirmation 
376 Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the ECHR (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 
377 Hereinafter NZBOR Act in the text. 
378 Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optician and Richard Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1. 
379 KJ Keith, "'Concerning Change": The Adoption and Implementation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990' (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 37. 
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and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the expression of New 
Zealand's commitments to the ICCPR. The aim of the NZBOR Act is to 'create a set ofrights 
for individuals which limit the power of executive, government and public actors' .380 
The caveat is that these purposes are to be achieved within the concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty.381 The NZBOR Act is unlike constitutional bills of rights in other jurisdictions,382 
in that it cannot be used as a basis to strike down legislation.383 A meaning consistent with the 
rights protected in the NZBOR Act is preferred. However, if there is a direct conflict with the 
terms of the statute, the statute will remain in force. 384 This situation has been criticised by the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee.385 The NZBOR Act can be considered to be an 
expression of fundamental values. It may be used in the purposive interpretation of legislation 
(such as the CYPF Act),386 and as a 'benchmark for acceptable governmental conduct and 
law' .387 In addition, the courts have extended the ambit of the NZBOR Act to provide 
remedies for breaches of section 23 and section 22 despite the fact that Parliament did not 
include any express mention ofremedies in the NZBOR Act. Simpson v A-G (Baigent's Case) 
involved an appeal against the High Court striking out of the appellant's cause of action 
against the police for an alleged unreasonable search of a dwelling.388 One of the appellant's 
380 Ministry of Justice, Re-Evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand (Wellington: Ministry of 
Justice, 2000), para 25. 
381 See further Andrew S Butler, 'Strengthening the Bill of Rights' (2000) 31 Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review 12. 
382 Constitution of the United States of America, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution 
of Ireland. 
383 The White Paper 'A Bill of Rights for New Zealand' (1985) proposed the enactment of a Bill of Rights that 
would have the power to strike down inconsistent legislation but this did not meet with approval by the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Justice and Law Reform. See Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform 
Select Committee, On a White Paper of a Bill of Rights for New Zealand [1998] AJHR 3. But see further Paul 
Rishworth, 'Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney General' [1998] New Zealand Law Review 
683 on the Court of Appeal's announcement in Quilter v Attorney General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) of intention 
to declare enactments inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
384 Ministry of Justice, Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand (Wellington: Ministry of 
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Rights Act' (2001) 4 New Zealand Law Review 421. 
386 Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439. 
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claimed causes of action was that the police had breached section 21 of the NZBOR Act by 
conducting an unreasonable search of the dwelling. The Court of Appeal held that damages 
could be awarded despite the express absence of a remedies provision in the NZBOR Act. 
The usual remedy for such a breach, namely the exclusion of the evidence in question, was 
not considered appropriate as the appellant was innocent of any wrongdoing. This judgment 
demonstrated the Court's willingness to take a purposive approach to human rights 
legislation, i.e. a recognition on the part of the courts that effective remedies should be 
available for breaches of rights. 
B. Application to the Youth Justice System 
1. Minimum guarantee of rights in the criminal process 
In the criminal law sphere, the significance of the NZBOR is in its affirmation and 
codification of the long-established minimum standards of criminal procedure which come 
from common law. In this regard, the NZBOR Act's function is to ensure the fair and humane 
treatment of such individuals.389 In this aspect, concern has been expressed that the NZBOR 
Act has the 'potential to harm the primary mission of criminal law, the protection of the 
public', by protecting the rights of 'those who victimise society' .390 It is true that societal 
opinion often criticises the substantial body of rights accorded to both adults and children 
accused or convicted of crimes. 
In sections 21 to 26, the NZBOR Act clarifies the traditional protections for the accused 
which should apply equally to adults or children and young people, covering the minimum 
rights accorded to those arrested or detained, charged with an offence and in the determination 
of the charge. These include: the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty,391 the right 
not to be compelled to confess guilt,392 the right to present a defence,393 to examine and hear 
witnesses,394 and to appeal the outcome.395 
389 See generally: Philip Alston (ed.), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
390 David M Paciocco, 'The Pragmatic Application of Fundamental Principles: Keeping a Rogues' Charter 
Respectable' in The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1992), 3. 
391 s 25(c), NZBOR Act. See Chapters 10 and 11 on how the offence is established at the FGC. 
392 s 25( d), NZBOR Act. 
393 s 25(e), NZBOR Act. 
394 s 25(f), NZBOR Act. 
395 s 25(h), NZBOR Act. 
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2. Children and young people 
While the rights mentioned above would apply equally to adults or children/young people in 
the criminal justice system, the only specific mention of the rights of the child or young 
person in the youth justice system is contained in section 25(i) of the NZBOR Act which 
provides that the 'child' charged with an offence has the right to 'be dealt with in a manner 
that takes into account the child's age' in the determination of the charge. Note the use of the 
term 'child'. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the term 'child' refers in a youth justice 
context to those aged ten and over but under fourteen years. Does this mean that young people 
are not covered by this provision? This is unlikely, given that child offenders may not be 
prosecuted except in cases of homicide. In both Attorney General v Youth Court. at 
Manakau,396 and Trifilo v Police,397 section 25(i) of the NZBOR Act was held to apply to 
individuals who would be classed as young people in law. This is another example of the 
confusing spread of terminology used in New Zealand legislation in relation to young people 
in different legal contexts.398 
As for what the right 'to be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the child's age' 
means, there is little judicial authority on the section. It is likely that this provision is derived 
from Article 14(4) of the ICCPR which states that 'in the case of juvenile persons, the 
procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting 
their rehabilitation'. Unlike international standards which require that human rights and legal 
safeguards be ensured when the child or young person is diverted from the formal judicial 
system,399 the NZBOR Act does not contain any provisions dealing with diversionary or 
restorative justice processes. 
3. Use of the NZBOR Act in youth justice cases 
There is a lack of case law in the youth justice sphere in New Zealand. Most offending is dealt 
with outside the court system. However, searches of case law reveal that the NZBOR Act is 
used regularly in the reported cases. The NZBOR Act has been used recently in Youth Court 
396 [2007] NZFLR 103. 
397 [2006] DCR 796. 
398 See Chapter 1 (Ill) for a discussion on the confusing array of terminology used to describe those aged less 
than eighteen years in New Zealand law. 
399 Article 40.2 (b), CRC. 
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cases involving the right to elect trial by jury,400 the right to be tried without undue delay,40 ' 
and the right to a fair trial. 402 
IV. RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE CYPF LEGISLATION 
A. Introduction 
The key features of the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act (such as diversion and the 
importance of family involvement in decision making) were discussed in the preceding 
chapter.403 Examination of the evolution of youth justice policy in New Zealand demonstrated 
how previous legislation such as the Child Welfare Act 1925 and the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1974 was centred on children and young people and their best interests.404 
International standards for youth justice also require that the youth justice system be child or 
young person centred.405 However, the CYPF Act explicitly recognises the interests and rights 
of other groups such as families and victims of offences. Therefore the relationship of the 
rights of the young person with the rights of these other groups must be considered. The focus 
in this section is what place rights have in the legislative framework. The specific rights are 
the subject of the substantive chapters. 
B. The Rights of Children and Young People under the CYPF Act 
The specific rights (or lack ofrights) which young people have are discussed in detail in their 
respective chapters.406 However it is useful to give a brief overview of what rights children and 
young people in the youth justice system have under the CYPF Act.407 The general principles 
400 Hudson v Youth Court at Palmerston North [2007] NZFLR 331. 
401 Attorney-General v Youth Court at Manukau [2007] NZFLR 103, Police v B [2007] DCR 232, Police v P & 
R [2004] DCR 673, Trifilo v Police [2006] DCR 796. 
402 Police v KR [2005] DCR 914. 
403 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), FWM McElrea, 
'The New Zealand Model of Family Group Conferences' (1998) 6 European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 527, Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, 'Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: A New Paradigm' 
(1993) 26 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 81. 
404 See Chapter 2(11) and (ID). 
405 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007. 
406 Chapters 8 and 9 examine the right to legal assistance, Chapters 10 and 11 consider how the offence is 
established, and Chapters 12 and 13 discuss FGC outcomes. 
407 This section is confined to discussion of the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act, and the general 
legislative provisions as they apply to youth justice. 
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of the CYPF Act provide some rights for children and young people.408 Consideration must be 
given to taking the child or young person's welfare into account when making decisions,409 
consideration must be given to taking the child or young person's wishes into account when 
making decisions,410 endeavours should be made to ensure that measures taken have the 
support of the young person,411 and decisions should 'wherever practicable' be made and 
implemented in an appropriate time frame for the child or young person.412 Sections 10 and 11 
of the CYPF Act provide for the right of the child or young person to be given infonnation 
and explanations about proceedings in the Family or Youth Court. Both the Judge and counsel 
advising the child or young person, have the duty to explain ( and to satisfy themselves that 
the child or young person understands) in age appropriate language, the nature of the 
proceedings and any orders that the Judge may make.413 
In terms of rights, the provisions dealing with the questioning of children and young people 
by the police are the most comprehensive and prescriptive. Section 208(h) of the CYPF Act 
emphasises the importance of protecting the rights of the young person during the 
investigation of the offence due to the 'vulnerability' of young people,414 and consequently 
there are extensive provisions dealing with the rights of young people when being questioned 
by the police.415 The young person must be informed of his or her rights, especially the right 
not to accompany the police officer to the station unless a formal arrest has been made.416 The 
408 See also Chapter 2(VII). 
409 s 5(c), CYPF Act. 
410 s 5(d), CYPF Act. However, this is qualified with the provision that these wishes 'should be given such 
weight as is appropriate in the circumstances, having regard to the age, maturity, and culture of the child or 
young person'. 
411 s 5(e)(ii), CYPF Act. 
412 s 5(£), CYPF Act. 
413 s 10(1) and 2, s 11, CYPF Act. 
414 The importance of this principle was confirmed recently by the Court of Appeal in R v Z [2008] NZCA 246. 
See further Nessa Lynch, 'Young Suspects' (2008) New Zealand Law Journal 357. 
415 ss 215-232, CYPF Act. See also R v Irwin [1992] 3 NZLR 119. 
416 These rights are set out ins 215. The police officer must warn the young person that if he or she refuses to 
give his or her name and address they may be arrested; that they are not obliged to accompany the officer to a 
place for questioning, and, if he or she gives his or her consent to do so, that consent may be withdrawn at any 
time; that there is no obligation on the young person to make a statement, and, ifhe or she consents to making a 
statement, that consent may be withdrawn at any time; that any statement made or given may be used in 
evidence in any proceedings; and that the young person is entitled to consult with and make or give any 
statement in the presence of a lawyer (a barrister or solicitor) and any person nominated by the young person. 
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police must allow the young person to nominate a supportive adult. The duties of this adult 
are set out in a 1994 amendment to the CYPF Act.417 The persons who may be nominated are 
specified in section 222 of the CYPF Act. These are the parent or guardian of the young 
person, an adult member of the family, whanau or family group of the young person or any 
other adult selected by the young person. If the young person fails to nominate any of the 
above, any adult nominated for that purpose by the police may fulfill the role.418 
There was resistance by the police to these provisions at the time that the CYPF Act was 
brought in.419 The police claimed that the requirements of the Act were impeding them in 
carrying out their duties.420 This initial resistance on the part of the police was matched by 
public disquiet after a high profile homicide case in which the young person's testimony was 
dismissed because the police had failed to observe the procedural requirements of the CYPF 
Act.421 The provisions do go further than those relating to adult suspects but, as the CYPF Act 
states, this is due to the vulnerability of young people when dealing with the police.422 A 1993 
research report raised concerns about police adherence to these provisions.423 Furthermore, a 
2004 evaluation found that the police appear to have discontinued the practice of recording 
whether the correct procedures were followed in the questioning of young people.424 
See The Queen v Z [2007] NZCA 401 (understanding the right to legal advice) and R v T [1997] 1 NZLR (the 
role of the nominated person). · 
417 s 221, CYPF Act. These include taking reasonable steps to ensure that the young person understands his/hers 
215 rights and to support the young person during questioning and the making of statements. This provision 
recognises the principle that young people in the police station are vulnerable to police pressure (s 208 (h), 
CYPF Act). See also R v T[1997] 1 NZLR. 
418 R v Kurariki (2002) 22 FRNZ 319. 
419 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Institute of Criminology Victoria University of Wellington, 1993). 
42° Kenneth Mason, Review of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: 
Department of Social Welfare, 1992). 
421 R v Irwin (1991) 9 FRNZ 487. 
422 s 298(h), CYPF Act. 
423 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Institute of Criminology Victoria University of Wellington), 182. 
424 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice Final Report (Wellington, Ministry of 
Social Development, 2004), 299. 
72 
\' C. Competing Rights 
I. The rights of children and young people 
Unlike victims of offences, there is no express provision in the CYPF Act requiring that the 
rights or interests of the child or young person be taken into account when powers are 
exercised under the legislation. The CYPF Act governs both care and protection proceedings, 
and criminal proceedings against children and young people. While the care and protection 
part of the CYPF Act is governed by section 6 which requires that the welfare of the child or 
young person be the first and paramount consideration,425 Part IV of the CYPF Act (which 
deals with youth justice) is exempt from this provision. This is in contravention of New 
Zealand's obligations under the CRC, which states that the best interests of children and 
young people should always be a primary consideration.426 During the legislative reform 
process,427 the Human Rights Commission recommended that a statement similar to that of 
Article 40 of the CRC be inserted here, that is that the aim of the youth justice system should 
be to reform and rehabilitate the child or young person,428 but a statement of this nature is not 
found in the final CYPF Act. Similarly, another submission argued that a clause should be 
inserted in the Bill to emphasise the principle that: 
A child or young person suspected of offending should be accorded the same legal protections as an 
adult suspect, save in so far as that child or young person may need extra protection by reason of his or 
her age, maturity or level ofunderstanding.429 
Statements emphasising the importance of the rights of the young person are to be found in 
the youth justice legislation of other countries. For example, the Preamble to the Canadian 
youth justice legislation states that: 
Canada is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and recognizes that 
young persons have rights and freedoms, including those stated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights, and have special guarantees of their rights and freedoms.430 
Further, in the section headed Declaration of Principle, the Canadian legislation states that the 
youth criminal justice system must emphasize inter alia 'enhanced procedural protection to 
425 'having regard to the principles set out in sections 5 and 13 '. 
426 Article 3, CRC. 
427 See Chapter 2(VI). 
428 Human Rights Commission, Submissions on Children and Young Persons' Bill (Submission to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Social Services). Submission number SS/89/157/35W. 
429 Warren Young and Neil Cameron, Submissions on the Children and Young Persons Bill (Submission to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Social Services. Submission number SS/89/108/89, para 3.1. 
430 Preamble, Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002 [italics in original]. 
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ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights, including their right to 
privacy, are protected' .431 Also, special considerations apply to proceedings against young 
people including that: 
young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right, such as a right to be heard in the course of 
and to participate in the processes, other than the decision to prosecute, that lead to decisions that affect 
them, and young persons have special guarantees of their rights and freedoms.432 
The only explicit mention of the rights of the young person in the CYPF Act is to be found in 
the provision relating to investigation of offences. Here, it is stated that: 
the vulnerability of children and young persons entitles a child or young person to special protection 
during any investigation relating to the commission or possible commission of an offence by that child 
or young person.433 
Proposals to include a statement of principle emphasising the importance of the child or 
young person's rights were put forward during the recent public submission process on 
reform of the CYPF Act.434 These proposals have not yet translated into legislation. A 
statement of this nature would be a valuable addition to the principles of the CYPF Act.435 
2. The rights of victims of offences 
In previous youth justice legislation, the focus was firmly on the child or young person and 
their needs and rights.436 The CYPF Act was innovative in recognising the interests and rights 
of other groups such as families and victims of offences. Traditional court based criminal 
justice accords only a minimal role to victims of crime, but in the last twenty years, both in 
New Zealand and overseas, there has been increasing recognition of the interests and needs of 
victims of crime. The Preface to the Victims Task Force Report to the Minister of Justice 
identifies three contributory influences for the growth of the victims' rights movement.437 
These are: pressure from diverse political groups ( e.g. feminists, conservative law and order 
431 s 3(1)(b)(iii), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
432 s 3(1)(d)(l), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
433 s 208(h), CYPF Act. 
434 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007), Ministry of Social Development, 
Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989: Overall 
Summary of Submissions (Wellington: Allen and Clarke Policy and Regulatory Specialists, 2007). 
435 See further Chapter 14(VI). 
436 For example the Child Welfare Act 1925 and the Children and Young Persons Act 1974. See Chapter 2(IV). 
437 Victims' Task Force, Towards Equality in Criminal Justice: Report to the Minister of Justice (Wellington: 





groups), increased recognition of the traumatic effects of crime; and New Zealand's 
acceptance of the United Nations principles relating to the treatment of crime victims.438 The 
enactment of the Victims of Offences Act 1987 formally recognised the interests and needs of 
victims in New Zealand law. This legislation provided inter alia for the use of victim impact 
statements in court proceedings and recognised that formal court based processes generally 
offer little support or opportunity for victims to participate in the process. This has now been 
superseded by the Victims' Rights Act 2002.439 The growth of the restorative justice 
movement that strongly encourages participation by victims may be another contributory 
factor. 440 Maxwell and Morris also note that indigenous dispute resolution systems (including 
those of Maori) accord a central rather than peripheral role to the victim.441 The move towards 
the legitimisation of the victim's interests is evident in section 208(g) of the CYPF Act which 
states that any measures dealing with offending by children or young people should have 'due 
regard' to the interests and needs of victims. In addition, the CYPF Act permits victims of 
offences to attend the FGC thereby allowing them a direct role in negotiating FGC 
outcomes.442 
Parliament clearly intended that the interests of the young person would not be paramount in 
the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act, by exempting the youth justice provisions from 
the best interests provision in section 6, CYPF Act. Under a proposed amendment to the 
CYPF Act, the position of the victim would be strengthened.443 This would mean that it will 
be mandatory to take the interests and rights of victims of offences into account e.g. when 
arranging the time and venue of the youth justice FGC and when deciding on outcomes in the 
FGC. The effect of this on FGC outcomes for the young person is considered in Chapter 13.444 
438 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. 40/34, annex, 40 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 214, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985). 
439 See further: Ministry of Justice, Victims' Rights Act 2002: A Guide for Agencies Dealing With Victims of 
Offences (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2002). 
440 James H Liu, 'Social and Historical Contexts for Restorative and Retributive Justice: Te Ao Po- Te Ao 
Marama (Worlds of Dark and Light)' in Gabrielle Maxwell and James H Liu (eds.), Restorative Justice and 
Practices in New Zealand: Towards a Restorative Society (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2007). 
441 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
442 s 251(±), CYPF Act. See Chapter 13(IV)(C) and Chapter 6. 
443 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Bill (No. 6). This Bill was reported back from 
Select Committee on 11 August 2008, but as of 16 December 2008, no further progress has been made towards 
enactment. 
444 See Chapter 13(IV)(C)(2). 
75 
3. The rights of the family 
In contrast to previous models of youth justice where the state was likely to intervene and take 
over the role of the family ( e.g. through placement in residential institutions or the use of the 
indeterminate guardianship order), where the young person was found to be offending,445 the 
New Zealand system now seeks to give increased responsibility to families over responses to 
offending by their young people.446 Section 4 sets out the object of the 1989 CYPF Act as the 
promotion of the wellbeing of children, young people and their families. Any measures 
imposed in respect of offending should seek to strengthen the family group,447 and 'foster the 
ability' of family groups to devise their own means of dealing with offending by their 
children and young people.448 Any sanctions imposed should 'take the form most likely to 
maintain and promote the development of the child or young person within his her family'. 449 
In addition, Freeman has identified an additional caveat in the provisions dealing with 
participation by children and young people in matters concerning them.450 Rather than the 
more usual provision that the views of the child or young person should be given weight 
according to the age and maturity of the child or young person, the CYPF Act adds culture to 
these requirements. 
It is apparent from the consideration of the reform process leading up to the enactment of the 
CYPF Act, that the prominence given to the importance of the family was in recognition of 
the important part the extended family has in Maori and Polynesian culture. The CYPF Act 
states that services and facilities provided under the CYPF Act should be 'appropriate having 
regard to the needs, values, and beliefs of particular cultural and ethnic groups ' 451 and those 
persons administering these facilities and services should be 'sensitive to the cultural 
perspectives and aspirations of different racial groups in the community' .452 
445 John Seymour, Dealing With Young Offenders in New Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1976). 
446 s 208(c)(ii), CYPF Act. 
447 s 208(c)(i), CYPF Act. 
448 s 208(c)(ii), CYPF Act. 
449 s 208(f)(i), CYPF Act. 
450 MDA Freeman, 'The Importance of a Children's Rights Perspective in Litigation' (1996) 2 Buttenvorth's 
Family Law Journal 84. 
451 s 4(a)(i), CYPF Act. 
452 s 4(a)(iii), CYPF Act. 
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This concept of a partnership between families and state agencies in dealing .with offending 
by young people is a 'novel' one.453 Maxwell et al state that 'the intention of the legislation is 
to enable families to influence outcomes' .454 The clearest expression of this policy imperative 
is the FGC itself: a formal mechanism which allows the family to participate in the decision 
making process. It is argued that the integral part that the FGC plays in the youth justice 
system results in a 'quite radical' 455 transfer of state power to the family and wider 
community.456 Through the mechanism of the FGC, the family is consulted on decisions at 
various stages of the youth justice system including diversion from the formal criminal justice 
system, the making of orders in the Youth Court and decisions around custodial sanction and 
jurisdiction over offences.457 
D. Concluding Remarks 
This section has considered the place of rights in the legislative framework. The guiding 
principles do not mention the rights of children and young people, apart from during the 
investigation of offences. Proposals to enact a principle stating the importance of the rights of 
the child or young person (perhaps along the lines of the Canadian youth justice legislation) 
have not come to fruition. The youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act are exempt from the 
requirement to consider the welfare of the child or young person as paramount. In addition, 
the interests and rights of others such as victims of offences and the family of the young 
person are given prominence in the legislation. This raises questions as to whose rights and 
interests are paramount if there is a conflict. The practical effects of these legislative 
requirements are considered in the substantive chapters of this thesis.458 
453 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 11. 
454 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 21. 
455 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becraft, 'Youth Justice: The New Zealand Experience: Past Lessons 
and Future Challenges' Paper Presented at Juvenile Justice: From the Lessons of the Past to a Roadmap for the 
Future, Sydney, Australia, 2003, 8. 
456 See Chapter 7(V). 
457 See Chapter 5(II) and (III). 
458 See especially Chapter 13(IV). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter sets out the rights benchmarks which will be used in this research to evaluate the 
youth justice FGC. 
International and national sources of rights were considered individually. In the international 
sphere, New Zealand has ratified the ICCPR and the CRC. The CRC is the most relevant to 
the youth justice system, as it is a human rights convention specifically dealing with the rights 
of children and young people. As noted though, the ICCPR may provide additional 
protections where its provisions have not been repeated in the CRC. Additional United 
Nations standards (principally the Beijing Rules) provide additional detail on existing rights 
and provide guidance for national authorities on minimum standards for youth justice. 
In international law, by signing and ratifying the CRC, New Zealand has signified its 
willingness to be bound by its principles (subject of course to the three reservations which 
New Zealand has entered). However, the status accorded to the CRC by the judiciary remains 
ambiguous, although there is evidence of a willingness to pursue a rights-based approach 
towards children and young people, in family law cases at least. It was argued here, and will 
be argued throughout this research, that international standards like the CRC and the Beijing 
Rules represent an important benchmark for youth justice in New Zealand. The domestic 
human rights legislation, the NZBOR Act, was also considered. The importance of the 
NZBOR Act for this research is its codification of the common law procedural guarantees for 
the accused or convicted person. Many of these rights (such as legal assistance, the right to 
examine witnesses, and the prohibition on retrospectivity) are found in international 
instruments such as the ICCPR, and indeed one of the purposes of the NZBOR Act was to 
enshrine the ICCPR' s content into domestic legislation. The last part of this chapter " 
considered the place of rights within the framework of the CYPF Act. An important 
consideration for this research is the emphasis the CYPF Act places on the rights and interests 
of the family,459 and of the victim of the offence.460 
459 See Chapter 7(IV). 
460 See Chapter 13(IV). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE FGC AND THE 
YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM: POWERS AND 
FUNCTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although this thesis is focused on the rights of the young person in the youth justice FGC, it 
is necessary to discuss the operation of the youth justice system generally, so as to place the 
FGC in context. Firstly, this chapter will provide general information and statistics on the 
operation of the youth justice system in New Zealand. Secondly, the place of the youth justice 
FGC within the youth justice system will be discussed, including its powers and functions. 
The operation of the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act have previously been detailed 
in two major reports.461 The third aim of this chapter is to provide some background 
information on youth justice conferencing schemes in other similar jurisdictions. New 
Zealand was innovative in introducing the FGC model in 1989, but since that time a number 
of other jurisdictions have legislated for youth justice conferencing. These other conferencing 
schemes are used as points of comparison during this research, so it is necessary to discuss 
their operation here. Then, Chapter 6 will discuss procedure and practice at the FGC itself. 
II. OPERATION OF THE YOUTH JUSTICE LEGISLATION 
A. Responses to Offending by Children 
There is a legislative distinction between children (those aged ten years and over but less than 
fourteen years) and young people ( those aged fourteen years and over but less than seventeen 
years).462 The age of criminal responsibility in New Zealand remains at ten years of age.463 
461 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in Nf;W Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective 
Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004). On the Police 
Youth Diversion Scheme specifically see Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson, and Tracy Anderson, Police 
Youth Diversion- Final Report (Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2002). For best practice guidelines in the youth justice FGC see Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi 
Tuiavi'i, and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998). For legal commentary see Nessa Lynch, 'Youth Justice' in 
Warren Brookbanks and Julia Tolmie (eds.), Criminal Justice in Nf;W Zealand (Wellington: Lexis Nexis, 2007). 
462 s 2(1 ), CYPF Act. 
463 s 21, Crimes Act 1961. 
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This has been criticised by international bodies as being too low,464 however the potentially 
harsh effects of this low age of criminal responsibility are mitigated somewhat by the fact that 
children cannot be prosecuted for criminal offences except manslaughter and murder, and 
only then when it can be proven that the child knew that what he or she did was wrong.465 
This presumption of doli incapax for children under fourteen was well established in the 
common law since the seventeenth century.466 Instances of homicide committed by children 
are thankfully extremely rare in New Zealand.467 
For all other types of offence, children cannot be held legally responsible through prosecution, 
but may still be held accountable. The legislative provisions dealing with child offenders 
reflect the assumption that offending by this age group is usually symptomatic of ongoing 
problems in the home life of the child, and that such children should not be held solely 
responsible for their actions.468 Most offences committed by children are at the minor end of 
the scale, typically involving petty theft and minor assaults against other young children.469 
Minor cases of offending by children may be dealt with by means of a police warning at the 
scene of the offence, 470 or informally through the specialised Youth Aid section of the New 
Zealand Police.471 More serious offending may be dealt with through referral to a FGC.472 
464 E.g. the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child: Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child: New Zealand, CRC/C/15/Add. 216, paras 20-21. 
465 s 22(1 ), CYPF Act. 
466 Stephen Bandalli, 'Children, Responsibility and the New Youth Justice' in Barry Goldson (ed.), The New 
Youth Justice (Dorset: Russell House, 2000). However the protections of doli incapax have now been reduced in 
England and Wales. See further Paul Cavadino, 'Goodbye Dali, Must We Leave You?' (1997) 9 Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 156. 
467 A recent infamous case was the killing of Michael Choy, a pizza delivery person, by five assailants, one of 
whom was a twelve year old child. See R v Kurariki (2002) 22 FRNZ 319. 
468 Gabrielle Maxwell and Jeremy Robertson, Child Offenders: A Report to the Ministers of Justice, Police and 
Social Welfare (Wellington: Office of the Commissioner for Children, 1995). 
469 Gabrielle Maxwell and Jeremy Robertson, Child Offenders: A Report to the Ministers of Justice, Police and 
Social Welfare (Wellington: Office of the Commissioner for Children, 1995). 
470 s 209, CYPF Act. 
471 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002). 
472 See below at III. 
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There have been calls for increased powers to deal with serious and persistent child offenders, 
whom it is alleged are out of control and are not being held properly accountable. 473 The 
contention that there are not sufficient powers to deal with child offending is unfounded. 
Granted, children can only be prosecuted in cases of homicide, but there are many options to 
deal with off ending by children such as warnings, the Police Youth Diversion scheme and the 
child offender FGC (which is discussed in more detail below). This FGC has the power to 
recommend a referral to the Family Court for a declaration that the child is in need of care and 
protection due to offending.474 
Overall, the question arises as to why the power to refer children to the Family Court for 
section 67 declarations on grounds of offending is not being used regularly, if indeed there is 
a problem with serious and persistent child offenders.475 The Family Court has extensive 
powers to address both the underlying care and protection issues which are contributing to the 
child's offending through the ordinary Family Court orders,476 and the effects of the offending 
on the community and the victim through additional criminal justice powers contained in 
section 84. The latest available statistics from the Family Court indicate that only sixty eight 
applications were made in 2005 for section 67 declarations on grounds of offending.477 In 
addition, only six applications were made for section 84 orders addressing the effect of a 
child's offending through forfeiture, reparation or admonishment.478 
Despite the existence of these extensive powers to deal with child offending (which seem to 
be rarely exercised), there have been calls for legislative reform to allow the prosecution of 
children. A Private Member's Bill proposed by the New Zealand First Party which would 
essentially have allowed children to have been prosecuted on the same basis as adults was 
473 These comments have primarily been from the MP Ron Mark who drafted a Private Members Bill which 
sought to lower the age of criminal responsibility in response to a 'spate' of serious crimes by children. See for 
example 'Young Offenders Account for 43% of Apprehensions' Press Release New Zealand First Party, 7 
August 2007. 
474 s 258(a), CYPF Act. The child may then be the subject of a wide range of orders even up to custody and 
guardianship orders. 
475 As alleged by the Hon. Ron Mark in his speech on the first reading of the Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) 
Bill 2006. (26 March 2006) 630 NZPD 2321. 
476 Such as counselling orders (s 74, CYPF Act), services orders (s 86, CYPF Act), support orders (s 91, CYPF 
Act) and custody orders (s 101, CYPF Act). 
477 Ong Su-Wuen, Family Court Statistics 2005 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). These are the latest 
available Family Court statistics as of October 2008. 
478 Ong Su-Wuen, Family Court Statistics 2005 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
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defeated in Parliament.479 The 2007 Discussion Document on an update of the CYPF Act, 
contained a proposal to include twelve and thirteen year old children who are alleged to have 
committed serious indictable offences within the jurisdiction of the Youth Court,480 but as yet 
this proposal has not been translated into legislation.481 
B. Responses to Offending By Young People 
Responses to offending by young people (those aged fourteen and over but under seventeen) 
will now be considered. This is the age group which is the focus of this research.482 
l. The upper age limit of the CYPF Act. 
Despite the age of majority in New Zealand being twenty years, 483 the youth justice provisions 
(similarly with the care and protection provisions) of the CYPF Act do not extend to young 
people beyond the age of seventeen years.484 This means that young people over the age of 
seventeen are dealt with through the adult system and not the specialised Youth Court. The 
upper limit also means that those who have attained seventeen years of age cannot benefit 
from the state funded Youth Advocate scheme and must use the over-burdened Legal Aid 
scheme (if eligible). The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child is concerned 
that special protection is not offered to all persons under eighteen years during the 
479 Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill 2006. 
480 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
481 See further Report to the Ministry of Social Development: Safeguarding Our Children, Updating the 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989- Overall Summary of Submissions (Wellington: Allen 
and Clarke Policy and Regulatory Specialists Limited, 2007). At the time of writing (December 2008), the 
incoming National-led government has made this change one of its legislative priorities. 
482 See Chapter 6. 
483 s 4(i), Age of Majority Act 1970. 
484 s 2(1), CYPF Act. The exclusion of seventeen year olds from the youth justice (and also the care and 
protection) provisions of the Act is part of a confusing array of policies around the definition of children and 
young people in New Zealand legislation. The 2003 non- governmental organisation report to the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child identified a range of ages at which the young person attains 'adult' 
status in New Zealand in different contexts, see Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Children and Youth in 
Aotearoa 2003 (Wellington: Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, 2003). The official investigation into the 
death of Liam Ashley (the seventeen year old remand prisoner murdered by a violent adult prisoner with which 
he was being transported) also noted that 'there are differences in the interpretation and application of youth 
status across Government which results in different management practices and requirements by the various 
agencies.' The exclusion of seventeen year olds from the provisions of the Act meant that instead of being dealt 
with through the Youth Court and remanded to a youth justice residence or bailed, Liam Ashley was charged in 
the adult District Court and remanded to an adult prison. This was arguably one of the contributing factors to his 
murder: Louise McDonald, Investigation of the Circumstances Surrounding the Death at Auckland Public 
Hospital of Prisoner Liam John Ashley of Auckland Central Remand Prison on 25 August 2006, Report to: Chief 
Executive Department of Corrections (Wellington: Department of Corrections, 2006). 
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investigation, prosecution and disposition of criminal offences and has recommended that the 
ambit of the Act be extended to include eighteen year olds.485 The Human Rights Commission 
has also recommended that the upper age limit be raised to eighteen years.486 In response the 
New Zealand Government promised a review of the upper age limit.487 A proposed 
amendment to the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act would include seventeen 
year olds within the definition of young person in section 2(1) of the CYPF Act and thereby 
include this group within the youth justice system.488 
2. Young people and the police489 
(a) Police diversion 
The scheme of the CYPF Act emphasises that formal criminal proceedings should not be 
instituted against a young person if there is an alternative means of dealing with the matter.490 
In line with this principle the majority of offending by young people is dealt with without 
formal charges being laid.491 The CYPF Act has a strong emphasis on diversion from formal 
criminal proceedings and custodial penalties. 492 
485 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: New Zealand, CRC/C/15/Add.216, 
2003, paras 20, 21. 
486 Human Rights Commission, New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights: Priorities for Action 2005-2010 
(Wellington: Human Rights Commission, 2005), para 2.2. 
487 Second Periodic Report of New Zealand to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/93/ Add.4., paras 
44, 45. 
488 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill (No. 6). This Bill was reported back from 
Select Committee stage on 11 August 2008, but no further progress has been made towards enactment. For 
discussion on the implications of this for the resourcing of the youth justice system see further Report to the 
Ministry of Social Development: Safeguarding Our Children, Updating the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act 1989- Overall Summary of Submissions (Wellington: Allen and Clarke Policy and Regulatory 
Specialists Limited, 2007). 
489 For a discussion of the statutory regime for questioning of children and young people in police custody see 
Chapter 4(IV)(B). 
490 s 208(a), CYPF Act. 
491 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 14. 
This is the first year in which specific statistics on youth justice have been produced. These are the latest 
available statistics on the youth justice system. The 2007 statistics are not available at time of writing (Personal 
communication from Bazia Arnold, Youth Justice Policy Manager at the Ministry of Justice). 
492 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson, and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002), Gabrielle Maxwell, 
Jeremy Robertson, and Venezia Kingi, 'Achieving the Diversion and Decarceration of Young Offenders in New 
Zealand' (2002) 19 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 76. 
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The CYPF Act mandates the police to first consider warning the young person, if the offence 
warrants it.493 Minor incidences of offending by young people (for example, minor property 
damage, possession of cannabis, minor incidences of shoplifting and theft494) are usually dealt 
with by means of an immediate police warning at the scene of the offence. In 2006, 26% of 
young people coming to notice were dealt with by means of a warning.495 Offending may also 
be dealt with through the Police Youth Diversion Scheme. Youth Aid officers may put a 
diversion plan (also known as 'alternative action plan') in place. Plans typically involve an 
apology to the victim of the offence, completion of community work hours, the writing of 
essays, or payment of reparation to the victim.496 In 2006, 39% of young people coming to 
notice were dealt with through the Police Youth Aid diversion scheme.497 
It is evident that New Zealand has been successful in establishing a comprehensive statutory 
diversion scheme where the majority of children and young people coming to notice of the 
police will be dealt with without recourse to prosecution.498 There is no doubt but that the rate 
of diversion compares favourably with rates of diversion in other similar jurisdictions.499 The 
police have generally embraced diversion, helped by the existence of a highly specialised 
Youth Aid section.500 The existence of specially trained officers to deal with youth justice 
matters is firmly in line with international best practice. 501 Previous diversionary schemes 
493 Pursuant to s 209, CYPF Act. 
494 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), 202. 
495 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 14. 
496 See further Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002). 
497 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 14. 
498 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson, and Venezia Kingi, 'Achieving the Diversion and Decarceration of 
Young Offenders in New Zealand' (2002) 19 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 76. 
499 John Muncie and Barry Goldson (eds.), Comparative Youth Justice (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 
Kenneth Polk, Christine Alder, Damon Muller, and Katherine, Rechtman, Early Intervention: Diversion and 
Youth Conferencing - A National Profile and Review of Current Approaches to Diverting Juveniles from the 
Criminal Justice System (Canberra: Australian Government Attorney General's Department, 2003). 
50° For discussion on the culture within the Youth Aid section of the New Zealand Police see, L Thomas 
Winfree, 'The New Zealand Police and Restorative Justice Philosophy' (2004) 50 Crime & Delinquency 189. 
501 Rule 12.1, UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules). The 
Police are also heavily involved in crime prevention and education in schools through the Youth Education 
Service. Examples of such programmes are Crime Prevention and Social Responsibility, DARE, Keeping 
Ourselves Safe, Kia Kaha and School Road Safety Education. See further New Zealand Police Youth Policing 
Plan 2005-2006 (Wellington: New Zealand Police, 2005). This Youth Policing Plan is the latest available at the 
time of writing. 
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allowed the police to take control of the system and to sidestep the diversionary mechanisms 
completely.502 Cases that were being referred for diversion were therefore cases where the 
police had already made the decision that prosecution was not justified.503 The present 
diversion scheme is evidently more independent and mainstream. There is clear statutory 
guidance that formal criminal justice proceedings are to be a last resort.504 The police may 
only make an arrest if there are no alternative means of dealing with the case. If the police 
wish to lay a charge in a non-arrest case, the statutory requirement to consult with the youth 
justice co-ordinator means that there is less chance of the police circumventing diversionary 
mechanisms and proceeding straight to prosecution. 
As noted earlier, more than one-third of young people coming to notice are dealt with through 
the Police Youth Diversion Scheme.505 This scheme is operated entirely by the police, thus 
lacking independent oversight. Nonetheless, it is evident that the scale of the present Police 
Youth Diversion scheme was not envisaged by the framers of the CYPF Act. As Maxwell et 
al have stated: 
it could be argued that it was not the intention of the [CYPF] Act that Police should make decisions 
about outcomes except in relatively minor matters that did not require substantive actions and it was the 
intention that the rights of families and young people would be best protected in a family group 
conference or the Youth Court when determining actions intended to make young people accountable 
for offending.506 
In spite of this, an evaluation of the Police Youth Diversion scheme in 2002 concluded that 
the actions of the police in developing the scheme were broadly within the principles of the 
CYPF Act, namely the legislative presumption against formal criminal proceedings and 
keeping matters within the community where possible. The report also praised Youth Aid 
officers in their efforts to adopt the ethos of the CYPF Act. 507 Some concerns were raised 
however about the significant variability between geographical areas in regard to outcomes. 508 
502 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1987). 
503 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1987), 125. 
504 s 208(a) and s 209, CYPF Act. 
505 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007) 
506 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson, and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre: 2002), 86. 
507 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre: 2002). See also L Thomas Winfree, 'The New Zealand Police 
and Restorative Justice Philosophy' (2004) 50 Crime & Delinquency 189. 
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(b) Arrest 
Police powers of arrest without warrant are limited in relation to children and young people.509 
The police officer must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the arrest is necessary to 
ensure appearance before court,510 prevent further offending,511 or prevent the loss or 
destruction of evidence or interference with witnesses.512 Arrest can only take place where 
these functions could not reasonably be carried out through the use of a summons. However, 
the police retain the power of arrest in cases where the young person is believed to have 
committed a purely indictable offence,513 or the police officer believes on reasonable grounds 
that the arrest is in the public interest.514 The Achieving Effective Outcomes report found that 
although the use of arrest declined dramatically in the years immediately following the 
introduction of the CYPF Act, the rate of arrest had climbed again during 2000/2001 'in 
circumstances that do not appear to be consistent with the principles and objects of the 
[CYPF] Act.' 515 If the police wish to lay a charge against a young person who has not been 
arrested, there is a statutory requirement to consult with a youth justice co-ordinator and an 
Intention to Charge FGC must be held.516 
C. Young People in the Criminal Courts 
Young people may be charged with any criminal offence. The vast majority of charges (with 
the exception of serious indictable offences and minor traffic offences which may be dealt 
with through the adult courts) are finalised in the Youth Court. 517 The Youth Court is a 
508 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson, and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre: 2002), 86. 
509 s 214, CYPF Act. 
510 s 214(1)(a)(i), CYPF Act. 
511 s 214(1)(a)(ii), CYPF Act. 
512 s 214(1 )(a)(iii), CYPF Act. 
513 s 214(1)(a)(i), CYPF Act. The fact that the alleged offence is purely indictable does not necessarily mean that 
the arrest is in the public interest: YP v Youth Court at Upper Hutt & Attorney General, 30/1/07, HC Wellington, 
Mallon J, CIV-2006-485-1905. 
514 s 214(2)(a), CYPF Act. 
515 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson and Venezia Kingi, 'Achieving the Diversion and Decarceration of 
Young Offenders in New Zealand' (2002) 19 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 76. 
516 See (III)(C)below. 
517 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
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specialised court which is separate from the adult criminal justice system, but operates 
administratively as a division of the District Court.518 It replaced the former Children and 
Young Persons Court which dealt with care and protection proceedings as well as offending 
by young people. The Youth Court has jurisdiction over young people who are charged with 
offences apart from manslaughter, murder and traffic offences not punishable by 
imprisonment.519 Serious indictable offences may be dealt with through the adult court system. 
Due to the legislative emphasis on diversion from prosecution,520 only about one third of 
police apprehensions of young people are dealt with through prosecution.521 The number of 
young people prosecuted (both through the Youth Court and the adult courts) in 2006 was 
6202.522 This was a slight increase on 2005 (5602) and 2004 (5918).523 
The Youth Court is a division of the District Court, but in recognition of the youth of the 
clientele who appear before it, procedure is different to that of the normal criminal court. To 
preserve confidentiality there is no public access to the Youth Court.524 In order to reduce the 
amount of waiting time for young people and their families, and to avoid the negative effects 
of young people associating with each other while waiting, the Youth Court is required to 
operate an appointment system.525 This provision is designed to reduce lengthy waiting times 
and make appearances at court more predictable and less stressful for young people appearing 
on charges.526 Every young person appearing before the Youth Court charged with an offence 
· is assigned a state funded Youth Advocate unless private legal representation has already been 
arranged. 527 Youth Advocates are lawyers specially selected to act for young people. 528 
518 s 321, CYPF Act. 
519 s 272(3), CYPF Act. 
520 s 208(a), CYPF Act. 
521 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 14. 
522 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 60. 
523 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 60. 
524 s 329, CYPF Act. 
525 s 332, CYPF Act. 
526 There were criticisms of the former Children and Young Persons Court in relation waiting times and 
unsuitability for young people and their families. See further Terrence Loomis, An Evaluation of the Children's 
Advocate Scheme Pilot in the Auckland Children and Young Persons Court (Auckland: The Social Research and 
Development Trust, 1985), Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and 
Practice (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
527 s 323( 1 ), CYPF Act. Private legal representation is almost unknown in the Youth Court due to the prevailing 
low socio-economic status of its clientele. 
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In the case of a child or young person charged with murder or manslaughter, the preliminary 
hearing will take place in the Youth Court.529 Serious indictable offences may be transferred to 
the District Court for trial or sentencing. 530 Purely indictable offences are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Youth Court unless Youth Court jurisdiction is offered. 531 Section 18 of the 
Sentencing Act 2002 does not permit a sentence of imprisonment to be imposed on a young 
person unless the offence is purely indictable. Section 283( o) of the CYPF Act allows a young 
person over the age of fifteen years to be convicted and transferred to the District Court for 
sentence. In the case of conviction and transfer to the District Court, the Court must consider 
'all other alternatives' available to it and be satisfied that none are appropriate to the 
circumstances of the case. 532 The Youth Court Judge is required to record his or her reasons in 
writing if taking such a step.533 In the years 2004 to 2006, the proportion of young people 
convicted in the District Court or High Court534 has remained constant at about 5%. 535 This is 
a significant reduction from the early 1990s where the proportion of young people convicted 
was at about one-tenth of prosecutions involving young people.536 
D. Young People in Custody 
1. Youth justice custody 
The CYPF Act promotes non-custodial and community based sanctions where practicable, 
therefore there are few young people held in custodial institutions.537 The latest official figure 
available for the amount of young people in youth justice custody is the daily count of 30th 
528 Youth Advocates may attend the FGC and make representations on behalf of the young person, similarly with 
any proceedings relating to residential institutions, s 324(3), CYPF Act. See further Allison Morris, Gabrielle 
Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role and Responsibilities 
(Wellington: Institute of Criminology for Victoria Link, 1997). See Chapters 8 and 9 on the right to legal 
assistance at the FGC. 
529 s 272(1) and (3), CYPF Act. 
530 s 274, CYPF Act. 
531 s 275 and s 276, CYPF Act. 
532 s 290(2), CYPF Act. 
533 s 290(3), CYPF Act. 
534 This occurs after the case is transferred for trial or sentencing. 
535 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 61. 
536 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 61. 
537 See for example the much higher rates of young people in custody in England and Wales: Youth Justice 
Board for England and Wales, Youth Justice Annual Statistics 2005-06 (London: Youth Justice Board, 2007). 
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June 2006, where there were 180 young people in custody.538 The lack of more up to date 
information about the number of young people in custody is frustrating. 539 
At present there are three youth justice residences in New Zealand. These residences house 
young people completing supervision with residence orders and also those on remand.540 
However, there is a significant shortfall in the number of youth justice residential beds 
available. There are plans to build an additional facility in the North Island to cope with 
increasing demand.541 As a result there are significant problems with accommodating young 
people on remand. A young person must not be held on remand unless he or she is likely to 
abscond or to commit further offences.542 However, there are not enough beds available 
because most available beds are taken up with young offenders completing supervision with 
residence orders. Because young people cannot be remanded to an adult penal institution,543 
and there is a lack of suitable facilities, they are regularly remanded to police cells - facilities 
designed to hold adult prisoners for short periods of time.544 A Parliamentary Question 
revealed that in the first six months of 2006, 329 young people spent more than twenty four 
hours in police cells.545 In some cases remands in police cells have stretched to seventeen 
days. 546 Young people may be left in situations which are inhumane and degrading. Access to 
538 Department of Child, Youth and Family Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2006 (Wellington: 
Ministry of Social Development, 2006). 
539 Repeated enquiries were made to Child, Youth and Family in 2008, but the answer was that a daily count is 
not kept. This seems highly unlikely as there must be information available to enable Youth Court Judges to 
decide whether a supervision with residence order can be made. 
540 Two are located in the North Island: Korowai Manaaki Youth Justice Residence is situated in Wiri, South 
Auckland and has forty six beds, and the Lower North Youth Justice Residential Centre is situated in Palmerston 
North and has thirty beds. Another is located in the South Island: Te Puna Wai o Tuhinapo is in Rolleston and 
has thirty two beds. Source: www.cyf.govt.nz (last viewed 12 February 2008). 
541 Work on a new forty bed residence (Youth Justice Central) is to begin on a site near Parekarangi in the Bay of 
Plenty in October 2008. See 'Fact Sheet: Youth Justice Residence - Rotorua' (August 2008), available at 
www.cyf.govt.nz (last viewed 16 October 2008). 
542 s 239(1), CYPF Act. 
543 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Court Has No Power to Remand Young People to 
Prisons: Crown Law Opinion' Court in the Act N(M)sletter, No 21, 21 March 2006, available at 
www.courts.govt.nz/youth (Last viewed 17 May 2008). 
544 s 239(2) of the CYPF Act states that young people should not be remanded to police custody unless the young 
person is violent and there are no other suitable facilities available. 
545 Hon Ruth Dyson, documents tabled in response to Parliamentary Question no 8068, Questions for Written 
Answer, 28th June 2006. 
546 Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Police Cell Remands' December 2002, Court in the Act Newsletter, available online 
at http://www.justice.govt.nz/youth/court-in-the-act/issue-5.html (last viewed 12 January 2008). 
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education is non-existent and young people may have contact with older adult offenders. The 
Principal Youth Court Judge has publicly criticised the situation as being in breach of New 
Zealand's obligations under human rights legislation to prohibit inhuman or degrading 
treatment.547 The Human Rights Commission has also expressed concern about the situation.548 
The chronic shortage of residential placements for young people on remand is not a new 
problem, having been criticised in 1997 in a report commissioned by the Children's 
Commissioner.549 While the numbers of youth justice residential places have increased since 
then, so has the demand. Consideration is being given to alternatives to remand, for instance 
electronic tagging of young people.550 
2. Adult prisons 
As noted, there is provision for some young people found guilty of serious offending to be 
transferred to the adult courts for sentence. These young people may then be sentenced to an 
adult correctional facility. 551 International standards require that young people be separated 
from adult prisoners, but New Zealand has entered a reservation to this requirement and 
retains the right to mix age groups in custody if it is in the interest of the prisoners 
concerned.552 The Department of Corrections has established youth wings in four of the adult 
male prisons. Those young people under seventeen are to be housed in Specialist Youth Units. 
Seventeen year olds are not eligible for Specialist Youth Units in prisons unless they are 
547 Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Children and Young People in Conflict with the Law: Asking the Hard Questions' 
Paper presented at the XVII World Congress of the International Association of Youth and Family Judges and 
Magistrates, Belfast, 2006, 11. 
548 Human Rights Commission, Human Rights in New Zealand Today (Wellington: Human Rights Commission, 
2004), 212. 
549 Robert Ludbrook, Young People in Police Cells: A Report by the Commissioner of Children to the Minister of 
Social Welfare and the Commissioner for Police (Wellington: Office of the Commissioner of Children, 1997). 
550 A pilot programme of supervised bail for young people has taken place, with an evaluation due in early 2007. 
See New Zealand Government Press Release, 'New Programme to Focus on Young People on Bail' gth June 
2004. Positive results from this pilot were presented at the Working Together: A Practical Conference on 
Offending by Young People in New Zealand conference in November 2007. See Gabrielle Martin, Dr Elaine 
Mossman and Sam Thompson, 'The Supported Bail Programme'. Available at www.yoc.org.nz (last viewed 12 
March 2008) 
551 David Harpham, Census of Prison Inmates and Home Detainees 2003 (Wellington: Department of 
Corrections, 2004): 2003 figures indicate that less than twenty young people were serving sentences in adult 
prison. However, there were 327 prisoners in the seventeen to nineteen age bracket. Although there is no 
breakdown as to the specific ages of this group, it is likely that a significant number of these were aged 
seventeen. As noted the Government has been criticised for failing to include all under eighteen year olds in the 
provisions of the CYPF Act. These are the latest available statistics showing the breakdown of age groups in 
prison. The prison census series is no longer published. 
552 Article 37( c), CRC. 
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specifically designated as vulnerable prisoners. 553 There is a complete lack of facilities for 
young female offenders and so young women are always detained in adult women's prisons.554 
This situation has been criticised by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 
and also in the 2004 Report of the United Nations Committee against Torture555 but, as yet, 
there has been no substantive progress in removing the reservation. 
Under the previous New Zealand regulations governing correctional facilities, prisoners under 
the age of twenty were not to mix with prisoners over twenty years of age 'so far as 
practicable' .556 Under the present regulations, it is only prisoners under eighteen years of age 
that must be separated from those over eighteen years.557 When outside the prison (for 
example, when being transported to and from court) prisoners under eighteen are separated 
from those over eighteen only 'where practicable'. This policy was one of the contributing 
factors in the recent murder of a seventeen year old remand prisoner who was being 
transported with an adult prisoner.558 The move to lower the distinguishing age from twenty to 
eighteen was apparently to 'align [the Corrections Regulations] with the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child' .559 As the Government is not usually so prompt in 
aligning legislation with the CRC it seem likely that the Convention is being used to justify 
what is doubtless a resource driven policy change. 560 
553 Second Periodic Report of New Zealand to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
CRC/C/93/ Add.4,at para 251. 
554 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Children and Young People in Conflict with the Law: Asking 
the Hard Questions'. Paper presented at the XVII World Congress of the International Association of Youth and 
Family Judges and Magistrates, Belfast, 2006, 11. 
555 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Consideration of New Zealand Country Report, CAT/C/SR .328 
and 327 (1998). 
556 Penal Institutions Regulations 2000, reg 132. 
557 Corrections Regulations 2005, reg 179. 
558 Louise McDonald Investigation of the Circumstances Surrounding the Death at Auckland Public Hospital of 
Prisoner Liam John Ashley of Auckland Central Remand Prison on 25 August 2006, Report to: Chief Executive 
Department of Corrections (Wellington: Department of Corrections, 2006). 
559 Department of Corrections' Corrections Act Implementation Committee statement quoted in Louise 
McDonald, Investigation of the Circumstances Surrounding the Death at Auckland Public Hospital of Prisoner 
Liam John Ashley of Auckland Central Remand Prison on 25 August 2006, Report to: Chief Executive 
Department of Corrections (Wellington: Department of Corrections,2006), para 284. 
56° For example, the upper age limit of the CYPF Act remains at seventeen years despite repeated criticism from 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
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E. Concluding Remarks 
This section has briefly outlined the main features of the youth justice system under the CYPF 
Act. The majority of offending is dealt with through action by the police, either through a 
warning administered by front-line staff at the scene of the offence, or through the police 
diversion scheme administered by the specialist Youth Aid division. Only about one-third of 
young people coming to notice are dealt with through prosecution, with a minority of these 
receiving a custodial sentence or being transferred to the adult criminal justice system. The 
role and powers of the youth justice process which is the subject of this research will now be 
considered. 
III. THE YOUTH JUSTICE FGC 
A. Statutory Functions of the FGC 
The term 'youth justice family group conference' refers to a statutory decision making forum 
in which the child or young person, their family, 561 state officials and possibly the victim of 
the offence meet under the auspices of Child, Youth and Family to decide on a plan to deal 
with offending by that child or young person. The FGC is a 'vital and integral part of the 
procedures for the delivery of youth justice' .562 The following table shows the amount of 
youth justice FGCs convened in the last three years. 563 
Table 1: Number of youth justice FGCs held annually 
Fiscal Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
New 6,543 6,524 7,870 7,803 7,964 
Reviewed 75 89 94 114 119 
Reconvened 824 1,014 1,243 1,242 1,113 
TOTAL HELD 7,442 7,627 9,207 9,159 9,196 
From this table, it is possible to see the large amount of children, young people and their 
families who are involved in the youth justice FGC process. There are six instances in which 
a FGC must be convened, however it is only the intention to charge and court-referred FGCs 
561 s 251 uses the terms 'family, whanau or family group' but for convenience the term 'family' is used 
throughout the text. 
562 Police v T [2006] NZFLR 1057, para 1, per Rodney Hansen J. 
563 Information request made to Child, Youth and Family, 11 November 2008. 
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which are the subject of this research as these types of FGC are involved in exerc1smg 
criminal justice type powers.564 The functions of all types ofFGC are outlined briefly below. 
B. Child Offender FGC 
If a child comes to the notice of the police due to serious or repeated offending (the level of 
which causes concern for the child's wellbeing), the police may form the opinion that the 
child is in need of care and protection. Off ending of this nature by a child is a ground for care 
and protection under section 14(e) of the CYPF Act. A FGC may then take place after 
consultation with the youth justice co-ordinator. 565 This is a youth justice conference, but with 
a difference. As well as formulating a plan to deal with the child's offending by making 
recommendations relating to accountability and addressing needs, 566 the FGC may recommend 
that an application be made to the Family Court for a section 67 declaration that the child is in 
need of care and protection.567 If the Family Court Judge does find that the child is in need of 
care or protection, he or she has the power to make wide-ranging orders, from parenting 
orders to support orders addressing the needs of the child and their family. 568 The Family 
Court Judge may also order the parents of the child to come up if called, or order reparation to 
be paid to the victim of the offence.569 Unusually, the child's need for care and protection on 
the ground of off ending must be demonstrated to the criminal standard of proof ( that is 
beyond reasonable doubt) rather than the civil standard of the balance of probabilities usually 
applicable to care proceedings.570 
C. Intention to Charge FGC 
As discussed above, the majority of offending by young people is dealt with by the police 
through warnings or the Police Youth Aid Diversion scheme. For more serious offending, if 
the police wish to lay a charge against a young person who has not been arrested, a youth 
564 See further Chapter 7. The child offender FGC is also involved in a response to offending but is part of the 
care and protection system. 
565 s 18(3), CYPF Act. 
566 s 260, CYPF Act with regard to the principles set out in s 208, CYPF Act. 
567 s 260(3)(c), CYPF Act. These applications are rare: Ong Su-Wuen, Family Court Statistics 2005 (Wellington: 
Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
568 s 83, CYPF Act. 
569 s 84, CYPF Act. 
570 s 198, CYPF Act. 
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justice co-ordinator must be consulted and a FGC held. 571 Providing the young person admits 
the offence,572 this type of FGC is tasked with deciding on a plan to keep the charges out of 
the Youth Court. If the agreed actions in the plan are completed within the specified 
timeframe, the police will agree not to charge the young person and it will be the end of the 
matter. The intention to charge FGC573 is one of the types of FGC which are the subjects of 
this research. 
D. Court-referred FGC 
The two types of FGC discussed above operate outside the formal court based system, but 
even when a young person's case has entered the Youth Court system through a prosecution, 
the FGC has a central role in the decision making process. The court -referred FGC is one of 
the two categories of FGC which are the focus of this research and may be convened in two 
situations. 
1. Court-referred FGC: charges 'not denied' 
When the young person appears before the Youth Court, he or she is asked to plead 'denied' 
or 'not denied' to the charge(s). The Principal Youth Court Judge has described the 'not 
denied' mechanism as 'a useful but somewhat odd mechanism' .574 It allows the young person 
to state the charge is not contested, leaving the FGC to ascertain whether the charge is 
actually admitted.575 If the charge is 'not denied', the Youth Court Judge is required to adjourn 
the case to allow a FGC to be held. 576 Provided the young person admits the offence, the FGC 
has the task of agreeing on what action and/or sanctions should result and recommending to 
the court accordingly.577 
571 s 245, CYPF Act. 
572 s 259, CYPF Act. 
573 Hereinafter ITC FGC in the text. 
574 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Justice Family Group Conferences: A Quick 'Nip and 
Tuck' or Transplant Surgery: What would the Doctor Order in 20067' Paper presented at the International 
Coriference on the Family Group Conference, Coming Home, Te Hokinga Mai, 2006, Wellington, New Zealand. 
See Chapter 9. 
575 The exact meaning of the terms 'not denied' and 'admitted' and the implications for the young person's right 
to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty and the right to a fair trial is the subject of Chapter Ten of this 
thesis. 
576 s 258(d) ands 259(1), CYPF Act. 
577 s 258(d), CYPF Act. The limits on sanctions are discussed in Chapter 12, while Chapter 13 considers the 
objectives underlying FGC outcomes. 
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2. Court referred FGC: charges 'denied' 
If the young person denies the charge a hearing date will be set. Matters proceed to a 
defended hearing in accordance with the Summary Proceedings Act 1957.578 Every young 
person appearing before the Youth Court charged with an offence is assigned a state funded 
Youth Advocate unless private legal representation has already been arranged.579 Hearings are 
closed to the public. 580 If the offence is proved at the defended hearing, the Youth Court Judge 
must adjourn the case and refer the matter to a FGC.581 This FGC has the task of deciding 
'how the young person should be dealt with for that offence, and to recommend to the Court 
accordingly' .582 
3. The role of the Youth Court Judge 
When the case has been adjourned for an FGC, the FGC then has the responsibility of 
formulating a plan or recommendation in relation to the young person's case.583 This plan or 
recommendation is presented to the Youth Court Judge at a later hearing. The Youth Court 
Judge is not bound to accept the plan or recommendation decided by the FGC but must have 
regard to such plans or recommendations when making decisions. 584 There are no statistics 
available on the percentage of FGC plans which are accepted.585 However, the Principal Youth 
Court Judge has stated that 95% of plans are accepted,586 and Maxwell et al noted that 
although the outcomes of court-referred FGCs are technically recommendations, non-
acceptance by the Youth Court is extremely rare. 587 If the requirements of the FGC plan are 
578 s 321, CYPF Act, subject to Schedule 1. 
579 s 323(1), CYPF Act. 
580 s 329, CYPF Act. 
581 s 247(e), CYPF Act. 
582 s 258(d), CYPF Act. 
583 s 258(d), CYPF Act. 
584 s 279, CYPF Act. 
585 Enquiry to the Youth Justice Policy section of the Ministry of Justice, August 2007. 
586 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Justice: The New Zealand Experience: Past Lessons 
and Future Challenges' Paper Presented at Juvenile Justice: From the Lessons of the Past to a Roadmap for the 
Future, Sydney, Australia, 2003. This was also the experience of the two youth justice co-ordinators whose 
practice was observed during this research. 
587 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 230. See Chapter 12. 
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completed within the agreed timeframe, there will usually be a discharge pursuant to section 
282 or 283(a) of the CYPF Act. The Judge may make further orders under section 283 
particularly where the FGC plan has not been successfully completed. 588 
E. FGC: Custodial Placement 
On occasion, it is necessary for the protection of the public for a young person to be placed in 
Child, Youth and Family or police custody pending the resolution of a 'denied' charge in the 
Youth Court. A FGC must then be convened to make recommendations to the Youth Court 
Judge on whether the custodial placement should continue and where the young person 
should be placed.589 
F. FGC at the Discretion of the Youth Court 
Under the CYPF Act, the Youth Court Judge has a residual discretion to order a FGC at any 
stage of proceedings where it appears necessary or desirable to do so.590 The Youth Court 
Bench Book gives as an example a situation where the Youth Court has to make a decision 
whether Youth Court jurisdiction is to be offered to a young person accused of a purely 
indictable offence.591 
G. Concluding Remarks 
This section has considered the six situations where there is a statutory requirement to 
convene a FGC. The FGC has a central role in decision making at all stages of the youth 
justice system including resolving off ending by children, diversion from prosecution, and 
after prosecution, in the Youth Court. It will be the intention to charge and court-referred 
FGCs that are the focus of this research. This is because criminal justice type powers are 
being exercised in these types of FGC.592 The theoretical foundations of the youth justice FGC 
and the type oflegal process which the FGC represents, is considered later in this chapter. 593 
588 Orders that the Youth Court may make are listed in s 283, CYPF Act and include discharge, admonishment, 
come up if called, fines, reparation, restitution, forfeiture, disqualification from driving, supervision orders, 
community work orders, supervision with activity, supervision with residence and conviction and transfer to the 
District Court for sentence. 
589 s 247(c), CYPF Act. 
590 s 28 lB, CYPF Act. 
591 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008) 
592 See Chapter 7. 
593 See Chapter 7. 
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IV. CONFERENCING SCHEMES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A. Introduction 
New Zealand was innovative in introducing the first statutory based conferencing scheme 
under the CYPF Act in 1989, but similar schemes now exist in most comparable jurisdictions. 
Youth justice is an area in which there has been a remarkable 'policy transfer' between 
jurisdictions,594 and the youth justice FGC is arguably one of New Zealand's best known 
policy exports. The FGC model has been adapted and adopted by a number of other 
jurisdictions.595 This research is not a purely comparative study, as it is focused on the New 
Zealand youth justice FGC. However, reference will be made to the legislation of other 
jurisdictions which have adopted the New Zealand model of conferencing. A theme running 
through this research is the argument that other jurisdictions utilising conferencing have in 
some cases developed better safeguards for the rights of young people compared to New 
Zealand. This section will give some background information on conferencing schemes in 
other jurisdictions. 
B. Conferencing Schemes in Australia 
I. Introduction 
The most comparable schemes are to be found in Australia. All Australian states or territories 
have some form of conferencing.596 While the 'favoured model' of conferencing in Australia 
sterns from the New Zealand FGC rnodel,597 some of the first forms of conferencing were 
different from the New Zealand model. One example was the conferencing model associated 
with Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, where the police facilitated conferencing based on a 
scripted approach. This approach was heavily influenced by Braithwaite's theory of re-
594 John Muncie, 'Policy Transfers and 'What Works': Some Reflections on Comparative Youth Justice' (2001) 
1 Youth Justice 27. 
595 Paul Nixon, Gale Burford, Andrew Quinn and Josh Edelbaum, A Survey of International Practices, Policy 
and Research on Family Group Conferencing and Related Practice (2005) available online at 
http://www.frg.org.uk/fgc_toolkit.html (last viewed 11 November 2007). Joe Hudson, Allison Morris, Gabrielle 
Maxwell, and Burt Galaway (eds.), Family Group Conferences: Perspectives on Policy and Practice (New 
South Wales: The Federation Press/Criminal Justice Press, 1996) 
596 Kenneth Polk, Christine Alder, Damon Muller and Katherine Rechtman, Early Intervention: Diversion and 
Youth Conferencing - A national profile and review of current approaches to diverting juveniles from the 
criminal justice system (Canberra: Australian Government Attorney General's Department, 2003), 27-45. 
597 Chris Cunneen and Rob White, Juvenile Justice: Youth and Crime in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 369. 
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integrative shaming.598 Conferences were convened by a police officer and held at the local 
police station. A similar police-led approach is now used in the Australian Capital Territory, 
Tasmania and the Northern Territory.599 These schemes have been criticised on the basis of the 
power imbalance between police and young people.600 
In terms of comparability with New Zealand, it is the conferencing schemes used by New 
South Wales and South Australia which are the most similar. These jurisdictions have used a 
model in which (like New Zealand) the conference is convened and facilitated by an agency 
independent of the police. Similar policy imperatives such as victims' rights and addressing 
the needs of young people, underpin the New South Wales and South Australian schemes. 
Tromboli notes that the growth of conferencing in Australia: 
reflects the interplay of a number of forces, including dissatisfaction with the existing juvenile justice 
systems, a shift in emphasis from simply punishing the offender towards holding the offender 
accountable for his/her actions while at the same time involving families in making decisions about 
their children and meeting the needs and rights of the victims of the offence(s).601 
In New Zealand, however, Maori concerns at the mono-cultural nature of the previous 
legislation resulted in an arguably more culturally appropriate youth justice system.602 In the 
Australian situation, there was not the same commitment to cultural appropriateness for 
indigenous Australians.603 The two most comparable schemes to New Zealand (New South 
Wales and South Australia) will now be discussed, as these jurisdictions will be used as points 
of comparison in this research. 
598 John Braithwaite and Stephen Mugford, 'Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing with 
Juvenile Offenders' (1994) 34 British Journal of Criminology 139. 
599 Kenneth Polk, Christine Alder, Damon Muller and Katherine Rechtman, Early Intervention: Diversion and 
Youth Conferencing - A national profile and review of current approaches to diverting juveniles from the 
criminal justice system (Canberra: Australian Government Attorney General's Department, 2003), 47. 
600 Jenny Bargen, 'Kids, Cops, Courts, Conferencing and Children's Rights: A Note on Perspectives' (1996) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 5. 
601 Lily Tromboli, An Evaluation of the NSW Youth Justice Conferencing Scheme (Sydney: NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 2000), 2. 
602 Mike Doolan, 'The Youth Justice- Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea, The Youth 
Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993) 
603 Chris Cunneen, 'Community Conferencing and the Fiction of Indigenous Control' (1997) 30 Australia and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 292, Loretta Kelly and Elvina Oxley, 'A Dingo in Sheep's Clothing? The 




2. Conferencing in New South Wales 
Youth justice conferencing was introduced in New South Wales by the Young Offenders Act 
1997. This conferencing scheme was generally influenced by the New Zealand FGC model.604 
The principles governing the operation of the youth justice system are set out in section 7 of 
the Young Offenders Act 1997. These draw heavily on the principles set out in section 208 of 
the CYPF Act, such as a preference for community based sanctions, a ban on criminal 
proceedings being used solely for welfare interventions and a presumption against the use of 
formal criminal proceedings.605 There are additional principles which govern the conferencing 
scheme itself. 606 
Like New Zealand, the youth justice conference is a high tariff intervention, 607 and may be 
used in response to a wide range of offences.608 Similarly, the New South Wales youth justice 
conference is tasked with making decisions and formulating a plan for a young person who 
has off ended. The young person can be referred for a conference by a specialised youth 
officer, by a court, or by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Typical procedure at a 
conference is similar to that at a New Zealand FGC.609 
During the drafting of the New South Wales legislation, there was debate on which agency 
should administer conferencing. It was 'acknowledged that the [ administering] agency must 
not only be neutral and independent of specific interest groups, but it must also have an 
established infrastructure across NSW' .610 There was a rejection of the police-referred 
604 Lily Tromboli, An Evaluation of the NSW Youth Justice Conferencing Scheme (Sydney: NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 2000). 
605 s 3, Young Offenders Act 1997. 
606 s 34(1 ), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
607 Lily Tromboli, An Evaluation of the NSW Youth Justice Conferencing Scheme (Sydney: NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 2000), 3. 
608 s 8, Young Offenders Act 1997. 
609 New South Wales Department of Juvenile Justice, Youth Justice Conferencing Policy and Procedures 
Manual (updated to 2005) available at www.djj.nsw.gov.au/publications.htm (last viewed 12 November 2008). 
610 Lily Tromboli, An Evaluation of the NSW Youth Justice Conferencing Scheme (Sydney: NSW Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research, 2000), 3. 
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schemes present in other Australian jurisdictions,611 and the New South Wales conference is 
facilitated by an independent convenor. 
Thus the New South Wales youth justice conference can usefully be employed as a point of 
comparison when considering the rights of young people in the New Zealand FGC. 
3. Conferencing in South Australia 
While the New South Wales scheme is the most comparable to New Zealand in term of 
conferencing, the South Australian legislation will also be referred to in this research. South 
Australia is regarded as being progressive in youth justice policy, being one of the first 
jurisdictions in the world to introduce a separate youth court, and to introduce a statutory 
youth justice conferencing scheme. 612 A youth justice conferencing scheme was introduced 
under the Young Offenders Act 1993,613 which was based on the New Zealand scheme.614 
Like the New South Wales legislation, the South Australian legislation is based on similar 
principles to the CYPF Act. Section 3 of the South Australian legislation emphasises the 
importance of holding young people accountable for their offending and ensuring community 
safety. Secondary to these principles are the concepts of strengthening families and 
rehabilitation of young offenders.615 Daly notes that the South Australian legislation is less 
prescriptive in relation to principles than the later New South Wales legislation. 616 
611 Jenny Bargen, 'Kids, Cops, Courts, Conferencing and Children's Rights: A Note on Perspectives' (1996) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 5. 
612 Joy Wundersitz and Nichole Hunter, Information Bulletin, January 2005, No 40: Juvenile Justice in South 
Australia: Where are we now? (Adelaide: Office of Crime Statistics and Research, 2005), 1. Kathleen Daly, 
Conferencing in New Zealand and Australia' in Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell (eds.), Restorative Justice 
for Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation & Circles (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
613 See further Kathleen Daly, Michele Venables, Mary McKenna, Liz Mumford, and Jane Christie-Johnston, 
South Australia Juvenile Justice (SAJJ) Research on Conferencing, Technical Report No. ]: Project Overview 
and Research Instruments (Brisbane: School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University, 1998), 
Kathleen Daly, South Australia Juvenile Justice (SAJJ) Research on Conferencing, Technical Report No. 2: 
Research Instn1ments in Year 2 (1999) and Background Notes (Brisbane: School of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, Griffith University, 2001). 
614 Jenny Bargen, 'Kids, Cops, Courts, Conferencing and Children's Rights: A Note on Perspectives' (1996) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 5. 
615 Joy Wundersitz and Nichole Hunter, Information Bulletin, January 2005, No 40: Juvenile Justice in South 
Australia: Where are we now? (Adelaide: Office of Crime Statistics and Research, 2005), 4. 
616 Kathleen Daly, Conferencing in New Zealand and Australia' in Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell (eds.), 
Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation & Circles (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002), 
69. 
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C. Other Jurisdictions Utilising Conferencing 
1. Introduction 
As was set out m the preceding section, certain Australian jurisdictions are the most 
comparable to New Zealand in terms of the design of the conferencing scheme and the 
principles underpinning youth justice. Limited reference will be made in this research to 
conferencing schemes in other jurisdictions. These provide a less valuable comparison as they 
are less well established and not used in the mainstream youth justice process. 
2. Conferencing in Canada 
Canada is a jurisdiction which 1s generally comparable to New Zealand. The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was used as a model for the NZBOR Act,617 and Canadian 
decisions are frequently cited in the New Zealand courts when considering rights issues.618 In 
addition, there are similar concerns about providing culturally appropriate justice for 
Canada's indigenous peoples.619 In relation to youth justice, the Canadian constitutional 
arrangements mean that responsibility for youth justice is shared between the federal and 
provincial authorities.620 Under the Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002, extra-judicial 
sanctions may be used for young people who offend.621 Conferences may be used to advise on 
extra-judicial sanctions.622 Like New Zealand, Canada has introduced conferencing to aid the 
development of culturally appropriate justice for Canada's indigenous peoples.623 
617 See generally Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optician, and Richard Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill 
of Rights (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003 ). 
618 James Allan, Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch, 'The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation in 
New Zealand' (2007) 11 Otago Law Review 433. 
619 Carol LaPrairie, 'Conferencing in aboriginal communities in Canada: Finding middle ground in criminal 
justice' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 576, Federal- Provincial- Territorial Task Force on Youth Justice, A 
Review of the Young Offenders Act and the Youth Justice System in Canada (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 
Canada, 1996). 
620 Anthony N Doob and Jane B Sprott, 'Youth Justice in Canada' 31 Crime & Justice 185. 
621 s 10(1 ), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
622 s 19(2), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
623 Carol LaPrairie, 'Conferencing in Aboriginal Communities in Canada: Finding Middle Ground in Criminal 
Justice' ( 1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 576. 
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3. Conferencing in England and Wales 
Youth justice legislation and policy in England and Wales is complex. In the last ten years, 
there have been numerous pieces of legislation, 624 and enormous amounts of policy documents 
relating to youth crime and justice.625 Youth justice conferencing in England and Wales has 
developed in a piecemeal manner and is not based on statute.626 There are a number of small-
scale conferencing schemes in operation, in both the child welfare and youth justice fields. 
The police-led scripted restorative caution model (the Wagga model) has been arguably more 
popular.627 
Unlike other jurisdictions, the principal objective of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is the 
prevention of offending.628 However, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 arguably facilitates a 
restorative justice type approach to offending by young people.629 These approaches include 
referral orders (where the young person is referred to a volunteer led youth offender panel) 
and the system of reprimands and wamings.63° Family group conferencing has become more 
prevalent but is not based on statute. 
D. Concluding Remarks 
This section has introduced youth justice conferencing schemes in other similar jurisdictions. 
The conferencing schemes of New South Wales and South Australia are the most comparable 
to New Zealand. These schemes are statute based, have been in operation for a number of 
624 For example: Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, Criminal Justice 
and Court Services Act 2001, Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. 
625 For example: Audit Commission, Misspent Youth (London: Audit Commission, 1996), Home Office, No 
More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1996), Home 
Office, Respect and Responsibility: Taking a Stand Against Anti-social Behaviour (London: HMSO, 2003). See 
generally John Muncie, Youth and Crime (London: Sage, 2004). 
626 Adam Crawford and Tim Newburn, Youth Offending and Restorative Justice - Implementing Reform in Youth 
Justice (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003). 
627 The Thames Valley Police Cautioning Scheme. See further C Hoyle, R Young and R Hill, Proceed with 
Caution: An Evaluation of the Thames Valley Police Initiative in Restorative Cautioning (York: RTF, 2002) 
628 s 37, Crime and Disorder Act. 
629 Georgios A Antonopoulos and John A Winfordyke, 'The British 1998 Crime and Disorder Act: A 
'Restorative' Response to Youth Offending?' (2003) 11 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 386, Lorraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris, 'Much Ado About Nothing: A Critical Comment 
on Key Provisions Relating to Children in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998' (1999) 11 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 209. 
630 See further Adam Crawford and Tim Newburn, Youth Offending and Restorative Justice - Implementing 
Reform in Youth Justice (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003). 
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years and evaluations are available. Most importantly, these schemes are directly based on the 
New Zealand model. Thus, these schemes provide a valuable comparison for this research as 
to how the rights of young people have been safeguarded in the conference process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out the necessary background information on the operation of the youth 
justice system, and the place of the youth justice FGC within this system. The key points to be 
taken from this discussion are summarised here. Firstly, the youth justice FGC has an 
essential part in the youth justice system. The FGC makes decisions at all stages of the youth 
justice system, both inside and outside the Youth Court. Secondly, approximately 9,000 FGCs 
take place every year, thus affecting the lives of many young people and their families. The 
powers and functions of the six types of FGC were set out here. The focus of this research is 
on the ITC and court-referred FGCs, as these are the most common type of FGC, and those 
which are involved in the administration of criminal justice type powers. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. Finally, youth justice conferencing schemes in other similar 
jurisdictions were discussed. These conferencing schemes are used as points of comparison 
throughout this research. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE AT THE 
YOUTH JUSTICE FGC 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter considered the operation of the youth justice legislation and the place 
of the FGC within the youth justice system. Information presented in this chapter is 
principally derived from an observational study of FGCs in two regions of New Zealand. This 
observational study allowed an insight into practice and procedure at the FGC, and how 
possible legislative and policy changes might improve protections for young people. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss practice and procedure at the FGCs which were 
observed. This provides the context for the use of practice examples from these FGCs in the 
substantive chapters. 
II. 0BSERV ATION OF THE FGC 
Though this research is grounded in legal concepts and carried out in a Faculty of Law, it was 
considered important that some observation of the FGC be carried out to gain practical 
expenence of how the FGC operates, and particularly to consider how proposed 
improvements to legislation and policy might work in practice. To this end, twelve FGCs 
were observed over a three and half year period in two centres, one in the lower North Island 
and one in the lower South Island. 631 
A. Centre 1- South Island 
There was little difficulty in gaining permission to observe FGCs in Centre 1, which was in a 
South Island city. An introduction was made to Child, Youth and Family staff through a 
member of the local judiciary in September 2006. A meeting was held with the two local 
youth justice co-ordinators. A protocol was agreed whereby subject to the permission of the 
young person and their family, I would be allowed to sit in and observe the FGC. Originally, 
two youth justice co-ordinators were involved, but by this stage one of the youth justice co-
ordinators involved had left the employment of Child, Youth and Family, and so it was the 
631 The exact location cannot be specified to preserve confidentiality. This was a condition of being allowed to 
observe these private and confidential meetings. 
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work of one youth justice co-ordinator which was observed. This youth justice co-ordinator 
agreed to ask young people and their families who had been referred for a FGC by the Youth 
Court or by the police whether I could observe the FGC. If the young person and their family 
agreed, I was permitted to sit in on the FGC, except during private family discussion time. No 
information was collected on how many families or young people refused to have an observer 
present. In the majority of cases, I would get a phone call on the morning or the day before to 
say that there was permission to attend. Over a six month period, it was possible to observe 
seven different FGCs. In Centre 1, all but one of the FGCs were court-referred (all through 
the 'not denied procedure),632 the other was an ITC FGC. All the young people involved were 
male. All were classed as 'young people' i.e. between the ages of fourteen and seventeen.633 
There were no 'child offender' FGCs in the sample.634 
B. Centre 2- North Island 
It was considered important to also observe FGCs in another centre in New Zealand, in order 
to compare practice. It proved much more difficult to gain access to observe FGCs in another 
centre. Repeated efforts were made to gain permission to observe FGCs in the North Island, 
through requests to youth justice co-ordinators, Child, Youth and Family staff, the judiciary, 
and other personal contacts by my supervisors. Although enquiries commenced in 2006, it 
was not possible to obtain permission to observe until the latter stages of this project, i.e. late 
2008. Finally, a successful introduction was made to a youth justice co-ordinator, again 
through a member of the judiciary. This youth justice co-ordinator is based in the lower North 
Island. The youth justice co-ordinator agreed to ask his referrals if they would permit me to 
observe the FGC. Again, this would generally eventuate at short notice. It was possible to 
observe five FGCs over a three month period in late 2008. Three of these were court-referred 
(again under the 'not denied' procedure), while the other two were ITC FGCs. All but one of 
the young people were male. Again, all were classed as young people. 
C. Ethical Approval 
Before observation of FGCs commenced in the South Island centre, ethical approval was 
sought from the University of Otago's Human Ethics Committee as the research involved 
human subjects. Ethical approval for the observations was granted through the Human Ethics 
632 See Chapter IO(III) for discussion of the 'not denied' procedure. 
633 Unfortunately, due to the fact that it was not always possible to obtain a copy of the FGC record, it was not 
possible to record ages accurately. 
634 See Chapter 5(111) for detail on the different categories ofFGC. 
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Committee in March 2007. The method and procedure as approved by the Committee was as 
follows: 
With the consent of the family and young person, the researcher will sit in and observe the family group 
conference. The researcher will sit as part of the circle but will not contribute to the discussion in any 
way. The researcher will leave the room with the co-ordinator and the police officer during the allotted 
time for family discussion. The researcher will observe whether the requirements of the Children, 
Young Persons and their Families Act are being met in terms of conference procedure, explanation of 
the young person's rights, and effective participation by the young person and will record the charge 
and the terms of the plan agreed upon. 
The information sheets for the young people and their families are attached an an appendix. 
D. Types of Offences dealt with at FGC 
The following table sets out the type of offences dealt with at these FGCs. The classification 
used is that used by the Ministry of Justice in the official sentencing statistics. The most 
common offences were assault and property offences, though there were two instances of 
'victimless' offences i.e. drug possession and dangerous driving. 
Table 2: Offence types at the FGCs 
Offence category635 Number (n =12) 
Violent offences (assault) 3 
Property offences 7 
(burglary, theft, car conversion, wilful damage) 
Drug offences 1 
Traffic offences 1 
III. PURPOSE OF OBSERVING THE FGC 
A. Limitations 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine a particular legal process (the youth justice FGC) 
from the perspective of the young person's rights. This includes examining the theoretical 
foundation of the rights of young people in the New Zealand youth justice system, the sources 
of such rights, how these rights apply to the particular theoretical model of the FGC, and to 
examine how specific key areas of rights are safeguarded in the youth justice FGC. It is a law 
thesis, using legal reasoning as the principal method. Therefore, it is important to set the 
limitations of the information obtained during observation of the FGC. 
635 The Ministry of Justice classification of offences is used here. See e.g. Nataliya Soboleva, Nina Kazakova, 
and Jin Chong, Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand 1996-2005 (Wellington: Ministry of 
Justice, 2006). 
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Patently, the observations were qualitative in nature, and the small sample size means that the 
discussion of outcomes etc is not statistically significant. There has been previous empirical 
research carried out FGC as part of large-scale evaluations of the youth justice system.636 
These research projects have provided quantitative information such as the number of 
participants at the FGC, what percentage of FGCs were attended by a Youth Advocate, and 
the levels of community work hours decided on by the FGC. These projects were supported 
and resourced by the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Justice. Reference 
is made to this larger scale statistical context throughout this research. In relation to larger 
scale statistical information, there are few reported cases dealing with the FGC procedure,637 
and the FGC records are not public. During the course of this research, a Youth Justice 
Statistics report was published by the Ministry of Justice, which is a most useful source of 
information about youth justice outcomes and sentencing in the Youth Court. However, there 
are many statistical holes in the system, e.g. the complete lack of recorded information about 
the 'not denied' procedure, and any statistical information about the FGC plan. The 2004 
evaluation (though supported and resourced by the Ministry of Social Development, the 
Ministry of Justice and the police) also faced difficulties with information about young people 
being held on many different databases.638 Efforts were underway in 2004 to establish a 
minimum youth justice dataset, though there have not been any more updates on this 
process. 639 
The key limitation relating to the information derived from these observations, however, is 
that access to the FGC was by invitation, and not of right. It proved difficult to gain access to 
the FGC as it is considered to be essentially a private family matter. Apart from officials such 
as the youth justice co-ordinator and the police, and the victim of the offence, other 
participants such as family supporters and social workers are present subject to the wishes of 
the family. Access was gained through contacts in the judiciary, and only the work of two 
youth justice co-ordinators were involved. Ideally, if practice were to be empirically tested, 
then the youth justice co-ordinators would not know that I was arriving and would not know 
636 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
637 See Chapter 1 O(IV) for discussion of the case law dealing with the 'not denied' procedure. 
638 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
639 Philip Spier and Tanya Segessenmann, Youth Justice Minimum Dataset: Data Integration Pilot (Wellington: 
Ministry of Justice, 2004). 
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what I was interested in,640 and youth justice co-ordinators would be assigned at random. This 
was not an objective of this project, and neither would it have been possible (both in terms of 
gaining permission, and resources). It would also have been useful to interview the young 
people afterwards to get their views on the process, but this was not possible because 
permission could not be obtained. 
It is appropriate here to make a brief comment about the difficulty of gaining access to 
information relating to the youth justice FGC. The youth justice co-ordinator is essentially the 
gate keeper of the process. It was also typical for the police officer or the Youth Advocate to 
question my authority for being there, although this seemed to be out of concern for the 
confidentiality of the young person's case. Had I and my supervisors not had personal 
contacts to whom requests could be made, it would have been impossible to gain access to 
observe the FGC. While it is important that confidentiality be maintained - the Youth Court 
too is not open to the general public, it is also vital that legitimate researchers are able to gain 
access to evaluate criminal justice processes.641 
B. Purposes of Observation 
Firstly, at the very initial stages of this research, observation of the FGC was necessary to 
learn how the convoluted and complicated legislation worked in practice. The legislation 
gives minimal guidance on procedure and practice at the FGC. Previous studies had discussed 
procedure at the FGC, but there was no information available on adherence to provisions such 
as the requirement that the young person admit the offence. 642 
Secondly, observation of the FGC helped at the initial stages in identifying which areas of 
rights were worthy of further study. The areas of legal assistance and sanctions have 
previously been identified as being areas where rights are in danger of being infringed in 
extra-judicial criminal justice processes like the FGC.643 However, the unusual and unique 
640 I did attempt to minimise bias by being as reticent as possible with explanations about the exact nature of the 
project, however the youth justice co-ordinators did know that I was a legal researcher interested in the rights of 
the young person, and it is possible that they would change their behaviour because I was there. However, others 
such the police officer and the youth advocate only knew that I was an observer. 
641 See Chapter 7 for discussion on the FGC as a criminal justice process. 
642 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice~ Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
643 See e.g. Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994). 
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way in which offences are proved through the FGC process became an issue of importance for 
this research, only after some observation of the FGC took place. Invaluable also were 
informal conversations, during the break for family discussion, with youth justice co-
ordinators, Youth Advocates and Youth Aid officers and other professionals who offered their 
own views about problems with the legislation. These discussions led me to investigate issues 
which I was not previously aware of, including ( e.g. the lack of provision for attendance by 
the Youth Advocate at the ITC FGC644). 
The key focus in this research is on the due process type rights such as the right to a lawyer, 
and the presumption of innocence. The right to participation has previously been identified as 
an area of concern for young people in the youth justice system. Participation is not an issue 
directly addressed by this research.645 Empirical research on participation at the FGC 
(including interviews with young people, and matching of their response with observational 
data) has previously been carried out.646 
Thirdly, it was necessary to observe how the legislative requirements relating to rights e.g. the 
requirement that the young person admits the offence and the behaviour of the Youth 
Advocate when he or she attends the FGC. I was particularly influenced by Dr Ursula 
Kilkelly's research project on the operation of the Irish Children Court.647 This research 
involved observational research of youth court proceedings, using international children's 
rights standards as an auditing tool. 
Observations were carried out on a non-participative basis.648It was not permitted to take notes 
during the FGC itself as the youth justice co-ordinator believed that this would disturb the 
informal atmosphere. My observations were written directly afterwards. In some cases, if the 
family agreed, and the youth justice co-ordinator was willing, it was possible to obtain a copy 
of the official FGC record. This document is the official record of the FGC and is transmitted 
644 Chapter 8. 
645 However, see the discussion later in this chapter about how decisions are made at the FGC, and see also 
Chapter 11(11) and (III). 
646 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), ch 4. 
647 Kilkelly, Ursula, The Children Court: A Children's Rights Audit (Cork: 2005). 
648 Catriona Campbell et al, Evaluation of the Northern Ireland Youth Conference Service - NIO Research and 
Statistical Series: Report No. I 2 ( Belfast: Northern Ireland Office, 2005). 
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back to the referring agency (i.e. the police or the Youth Court Judge). This was possible in 
eight out of the twelve cases. In cases where it was not possible to obtain the FGC record, I 
relied on my notes of what the FGC had decided. The FGC record notes the participants who 
attended the FGC and their relationship to the young person, the charge which the young 
person admitted, and the decisions or recommendations made by the FGC. 
Practice examples derived from the observations made at the FGC, and the FGC record 
informs the discussion of practice and procedure at a typical FGC (which is discussed later in 
this chapter). These will be used to illustrate the discussion in the substantive chapters. For 
example, what form of words is used to fulfil the legislative requirement that the young 
person admits the offence,649 the role of the Youth Advocate when he or she attends the 
FGC,650 and examples ofFGC outcomes.651 
Finally, the most important purpose of observing the FGC was to aid understanding of how 
improvements could be made to legislation and practice. The issue of rights in informal 
processes like the youth justice FGC has been the subject of previous critiques, though not in 
a New Zealand context.652 What has been missing from these critiques however, is a way 
forward - if there are concerns about rights, how can processes be improved and how 
suggested legislative and policy improvements work in practice. Given that the FGC is likely 
to remain a part of the New Zealand youth justice system for the foreseeable future, it is 
necessary to take a pragmatic approach, and suggest workable improvements. The experience 
of observing the FGC particularly informs the last chapter entitled 'The Way Forward'. This 
chapter draws together the recommendations for improving rights protections at the FGC, 
including draft legislative changes and policy recommendations. 
649 Chapter 11. 
65° Chapter 9. 
651 Chapters 12 and 13. 
652 See Chapter Seven. E.g. Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 
British Journal of Criminology 578, Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in 
Christine Alder and Joy Wundersitz, (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or 
Misplaced Optimism? (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994). 
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IV. PARTICIPANTS AND VENUE 
A. FGC Participants and Their Statutory Roles 
Before proceeding to discuss procedure at a typical FGC, it is necessary to set out who the 
participants are, and what their statutory roles are. The FGC is responsible for a number of 
important statutory functions in the youth justice system. Consequently, there are extensive 
legislative provisions setting out who may attend the FGC.653 
I. The youth justice co-ordinator 
The youth justice co-ordinator is employed by Child, Youth and Family654 to perform the 
statutory role of convenor and facilitator of the FGC. The YJC has a number of legal duties 
concerning the FGC.655 These include: 
• To convene the FGC according to the time limits prescribed by the CYPF 
Act,656 
• To consult with the family group and the young person to agree on a suitable 
date, venue and time to hold the FGC,657 
• To ensure that the victim of the offence is notified,658 and if the victim is 
unwilling or unable to attend, to ascertain his/her views,659 
• To notify all those entitled to attend.660 
The role of the YJC in the FGC is an important and vital one for a successful FGC. It requires 
skilful facilitation and mediation between the various participants, especially between 
estranged family members coming together for the FGC. Both youth justice co-ordinators 
observed for this research had worked for Child, Youth and Family for at least ten years, and 
were thus experienced facilitators. 
653 s 251, CYPF Act. 
654 Child, Youth and Family is part of the Ministry of Social Development. 
655 In practice, youth justice coordinators may delegate some responsibility for conference preparation to a clerk 
or a youth justice social worker if one is employed in that region. 
656 s 249, CYPF Act. Time limits vary from 7 -21 days depending on the type ofFGC. 
657 s 250(1 ), CYPF Act. 
658 s 250(2), CYPF Act. 
659 s 254(1), CYPF Act. 
660 s 253, CYPF Act. 
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2. The police 
The informant is entitled to attend the FGC.661 In all of the twelve FGCs this police informant 
was a member of the specialised Youth Aid section. Unlike some Australian states, where the 
police officer acts as the facilitator of the conferencing process, the police officer's primary 
role is to inform the FGC of the charge against the young person, through a reading of the 
summary of facts, 662 but the police officer is also a member of the FGC, and thus must agree 
to the FGC outcome before an agreement is reached. In practice, the police often acted as a 
guardian of the public interest, especially when the victim was not present.663 The proper role 
of the police in the FGC decision making is considered in a later chapter. 664 
3. The young person and the family 
Attendance at the FGC is a right and not an obligation; however it would be highly unusual 
for a FGC to take place without the child or young person present.665 All the FGCs attended 
during this research took place with the young person present. The family of the young person 
may attend and invite such supporters as they see fit. 666 All FGCs had at least one family 
member present (in all cases a parent). In the other eleven FGCs, there was at least one other 
family member present. Family members included siblings, aunts, uncles, grandparents, and 
cousins. The largest FGC attended had twelve family members present. In two cases, family 
members joined the proceedings via speakerphone. This was to facilitate family members who 
were in another location and would not otherwise have been able to participate. 
4. Other professionals 
There is provision for a lawyer for the young person to be present.667 This may be the young 
person's own lawyer or a court-appointed youth advocate where the case has been referred 
661 s 251(1)(d), CYPF Act. The legislation uses the term 'informant' as the role could potentially be carried out 
by a Ministry of Transport official where a motoring offence was concerned. For convenience, the term Police 
officer is assumed throughout the text. 
662 See Chapter 11 for more detailed discussion on how admissions are made in the FGC. 
663 See Chapter 12(IV) on the role of the police in deciding on the FGC outcome, and Chapter 13(IV) on the 
relationship between the rights of victims and the rights of young people. 
664 See Chapter 12(IV). 
665 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice~ Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 83. 
666 s 251 (l)(b)(ii), CYPF Act. 
667 s 251 (g), CYPF Act. 
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,!', 
from the Youth Court.668 All the court-referred FGCs attended during this research had a 
Youth Advocate present for at least some part of the FGC. Youth Advocates were not present 
at the three ITC FGCs observed. The issue of legal assistance at the FGC is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapters 8 and 9. 
In eleven out of the twelve FGCs, at least one other professional was present. These included 
school guidance counsellors (at four FGCs), youth justice social workers (at four FGCs), 
social workers (at six FGCs),669 drug and alcohol counsellors (at seven FGCs), psychologists 
(at one FGC), and Maori or other cultural support workers (at three FGCs). The largest 
number of professionals present at a FGC was five. 
The number and nature of professionals attending the FGCs is surprising when one looks at 
the legislative provisions governing the FGC. The legislation is prescriptive in regard to 
attendance by professionals. Social workers can only attend in limited prescribed 
circumstances,670 similarly other agency representatives may only attend where the young 
person is subject to a support order pursuant to the care and protection provisions of the 
CYPF Act.671 The only authority for having others (such as drug and alcohol counsellors and 
school guidance counsellors) present at the FGC is section 251(0) which permits 'any other 
person whose attendance at that conference is in accordance with the wishes of the family, 
whanau, or family group of the child or young person' .672 These restrictions on the attendance 
of professionals except where already involved in the young person's case are presumably 
intended to restrict the power of professionals and empower the young person and their family 
to make decisions. 
668 s 324(3)(a), CYPF Act. 
669 s 251(1)(h), CYPF Act. 
670 s 251(h) states that a social worker may only attend where: 
(i) The chief executive is a guardian of the child or young person; or 
(ii) the chief executive has the role of providing day-to-day care for the child or young person under the 
Care of Children Act 2004, or is entitled to custody of the child or young person under an order or 
agreement made under Part 2 of this Act; or 
(iii) The chief executive is required, pursuant to an order made under section 91 of this Act, to provide 
support to the child or young person; or 
(iv) The young person is under the supervision of the chief executive pursuant to an order made under 
section 283(k) or section 307 or section 311 of this Act: 
671 s 91, CYPF Act. 
672 This is the section under which my attendance at the FGC is permitted. 
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Despite these legislative restrictions, there was an overwhelming impression that these 
professionals regarded themselves as attending as of right, rather than by invitation of the 
family. For example, when social workers did attend, there was no evidence during the FGC 
to suggest that they were there as a result of a Family Court support order. In the cases where 
the school guidance counsellor attended, the YJC stated 'I asked X to come along'. Similarly, 
the drug and alcohol counsellor in Centre 2 arrived with the police at their invitation. Granted, 
there was no question of the family disputing professionals being there, in all cases the family 
and the young person seemed content to have others there, but this is certainly an area in 
which care needs to be taken that the family and the young person give consent for these other 
professionals to be present. The legislation has placed restrictions on their attendance for a 
good reason: to minimise cross over between care and protection and youth justice except 
where strictly necessary.673 
5. The victim of the offence 
As discussed, an innovative feature of the CYPF Act was the provisions designed to directly 
involve victims of offences in responses to offending by young people. The victim of the 
offence has the right to attend or send a representative,674 and the youth justice co-ordinator 
has a statutory duty to ascertain and present to the FGC the views of the victim if the victim 
cannot or will not attend the FGC. Responses to offending under the previous legislation (the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1974) had an element of community representation,675 the 
CYPF Act was innovative in giving the victim of the offence the right to attend the FGC and 
to play a direct part in formulating the FGC outcome. The original legislation did not permit 
the victim's supporters to attend but the CYPF Act was amended to allow this,676 following a 
review of the CYPF legislation in 1992 which had reported victims' concerns about lack of 
support compared to the young person and their family. 677 Persons attending under this section 
673 See Chapter 13(V) for analysis on the relationship between the two systems, and the implications for the 
rights of the young person. 
674 s 251(1)(f), CYPF Act. 
675 Childrens Boards and Youth Aid consultations, John Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New 
Zealand: The System in Evolution (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1976). 
676 s 37, Children, Young Persons and their Families Amendment Act 1994. 
677 Kenneth Mason, Review of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989: Report of the 
Ministerial Review Team to the Minister of Social Welfare, (Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1992). 
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are not members of the FGC for the purposes of the legislation.678 A larger scale evaluation of 
the youth justice system has demonstrated that victims are present at approximately half of 
FGCs.679 Only three out of twelve of the FGCs attended during this research had a victim 
present (in one of these cases, the victim was a close family member), although in six of the 
remaining FGCs, the youth justice co-ordinator reported the views of the victim to the FGC. 
B. Venue 
The CYPF Act permits the FGC participants to agree amongst themselves on a suitable venue 
to hold the FGC,680 and thus would seem to envisage FGCs taking place in alternative venues 
such as the home of the young person or on the marae.681 All the FGCs observed in the course 
of this research took place at Child, Youth and Family premises, and there was the impression 
that this was usual practice. Again, these FGCs were attended by invitation rather than by 
right, and it is very likely that the youth justice co-ordinators invited me to attend FGCs 
which were held in easily accessible and neutral venues, rather than private homes. Choice of 
venue for the FGC was not an issue directly addressed by this research, but a 2004 evaluation 
found that the requirements of the CYPF Act to consult families and victims in relation to 
preferences for the time and place of the FGC were not always followed. 682 In these twelve 
FGCs, there was no evidence that families or young people were unhappy with the choice of 
venue. 
In both centres, the room where the FGCs took place was a standard meeting room facility. 
There was adequate room for up to twenty people to sit in a circle of chairs. There was a 
whiteboard provided for the family to write up the FGC plan which could be printed out. Tea 
and coffee was available for the participants. Unlike a courtroom, there was no designated 
seating arrangement and participants sat wherever they wished in the circle of chairs. 
678 s 251(2) and (3), CYPF Act which permit the victims supporters to attend the FGC but state that such 
supporters are not members of the conference were added by s 37 of the Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Amendment Act 1994. 
679 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
680 s 250(1) and (2), CYPF Act. 
681 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
682 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 12. 
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V. FORMAT OF THE FGC 
The CYPF Act provides that participants regulate FGC procedure as they see fit, but the 
FGCs generally proceed in a comparable manner. Specific procedural issues relating to the 
rights under discussion will be dealt with in the substantive chapters,683 but typical practice 
will be discussed here. The key stages will now be considered. There were no discemable 
differences in procedure or format between the court-referred FGC and the ITC FGC. 
A. Introduction Phase 
In all cases, the youth justice co-ordinator was present in the room first and welcomed the 
participants as they arrived. The young person was usually the last to arrive, but in one case, 
the Youth Advocate was already there speaking to the young person in private. 684The youth 
justice co-ordinator introduced everyone and stated their relationship to the young person. 
These introductions were repeated if there was a latecomer. In two cases, there was a prayer 
by a member of the young person's family. It was usual for the youth justice co-ordinator to 
make some comment about the purpose of the FGC. Sometimes this was as brief as 'We are 
here to talk about offending by X' or 'We are here for you, X'. In other cases, there would be 
a fuller explanation about the FGC, explaining the purpose e.g. in the case of a court-referred 
FGC, that the Judge had referred the matter to the FGC to make decisions, or that the FGC 
was here 'to make sure you were accountable to your victim', or 'to put things right between 
you and your victim'. The level of explanation given appeared to depend on how much 
'groundwork' the youth justice co-ordinator had been able to put in before hand.685 The youth 
justice co-ordinators explained to me that they preferred to meet the participants separately 
before the FGC and explain matters to them. Sometimes this was not possible (it was 
sometimes difficult to track young people down as they were often transient), or it might only 
be possible to speak on the phone. The introductions phase lasted five to ten minutes 
depending on the number of participants present. 
B. Admission of the Offence 
As noted, the CYPF Act does not take a prescriptive approach to procedure at the FGC. One 
of the few prescribed procedural requirements is that the young person admits the offence at 
683 See Chapters 8 and 9 (legal assistance), 10 and 11 (how the offence is proved in the FGC), 12 and 13 
(outcomes of the FGC), and 14 (a summary of recommendations). 
684 See Chapter 9, which discusses the role of the Youth Advocate at the FGC. 
685 See Chapter 14(V) for recommendations on explanations that should be provided to the young person. 
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the FGC.686 This requirement was fulfilled in all the FGCs. In all cases, this was accomplished 
by the police officer reading the summary of facts and the young person being asked whether 
they agreed.687 
Chapters 10 and 11 deal with this requirement in much more detail, but it is worth noting here 
the variance in explanations given to the young person. In Centre 2, the youth justice co-
ordinator gave a detailed plain language explanation about what would happen if the young 
person chose not to admit the offence, including that the offence would then go back to the 
police or the Youth Court (as appropriate). This did not happen in Centre 1, although I cannot 
discount the possibility that the youth justice co-ordinator explained this to the young person 
in advance of the FGC. This was the quickest phase of the FGC, typically lasting only a few 
minutes. 
C. Discussion Phase 
After the admission was formally noted by the police and the youth justice co-ordinator, the 
FGC proceeded to the discussion phase. Patently, the content and length of time devoted to 
discussion varied depending on the circumstances of the young person, whether the victim 
was present, and especially how many family members were present, but three broad themes 
were discussed in all the FGCs: the effect of the offending/ circumstances of the offending, 
the general circumstances of the young person and/or their family, and possible/appropriate 
outcomes for the FGC. 
The first of these is the offence. The victim (if present) had an opportunity to speak about the 
effects of the offending ( on the invitation of the youth justice co-ordinator), noting that 
victims were only present in a quarter of these FGCs.688 When the victim was present, this was 
evidently more satisfactory than when the victim's views were conveyed by the youth justice 
co-ordinator, or there was no presentation of the victim's views. It was possible to hear the 
effect of the offence on the victim ( analogous to a victim impact statement in court), and an 
apology could be made directly to the victim. When the victim was present, it was possible to 
get 'the other side of the story' relating to the circumstances of the offending. The relationship 
between the victim and the rights of the young person is discussed in more detail in a later 
686 s 259(1), CYPF Act. 
687 The legal issues relating to this are discussed in detail in Chapters 10 and 11. 
688 One of the FGCs was a drug offence, and another was a traffic offence, so there were no victims per se. 
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chapter.689 If the victim was not present, it was typical for the police or the youth justice co-
ordinator to start the discussion by asking the young person 'why it happened'. This would 
lead into a discussion about the causes of the offending, e.g. why the young person had been 
out that late, whether he or she had been drinking, and what friends he or she had been with. 
As drugs and/or alcohol were featured in all twelve FGCs, this would always lead into 
discussion about whether the young person had alcohol or drug abuse issues, and whether 
these needed to be addressed in the FGC plan. 
In all the FGCs, there was discussion about the general circumstances of the young person. 
For example, this could include discussion about how the young person was getting on at 
school, and whether he or she was attending school - especially in the cases where a school 
guidance counsellor was present, the young person's living arrangements, who the young 
person was associating with, and the young person's relationship with his or her family. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 13, this type of discussion is arguably indicative of a care and 
protection process rather than a criminal justice process. This was especially noticeable where 
there was no victim presence. The presence of the victim also reminded participants that the 
FGC was a process convened to deal with offending. Otherwise, the FGC tended to resemble 
a social work meeting between the family and various professionals, with only the police 
officer there to argue the public interest. 
Before the FGC paused to allow the family time to discuss in private, there would be some 
discussion about possible outcomes. It was typical practice for the police officer or the youth 
justice co-ordinator to make some suggestions to the young person and his or her family about 
what would be 'acceptable' to the Youth Court Judge, or to the police.690 This would include 
advice like 'the Judge is going to be looking for some accountability', or 'the Judge is going 
to want a curfew'. In Centre 1, it was the practice of one particular police officer to make 
reference to sentences in the adult court, e.g. 'if you were two years older you would be 
looking at up to ten years' (a burglary charge). However, the youth justice co-ordinator would 
typically tell the family to come up with a plan that they thought would work for them. 
There are arguments for and against these suggestions made to the young person and their 
family. Obviously, the family are new to the process and need some guidance on what is 
689 See Chapter 13(IV). 
690 The issue of limits on sanctions is dealt with in Chapter 12 
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expected in the plan e.g. that there would need to be an appropriate sanction, what form the 
sanction could take, what community service was available or how money could be paid back 
through the police officer or through the Youth Advocate's trust account. The police officer 
would usually have a value for reparation in the case of damage or vandalism. In some cases 
this would be provided by the insurance company. However, these suggestions could also 
descend into a discussion between the professionals as to what placements ( e.g. drug and 
alcohol), referrals (e.g. to psychologists) and community work placements were available. 
Unfortunately, this was usually characterised by frequent use of acronyms, presumably 
incomprehensible to those not familiar with the system. The discussion phase was typically 
the longest phase of the FGC, taking between thirty minutes and an hour and a half. 
D. Private Family Discussion 
In all but one of the FGCs, the professionals left the room to allow time for family discussion 
in private.691 In the one FGC where this did not happen, the family and the young person did 
not feel it was necessary to have private discussion time. The length of time which the family 
took was generally related to the amount of family members present, and ranged from five 
minutes to one hour. In four cases, the family requested further information from the 
professionals (usually the youth justice co-ordinator) before making a decision. In one case, 
the family asked the Youth Advocate to stay and explain matters to them. 
E. Formulation of the Plan 
1. Reporting back after family decision making 
In both centres, the young person and their family were encouraged to write their proposed 
plan on the whiteboard before the formal part of the FGC re-started. In Centre 1, the practice 
of the youth justice co-ordinator was to ask the young person to inform the FGC participants 
as to what had been decided during family discussion time. This appeared to be a successful 
method of involving the young person at this stage of the FGC. 
There were two issues of concern with this part of the FGC. In all cases, there was evidence 
that the young person would benefit from a break at this stage in proceedings. Young people 
appeared tired and lacking in concentration, after being the centre of attention for up to two 
hours at this stage. The second issue is that both families and young people typically appeared 
confused about what the process involved, what they were actually being asked to decide and 
691 This included myself. 
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especially what the next steps would be. Recommended explanations for the young person are 
set out in the final chapter.692 
2. How decisions were made 
Theoretically, the FGC process is characterised by group consensus decision-making.693 This 
is a decision making model characterised by negotiation and participation. In the FGC, the 
young person, their family and the victim of the offence are given the opportunity to directly 
participate in the negotiation of a response to the offending. Maxwell et al contrast group 
consensus decision making with the linear decision making process, that is when a 
professional or expert person (e.g. a judge) makes a decision on behalf of others.694 Decisions 
at the FGC are to be made by negotiation between the parties concerned and the agreement of 
all parties must be reached before the recommendations of the FGC are reported back to the 
referring agency (the police or the Youth Court).695 
In the observations, I recorded which participant, in my opinion, took the largest part in 
decision making. In only one out of the twelve FGCs, this was the young person. This young 
person was a confident and articulate young person, and was well able to put across his views 
and speak up when he thought proposed outcomes were unfair. This level of participation was 
as a result of the young person's own confident personality, rather than any special 
intervention by the facilitator. In four cases, the police officer was recorded as being the 
dominant party.696 In two cases, it was the youth justice co-ordinator, and in one case it was a 
relative of the young person. In the remaining FGCs, no party stood out as dominating the 
decision making process. 
It is apparent, however, that there is a fine line between assisting the young person and their 
family with information, and making the decision on their behalf. Typically, there was a need 
for the professionals to inform the family if they were crossing the boundaries of the CYPF 
Act's powers. Common instances of this were the family wanting to write conditions into the 
692 See Chapter 14(V). 
693 Jane Dalrymple, 'Family Group Conferences and Youth Advocacy: The Participation of Children and Young 
People in Family Decision Making' (2002) 5 European Journal of Social Work 287 
694 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice~ Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
695 See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the theoretical model of the FGC. 
696 See Chapter 12(IV) for discussion on the role of the police in deciding on the FGC sanction. 
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plan which were outside the remit (such as requesting that a police officer accompany the 
young person to school in the morning to make sure he went there) or provisions which 
strayed into family law proceedings (attempting to write conditions in which overrode 
previous custody and guardianship orders). However, some plans still had conditions which 
arguably fell outside the remit of the CYPF Act, especially those overlapping with the care 
and protection system. These issues are discussed in further detail in Chapters 12 and 13. 
3. Agreement and recording 
There must be an agreement between the participants before the FGC plan can be reported 
back to the referring agency. All of the FGCs observed came to an agreement.697 To avoid 
repetition, the content of the plans are not detailed here, but are referred to in Chapters 12 
(dealing with limits on sanctions) and 13 (dealing with the objectives underlying FGC 
outcomes). 
The meeting was closed by the youth justice co-ordinator who thanked all participants, and 
then printed off the plan from the whiteboard for the record. An official typed copy of the 
FGC plan is then sent to all participants and to the relevant referring agency (that is the police 
or the Youth Court). 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has provided the context for the substantive chapters by discussing practice and 
procedure at the FGC. The roles of the participants, the venue, and format of the typical FGC 
were considered. Although the legislation is generally silent on FGC procedure, in both 
centres, the FGC followed a similar course. The information derived from the observation of 
these FGCs provides practice examples which are used throughout the substantive chapters. 
697 s 264 of the CYPF Act requires that where there is no agreement, the youth justice co-ordinator must report 
back to the referring agency. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE APPLICATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE FGC MODEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4 analysed the rights framework for the young person involved in the youth justice 
system. It is self evident that international human rights standards ( such as the CRC and the 
ICCPR) and the NZBOR Act were formulated with the formal adversarial (or inquisitorial) 
criminal process in mind. Chapters 5 and 6 set out the powers of, and procedure at, the youth 
justice FGC. It was apparent that although the FGC is an integral process in the resolution of 
offending by young people, it differs markedly in format from the normal adversarial criminal 
process. Therefore, before considering some of the specific rights issues in the FGC, it is 
necessary to clarify the nature of FGC outcomes in support of an argument that rights do 
apply to young people in these situations. As arguments for rights protections in more 
informal processes like the youth justice FGC are frequently countered with contentions that 
rights do not apply, or are not required,698 it is important to establish what type of legal process 
the FGC represents. 
In the following sections, three contentions advanced against the need for, or application of, 
rights to the FGC model will be refuted. First, that the FGC is concerned with restoration or 
reconciliation rather than punishment in respect of a criminal offence. Secondly, that the FGC 
is a voluntary process in which the young person consents to the outcome rather than a 
coercive state process. Thirdly, that the FGC is a cultural justice process, not a state process. 
Essentially, it will be argued here that although the FGC may contain elements of restorative 
justice practice and Maori justice principles, and emphasises the importance of family 
empowerment, it remains a state process designed to resolve breaches of the criminal law and 
thus the due process rights of the young person should be safeguarded. 
698 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), Nessa Lynch, 'Respecting Legal Rights in the New 
Zealand Family Group Conference' (2007) 19 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 75. 
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11. RESTORATION, NOT PUNISHMENT? 
A. Introduction 
Certain features of the youth justice FGC, such as the potential for victim involvement mean 
that the youth justice FGC is commonly identified as an example of restorative justice in 
practice.699 This section will define restorative justice and consider the potentially restorative 
features of the youth justice FGC.700 More importantly for the purposes of this research, is the 
relationship between rights and restorative justice. Proponents of restorative justice often deny 
the need for rights in such processes, arguing that the process does not involve punishment, 
but a 'higher purpose' of reconciliation and re-integration. These arguments have been 
advanced in relation to the FGC.701 It will be argued here that although the FGC has the 
potential for restorative processes and outcomes, it still involves punishment in respect of a 
criminal offence. 
B. The FGC as a Restorative Justice Process 
1. Defining restorative justice 
Under the restorative justice model, the criminal act is seen not as an act against the state but 
as an act against the community in general and the victim in particular.702 The focus is on 
creating positive obligations for the offender rather than imposing negative consequences. 
Restorative justice sees offending behaviour as damaging human relationships; therefore these 
breaches should be remedied by active participation by families, victims and the 
community.703 Restorative justice aims for re-integration and repair of harm rather than 
punishment and retribution.704 Restorative justice is often distinguished by comparison with 
the traditional retributive or punishment model, in which the formal legal process is involved 
in a determination of guilt for which punishment proportional to the gravity of the crime is 
699 FWM McE!rea, 'The New Zealand Model of Family Group Conferences' (1998) 6 European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research 527, Allison Morris and Gabrielle M Maxwell, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: 
Restorative Justice in Practice?' (2006) 62 Journal of Social Issues 239, Gabrielle Maxwell and James H Liu 
(eds.), Restorative Justice and Practices in New Zealand: Towards a Restorative Society (Wellington: Institute 
of Policy Studies, 2007). 
700 The compatibility of restorative justice with the rights of the young person is considered in greater detail in 
Chapter 13(IV). 
701 Ann Skelton, 'Restorative Justice as a Framework for Juvenile Justice Reform' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 496. 
702 John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Re-integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
703 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (USA: Herald Press, 1990). 
704 Jim Consedine, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lytellton: Ploughshares Publications, 
1995). 
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imposed. The system Is adversarial and the focus IS more on process then on actual 
outcome. 705 
2. Potentially restorative features of the FGC 
Though it has been described as the 'first legislated example of a move towards a restorative 
justice approach to offending' ,706 there is no explicit mention of restorative justice in the 
CYPF Act. 'Restorative justice' was not truly developed as a concept in criminology until the 
work of Howard Zehr and John Braithwaite in the early l 990s.707 The youth justice provisions 
of the CYPF Act had been developed before these ideas had been widely disseminated. The 
CYPF Act is, therefore, restorative in practice rather than in theoretical basis. As Stewart has 
commented 'the concept of restorative, as opposed to adversarial, justice was probably not a 
foremost concern of the original legislators but this has emerged from practice as a key factor 
in dealing with juvenile offenders' .708 
It can be said that the goals of restorative justice and the New Zealand youth justice principles 
intersect on some levels. McElrea categorizes three particular elements of the CYPF Act as 
being restorative in nature; the transfer of state power from the courts to the family and 
community, group consensus decision-making in the FGC and the involvement of victims 
leading to a healing process.709 In practice, levels of 'restorativeness' vary between FGCs. 
Approximately half of FGCs do not have a victim or victim's representative present.110 When 
the victim is not present, one of the key components of a restorative justice event (i.e. the 
repair of harm caused by the offending) is diminished.111 It is difficult therefore to class as 
restorative justice a FGC where there is no victim presence. The central idea of restorative 
705 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (USA: Herald Press, 1990). 
706 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice: Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 8. 
707 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (USA: Herald Press, 1990), John 
Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Re-integration (Cambridge/Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
708 Trish Stewart, 'Family Group Conferences with Young Offenders in New Zealand' in Joe Hudson, Allison 
Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell, and Burt Galaway, Family Group Conferences: Perspectives on Policy and Practice 
(New South Wales: The Federation Press/Criminal Justice Press, 1996), 68. 
709 FWM McElrea, 'A New Model of Justice' in FWM McElrea and BJ Brown (eds.), The Youth Court in New 
Zealand: Four Papers (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993). 
710 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). See also Chapter 6. 
711 Jim Consedine, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lytellton: Ploughshares Publications, 
1995). 
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justice is that the offender will perform actions to repair the harm caused by the offending. 
This could take the form of an apology to the victim, reparation to the victim or the carrying 
out of some work ( either for the victim directly, for some organisation nominated by the 
victim, or some work related to the offence).712 In addition, there are the more subtle measures 
of restorativeness. Spontaneity and genuineness of the apology is an issue, especially if the 
victim is not actually present at the FGC.713 Voluntary attendance and participation by the 
offenders is a characteristic of restorative justice events. However, it is essentially mandatory 
for a young person to attend a lawfully convened FGC. McElrea notes that it is 'extremely 
rare for a young person to refuse to attend a conference, perhaps reflecting a strong preference 
for the community based altemative.' 714 Non-attendance is not an offence per se but if the 
young person refuses to attend, the case will go to the Youth Court ( with the attendant risk of 
a more coercive sanction). 
C. Implications for the Rights of the Young Person 
In Chapter 2, the relationship between the welfare approach to youth justice and the rights of 
the young person was discussed.715 In the welfare model of youth justice, which had as its 
broad aim an individualised and paternalistic approach to off ending by young people, it was 
argued that rights were not needed or did not apply because the purpose of the youth justice 
system was benevolent and any actions were taken in the best interests of young people.716 In 
other words, there was a higher purpose, and the results were not criminal sanctions, even 
though impositions such as custodial sanctions were involved which, if imposed on an adult, 
would certainly be regarded as punishment for a criminal offence. In the current youth justice 
system operating under the CYPF Act, it is argued that the sanctions resulting from the FGC 
are distinguished from punitive criminal justice sanctions because the intention or purpose is 
not punishment for its own sake, but the repair of harm, the reconciliation of the young 
712 Maxwell et al described as restorative those elements aiming to repair the harm caused by the offending 
(apologies, reparation or donation, work for the victim): Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes 
in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004), 240. 
713 Kathleen Daly, 'Making Variation a Virtue: Evaluating the Potential and Limits of Restorative Justice' in 
Elmar GM Weitekamp, and Hans- Jurgen Kerner (eds.), Restorative Justice in Context: International Practice 
and Directions (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003). See also Chapter 6. 
714 FWM McElrea, 'A New Model of Justice' in FWM McElrea and BJ Brown (eds.), The Youth Court in New 
Zealand: Four Papers (Auckland, Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 13. 
715 See Chapter 2(III). 
716 Jane Pickford, 'A New Youth Justice for a New Century?' in Jane Pickford ( ed.), Youth Justice: Theory and 
Practice (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000). 
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offender with the victim of the offence and the re-integration of the young person to their 
'community of care' .717 Maxwell et al describe as restorative those elements aiming to repair 
the harm caused by the offending (apologies, reparation or donation or work for the victim).718 
Proponents of restorative justice do not deny that the process is involved in the administration 
of criminal sanctions but argue that procedural protections for the offender are not required 
because restorative justice has a 'higher purpose' i.e. reconciliation and reintegration between 
the offender and the victim. This assertion may be partially explained by the fact that 
advocates of restorative justice often come to the process from a religious standpoint.719 
Similarly those who see restorative justice as coming from indigenous traditions often seem to 
gloss over the more coercive elements of such processes.720 Such ideological standpoints may 
cloud judgment with regards to the potential for coerciveness and unfairness in restorative 
justice. Braithwaite states his view that rights in restorative justice processes would ruin the 
restorative nature of the process and describes the debate on standards for restorative justice 
as a 'dangerous debate' .721 As Ashworth has commented, 'too often ... enthusiasm for such 
processes leads proponents either to overlook the need for safeguards or to imply that they are 
not relevant' .722 In the restorative justice literature a sharp contrast is made between restorative 
sanctions, purportedly designed to repair the harm caused to the victim, and retributive 
sanctions, designed to punish the off ender. Does the different intention mean that the sanction 
is not punishment? The argument that procedural protections for the alleged offender are not 
required because the FGC process has a 'higher purpose' is a dangerous one, reminiscent of 
the punishment versus treatment debate. 
717 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
718 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 240. 
719 E.g. Christopher D Marshall, Beyond Retribution: A New Testament Vision for Justice, Crime, and 
Punishment (Michigan: Eerdmans, 2001), Daniel Van Ness, Crime and Its Victims (Leicester: Inter-Varsity 
Books, 1986). 
72° Kathleen Daly 'Restorative Justice: The Real Story' (2002) 4 Punishment & Society 55. 
721 John Braithwaite, 'Setting Standards for Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 563, 
565. 
722 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578,591. 
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A theoretical forerunner of the restorative justice movement was the development of the idea 
that the state had stolen conflicts from individuals.723 Restorative justice views conflicts more 
as the property of individuals rather than the state. Due process, the argument runs, was 
formulated to place controls on state arbitrariness and so is not needed when individuals 
resolve the matter. Critics of restorative justice question whether the returning of control over 
conflicts to individuals is a positive development, especially in relation to the role restorative 
justice gives to the victim.724 
D. Is the FGC Outcome Punishment in Respect of a Criminal Offence? 
1. Theoretical arguments 
Many restorative justice theorists argue that an outcome is only punishment if the intention is 
to punish. As Miller and Blackler note, 'restorative justice is often contrasted with retributive 
justice, on the grounds that the latter is held to be committed to punishment for its own sake, 
the former to abandoning punishment in favour of shame, reconciliation and forgiveness' .725 
Punitive elements are distinguished as being the infliction of punishment for its own sake. 726 
Walgrave also distinguishes punishment as occurring when the pain is willingly inflicted. 727 
RA Duff argues that: 
Punishments are 'merely punitive' if they are intended or administered as mere retribution, with the sole 
aim of 'making them suffer' - regardless of the meaning of that suffering. They are 'merely punitive' if 
they are intended or administered merely as deterrents whose sole aim is to secure the obedience of a 
supposedly dangerous class of potential offenders by threatening them with sanctions. They are 'merely 
punitive' if their primary effect is to further exclude those who have already been excluded - to 
stigmatise offenders as enemies against whom 'we' must be protected, to deprive of more of the rights 
and benefits of citizenship those we were already excluded from a just share in those rights and 
benefits.728 
Luna argues that 'punishment entails the intentional infliction of pain or some type of 
deprivation that individuals would generally prefer to avoid, making it insufficient to simply 
723 Nils Christie, 'Conflicts as Property' (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 15. 
724 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, 591. 
725 Seumas Miller and John Blackler, 'Restorative Justice: Retribution, Confession and Shame' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (eds.) (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000), 88. 
726 Martin Wright, 'Victim/Offender Conferencing: The Need for Safeguards' in Lode Walgrave (ed.), 
Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Potentialities, Risks and Problems for Research (Leuven: University Press, 
1998). 
727 Lode Walgrave, 'Restorative Justice and the Republican Theory of Criminal Justice: An Exercise in 
Normative Theorising on Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite ( eds.), Restorative Justice: 
Philosophy to Practice, (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000). 
728 RA Duff, 'Probation, Punishment And Restorative Justice: Should Al Turism Be Engaged in Punishment?' 
(2003) 42 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 181, 182. 
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declare that state-imposed sanctions are a necessary adjunct of a criminal justice system' .729 
Walgrave states that 'punishment only occurs when the pain is willingly inflicted, and is 
inflicted on a person because of the wrongfulness of the behaviour he/she has done'. 730 
Similarly, Wright and Masters argue that 'the outcome [ of restorative justice processes] is not 
'punishment', which means the infliction of pain for its own sake and hence making things 
worse, but reparation, which means attempting to make things right' .731 Arguments such as 
those just outlined inevitably lead to the assumption that rights are not required when the 
intention is not punishment.732 As Skelton argues: 
The protection of rights is surely important, but in restorative justice we are striving for more than 
formalistic protection - we are aiming higher, hoping for behaviour change, hoping to prevent re-
offending, hoping to balance the needs of the offender with the needs of the victim.733 
Restorative sanctions should be seen as an alternative form of punishment rather than an 
alternative to punishment.734 
As Zernova has argued 'punishment is probably best defined not by reference to the intention 
of the punisher, but to the element of hard treatment' ,735 and criticisms of the intention based 
approach of distinguishing restorative justice sanctions from punishment have correctly 
likened the approach to the arguments around the difference between punishment and 
treatment. The distinction appears to tum upon the intention of the punisher. Daly rightly 
argues that it 'overlooks decades of critique of the rehabilitative ideal, with its associated 
729 Erik Luna, 'Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice' (2003) Utah 
Law Review 205, 207. 
730 Lode Walgrave, 'Restorative Justice and the Republican Theory of Criminal Justice: An Exercise in 
Normative Theorising on Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: 
Philosophy to Practice, (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000). 
731 Martin Wright and Guy Masters 'Justified Criticism, Misunderstanding, or Important Steps Along the Road to 
Acceptance' in Elmar GM Weitekamp and Hans- Jurgen Kerner (eds.), Restorative Justice: Theoretical 
Foundations (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002), 55 [internal references omitted]. 
732 Andrew Ashworth, 'Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward for Criminal Justice?' (2001) Current Legal 
Problems 347. 
733 Ann Skelton, 'Restorative Justice as a Framework for Juvenile Justice Reform' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 496, 506. 
734 RA Duff, 'Alternatives to Punishment - or Alternative Punishments?' in Wesley Cragg (ed.), Retributivism 
and Its Critics (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992). 
735 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 493. 
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treatment-orientated intervention' ,736 and 'exemplifies how elites may delude themselves into 
thinking that what they intend to do (that is, not to punish) is in fact experienced by those at 
the receiving end' .737 Daly seeks to explain why restorative justice advocates are against the 
idea of calling the outcomes of such processes punishment: 
It is part of a broader development in the history of punishment, in which justice elites have 
increasingly come to imagine and announce that what they intend to do in responding to crime is not to 
punish, but rather to guide, correct, educate, or instntct offenders .... Such intentions are fine, but they 
need to be mindful of the empirical world. Do those who are not justice elites or who are on the 
receiving end of this new penal imaginations see it in the same way? Does their experience matter to the 
justice elites?738 
2. Application to the FGC 
The non-punitive intentions of restorative justice theorists are all very well, but what of the 
characteristics of the FGC plan? An FGC outcome involving, for example, fifty hours of 
community service or a monetary penalty of $500 will undoubtedly be seen as a punishment 
by the young person. Punishment is something that is unpleasant and involves an 
imposition.739 Little appears to distinguish a sentence of reparation or community service 
administered in the adult courts (which few would deny constitutes punishment) and the FGC 
plan. Both deprive the offender of interests such as money or time. FGC plans may involve 
numerous hours of community service and thousands of dollars in reparation.740 The purported 
difference between punitive and restorative measures appears to tum upon the intention. 
There may be exactly the same outcome. Zemova has carried out interviews with FGC 
participants in England. Only a minority of young offenders perceived FGC outcomes as 
punishment although it was 'clear' from interviews with offenders that outcomes were 
frequently painful.741 One possible explanation for the fact that the young offenders seemed 
736 Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 39 [italics 
in original. 
737 Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 39 [italics 
in original]. 
738 Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 38. 
739 Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000). See 
Chapter 12. II for examples from FGC plans. 
740 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice~ Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
741 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491,494. 
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not to regard conference outcomes as punishment was 'the way restorative interventions were 
prepared and conducted could have concealed the essence of restorative justice sanctions' .742 
The 'hospitable, informal and friendly atmosphere' might have meant that the offender did 
not perceive the FGC as punishment.743 
Moreover, the terminology of the CYPF Act refers to 'sanctions' and 'penalties'. The 
principles guiding youth justice use the terminology 'impose sanctions in respect of criminal 
offending' and the 'nature of any such sanctions' .744 Section 260 (3)(d) states that the FGC 
may recommend 'appropriate penalties', while section 260 (3)(e) states that FGC may 
recommend that the young person 'make reparation to any victim of the offence'. Again there 
is no mention of repair of harm or reconciliation as the objective. Criminal justice terms such 
as 'reparation' and 'penalty' are used. McElrea (a strong advocate of a restorative justice 
approach to offending), states that he has 'never seen restorative justice as an alternative to 
punishment' 745 and notes that most FGC plans have a 'punitive' element such as 'unpaid 
community work' .746 
The argument that sanctions resulting from a FGC are not punishment because they are 
designed to repair harm and effect reconciliation cannot be sustained when the statistics on 
the rate of victim participation are considered. Both major evaluations of the youth justice 
system under the CYPF Act have reported victim attendance rates at less than one half of 
youth justice FGCs.747 In the FGCs observed for this research, only three out of twelve had a 
victim present.748 How could the sanctions imposed on the young person whose victim chose 
not to participate in the process be designed to reconcile the victim to the offender or to repair 
742 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 494. 
743 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 495. 
744 s 208(e)(i) and (ii), CYPF Act. 
745 Judge FWM McElrea, 'Restorative Justice - A New Zealand Perspective'. Paper presented at Modernising 
Criminal Justice - New World Challenges, London, 16-20 June 2002, para 13 [italics in original]. 
746 Judge FWM McElrea, 'Restorative Justice - A New Zealand Perspective'. Paper presented at Modernising 
Criminal Justice -New World Challenges, London, 16-20 June 2002, para 13. 
747 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/fustitute of Criminology, 1993). 




the harm caused? What about a driving offence ( e.g. driving without a licence or speeding749) 
where there is no specific harm to a specific victim? To argue that the community work hours 
completed by such young people are intended to be restorative rather than punishment is to 
argue that a sentence of community work in the District Court is restorative. 
3. Censure in the FGC 
As well as a sanction, the FGC plan involves the censure of the young person. Disposition 
involves depriving the offender of important interests. It may be a negotiated procedure but it 
is still an imposition. The youth justice FGC process involves admitting liability for and being 
censured for a criminal offence. The FGC process is a process which begins with an 
allegation that the young person committed a criminal offence, involves acceptance of 
liability for that offence, and usually ends in a penalty being imposed on the young person in 
respect of that offence. Luna distinguishes the type of censure supposedly associated with 
restorative justice processes when compared to retributive court based sentencing: 
Constructive censuring must be distinguished from destructive censuring. The latter condemns the 
offender, rather than just the crime, as bad or evil. This type of denouncement stigmatizes the offender 
as unworthy of respect and designates him an outcast of society. Self-categorisation theory predicts that 
destructive censuring will only further entrench the offender's identity as a deviant with ad hominem 
condemnation often becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.750 
Daly makes the valid argument that holding a young person 'accountable' is in itself 
retributive as it involves censure for an action in the past.751 To apply Daly's theory of 
'multiple justice aims' to a typical FGC outcome, there will potentially be elements of 
retributive justice (for example community work), elements of rehabilitative justice ( drug and 
alcohol counselling), and elements of restorative justice (payment of reparation to the 
victim).752 Censure is a process which 'impose[s] obligations as the consequence of 
committing an offence'. 753 
749 See Chapter 6(11) on the offence types dealt with at these FGCs. 
750 Erik Luna, 'Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice' (2003) Utah 
Law Review 205, 291. 
751 Kathleen Daly, 'Restorative Justice: The Real Story' (2002) 4 Punishment and Society 55. 
752 Kathleen Daly, 'Restorative Justice: The Real Story' (2002) 4 Punishment and Society 55, 61. See Chapters 
12 and 13 for examples from FGC plans. 
753 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, 578. 
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E. Concluding Remarks 
From the point of view of those in charge of the system it is not punishment, but in the view 
of the young person it will certainly be a punishment.754 Even if outcomes of such FGCs are 
benevolent in intention, they still involve a form of punishment.755 Calling the outcome of a 
FGC community or family based punishment does not change the fact that it is punishment. 756 
As Warner argues, FGC outcomes must be seen as 'alternative punishments' not 'alternatives 
to punishments', 'nor can calling it community punishment rather than state punishment 
justify it any more than calling punishment treatment' .757 
III. VOLUNTARY, RATHER THAN COERCIVE? 
A. Introduction 
In a similar vein to the argument that rights are not required in the FGC because the outcome 
is not punishment, is the contention that FGC outcomes are voluntary so rights are not 
required, or concerns about coerciveness are countered with the argument that the young 
person and their family have agreed to the outcome.758 This argument is commonly advanced 
against the need for rights in restorative justice type processes. For instance, Reimund argues 
that 'voluntariness can remedy coercive elements of restorative practices that have a tendency 
to impede due processes.759 Walgrave notes that some commentators perceive 'free 
participation in the process and voluntary compliance with the agreements as satisfying 
754 Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000), 41. 
755 Jim Dignan, 'Towards a Systemic Model of Restorative Justice' in Andrew von Hirsch et al (eds.), 
Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms (Oxford/Portland, Hart 
Publishing, 2003). 
756 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), 147. 
757 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), 147. 
758 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994). 
759 Mary Ellen Reimund, 'The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic Look at the Legal Issues 
in Restorative Justice' (2005) 53 Drake Law Review 667, 685. 
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replacements for legal safeguards. If not, it is feared, legal formalism and rule setting would 
hinder the healing and encountering character of the sessions' .760 
This may be true for voluntary pre or post sentencing programmes for adult offenders, for 
instance the New Zealand court-referred restorative justice programme.761 However, this 
scheme is completely voluntary and involves adult offenders who are mature enough to make 
an informed decision to participate in a process with less due process protections than a court 
hearing. Marshall has argued that free participation is a substitute for procedural rights,762 but 
even voluntary processes must have rights as a safeguard against coerciveness. Even 
voluntary sessions 'need to be checked as to their respect for legal rights' .763 It will be argued 
here that the criminal justice sanctions in the FGC context are being re-framed as something 
that is voluntary and is agreed to by the young offender. 
B. Mandatory Nature of the FGC 
Luna argues voluntariness means: 
that a party is involved in the sanctioning process of his own freewill. An individual is granted respect 
by providing him the power of choice, giving him the autonomy to participate in a decisionmaking 
process and the freedom to accept or reject a particular decision.764 
In terms of attendance at the FGC itself, it is essentially mandatory for a young person to 
attend a lawfully convened FGC. 
An ITC FGC is held where the police wish to lay a charge in a non-arrest case. If agreement 
can be formulated on a plan to deal with the offence, and the plan completed, no charge will 
be laid. Is this a voluntary plan? Who has a choice? Yes, the young person can refuse, but 
then the matter will be dealt with through a charge in the Youth Court. While the process is 
760 Lode Walgrave, 'Restorative Justice and the Republican Theory of Criminal Justice: An Exercise in 
Normative Theorising on Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: 
Philosophy to Practice (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000), 165. 
761 Crime and Justice Research Centre and Sue Triggs, New Zealand Court- Referred Restorative Justice Pilot: 
Evaluation (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2005). 
762 Tony F Marshall, 'The Evolution of Restorative Justice in Britain' (1996) 4 European Journal of Criminal 
Policy and Research 21. 
763 Lode Walgrave, 'Restorative Justice and the Republican Theory of Criminal Justice: An Exercise in 
Normative Theorising on Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite ( eds.), Restorative Justice: 
Philosophy to Practice (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000). 
764 Erik Luna, 'Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice' (2003) Utah 
Law Review 205, 291. 
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nominally voluntary, the young person cannot choose to have nothing happen to him or her. If 
he or she refuses to attend the FGC, he or she cannot avoid the laying of information by 
failing to attend the FGC. In H v Police, Smellie J stated that: 
It cannot possibly have been the intention of Parliament that a young person and his family could avoid 
the laying of an information in respect of alleged offending simply by staying away from a [family 
group] conference and then arguing that because of their absence no [family group] conference had 
taken place.765 
The plan formulated by an ITC FGC is binding on the participants when agreed to and there 
may be adverse consequences for non-compliance with the sanctions imposed by an ITC 
FGC. Non-completion of an ITC FGC plan means potential re-entry to the formal court based 
criminal justice system where the Youth Court could dispose of the matter through formal 
court orders under section 283 of the CYPF Act. 
The situation of the court-referred FGC is a little different. While the ITC FGC takes place 
completely outside the court system, the plan agreed to by the court-referred FGC is 
technically a sentencing recommendation to the Youth Court Judge. The Youth Court is not 
bound to accept the plan but will do so in the vast majority of cases.766 The Youth Court may 
also modify or extend the plan. A FGC plan is technically a recommendation which is 
accepted by the Judge. Therefore it is a type of order, though not one under section 283. The 
Youth Court Judge also retains the right to make orders if the FGC plan is not completed. The 
Judge must deliberate the FGC plan before it becomes binding on the young person. But 
almost all FGC plans are accepted and will only be modified by the Judge when clearly 
falling outside the principles of the CYPF Act.767 Statutory principles stress the empowerment 
of the family and the responsibility of the family. Therefore there is a rebuttable presumption 
that FGC plans will be accepted. 
C. Consent to the FGC Plan 
The fact that the plan agreed to by a youth justice FGC is a criminal sanction cannot be 
refuted by arguing that the young person and his or her family gave consent to the outcome. 
765 H v Police [1999] NZFLR 966, 975. 
766 See Chapter 12(1II), also Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 
2008), Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: ,, 
Ministry of Social Development, 2004). 




The young person cannot choose to have nothing happen to him or her. 768 The statement that 
the young person (and his or her family) has agreed to the FGC plan is technically true. To 
report back to the referring entity ( the police in the case of the ITC FGC and the Youth Court 
in the case of the court-referred FGC), the youth justice co-ordinator must have agreement 
among the FGC participants. The young person and their family have a veto - but what can 
they do if they veto the plan? The case goes back to the police or to the Youth Court. The 
referring agency is in a much stronger position. Any consent by the young person and their 
family is 'consent in a coercive situation' .769 
While the FGC has a useful function in promoting family decision making in a culturally 
appropriate environment, it is important to note that entry to and exit from the FGC process is 
tightly controlled by the referring entity ( either the police or the Youth Court). The statutory 
principles stress the importance of family decision making and the literature is replete with 
the rhetoric of empowering families. 770 In fact, freedom of choice for families is within tightly 
controlled boundaries. The family cannot choose to have nothing happen to a young person 
who has been referred for a FGC. Any decisions, recommendations or plans agreed to by a 
FGC must be acceptable to the referring agency (the police or the Youth Court Judge). 
Essentially, there is freedom to participate in decision making within the bounds of what is 
acceptable to the state. As Zemova observes (in the context of English family group 
conferences) 'the criminal_justice system stayed in charge, while creating an impression that 
FGC participants were the key decision makers. Participants were 'empowered' so as not to 
frustrate - or even positively to promote- the agenda of the system' .771 It has been argued that 
the FGC model: 
... reflects post-modern notions of empowerment in promoting active participation with family members 
being both consulted and supplying some means of interpretative framework ... As a decision-making 
768 Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Clifford Shearing, 'Specifying Aims and Limits for Restorative 
Justice: A 'Making Amends' Model' in Andrew von Hirsch et al (eds.), Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: 
Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
769 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), 147. 
770 Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998). See also Carol 
Luton and Paul Nixon, Empowering Practice?: A Critical Appraisal of the Family Group Conference Approach 
(Bristol: Policy Press, 1999). 
771 Margaret Zernova, 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 505. 
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mechanism, it could be argued that FGCs are in reality based on modernist notions of empowerment 
where power is a possession and professionals are central to the process.772 
And whatever the theoretical basis of the FGC model, in practice, professionals ( especially 
the youth justice co-ordinator and the police officer) have been consistently found to be 
primary decision makers in the FGC.773 
Wonnacott has analysed the principles underpinning the youth offender contract in the United 
Kingdom.774 This disposal for young offenders involves the negotiation of a contract with a 
lay panel.775 Wonnacott argues that despite the 'imagery' surrounding the process being 
'overwhelmingly consensual', 776 the young offender is in a precarious position. There is little 
for the young offender to 'bargain' with. If there is no agreement, there is no detriment to the 
panel, however the young offender's case will be remitted to the formal court system, with the 
high possibility of a coercive order being imposed. As Wonnacott notes: 
the offender is supposed to be an active (if not necessarily willing) participant in agreeing and then 
carrying out a course of action that will remedy what he has done, instead of being the traditional 
passive and resentful recipient of a sentence determined by the court.777 
Young people under the age of eighteen have restrictions on their ability to enter into binding 
contracts because of their immaturity and vulnerability.778 It does not then seem right to argue 
that an outcome cannot be coercive because the young person and their family have agreed to 
it, especially since the young people who populate the youth justice system are generally 
disadvantaged. 779 Zernova argues that it is: 
... deceptive on the part of [FGC] proponents to equate coercion to judicial coercion and limit to official 
legal sanctions ... there might be other sources which were informal and more covert in nature. Also it is 
772 Jane Dalrymple, 'Family Group Conferences and Youth Advocacy: The Participation of Children and Young 
People in Family Decision Making' (2002) 5 European Journal of Social Work 287, 292. 
773 See Chapter 6(V), also Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report 
(Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004), 170-172. 
774 Camilla Wonnacott, 'The Counterfeit Contract - Reform, Pretence and Muddled Principles in the New 
Referral Order' ( 1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 271. 
775 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, Part 1. 
776 Camilla Wonnacott, 'The Counterfeit Contract - Reform, Pretence and Muddled Principles in the New 
Referral Order' ( 1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 271, 279. 
777 Camilla Wonnacott, 'The Counterfeit Contract - Reform, Pretence and Muddled Principles in the New 
Referral Order' (1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 271,280. 
778 Minors' Contract Act 1969. 
779 Kaye L McLaren, Tough is Not Enough: Getting Smart About Youth Crime (Wellington: Ministry of Youth 
Affairs, 2002). 
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misleading to think of coercion in 'either/or' terms: either coercive or voluntary. Such a way of thinking 
is too naYve and fails to reflect the intricacies and complexities of what really happens.780 
There are major inequalities in bargaining power between the young person and their family 
and state representatives such as the youth justice co-ordinator and the police representative.78 ' 
There will also be implicit pressures to come to an agreement (mostly from the youth justice 
co-ordinator).782 In theory, the FGC process should operate on a group consensus decision 
making model with a negotiated outcome resulting from full participation by all the parties. 
In practice, professionals (such as the youth justice co-ordinator and the police) frequently 
play a large part in the decision making process.783 This raises questions about whether the 
outcomes are truly voluntary. Shapland argues that 'the extent to which offenders (or victims) 
can be said to have freely 'consented' to any justice outcome is dubious. Consenting implies 
the ability to walk out of the situation without prejudice. Justice processes rarely provide that 
opportunity' .784 
D. Concluding Remarks 
Although the FGC process is couched in the language of voluntariness and consent, the extent 
to which this is true in practice is debatable. The balance of power is held by the referring 
agency (the police or the Youth Court) who must agree to the plan before it becomes binding. 
The Youth Court Judge retains the power to alter the FGC plan or to impose additional 
obligations after the plan is finished. Most importantly, the family cannot choose to have 
nothing happen to the young person. 
780 Margaret Zernova, 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 506 [italics in original]. 
781 Richard Delgado, 'Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice' (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 751. 
782 In the youth justice FGCs observed by the author, there was a sense of the youth justice co-ordinator having 
put considerable efforts into organising the coming together of different groups. There seemed to be implicit 
pressure to come to an agreement after putting so much work into facilitation. See Chapter 11, III. 
783 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
784 Joanna Shapland, 'Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Just Responses to Crime? in Andrew von Hirsch 
et al (eds.), Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms, (Oxford/Portland, 
Hart Publishing, 2003), 209. 
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IV. A CULTURAL PROCESS, NOT A STATE MATTER? 
The communitarian decision-making process embodied in the FGC has been linked by some 
to family decision-making models used in traditional Maori society. Pratt notes that the justice 
system in use by Maori in pre-European times -in common with other indigenous justice 
systems- was 'founded on the belief that socially harmful behaviours (hara), whether of a 
civil or criminal nature in Western terms, had been caused by an imbalance to the social 
equilibrium of some kind or other' .785 Responsibility for offences was collective rather than 
individual.786 Traditional Maori dispute resolution processes thus used a restorative type 
approach of restoring the balance by remedying the harm done by the transgression. 
Participation by victims and the provision of reparation to the victim and their family were 
integral parts of the process.787 If the correct elements are in place customary Maori dispute 
resolution procedure and FGC procedure may share some common features. These include 
group consensus decision making, the goal of restoring balance and harmony in the 
community and meaningful participation by those concemed.788 It is apparent that the process 
is influenced by some elements of Maori custom - collective responsibility, family decision 
making and an aim of healing the effects of crime rather than engaging in retributive 
behaviours.789 However, Crawford cautions about the 'romanticization of 'unregulated 
community self regulation' ... such visions often stem from a selective reading of history, 
anthropological studies or contemporary commentaries' .790 In addition, Daly has cautioned 
against linking processes such as the FGC directly with indigenous justice processes.791 
The FGC process has few procedural rules therefore there is potential for different cultural 
groups to adapt the process to fit their own cultural ethos. This is in accordance with section 
785 John Pratt, Punishment in a Perfect Society - The New Zealand Penal System 1840-1939 (Wellington: 
Victoria University Press, 1992), 35. 
786 Juan Tauri and Allison Morris, 'Re-forming Justice: The Potential of Maori Processes' (1997) 30 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 149. 
787 John Pratt, Punishment in a Perfect Society - The New Zealand Penal System 1840-1939 (Wellington: 
Victoria University Press, 1992), 35. 
788 Gabrielle Maxwell, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development, 2004), 256. 
789 Juan Tauri and Allison Morris, 'Re-forming Justice: The Potential of Maori Processes' (1997) 30 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 149. 
790 Adam Crawford, 'The State, Community and Restorative Justice: Heresy, Nostalgia and Butterfly Collecting' 
in Lode W algrave (ed.), Restorative Justice and the Law (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002), 109. 
791 Kathleen Daly, 'Restorative Justice: The Real Story' (2002) 4 Punishment & Society 55. 
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4(a) of the CYPF Act which states that services must be appropriate to the 'needs, values, and 
beliefs of particular cultural and ethnic groups'. However, the FGC is not the 'wholesale 
adoption of an indigenous method of dispute-resolution and a rejection of the Western legal 
system' .792 Rather the CYPF Act seeks to make the established youth justice system more 
culturally appropriate and flexible. Although the system seeks to recognise the important role 
played by extended family in Maori and Polynesian culture,793 and the family and community 
are empowered to participate in decision making, state officials still retain overall control of 
the system. The roles played by participants of a FGC may be very different roles to the 
traditional ones.794 For example, the young person is required to participate in and agree to any 
decision made at a FGC. This requirement may be in conflict with cultural traditions where 
family members usually make decisions on behalf of children and young people. 795 
What is most relevant to this research is that even though the process has the potential to be 
culturally appropriate in terms of process and procedure, the criminal law and procedure of 
the state remains in place. As Maxwell et al stress 'it needs to be recognised that this is a 
statutory process arranged by the state to resolve matters according to law.' 796 The family 
cannot choose to have nothing happen to the young person or pursue an alternative method 
based on culture if not in the public interest. This was confirmed in the case of Police v S and 
M 797 concerning the exercise of section 275 discretion as to Youth Court jurisdiction. Two 
young people of Samoan descent were accused of serious sexual offending against a girl from 
the same community. The families of the alleged offenders and the victim of the offence were 
from the same community and knew each other. The families wished to resolve the matter 
according to cultural norms and argued that the case be decided within the Youth Court 
system. Harvey DCJ ruled that the circumstances and nature of the offence meant that the 
792 Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Justice - The New Zealand Experience Past Lessons and Future Challenges'. 
Paper presented at Australian Institute ofl Criminology/ NSW Department of Juvenile Justice Conference: 
Juvenile Justice: From Lessons of the Past to a Road for the Future, Sydney, Australia, 2003, 5. 
793 Gabrielle Maxwell, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development, 2004), 10. 
794 Juan Tauri and Allison Morris, 'Re-forming Justice: The Potential of Maori Processes' (1997) 30 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 149. 
795 Sailau Suaalii-Suani, 'Spirits of Governing -Samoan Youth Offenders' (Unpublished PhD dissertation: 
Auckland University, 2005). 
796 Gabrielle Maxwell, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development, 2004), 240. 
797 (1993) 11 FRNZ 322. 
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matter was too serious to be dealt with through the cultural process and remitted the matter to 
the High Court. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE FGC AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
This chapter has argued that although there is evidence that the FGC has potential to be 
restorative and culturally appropriate, and to involve families in decision making, it remains a 
state process involved in resolving a breach of the criminal law and thus the young person 
should have the protection of rights. The rest of this thesis will examine key areas of rights 
which may be infringed in the youth justice FGC process. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE RIGHT TO LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Having established the theoretical framework for the rights of the young person in the youth 
justice system, and considered the application of this framework to the particular model of the 
youth justice FGC, this thesis will now move to consider the three key areas of rights in the 
context of the FGC. 
This chapter will discuss the young person's right to legal assistance in the FGC process. 
Firstly, the importance of legal assistance to the young person involved in the youth justice 
system generally, and in the FGC specifically, will be considered. It will be argued here that 
the informal and private nature of the FGC and the vulnerability of the young people involved 
in the process, make legal assistance particularly important. Secondly, law and practice 
relating to the availability of legal assistance in the FGC process will be examined. In 
particular, the disparity of access between young people participating in the ITC FGC and 
those participating in the court-referred FGC will be highlighted. The ITC FGC takes place 
completely outside the court system, and thus there are no formal procedures in place to 
ensure that the young person has access to legal assistance. The quality of the right to legal 
assistance, i.e. what happens when lawyers do attend the FGC, is considered in the next 
chapter. 
The CYPF Act provides for specially selected lawyers for young people (referred to as Youth 
Advocates).798 Youth Advocates are state-funded.799 To set the context of this research, the role 
of the Youth Advocate under the CYPF Act generally was considered in a 1997 report. 800 The 
1997 Report surveyed and interviewed Youth Advocates and other youth justice professionals 
such as Youth Court Judges, Youth Aid officers and youth justice co-ordinators. This report 
sought to 'clarify the views and expectations of youth advocates and other participants in the 
798 s 323 and 324, CYPF Act. 
799 s 325, CYPF Act. 
800 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997). Hereinafter the 1997 Report in the text. 
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youth justice system about the role of youth advocates' .801 With respect to the contribution that 
this research makes to understanding the role played by Youth Advocates, and the profile and 
training needs of Youth Advocates, there was no mention of the rights and needs of the young 
person in relation to legal assistance at the FGC. Neither was there discussion of the 
professional standards applying to legal practitioners in New Zealand. This research differs 
from the 1997 Report as it deals specifically with the legal assistance at the FGC, and takes 
the perspective of the young person's rights. 
II. THE RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM: CONTEXT 
AND IMPORTANCE 
A. Introduction 
The right to legal assistance during the criminal process is a fundamental tenet of a modem 
criminal justice system. As the United States Supreme Court stated when when considering 
the rights of young people in the youth justice system: 'the right to representation by counsel 
is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence 
of justice' .802 The right to legal assistance for the accused person is provided for in the 
NZBOR Act, 803 and the ICCPR. 804 The right to legal assistance for young people is mandated 
by the CRC.805 
B. Historical Context 
At various stages in the history of youth justice, there has been debate about whether legal 
assistance is required in youth justice proceedings at all. Wilson notes that for most of the 
twentieth century in Canada, 'there was considerable doubt as to whether or not lawyers could 
appear as of right in the juvenile court'. 806 In a specific New Zealand context, a 1987 study 
found that 'in some areas judges and social workers have discouraged the use of duty 
' 
solicitors, believing that they add unnecessarily to the formality of the Court and are of little 
801 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), vii. 
802 Kentv United States, 343 F.2d 247,258 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 541,561. 
803 s 23(1)(b) ands 24(c), NZBOR Act. 
804 Article 14.3(d), ICCPR. 
805 Article 40.2 (ii) and (iii), CRC. 
806 Larry C Wilson, 'The Role of Counsel in the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 
1029, 1029. 
142 
value' .807 Perceptions of the lawyer's place in the youth justice system have evolved with the 
changing ideologies of youth justice. In the welfare-based youth justice system, 808 which had 
as its objective the re-classification of the young offender to a young person in need of state 
assistance, reform and re-education of the young person were broadly the aims of the system, 
rather than the administration of a proportionate response to the offence.809 Where the best 
interests of the young person were paramount, it was argued, there was either no place for 
legal assistance or else the lawyer was seen as a friend of the court.810 The lawyer was a 
'repeat player' 811 who assisted with the expediency and smooth running of the court rather 
than advocating for the client's interests. 812 As one commentator states, lawyers in the welfare 
based youth justice system were 'badly cast as "friendly interveners" or "wise judicious 
parents"' .813 The 'best interests' of the young person was to be the basis of the court's decision 
and so the lawyer would not be expected to argue against decisions taken in furtherance of 
this objective. In a New Zealand context, it was apparent that judges regarded lawyers to be 
of value in assisting in the efficient running of the Children and Young Persons Court. Morris 
and Young's study in 1987 reported that lawyers in the Children and Young Persons Court 
'primarily worked for the benefit of the court system, enabling it to operate smoothly and 
fostering the appearance rather than the reality of adversarial justice'. 814 
In addition, international standards for youth justice now emphasise the importance of legal 
assistance for the young person. 815 Most western jurisdictions now provide for (generally 
807 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 111. 
808 See Chapter 2(11). 
809 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
810 Larry C Wilson, 'The Role of Counsel in the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 
1029. 
811 Marc Galanter, 'The Architecture of the Legal System' (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95. 
812 Ngaire Naffine, 'Children in the Children's Court - Can There Be Rights without a Remedy?' (1992) 6 
International Journal of Law and the Family 76. 
813 Larry C Wilson, 'The Role of Counsel in the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 
1029, 1032. 
814 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 123. See also D Duffer and L Siegel, 'The Organisation Man: Legal Counsel in 
the Juvenile Court' ( 1971) 7 Criminal Law Bulletin 544. 
815 Article 40.l(b), CRC. cf Article 14.3(b) and (d), ICCPR. 
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state-funded) legal representation for young people during court proceedings.816 It is important 
to note however, that the mere presence of a lawyer in youth justice proceedings does not 
guarantee the rights of the young person. For instance, evidence derived from empirical 
studies of youth court practice have even raised doubts about whether legal representation 
actually benefits the young defendant. 817 One American study reported that 'out of home' 
placements occurred more frequently where the young person was represented by counsel, 
with the authors postulating that when routine matters were disrupted by counsel, more formal 
interventions were likely to result, with potentially negative effects for the young person. 818 
It was noted above that in the welfare based youth system, it was frequently assumed that 
legal assistance for the young person was not required because the process was informal and 
compassionate in intention. With the phenomenal growth in the use of informal extra-judicial 
measures (such as the FGC, youth offender panels and restorative cautioning) across 
jurisdictions in response to offending by youth, 819 similar ideological arguments against the 
involvement of lawyers are invoked. It is argued that lawyers are not needed, that lawyers 
complicate proceedings and that legal assistance is not required as the process is benevolent, 
informal and in the interests of the young person.820 As one New Zealand commentator argues, 
'unless the facts are in major dispute, purely legal defences are probably not as important in 
serving the interests of either justice or the young person as a quick and diversionary 
solution' .821 As was discussed in a preceding chapter, the FGC is a process which should be 
based on a group consensus decision making model with an emphasis on meaningful 
participation by all parties.822 There is also the potential for restorative process and 
816 See for examples 323(1) CYPF Act ands 25, Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002 (Canada). 
817 See for example: George W Burruss and Kimberley Kempf-Leonard, 'The Questionable Advantage of 
Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court' (2002) 19 Justice Quarterly 37. 
818 George W Burruss and Kimberley Kempf-Leonard, 'The Questionable Advantage of Defense Counsel in 
Juvenile Court' (2002) 19 Justice Quarterly 37, 60. See also Chapter Nine on the proper role for the lawyer in 
the FGC process. 
819 See generally John Muncie and Barry Goldson (eds.), Comparative Youth Justice (London: Sage 
Publications, 2006), Adam Crawford and Tim Newburn, Youth Offending and Restorative Justice (Devon: 
Willan Publishing, 2003). See Chapter 5(IV). 
820 See for example Judge FWM Mc Elrea, 'Restorative Justice -A Peace Making Process'. Paper presented at a 
LEADR International Conference, Perth, Australia, May 1997. 
821 Gabrielle Maxwell, 'The Youth Advocate's Role: The Implications of Research Findings' in New Zealand 
Law Society, Youth Advocates' Conference (Wellington: CLE NZLS, 2004), 161. 
822 See Chapter 6 for discussion on typical practice and procedure at the FGC. 
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outcomes. 823 Some commentators argue that when the lawyer does attend a restorative justice 
type process, this will alter the restorative potential of the process.824 Concerns have also been 
expressed that the lawyer would speak for the young person or discourage the young person 
from telling the truth, and that the presence of the lawyer would compromise the potential for 
increased participation by the young person in the FGC process. 825 In a paper frequently cited 
by restorative justice advocates, Christie contends that 'lawyers are particularly good at 
stealing conflicts', 826 and as was discussed in a foregoing chapter, one of the avowed purposes 
of the CYPF Act generally, and the FGC particularly, is to empower the family to deal with 
off ending by their young person. 827 
C. The Importance of Legal Assistance Generally 
Legal assistance is a fundamental safeguard for accused persons at all stages of the criminal 
justice process. The importance of legal assistance for the accused person is well rehearsed. In 
particular, the vulnerability of the accused person in comparison to the power of the state and 
the complicated nature of the legal system are strong reasons for the right to legal 
assistance.828 Young people are especially vulnerable in the criminal justice system. The 
CYPF Act explicitly recognises this vulnerability and recognises that young people should 
have special protections in the system. 829 Research has demonstrated the susceptibility of 
young people to explicit and implicit pressures, and their lack of foresight as to 
consequences. 830 Grisso states that although studies on decision making capacities have 
generally concluded that mid-adolescents' decision making capacities are not much different 
823 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
824 Daniel W Van Ness, 'Legal Issues of Restorative Justice' in Gordon Bazemore and Lode Walgrave (eds.), 
Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime (Devon: Criminal Justice Press, 1999). 
825 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997). 
826 Nils Christie, 'Conflicts as Property' ( 1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1, 4. 
827 s 208(c)(ii), CYPF Act. 
828 Ben Emmerson, Andrew Ashworth and Alison MacDonald, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2007), ch 14. 
829 s 208(h), CYPF Act. See also R v Z [2008] NZCA 246. 
830 See generally Thomas Grisso and RG Schwartz, Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile 
Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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from adults,831 few studies have examined the decision making capacities of socially and 
educationally disadvantaged young people -young offenders generally fall into these groups-
and warns that 'progress towards completion of cognitive and moral developmental stages can 
be detoured or delayed by cultural, intellectual and social disadvantages' .832 Empirical studies 
have demonstrated the susceptibility of young people to coercion and lack of understanding in 
relation to the right to legal assistance. 833 
Young people generally are a vulnerable group but this is especially true for the typical 
clientele of the youth justice system. As one commentator notes: 
the contrast ... between juvenile justice and family proceedings is particularly marked. The Family Court 
presumes that young people will be traumatised by direct participation in proceedings which are 
deciding their residence and parental contact rights. Certain juvenile justice conferencing schemes 
proceed on widely different assumptions - that young people will benefit by being 'shamed', should 
directly confront often angry and emotional victims (and their families) and acknowledge their 
wrongdoing by devising and making appropriate reparation. The contrasting approaches are even more 
stark when due account is taken of the types of children involved in family and juvenile justice 
proceedings. Many of the young people involved in family matters are confident, articulate, well-
nurtured youngsters who are keen to inform a judge of their views. The juvenile justice cohort has 
within it some of the most disadvantaged, disaffected and least articulate young people in out 
community. Many young accused have little incentive to participate in, and few skills to comprehend 
legal processes.834 
There is evidence that young people frequently find the legal system 'incomprehensible' .835 
The CYPF Act is a particularly complicated piece of legislation. As Judge Inglis QC 
remarked in Police v L, the legislative provisions governing the FGC 'might almost have been 
deliberately drafted so as to promote obscurity and to daunt even the most experienced 
lawyer' .836 In relation to effective and meaningful participation in the youth justice system,837 
as Grisso states, 'expecting children [and young people] to participate in legal proceedings in 
831 Thomas Grisso, 'Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective' (1996) 
20 Law and Human Behavior 229,233. 
832 Thomas Grisso, 'Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective' (1996) 
20 Law and Human Behavior 229, 233. 
833 Rona Abramovitch, Michele Peterson- Badali and Meg Rohan, 'Young People's Understanding and Assertion 
of Their Rights to Silence and Legal Counsel' (1995) 37 Canadian Journal of Criminology 1. 
834 Kathryn Cronin, 'Children in the Legal Process - A Comment on Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice' Paper 
presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice, Towards 
2000 and Beyond, Adelaide, 26-27 June 1997, 2. 
835 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Australian Law Reform Commission, Seen and 
Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process: Australian Law Reform Commission Report 84 (Sydney: 
Australian Law Reform Commission, 1997), para 4.20-4.22. 
836 Police v L (1991) 8 FRNZ 123, 125. 
837 As mandated by Article 12, CRC. 
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an adult-like manner without taking special measures to ensure that they possess the 
knowledge, understanding, and ability to make appropriate legal decisions renders them 
vulnerable to potentially negative outcomes' .838 Legal assistance is an important tool in 
ensuring that young people in the youth justice system have the necessary understanding to 
participate in proceedings. 839 
D. The Particular Importance of Legal Assistance in the FGC Process 
There is little dispute that young people participating in the formal court based criminal 
justice system should have access to legal assistance. There is less support for the entitlement 
of young people participating in extra-judicial and diversionary measures to legal assistance. 
As was set out in a preceding chapter, although the FGC differs in format from formal court 
proceedings, the FGC has significant powers of a criminal justice nature.840 Morris and Young 
state that there was a belief that 'legal representation is desirable [in the court system] because 
it will enable young persons to understand the court proceedings, to exercise their rights and 
to make an informed decision as to the options open to them' .841 It is apparent that these 
reasons for the importance of legal assistance are relevant to the FGC as well. 
It is important that the young person gives an informed consent to participation in the FGC, 
because through accepting responsibility for the offence at the start of the FGC, that young 
person is effectively waiving his or her right to have the matter dealt with by a court. 842 The 
argument which is frequently advanced in the New Zealand context is that the formal court 
system is present as a 'backstop'. 843 That is, that the young person has the option to have a 
trial in court if they wish.844 However, this option is not a real safeguard unless the young 
838 Michele Peterson-Badali, Rona Abramovitch and Juliane Duda, 'Young Children's Legal Knowledge and 
Reasoning Ability' (1997) 3 Canadian Journal of Criminology 145, 167. 
839 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007. 
840 See Chapter 7. 
841 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice In New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 112. 
842 This issue is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 10, which discusses the unusual and unique method by 
which the offence is established through the FGC process. 
843 Judge FWM Mc Elrea, 'Restorative Justice - A Peace Making Process'. Paper presented at a LEADR 
International Conference, Perth, Australia, May 1997, 3. 
844 If the young person chooses not to admit the offence at the FGC, the matter is remitted to the referring 
agency, presumably for prosecution (in the case of the ITC FGC), or for formal court orders to be imposed (in 
the case of the court-referred FGC). 
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person is cognisant of it. Arguing that it is always possible to have recourse to the formal 
criminal justice system is not realistic unless the young person is aware of this choice. This is 
why access to legal assistance is especially necessary to provide such information to the 
young person in the FGC process. This is particularly important in New Zealand as the CYPF 
Act does not place a statutory duty on the youth justice coordinator or the referring entity (the 
police or the Youth Court Judge) to advise the young person on his or her rights. For example, 
in the New South Wales legislation there is a statutory requirement for the referring police 
officer and the conference convenor to explain to the young person that he or she is entitled to 
elect that the matter be dealt with by a court. 845 
It is essential in all types of youth justice proceedings that the young people have access to 
legal advice and representation to ensure that their rights are protected and that they are 
treated fairly. However, in an informal process such as the FGC, there is a particular danger 
that the young person's rights could be infringed. In the ITC FGC, there is no judicial 
oversight. Entry to and exit from the process is controlled by the police.846 The court-referred 
FGC is overseen by a Youth Court Judge but the evidence is that almost all FGC plans are 
accepted.847 Further, one of the functions of the formal judicial system is to scrutinise the 
investigative methods carried out by the police.848 The essentially confidential nature of the 
FGC process means that there is not the same level of scrutiny and openness as a criminal 
trial. In the criminal trial, defence counsel should make the Judge aware if the police have not 
followed the correct investigative procedures. Warner rightly questions whether the 
'progressive dimensions of the current emphasis on procedural justice and rights at the 
investigation stage will be undermined by a system whose emphasis is on essentially private 
solutions to alleged offending?' .849 Young people are particularly vulnerable to police pressure 
during questioning and investigation. 850 Because the majority of offending dealt with by the 
845 s 39(l)(c), s 45(3)(h), Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW). See further Chapter 14(V) on recommendations for 
the wording of information to be given to the young person. 
846 s 245(1), CYPF Act. 
847 See Chapter 12(III). 
848 Ben Emmerson, Andrew Ashworth and Alison MacDonald, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2007). 
849 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: 1994, Australian Institute of Criminology), 142. 
850 s 208(h), CYPF Act, Nessa Lynch, 'Young Suspects' (2008) New Zealand Law Journal 357. 
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FGC process is a result of admissions of guilt made outside the court system, it is unusual for 
confessions to be scrutinised by the courts.851 
In relation to the New Zealand FGC, it has been argued that there are sufficient procedures in 
place to ensure that the rights of the young person are protected during the FGC. Morris states 
that 'if facilitators [youth justice co-ordinators] at a family group conference have any 
concerns about young offenders' legal rights, they may request the appointment of a lawyer 
(paid for by the state)'. 852 It could be argued that the youth justice co-ordinator has the duty of 
informing the young person and their family of their rights.853 However the youth justice co-
ordinator operates however; he or she is an officer of Child, Youth and Family.854 Many of the 
young people and their families will have had contact with Child, Youth and Family through 
the care and protection system. 855 It is also likely that some young people and their families 
will have had negative experiences with Child, Youth and Farnily.856 This raises questions 
about the independence or perceived independence of the youth justice co-ordinator. It was 
also apparent from observation of FGCs that there was a close working relationship between 
the professionals (youth justice co-ordinators, Youth Aid officers, CYFS social workers 
etc). 857 Although interagency co-operation is desirable and recommended as best practice,858 
this may raise questions about impartiality. 
851 See Chapter 11. 
852 Allison Morris, 'Critiquing the Critics: A Brief Response to Critics of Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British 
Journal of Criminology 596, 601. Note use of the term 'young offenders'. Surely the young person cannot be 
classed as 'an offender' until guilt has been admitted during the conference? 
853 Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998), 4. 
854 Child, Youth and Family is the social agency which deals with children, young people and their families in 
matters of care and protection, adoption, and offending. 
855 Gabrielle Maxwell et al Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
856 Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998), 5. Gabrielle 
Maxwell et al Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social 
Development, 2004), 56. In total, approximately 7 out of 10 young people in the retrospective sample had had 
previous contact with Child, Youth and Family for either youth justice or care and protection referrals. 
857 See Chapter 6(V) for detail on the format of a typical FGC. 
858 Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998), Child, Youth, 
and Family, The Youth Justice Plan (Wellington, Child, Youth, and Family, 2002) and Ministry of Social 
Development, Safeguarding Our Children: Updating the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 
(Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
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Ill. THE RIGHT To LEGAL ASSISTANCE AT THE COURT REFERRED FGC 
A. Introduction 
Law and practice relating to the right to legal assistance in the two types of FGC under 
discussion will now be considered. The two categories of FGC which are the subject of this 
research (i.e. the court-referred FGC and the ITC FGC) will be examined separately. The 
situation of the court-referred FGC will now be considered. Firstly, the legislative provisions 
relating to legal assistance at the FGC will be analysed. Secondly, the sufficiency of practice 
and policy in relation to legal assistance will be evaluated. 
B. Legal Assistance at the Court-Referred FGC 
I. Legislation 
In the court-referred FGC, the first instance where a young person would expect to have the 
right to legal assistance is when that young person is making a decision whether to have the 
matter decided by a defended court hearing. In the Youth Court, referral to the first type of 
court-referred FGC is triggered by a plea of 'not denied'. 859 If the young person chooses to 
deny the charge, the matter is dealt with through a defended hearing according to the 
procedure set down in the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. If the charge is proved, there will 
then be a referral to a FGC to make recommendations as to orders.860 All young people 
appearing before the Youth Court are automatically assigned a state funded Youth Advocate 
unless private representation has already been or is about to be arranged.861 The Youth Justice 
Sub-committee of the New Zealand Law Society have stated that it is 'extremely rare for 
young people to privately retain their own counsel, and Youth Advocates are used almost 
exclusively' .862 The rarity of privately retained counsel is almost certainly due to the 
prevailing low socio-economic circumstances of the Youth Court's clientele. 
Those young people appearing before the Youth Court should therefore have the opportunity 
to consult with their Youth Advocate before deciding to 'deny' or 'not deny' the charge (the 
process which triggers the referral to the FGC). Indeed, under section 246 of the CYPF Act a 
young person appearing on a charge in the Youth Court must consult with a lawyer before 
859 s 246(b )(i), CYPF Act. Chapters 10 and 11 deal with how the offence is established in the FGC process. 
860 s 246(a), s 273, CYPF Act. 
861 s 323(1), CYPF Act. 
862 New Zealand Law Society, Submissions in Support of a Review of Remuneration Rates for Youth Advocates, 
11 November 2005, available online at www.lawyers.org.nz (last viewed 7 August 2008), para 9. 
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deciding to deny the charge. 863 It appears as if it is mandatory for a consultation with a lawyer 
to take place before the Youth Court accepts a plea of 'not denied'. Can the young person 
enter a plea of 'not denied' without consulting with a lawyer? This is not specifically 
mentioned in the legislation but is probably a moot point as each young person appearing on a 
charge in the Youth Court is automatically assigned a Youth Advocate. 864 Therefore, there is a 
formal mechanism for ensuring that a young person has the opportunity to avail themselves of 
legal advice before deciding whether to plead 'not denied' to the charge and have the matter 
resolved through a court-referred FGC, or to plead 'denied' and have the matter proceed to a 
defended hearing in the Youth Court. In regards to legal assistance at the FGC itself, there is 
provision in the CYPF Act for a lawyer representing865 the young person to be present at the 
FGC.866 
2. Policy 
Although in law it is still a matter of discretion for Youth Advocates as to whether they attend 
the FGC or not, it is generally accepted that those young people participating in a court-
referred FGC should have legal assistance at the FGC. It is instructive to examine the various 
Practice Notes issued in relation to attendance of Youth Advocates at FGCs in which the 
evolution of policy in relation to attendance by Youth Advocates may be observed. In the 
early years of the CYPF Act's operation, Principal Youth Court Judge Brown stated that 'the 
legislation contained the laudable aspiration requiring that every child or young person 
charged with an offence be legally represented'. 867 In a 1993 Youth Court Practice Note, Judge 
Brown then indicated that he was concerned with the 'exponential growth' in expenditure on 
Youth Advocates and the fact that it had become the 'norm' for Youth Advocates to attend 
FGCs. 868 It appears from the Practice Note that the reluctance to permit Youth Advocates to 
attend FGCs was guided more by financial than ideological reasons. Ideological reasons were 
to come later. Principal Youth Court Judge Carruthers changed tack. A 1995 Practice Note 
was concerned about the 'growing practice of denying funding for youth advocates to attend a 
863 s 246(a), CYPF Act. 
864 s 323(1), CYPF Act ( unless private representation has been arranged). 
865 See Chapter 9 which discusses the quality of legal assistance at the FGC. 
866 s 324 (a), CYPF Act. 
867 Youth Court Practice Note: Youth Advocate Scheme (MJA Brown. Principal Youth Court Judge, 17 
December 1993) [author's italics]. 
868 Youth Court Practice Note: Youth Advocate Scheme (MJA Brown. Principal Youth Court Judge, 17 
December 1993). 
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Family Group Conference unless there are special circumstances which make that 
necessary' .869 
The current Best Practice Guidelines for Youth Advocates state that the Youth Advocate 
should attend the FGC.870 It is likely that it is the court-referred FGC that is referred to. These 
Guidelines stress that attendance by the Youth Advocate is especially important if the young 
person wishes that the Youth Advocate attends, if the matter is a serious one, if the young 
person is a repeat offender, or there are legal issues involved.871 But it could be argued that 
there are legal issues involved in every FGC, since a FGC by its nature involves a 
determination of legal issues, such as the admission of the offence, and decisions on 
outcomes. It must be for the young person to make an informed decision as to whether legal 
advice is required. 872 
3. Attendance of Youth Advocates in practice 
In the nine court referred FGCs observed for this research,873 all the young people had been 
appointed a Youth Advocate when appearing in the Youth Court. This is to be expected as it 
is mandatory for each young person to be appointed a Youth Advocate when appearing in the 
Youth Court. It was not possible to observe discussions that took place when Youth 
Advocates advise young people before the Youth Court hearing. Previous research into 
practice at the Youth Court found that many young people only met their Youth Advocate 
briefly before the court hearing. The 1997 Report found that Youth Advocates were often not 
notified of their appointment to represent a young person until the day of the court 
appearance. 874 This would raise questions about the quality of the right, such as whether young 
people have sufficient time in an adequate environment to consult with the Youth Advocate. It 
is important to note that the rules of professional conduct for legal practitioners state that: 
869 Youth Court Practice Note: Attendance of Counsel at Family Group Conference (Principal Youth Court 
Judge DJ Carruthers 5 November 1996). 
870 New Zealand Law Society Youth Justice Sub-committee, Best Practice Guidelines for Youth Advocates, 2 
November 1998. 
871 New Zealand Law Society Youth Justice Sub-committee, Best Practice Guidelines for Youth Advocates, 2 
November 1998. 
872 See Chapter 14(V) for suggested wording of explanations to the young person. 
873 See Chapter 6(II). 
874 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), 8. 
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When taking instructions from a client, including instructions on a plea and whether or not to give 
evidence, a defence lawyer must ensure that his or her client is fully informed on all relevant 
implications of his or her decision and the defence lawyer must then act in accordance with the client's 
instructions. 875 
However, the 1997 Report on the practice of Youth Advocates observed that: 
Some youth advocates took the view that if the young person wanted to deny the charge, then youth 
advocates should pursue these instructions; avoiding a finding of guilt was viewed as 'the best interests' 
of the young person. Others felt that it was not always in the young person's 'best interest' to run 
'technical' defences and that a sanction might be more beneficial in the long run. They viewed the 
provision in the 1989 Act with respect to accountability as allowing them, on occasions, to dissuade the 
young person from defending him or herself. 876 
The question arises as to whether defence counsel would take this sort of view when 
defending an adult client in a criminal case. The answer is it is very unlikely. The issue of the 
quality of legal assistance at the FGC will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter. 
As regards attendance at the FGC itself, all the court-referred FGCs observed for this research 
had a Youth Advocate in attendance at some stage in the FGC. 877 There are some larger scale 
statistics available from the two major empirical evaluations of the youth justice system. The 
first comprehensive evaluation of the operation of the CYPF Act found that Youth Advocates 
were present in only 59% of court-referred FGCs,878 however the most recent evaluation found 
that lawyers were present in 364 of the 471 court-referred FGCs in the sample (77%).879 In 
summary, although all young people appearing at the Youth Court are automatically assigned 
a Youth Advocate, not all FGCs are attended by Youth Advocates. 
4. Views of Youth Advocates 
The four Youth Advocates who represented those young people involved in these FGCs were 
surveyed by postal questionnaire to ascertain their views on attending the youth justice 
FGC. 880 The 1997 study on the practice of Youth Advocates found that two thirds of Youth 
875 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008. Herinafter Conduct and 
Client Care Rules in the text. 
876 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997, 32. 
877 In three of the nine FGCs, the Youth Advocate either arrived late, or left early. 
878 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture: Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), 82. 
879 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice- Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 83. 
880 The questionnaire is attached as an appendix to this thesis. 
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Advocates surveyed agreed that attendance at the FGC was an integral part of their role.881 
Three out of the four Youth Advocates surveyed here agreed that they 'always' attended the 
FGC when they had been appointed by the Youth Court to represent the young person. One 
Youth Advocate stated: 
[I] would never not attend. 
Other Youth Advocates stressed the importance of attending the FGC. One Youth Advocate 
stated that if they could not attend they would arrange for another Youth Advocate to attend 
instead. Another Youth Advocate surveyed stated: 
[I] always make myself available by telephone if I cannot be there in person. 
C. Concluding Remarks 
The preceding section discussed legal assistance during the court-referred FGC process. There 
is a formal mechanism in place to ensure that the young person has access to legal advice 
when making the decision whether to plead 'not denied' or 'denied' to the charge (the process 
which triggers referral to the FGC). Those young people who deny the charge are dealt with 
through a defended hearing in the Youth Court. Although the CYPF Act provides that a 
Youth Advocate appointed to represent a young person may attend the FGC if the young 
person requests, it is a matter of discretion for the Youth Advocate as to whether they attend. 
Policy would appear to support the attendance of Youth Advocates at the FGC. In addition, 
all court-referred FGCs observed were attended by the Youth Advocate. Overall in New 
Zealand, the majority of court-referred FGCs are attended by a Youth Advocate. 
IV. THE RIGHT To LEGAL ASSISTANCE AT THE ITC FGC 
A. Introduction 
The situation of the young person referred to an Intention to Charge (ITC) FGC is much less 
satisfactory as regards legal assistance. The legislative and policy difficulties will now be 
considered. 
B. Legislative Provisions Dealing with Legal Assistance at the ITC FGC 
An ITC FGC is held where the police form the intention to lay a charge against a young 
person who has not been arrested. In these cases, there is a statutory requirement to consult 
881 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997). 
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·. I 
with a youth justice co-ordinator before a charge is laid in the Youth Court, 882 and an ITC 
FGC will alinost always be held at this stage. The ITC FGC is tasked with 'considering 
whether the young person should be prosecuted for that offence or whether the matter can be 
dealt with in some other way' .883 In practice, this means that the FGC will agree on a binding 
plan, and if this plan is completed within the specified timeframe that will be the end of the 
matter. 884 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, all young people appearing on a charge before the Youth 
Court are automatically appointed a Youth Advocate unless private representation has been 
arranged, 885 however there does not appear to be any provision dealing with the appointment 
of Youth Advocates for those young people referred for an ITC FGC. At section 251 of the 
CYPF Act (which presumably refers to all types of FGC, court-referred or ITC), it is stated 
that 'any barrister or solicitor or Youth Advocate or lay advocate representing the child or 
young person' 886 is 'entitled' to attend. It has been argued that the wording of section 324(3) 'a 
Youth Advocate appointed to represent a child or young person in any proceedings' may 
attend the FGC and 'make representations on behalf of the child or young person at any such 
conference' 887 applies only to the court-referred FGC.888 If this interpretation of section 324(3) 
was correct, then it would mean that young people participating in an ITC FGC would not be 
precluded from having a lawyer present at the FGC but the lawyer would not be state-funded 
through the Youth Advocate scheme. As privately retained counsel are practically unknown in 
the youth justice system due to the socio-economic circumstances of the clientele,889 this 
effectively rules out the right to legal assistance for those young people participating in an 
ITC FGC. Alternatively, it could be argued that the wording of section 324(3) 'appointed to 
882 s 245(1), CYPF Act. 
883 s 258(b), CYPF Act. 
884 Of course, the young person must admit responsibility for the offence at the FGC before a plan may be 
formulated. s 259(1), CYPF Act. 
885 s 323(1), CYPF Act. 
886 s 251(1), CYPF Act. 
887 s 324(3), CYPF Act. 
888 'Intention to charge Family Group Conferences continue to provoke debate amongst youth justice 
professionals' Court in the Act Newsletter (Principal Youth Court Judge's Office, March 2007). 
889 New Zealand Law Society, Submissions in Support of a Review of Remuneration Rates for Youth Advocates, 
11 November 2005, available at www.lawyers.org.nz (last viewed 14 August 2008), para 9. 
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represent a child or young person in any proceedings' 890 could encompass an appointment to 
represent the young person in an ITC FGC and not just in court proceedings. There is 
evidence that some Court Registrars have appointed Youth Advocates to represent young 
people at ITC FGCs (presumably under this section).891 
While it is uncertain whether the statutory appointment process envisages the appointment of 
Youth Advocates for young people participating in ITC FGCs, what is certain is that it is 
exceptional for a young person participating in an ITC FGC to have legal assistance either in 
advance of the FGC or during the FGC itself. 892 None of the three ITC FGCs observed for this 
research had a Youth Advocate present. The most recent larger scale evaluation found that 
Youth Advocates were only present at 10 out of 366 of ITC FGCs (approximately 2%).893 
There is therefore, a disparity between young people participating in court-referred FGCs and 
those participating in ITC FGCs. The arguments for extending the state funded Youth 
Advocate scheme to the young person participating in an ITC FGC will now be set out. 
C. The Case for Legal Assistance at the ITC FGC 
1. Required to admit offence without the benefit of legal advice 
It is generally accepted as important that young people should have access to legal advice 
before making the decision to admit an offence.894 The Youth Justice Sub-Committee of the 
New Zealand Law Society has stated that not having a Youth Advocate at an ITC FGC 
'potentially places a young person in a worse position than an adult defendant would be, as 
they [young people] are essentially being required to plead before receiving independent legal 
890 s 324(3), CYPF Act [author's italics]. 
891 'Intention to charge Family Group Conferences continue to provoke debate amongst youth justice 
professionals' Court in the Act Newsletter (Principal Youth Court Judge's Office, March 2007). 
892 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/fustitute of Criminology, 1993). 
893 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 83. Neither of the youth justice co-ordinators had convened an ITC FGC where a 
Youth Advocate was present. 
894 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Australian Law Reform Commission, Seen and 
Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process: Australian Law Reform Commission Report 84 (Sydney: 
Australian Law Reform Commission, 1997), para 18.152. See also discussion in Chapter 14(II) on the 
comparison between the regime in police custody and the FGC. 
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advice' .895 A joint submission to the review process of the CYPF Act by Youth Law,896 and 
ACY A897 stresses that: 
It should be remembered that a pre-charge FGC is still a formal part of the criminal process for young 
people. As the accused, a young person is in the most vulnerable position at a pre-charge FGC and in 
that respect should be able to access legal advice and advocacy. We would therefore support s323 of the 
Act to be amended to allow a Youth Advocate to be appointed once the police have consulted with an 
FGC co-ordinator under s245(1)(b)(ii).898 
All the Youth Advocates for this research were in favour of the Youth Advocate scheme 
being extended to cover ITC FGCs. Some Youth Advocates felt strongly about the rights of 
the young person in the ITC FGC. One Youth Advocate stated: 
Youth Advocates should be available at FGCs for all serious offending. FGCs for sex offending, 
burglaries and serious assaults should not be held in the first instance as non-court FGCs without Youth 
Advocates being present. This denies the young person very important representation at an early stage. 
The current government Youth Offending Strategy has recognised that current practice in 
regards to the role of the Youth Advocate requires clarification especially with regard to 
attendance at the ITC FGC.899 The New Zealand Law Society recommends that 'attendance by 
a [youth] advocate should be mandatory for purely indictable offences' .900 
2. Extra-judicial sanctions 
The ITC FGC may formulate plans with elements ranging from community work to payment 
of reparation to apologies.901 In addition, ITC FGC plans are not overseen by a Judge (unlike 
court-referred FGCs). The CYPF Act does not prescribe any limits for FGC plans. As Bala 
argues (in a Canadian context): 
the plan developed in extrajudicial sanctions may be more onerous or intrusive than the sentence which 
a youth court judge would impose, but the youth without legal assistance may not be aware of the 
895 'Youth Justice Committee' (2007) LawTalk Issue 680 (January). 
896 Youth Law is a community law service which specialises in children and young people's legal services. 
897 Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa is a non-governmental body which advocates for the rights of 
children and youth. It is involved in the preparation of the alternative report to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child. Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Children and Youth in Aotearoa 2003 (Wellington: Action 
for Children and Youth Aotearoa, 2003). The author is a member of the advisory panel. 
898 YouthLaw Tino Rangatiratanga Taitamariki/Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa. Submission on 
Ministry of Social Development Discussion Document Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children 
Young Persons and their Families Act 1989, l June 2007, para 14. 
899 Ministry of Social Development/ Ministry of Justice, Youth Offending Strategy (Ministry of Social 
Development/ Ministry of Justice: Wellington, 2005). 
900 'Youth Justice Committee' (2007) LawTalk Issue 680 (January). 
901 The issue of sanctions is dealt with in Chapters 12 and 13. 
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discrepancy and may erroneously believe that any alternative measures plan is less than the sanction a 
court would impose.902 
The issue of limits on sanctions is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 12. 
As well as intervening if the ITC plan is too severe or coercive, Youth Advocates may assist 
in ensuring that the plan is realistic. While observing FGCs, it was apparent in some instances 
that the family were 'overambitious' as to the elements of the plan, and suggested plans that 
could not realistically be completed within the specified time frame. 903 The Youth Advocate 
then intervened to make sure that the plan was one which could reasonably be completed 
within the timeframe. As one Youth Advocate stated when surveyed for this research, 
intervention at this stage could help to prevent the young person ending up in the Youth Court 
for failing to complete elements of the plan: 
I believe that the process could be assisted with the attendance of a Youth Advocate at an Intention to 
Charge Conference. Sometimes the young person ends up in Court anyway for non-compliance and the 
presence of a Youth Advocate at an Intention to Charge FGC might help avoid non-compliance with a 
plan 
This was also emphasised in the New Zealand Law Society's submission on the Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Act Amendment Bill (no 4).904 The submission argued that: 
... interventions within the Youth Justice system generally become less effective the more times a child 
or young person goes through them. Specifically this was recognised in the Report of the Ministerial 
Task Force on Youth Offending, April 2002. Following that report, a Youth Offending Strategy was 
also produced in April 2002. Anecdotal evidence suggests that where pre-charge [ITC] FGCs are held 
without a Youth Advocate being present, agreements reached are often unrealistic. This is particularly 
true in respect of reparation plans. This unfortunately has an effect of setting a young person up to fail 
when he or she is not able to comply with those agreements. Further intervention may then be required. 
Not only does this involve fairness issues for the young person involved but also for the victims of the 
offending. In such situations it is not unusual for victims to feel let down by the system.905 
Ensuring that the plan is realistic is especially important as there is no judicial oversight of the 
FGC plan. Unlike the court-referred FGC, the plan agreed to by the ITC FGC is not reviewed 
by a Youth Court Judge.906 Entry to and exit from the process is at the discretion of the police. 
902 Nicholas Bala, 'Diversion, Conferencing and Extrajudicial Measures for Adolescent Offenders' (2003) 40 
Alberta Law Review 991, 1024. 
903 See Chapter 6(V). 
904 New Zealand Law Society, Submissions on the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Act 
(no. 4) (6 September 2004). Available online at www.lawyers.org.nz (last viewed 1 October 2008). 
905 New Zealand Law Society, Submissions on the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Act 
(no. 4) (6 September 2004). Available online at www.lawyers.org.nz (last viewed 1 October 2008), 
Recommendation: Clause 14 - Persons entitled to attend FGC. 
906 See Chapter 12. 
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It is important that a person with legal knowledge (that is the Youth Advocate) is present to 
ensure that the young person is treated fairly. 
D. Concluding Remarks 
An examination of the legislation and policy relating to legal assistance at the FGC and data 
available on the attendance by lawyers at the FGC has demonstrated that although the CYPF 
Act provides for the attendance of a lawyer representing the young person at all types of FGC, 
in practice only those young people participating in a court-referred FGC have the opportunity 
to seek legal advice before referral to the FGC or have the opportunity to have a state funded 
Youth Advocate present at the FGC. There is no statutory obligation to inform the young 
person that they have the right to seek legal advice before participating in a FGC and there is 
no obligation to advise the young person that they have the right to have a lawyer present at 
the FGC. 
Those young people referred for a court-referred FGC will have already been assigned a 
Youth Advocate at the court hearing. This Youth Advocate will advise them before they 
decide whether to deny or not deny the charge. Although the legislation allows for this Youth 
Advocate to attend the FGC if the young person requests, it is still a discretionary matter for 
the Youth Advocate as to whether they will attend. In the ITC FGC, there is no legislative 
mechanism for ensuring that the young person has access to legal advice. Although the 
legislation does not preclude attendance at an ITC FGC, there is no formal mechanism to 
enable young people to have a lawyer present at the FGC. There is a strong argument that 
young people participating in an ITC FGC should have legal assistance as they are essentially 
being required to plead without the benefit of legal advice. There is also no judicial oversight 
for the sanctions imposed by an ITC FGC. 
V. THE COMPLIANCE OF LAW AND PRACTICE WITH RIGHTS STANDARDS 
A. Introduction 
Following from the criticisms above, it is now proposed to examine whether the current 
situation in relation to legal assistance for young people in the FGC process is in compliance 
with the NZBOR Act and New Zealand's obligations under the CRC. In each case, the 
applicability of the rights benchmark is discussed and then whether the current situation is in 
compliance. 
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B. Compliance with the NZBOR Act 
1. Does the NZBOR Act apply to the FGC? 
Section 24 of the NZBOR Act provides for certain rights applying to 'all those charged with 
an offence'. This includes the right to 'consult and instruct a lawyer' ,907 and the right to free 
legal assistance 'if the interests of justice so require and the person does not have sufficient 
means to provide for that assistance' .908 As the young person involved in a court-referred FGC 
has already been the subject of an information laid before the Youth Court,909 such young 
persons would come within the remit of this provision. The position of a young person 
referred to an ITC FGC vis-a-vis the NZBOR Act is less clear cut. As previously noted, the 
young person involved in a court-referred FGC will already have been the subject of formal 
charges before the Youth Court. It is therefore necessary to examine more closely the 
situation of a young person referred to an ITC FGC to determine whether such a young person 
comes within the remit of section 24 of the NZBOR Act. 
2. The meaning of 'charged' 
Section 245(1) of the CYPF Act states that the young person (who is to be the subject of the 
ITC FGC) is alleged to have committed an offence but no information has been laid yet. 
Section 247 of the CYPF Act (which specifies the instances in which a youth justice co-
ordinator is to convene a FGC) states in relation to the ITC FGC that the 'intended informant 
desires that the young person be charged with the offence' .910 Section 258 (which deals with 
the functions of the FGC) states in relation to the ITC FGC that it has been 'convened in 
relation to an alleged offence in respect of which proceedings have not yet been commenced 
under this part' .911 These provisions read together mean that the young person participating in 
an ITC FGC has not yet been formally charged in court. 
The application of section 24 of the NZBOR Act to the ITC FGC would thus seem to hinge 
on the meaning of 'charged'. Section 6 of the NZBOR Act requires that 'whenever an 
enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in 
907 s 24( c ), NZBOR Act. 
908 s 24(±), NZBOR Act. 
909 s 246, CYPF Act. 
910 s 247(b), CYPF Act. 
911 s 258(b), CYPF Act. 
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this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning'. In R v Pora, 912 and 
R v Poumako, 913 it was stated that Parliament must demonstrate clear intention if fundamental 
rights are to be eroded. 
The meaning of the phrase 'charged' has been considered on a number of occasions in New 
Zealand and overseas case law. In the New Zealand case of R v Gibbons, Goddard J stated 
that 'in common parlance the word "charge" does not have a fixed meaning and is loosely 
applied to a number of steps in the prosecutorial process' .914 His Honour gave some possible 
examples of the meaning of the phrase 'charged': the moment of arrest when the arrested 
person is informed of the reason for the arrest; following arrest where the arrested person is 
informed that the police intend to prosecute; when the police initiate formal court 
proceedings; when the charge is read to the accused person in court and a plea is requested. 
Later in the Gibbons decision Goddard J expressed a preference for the Canadian position as 
to the meaning of 'charged'. In the Canadian decision of R v Kalanj,915 the majority decided 
that a person was 'charged' for the purposes of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
when a formal court process was initiated.916 Lamer J in a minority judgment argued that a 
person is 'charged' when they are made aware that a process is to be initiated against them.917 
This is interesting because in the case of the ITC FGC, the police must have the intention to 
prosecute before referring to the youth justice co-ordinator before a FGC of this type is held. 
In the Gibbons case, it was eventually held that the right to a lawyer in section 24 of the 
NZBOR Act is 'triggered' by the concept of charged.918 Goddard J concluded that 'charged' 
must refer to an intermediate step in the prosecutorial process when the prosecuting authority 
formally advises an arrested person that he is to be prosecuted and gives him particulars of the 
charges he will face' .919 Following this decision it would seem that the right to a lawyer would 
912 [2001] 2 NZLR 37. 
913 [2000] 2 NZLR 695. 
914 [1997] 2 NZLR 585, 593. 
915 (1989) 70 CR (3d) 260. 
916 s 11, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
917 (1989) 70 CR (3d) 260, para 27. 
918 [1997] 2 NZLR 585, 595. 
919 [1997] 2 NZLR 585. 
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not apply to the young person participating in an ITC FGC as this young person would not 
have been arrested.920 Nonetheless, in a later unreported High Court decision concerning a 
young person (where charges were laid in the High Court), Fisher J stated his belief that: 
broadly speaking ... to "charge" a person in a criminal context is to take the formal step of confronting 
an accused with an alleged offence in a way that identifies for the accused the offence for which the 
accused stands in jeopardy of conviction in a proposed or current prosecution.921 
Applying this reasoning to the young person participating in an ITC FGC, the police must 
have clearly formed the intention to prosecute the young person before referral to an ITC FGC 
takes place.922 The ITC FGC may be considered a step along the road to prosecution (if the 
young person does not complete the plan agreed to at the FGC). By Fisher J's reasoning the 
situation of the young person participating in the ITC FGC could fit within the meaning of 
'charged' for the purposes of the NZBOR Act.923 
The decision of the House of Lords in the English case of R v Durham Constabulary924 may 
also be of relevance in interpreting the meaning of 'charged' in the present context. This 
appeal concerned a young person who had been given a formal warning by the police under 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, in respect of an offence of indecent assault. The system of 
reprimands and warnings under this legislation differs from the New Zealand system of 
diversion in that reprimands and warnings can be introduced as evidence in court hearings 
should the young person commit another offence at a later date.925 In addition, the young 
person may be required to give fingerprints, and all reprimands and warnings are recorded on 
the police national computer system. Since the offence in Durham Constabulary was sexual 
in nature, the young person's details were also placed on the Sex Offenders Register. The 
young person challenged the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act on a number of 'fair 
trial' issues. 
In the course of the judgment, there was discussion about the meaning of 'charged' in the 
youth justice system, as it was necessary for the young person to have been 'charged' in order 
920 s 245(1), CYPF Act. 
921 The Queen v PK, AP, RR & DH, 18/06/02, Fisher J, HC Auckland T O 1404 7. 
922 s 245(1), CYPF Act. K v Police (1993) 11 FRNZ 335. 
923 Of course this would mean that the other rights contained withins 23 NZBOR would also apply. Other rights 
are considered in later chapters. 
924 R v Durham Constabulary ex parte R [2005] 1 WLR 1184. 
925 s 65 ands 66, Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
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to engage his fair trial rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. The judgment of Baroness Hale of Richmond discussed the 
meaning of' in the determination of a criminal charge'. Counsel for R argued that: 
the process to which R was subjected involved the determination of a criminal charge within the 
autonomous meaning given by the Strasbourg jurisprudence to that expression in article 6 of the 
Convention, since it was triggered by suspicion that R had committed criminal acts and culminated in a 
finding that he had committed such acts.926 
Baroness Hale found that the criminal charge in this instance ceased to exist when the police 
had made the firm decision that the young person would not be prosecuted.927 As Gillespie 
argues 'it [the reprimand and final warning scheme] must be considered punitive and could be 
considered as a determination of a criminal charge even if it falls short of a public 
pronouncement of guilt' .928 Applying this reasoning to the New Zealand ITC FGC, the police 
retain the option to charge until the conference plan has been completed successfully. 
C. International Law 
It is also necessary to consider compliance with New Zealand's obligations under 
international law relating to youth justice (principally the CRC). The relevance of non-binding 
United Nations standards (principally the Beijing Rules) will also be discussed. 
l. The CRC 
The CRC provides that 'every child alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed 
the criminal law' is guaranteed 'legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation of his 
or her defence' .929 This is an affirmation of the right to legal assistance as provided for in the 
general human rights conventions.930 The CRC also guarantees the young person the right 'to 
have the matter determined by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial 
body in a fair hearing according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate 
assistance' .931 It is not clear whether the court-referred FGC would be considered part of 
formal court proceedings under the CRC. International law on the rights of children and 
926[2005] 1 WLR 1184, para 9. 
927 [2005] 1 WLR 1184, para 12, per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
928 Alisdair Gillespie, 'Reprimanding Juveniles and the Right to Due Process' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 
1006, 1010. 
929 Article 40.1, CRC. 
930 Article 11, UDHR. Article 14.2, ICCPR. 
931 Article 40.2(b)(iii), CRC. 
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young people must be wide enough to cover differing national systems of youth justice, but 
the CRC is generally designed with formal judicial proceedings (adversarial or inquisitorial) 
in mind. However, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has mentioned alternatives to a 
conviction even when the case has reached the level of the formal court proceedings (pre-trial 
altematives).932 However, any diversion from formal judicial proceedings should respect 
human rights and legal safeguards.933 What are the human rights and legal safeguards? The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated that 'the child must be given the opportunity 
to seek legal or other appropriate assistance on the appropriateness and desirability of the 
diversion offered by the competent authorities, and on the possibility of review of that 
decision' .934 
2. Other United Nations standards 
The Beijing Rules state that 'basic procedural safeguards such as ... the right to counsel ... shall 
be guaranteed at all stages of proceedings' .935 As the Beijing Rules were formulated in 1985 
before the development of extra-judicial processes like the FGC, the Beijing Rules 
contemplate formal judicial proceedings. The court-referred FGC is part of the Youth Court 
proceedings, as a formal charge has been laid before the Youth Court. At Rule 15 .1 of the 
Beijing Rules, which deals with adjudication and disposition, it is stated that 'throughout the 
proceedings the juvenile shall have the right to be represented by a legal adviser or to apply 
for free legal aid where there is provision for such aid in the country'. 
Turning to the ITC FGC, 'diversion' is defined in the Beijing Rules as action that is taken 
without 'resorting to formal trial'. 936 The Beijing Rules also state that 'any diversion involving 
referral to appropriate community or other services shall require the consent of the juvenile, or 
her or his parents or guardian, provided that such decision to refer a case shall be subject to 
review by a competent authority, upon application'. The Commentary to Rule 11 states that: 
consent [to participation in a diversionary process] should not be left unchallengeable since it might 
sometimes be given out of sheer desperation on the part of the juvenile. This rule underlines that care 
should be taken to minimise the potential for coercion and intimidation at all levels in the diversion 
932 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 68. 
933 Article 40.3, CRC. 
934 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 26. 
935 Rule 7.1, Beijing Rules. 
936 Rule 11.1, Beijing Rules. 
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process. Juveniles should not feel pressured (for example in order to avoid a court appearance) or be 
pressured into consenting to diversion programmes. 
D. Concluding Remarks 
From an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that international law stresses the 
importance of the young person having the right to legal assistance at all stages of youth 
justice proceedings. As international standards for youth justice are necessarily general, it is 
not clear whether CRC's guarantee of legal assistance would encompass the ITC FGC. 
Nevertheless, international standards emphasise the importance of protecting human rights 
and legal safeguards when young people are diverted from the formal criminal justice system. 
The importance of informed consent to diversionary processes is also emphasised. Legal 
assistance is an important safeguard to ensure that young people give an informed consent to 
the process. To ensure compliance with international law, it is essential that the young person 
has access to, and is facilitated to access, legal assistance before and during the FGC process. 
VI. THE RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS UTILISING 
CONFERENCING 
A. Introduction 
The preceding section has argued that the current law and practice in relation to the young 
person's right to legal assistance in the FGC process is not in compliance with rights 
standards. To argue non-compliance is relatively straightforward, but to set out legislative 
solutions to safeguard the right to legal assistance is more difficult. As previously discussed 
the New Zealand model of family group conferencing has been adopted and adapted by a 
number of other jurisdictions.937 It is instructive to examine what statutory provisions relating 
to the young person's right to legal assistance are present in the youth justice legislation in 
other jurisdictions. In this respect, it would appear that other jurisdictions have increased 
provisions relating to legal assistance when compared with New Zealand. 
B. Legal Assistance before Referral to a Conference 
In other jurisdictions, importance is placed on the young person being informed of their right 
to obtain legal advice before agreeing to participate in a conference process. The New South 
Wales youth justice legislation prescribes strict conditions for admission of the offence which 
937 Kathleen Daly and Hennessey Hayes, Restorative Justice and Conferencing in Australia (Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 2001 ), Adam Crawford and Tim Newburn, Youth Offending and Restorative 
Justice (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003). See further Chapter S(IV). 
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must occur before a conference can be held.938 Admission of the offence for the purposes of 
the legislation must occur in the presence of an independent adult (that is a parent, caregiver, 
appropriate adult or lawyer).939 The principles of the New South Wales legislation state that 
'children who are alleged to have committed an offence are entitled to be informed about their 
right to obtain legal advice and to have an opportunity to obtain that advice' .940 The legislation 
prescribes that the child must be informed of the entitlement to legal assistance at two 
different stages in advance of the conference. The first stage is when the specialist youth 
officer is proceeding to refer the child for a conference. Section 39(1)(b) of the New South 
Wales legislation specifies that this specialist youth officer must explain to the young person 
'that the child is entitled to obtain legal advice and where that advice may be obtained'. In 
addition, before the conference is convened, the conference convenor must ensure that the 
young person has been provided with a written notice outlining inter alia the young person's 
right to obtain legal advice and where such legal advice may be obtained.941 Best practice 
guidelines for conference convenors state that the convenor has the duty to ensure that the 
young person is aware of specialist children's lawyers in the area, how to contact a lawyer 
that has represented the child previously and that the lawyer is aware of the time and date of 
the conference. 942 The manual for conference convenors also stresses the importance of the 
young person's right to legal assistance being realised in practice: 
Whilst the development of the [Young Offenders] Act has been aware of the risk [of lack of legal 
advice] and has addressed it in statutory terms, it remains vitally important that the principles of access 
are realised in practice. It is clear that the earlier that a young person can obtain access to legal advice 
the better.943 
In South Australia, before a police officer refers a young person for a family conference under 
the Young Offenders Act 1993, the officer shoufd explain to the young person that the young 
person is 'entitled to obtain legal advice. ' 944 
938 s 36(b), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
939 s 10, Young Offenders Act 1997. 
940 s 7 (b ), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
941 s 45(3)(g), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
942 New South Wales Department of Juvenile Justice, Youth Justice Conferencing Policy and Procedures 
Manual (updated to 2005) available at www.djj.nsw.gov.au/publications.htm# (last viewed 1 September 2008), 
para 3.1.2. 
943 New South Wales Department of Juvenile Justice, Youth Justice Conferencing Policy and Procedures 
Manual (updated to 2005) available at www.djj.nsw.gov.au/publications.htm# (last viewed 1 September 2008), 
para 3.1.3 
944 s 7(2)(a)(ii), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
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Under the Irish Children Act 2001, there is provision for a Garda945 to convene a restorative 
conference to discuss offending by a child.946 The child must have the opportunity to consult 
with a solicitor before admitting the offence and agreeing to participate in the conference. In 
Canada also, the legislation states that the young person must have been advised of his or her 
right to be represented by counsel and been given a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel before consenting to take part.947 However, Bala reports that in Canadian programmes 
similar to the New Zealand FGC, most young people are advised of their right to consult with 
counsel but few have the opportunity to actually do so usually because oflack of funding. 948 
C. Legal Assistance at the Conference 
In Northern Ireland, for example, legal representation is permitted at all types of FGC. A 
young person may apply for legal aid under certain conditions.949 In Canada, there is no legal 
provision providing for access to legal counsel during the conference itself. This is compared 
with a provision which provides for the right to counsel during the formal court based 
process. 950 Under section 47(f) of the Young Offenders Act 1997 lawyers are permitted to 
attend conferences in New South Wales.951 In South Australia, the young person is entitled 'to 
be advised by a legal practitioner' at a family conference.952 
D. Policy Lessons for New Zealand? 
The Ministry of Social Development commenced a review of the CYPF Act in 2007. The 
discussion document Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989 stresses the importance of learning from other jurisdictions which 
have implemented conferencing.953 Youth justice is an area in which there has been a 
945 Police officer. 
946 In the Children Act 2001, the term 'child' encompasses all those under eighteen years. 
947 s 10(2)( d), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
948 Nicholas Bala, 'Diversion, Conferencing and Extrajudicial Measures for Adolescent Offenders' (2003) 40 
Alberta Law Review 991, 1024. 
949 s 35A ands 28A, Legal Aid, Advice, and Assistance Order (Northern Ireland) 1981. 
950 s 25(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
951 See Chapter 9 for discussion of the role of the lawyer at the conference. 
952 s 11 ( 4), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
953 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
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'remarkable correspondence' in terms of policy across westemjurisdictions.954 Although New 
Zealand was innovative in being the first jurisdiction to legislate for a conferencing model, it 
is clear from the above discussion that other jurisdictions have been innovative in protecting 
the rights of young people in conferencing. It is important that New Zealand considers these 
developments. 
In terms of 'policy lessons', the most comparable conferencing schemes are probably 
Australian.955 The New South Wales legislation has a strong emphasis on the rights of young 
people. It contains prescriptive legislative provisions setting out exactly what the 
requirements are for ensuring that young people have appropriate legal assistance before and 
during the conference. It is important too that such requirements are set at the legislative level. 
This means that young people in all areas have the same entitlements. In New Zealand 
currently, it is clear that different geographical areas are interpreting the requirements of the 
CYPF Act in relation to legal assistance differently.956 
Having a requirement to ensure that the young person is informed of and facilitated to access 
legal assistance could easily be made part of the FGC referral process. Best practice for youth 
justice co-ordinators is that home visits ( or at least phone conversations) should take place 
with the young person and their family in advance of the FGC process.957 Explaining and 
facilitating the right to legal assistance could be part of this. The final chapter of this thesis 
makes specific recommendations in the form oflegislative and policy changes.958 
VII. CONCLUSION: RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FGC PROCESS 
This chapter has considered law and practice relating to legal assistance at the FGC. It is 
apparent that while the legislation does not preclude legal assistance during the FGC process, 
the provisions are not sufficient to ensure that young people have access to legal assistance. A 
954 John Muncie, 'The Globalisation of Crime Control - The Case of Youth and Juvenile Justice' (2005) 9 
Theoretical Criminology 35, 36. 
955 Kathleen Daly and Hennessey Hayes, Restorative Justice and Conferencing in Australia (Canberra, 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 2001). 
956 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997). 
957 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative 
Youth Justice Practice (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 
1998). 
958 See Chapter 14(11). 
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young person participating in a court-referred FGC comes within the ambit of section 24 of 
NZBOR and the provisions of the CRC and the general human rights conventions. There is a 
strong argument that a young person participating in an ITC FGC should come within the 
ambit of the NZBOR Act. In addition, international law states that young people dealt with 
extra-judicially should have their human rights and legal safeguards (such as legal assistance) 
safeguarded. 
At present in New Zealand only young people referred to a court-referred FGC have legal 
assistance before the FGC. Those referred to an ITC FGC do not, which means that those 
young people are required to plead and to accept extra-judicial sanctions without the benefit 
of legal assistance. Essentially only young people in court-referred FGCs have legal 
assistance at the FGC. An examination of best practice in other jurisdictions demonstrates the 
comprehensive statutory provisions relating to legal assistance in the legislation of other 
jurisdictions which utilise conferencing. A more prescriptive standard in relation to legal 
assistance would ensure that each young person participating in the FGC would have access 
to legal assistance. 
The next chapter will consider the quality of the right to legal assistance, i.e. what happens 
when the Youth Advocate does attend the FGC. 
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CHAPTER NINE: QUALITY OF THE 
RIGHT To LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
Under the old legislation, I sometimes observed that a lawyer's only objective was to 'get the client 
off'. Achieving this by focussing on technicalities and loopholes means that young clients sometimes 
did not have to take responsibility for their actions and walked away from wrongdoing. The lessons 
learned from these situations were beneficial to no-one in the longer term - neither to the young 
offender, nor to the victim, and certainly not to society.959 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the preceding chapter concluded, the right to legal assistance is a fundamental right under 
international and national human rights law. The preceding chapter considered the young 
person's right to legal assistance in the course of the FGC process. Aspects of legislation and 
practice were criticised, especially the disparity of access to legal assistance in the two types 
of FGC under discussion. 
In this chapter, the discussion will move to the quality of the legal assistance when the 
lawyer960 does attend the FGC. There are two key issues to consider. Firstly, while the 
legislation provides that the Youth Advocate has the same rights and duties as if privately 
instructed by a client,961 there is evidence from the observation of FGCs that some Youth 
Advocates take a best interests approach in advising the young person. It will be argued that 
the CYPF Act and the relevant professional standards (Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008962) preclude a best interests model of 
representation, and that a best interests approach is at odds with the view of the young person 
as a competent and autonomous individual. 
959 Trish Stewart, 'The Youth Justice Co-Ordinatory Role' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The Youth 
Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 47. 
960 As considered in the previous chapter, in almost all cases legal representation in the youth justice system is 
provided by State funded lawyers called Youth Advocates. Privately retained counsel are practically unknown in 
the Youth Court. Thus the terms Youth Advocate and lawyer are used interchangeably in this chapter. 
961 s 234 of the CYPF Act states that 'a Youth Advocate appointed to represent a child or young person in any 
proceedings shall have, in relation to the representation of that child or young person in those proceedings and on 
any other occasion on which that Youth Advocate represents that child or young person, the same rights, powers, 
duties, privileges, and immunities that the Youth Advocate would have had if he or she had not been appointed 
pursuant to section 323 of this Act but had been retained by that child or young person to provide legal 
representation.' 
962 Hereinafter Conduct and Client Care Rules in the text. 
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The second issue to be considered is the correct role of the lawyer in the light of the different 
model of criminal justice represented by the FGC. There is an argument that the attendance 
of, and participation by lawyers who are used to adversarial criminal proceedings and the 
traditional model of representing an accused in the criminal trial might stunt the potential for 
an informal and supportive environment which is conducive to increased participation by the 
young person. It will be argued here that a balance can be achieved between protecting the 
rights of the young person through effective legal assistance, and preserving the positive 
aspects of the FGC process. 
IL THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN THE YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A. Competing Views 
Like the issue of whether lawyers should be involved in youth justice proceedings at all,963 
there is an ongoing theoretical debate regarding the role of the lawyer in proceedings 
concerning children and young people. A large body of literature exists in relation to 
representation of young clients in family law proceedings.964 There is a less visited debate 
( though along similar lines) in relation to the proper role of counsel in youth justice 
proceedings.965 The debate centres on best interests versus direct representation. 
A best interests model of legal representation is fundamentally concerned with what adults 
decide is best for the young person.966 The 'best interests' style of representation necessarily 
views the young person as lacking in capacity and unworthy of consultation and participation. 
This view is inconsistent with the idea of the competent young person. 967 Lawyers taking a 
best interests approach tend to act more as facilitators of the smooth running of the system 
rather than as an advocate for the young person. In this model, '"the best interests of the 
child" is the accepted mantra and any "bargaining" that might hinder the child's rehabilitation 
963 See Chapter 8. 
964 See e.g. William J Keough, Child Representation in Family Law (Pyrmont, NSW: LBC Information Services, 
2000), Pauline Tapp, 'Judges are Human Too: Conversation between the Judge and a Child as a Means of 
Giving Effect to Section 6 of the Care of Children Act 2004' (2006) New Zealand Law Review 39, Nicola 
Taylor, Megan Gallop and Anne Smith, 'Children and Young People's Perspectives on the Role of Counsel for 
the Child' (2000) 3 Butterworths Family Law Journal 146. 
965 Larry C Wilson, 'The Role of Counsel in the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 
1029. 
966 Ellen Marrus, 'Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation 
for Children Accused of Crime' (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 288. 
967 See Chapter 3. 
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would theoretically conflict with that notion' .968 The best interests of the young person no 
longer guide the youth justice system in New Zealand,969 but there is evidence that the 
paternalistic attitude may still prevail amongst some lawyers.97° Conversely, the direct 
representation model means that the lawyer fulfils the 'traditional role' of the legal 
practitioner in the criminal justice system; protecting rights, providing legal advice and above 
all being guided by the instructions and interests of the client.971 This model regards the young 
person as an autonomous and competent individual, however, under this model of legal 
assistance the lawyer will speak on behalf of the client, thus diminishing the opportunity for 
meaningful participation by the young person. 
B. The Youth Advocate Role 
I. Who are the Youth Advocates? 
The detailed provisions relating to the type of person suitable to be appointed to the Youth 
Advocate list provide some information as to the type of legal representation envisaged by the 
CYPF Act. The CYPF Act states that the barrister or solicitor appointed as a Youth Advocate 
should be suitable 'by reason of personality, cultural background, training, and experience' to 
represent the young person.972 The Youth Court Practice Note relating to the appointment of 
Youth Advocates gives further detail on the qualities desirable in a Youth Advocate. These 
include: 
-Knowledge of the objects, principles and provisions of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, 
including a knowledge of the procedures under s 14( 1 )( e) of the Act, relating to child offenders; 
-Knowledge of, and experience in, criminal law; 
-Knowledge of specialist Police practice as it applies to young offenders; 
-Knowledge of the roles of the various participants in the Youthjustice system; 
-Ability to relate to and communicate with young persons and their families; 
-Awareness of community groups and resources available; 
-Knowledge of education and training facilities available in local areas; 
-Evidence of knowledge and experience oflocal cultural organisations; 
-Knowledge of restorative justice principles and practice; 
968 Ellen Marrus, 'Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation 
for Children Accused of Crime' (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 288, 289. 
969 s 6, CYPF Act. 
970 Allison Monis, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997). 
971 Conduct and Client Care Rules. 
972 s 323(2), CYPF Act. 
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-Relevant qualifications, and training and whether there is a commitment after appointment by the applicant to 
attend all relevant training and education programmes that may be offered by the New Zealand Law Society at a 
local, regional or national level; 
-Any other evidence, including references; and 
-Where there is a secure Youth Justice Residential facility close to the Court to which the person has applied to be 
listed as a Youth Advocate a demonstrated knowledge of the secure care provisions of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act 1989. 973 
A 1987 report on the New Zealand youth justice system found that the standard of legal 
representation in the Children and Young Person's Court was frequently lacking in quality.974 
Similar observations were reported in a 1985 account of the Children's Advocate scheme in 
the Auckland Children and Young Person's Court.975 Morris and Young found that 
representing children and young people was perceived as 'one of the lowest rungs on the 
professional ladder' and that some junior practitioners were using the Children and Young 
Person's Court as a forum for work experience.976 Thankfully, research in the post- CYPF Act 
era has found that Youth Advocates are generally 'an experienced group of lawyers' .977 The 
1997 Report found that most of the Youth Advocates surveyed were senior practitioners and 
over half had experience in acting as counsel for the child in family law proceedings.978 Of the 
Youth Advocates who attended the FGCs observed for this research, none was newly 
qualified, and all were senior criminal or family practitioners. 
2. What is the Youth Advocate role? 
The role of the Youth Advocate is codified in the CYPF Act as the normal lawyer and client 
relationship. The legislation requires that when appointed, the Youth Advocate shall have 'the 
same rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities that the Youth Advocate would have 
had if he or she had not been appointed pursuant to section 323 but had been retained by that 
973 Youth Court Practice Note: Appointment and Review of Youth Advocates (AJ Becroft, Principal Youth Court 
Judge, 1 December 2006), para 3.55. 
974 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
975 Terrence Loomis, An Evaluation of the Children's Advocate Scheme Pilot in the Auckland Children and 
Young Persons Court (Auckland: The Social Research and Development Trust, 1985). This scheme was the 
genesis for the current Youth Advocate scheme. 
976 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 116. 
977 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), 7. 
978 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), 7. 
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child or young person to provide legal representation' .979 As noted, there is also provision for 
'any barrister or solicitor representing the young person' to be present at the FGC.980 A 
privately appointed lawyer attending a FGC under this provision would be presumed to be 
fulfilling the nonnal role of a lawyer. 
The normal 'rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities' of New Zealand legal 
practitioners are set out in the Conduct and Client Care Rules. Section 107 of the Lawyers and 
Conveyancers Act 2006 states that these rules are: 
binding on all lawyers and former lawyers, whether or not they are members of the New Zealand Law 
Society, and on all incorporated law firms and former incorporated law firms, but are not binding on 
other persons.981 
Thus Youth Advocates, or indeed any lawyers acting for a young person in the youth justice 
system, are not exempt from the professional standards. The duties of practitioners are 
especially relevant in this instance. The lawyer has an ethical duty to represent the client to 
the best of his or her ability. The Conduct and Client Care Rules state that 'A lawyer must be 
independent and free from compromising influences or loyalties when providing services to 
his or her clients. ' 982 
Further, a lawyer representing a child or young person in the Youth Court has the statutory 
duty to explain in age appropriate language 'the nature of the proceedings, including, in the 
case of proceedings in a Youth Court, the nature and legal implications of the allegations ' 983 
and also the nature of any court orders which may be made.984 There is a similar duty on the 
lawyer to 'encourage and assist' participation by the young person, where appropriate.985 
Overall, it is clear that the CYPF Act prescribes a direct representation model of representing 
the young person rather than a best interests model. As noted, the youth justice provisions of 
979 s 324(1), CYPF Act. 
980 s 251 (g), CYPF Act. 
981 s 107(1), Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. Furthers 107(3) states that 'no partnership deed, employment 
agreement, or other legal arrangement governing the manner in which a practitioner is in practice, business, or 
employment may require a practitioner to act in breach of the practice rules and any part of a deed, condition of 
employment, agreement, or other legal arrangement that purports to require such conduct is void'. 
982 Rule 5, Conduct and Client Care Rules. 
983 s 10(2)(a), CYPF Act 
984 s 10(2)(c) CYPF Act. 
985 s 11, CYPF Act. 
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the CYPF Act are not subject to the paramountcy of the child or young person's welfare and 
interests.986 In summary, the CYPF Act envisages a traditional lawyer-client relationship, 
viewing the young person as an autonomous individual. 
III. QUALITY OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE AT THE FGC 
A. Introduction 
This section considers the role of the Youth Advocate at the FGC, principally based on 
observation of the FGC. The typical functions performed by the Youth Advocate are 
discussed, as well as some areas of concern. 
B. The Lawyer's Role at the FGC 
I. Legislative provisions 
In relation to the role of the lawyer during the FGC itself, the CYPF Act provides that when 
the Youth Advocate attends the FGC ( at the request of the young person) the Youth Advocate 
may make representations on behalf of the young person.987 As mentioned above, there is 
provision for any barrister or solicitor (or lay advocate) to attend the FGC.988 There must be a 
presumption that the lawyer is to act in the normal role of a New Zealand legal practitioner, 
that is in the interest of the client.989 
2. Practice examples 
Firstly, to outline the typical role which the Youth Advocate played at the FGCs which were 
observed. I was not privy to what was said at the initial meeting with the young person at the 
Youth Court, when the young person is referred to the FGC. Turning to practice at the actual 
FGC, I always arrived early at the FGC venue. There was only one instance where the Youth 
Advocate arrived before me and was speaking to the young person in a separate room. At the 
remaining FGCs there was no evidence of the young person meeting with the Youth Advocate 
before the FGC began. In four of the FGCs the Youth Advocate arrived late or left early 
during the FGC, coming from, or going to attend court or on other urgent business. The 
foremost impression of the role of the Youth Advocate in proceedings was that Youth 
986 s 6, CYPF Act. 
987 s 324(a), CYPF Act. 
988 s 251 (g), CYPF Act. 
989 Rule 5, Conduct and Client Care Rules. 
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Advocates tended to act as a partner to the youth justice co-ordinator and the police. There 
was a strong sense that all the professionals knew each other well (which of course would be 
the position at the criminal court as well). 
Typically, the stage at which the Youth Advocate participated most was when discussion 
moved to possible outcomes. The Youth Advocate was often up to date with what community 
work and assessments were available, and whether local psychologists and drug and alcohol 
counsellors had capacity to see the young person. Youth Advocates were also willing to 
facilitate FGC plans, e.g. by offering to hold money to be earned by the young person in a 
trust account to be eventually paid to the victim of the offence. It was common for the Youth 
Advocate to join in the general discussion of what the young person should do in the future -
suggesting possible educational courses, and giving general 'life advice' to the young person. 
In summary, the Youth Advocate's role at these FGCs was to provide information to the FGC 
and to assist in facilitatating the FGC plan, rather than the usual role of a lawyer in a criminal 
proceedings which would be to protect rights, advocate on behalf of the client and aim to 
mitigate the client's liability or penalty. 
C. Issues of Concern 
1. Acting against the young person's interests 
What is most relevant for this discussion about rights, is that even in the small amount of 
FGCs observed there were examples of the Youth Advocate acting in a manner at odds with 
the duties of a defence lawyer in a criminal proceedings (remembering that the CYPF Act 
states clearly that the Youth Advocate has the 'same rights, powers, duties, privileges, and 
immunities' ,990 as if he or she was retained by the young person privately). What was 
particularly concerning was when the Youth Advocate appeared to act completely contrary to 
the young person's interests. There were three particular examples of this attitude on the part 
of the Youth Advocate. 
In one court-referred FGC, the young person had been involved in a burglary. The police 
summary of facts stated that the proceeds of the burglary had been divided between a number 
of young people. Other FGCs were in progress for the co-offenders. This young person had 
stated that the offence was 'not denied' at the start of the FGC when the police summary of 
facts was read. However, during the FGC, it became apparent that the matter was not so clear 
990 s 323(1), CYPF Act. 
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cut. The young person claimed that he had not taken such a central part in the off ending and 
had received a much lesser part when the proceeds were divided. Despite the young person 
giving a plausible explanation and not knowing the details of the burglary proceeds, the 
Youth Advocate backed up the police version of events, and began to pick holes in the young 
person's story. The Youth Advocate did not ask the young person whether he wanted to 
reconsider his earlier admission, and simply stated 'well, you have admitted this already'. In 
this instance, the Youth Advocate was clearly acting against the young person's interests. If a 
defence counsel had advanced this sort of argument during a criminal trial (i.e. doubting 
publicly the client's version of events), it would be a serious breach of professional 
responsibility. It is certain that in the adult criminal justice system, a defence counsel would 
never argue for the victim's interests in such a manner. 
In three other FGCs, the Youth Advocate appeared to be more of a 'Victim Advocate', and 
began speculating how upset the victim must have been after the offence. In one of these the 
Youth Advocate asked the young person in an angry tone: 
Did you think of your victim [while committing the offence] and how they felt? 
That is not to doubt the importance of the victim's perspective and the importance of the 
young person accepting responsibility for his or her actions. But it is certainly not the role of 
the Youth Advocate to advocate for the perspective of the victim. The CYPF Act makes 
ample provision for the victim's views to be heard. Victims are permitted to attend the FGC 
and make representations, are permitted to bring a reasonable number of supporters to the 
FGC.991 In addition, the youth justice co-ordinator may report the views of the victim to the 
FGC if the victim is unable or unwilling to attend. The police also take the responsibility for 
the public interest. 
2. Defences 
In other FGCs, it appeared that there was a prima facie case that the elements of the offence 
were not made out from the summary of facts, or that there were available defences for the 
young person which were not raised. The subject of how the offence is established in the FGC 
process is dealt with in detail in other chapters,992 but it is important to note here that the 
young person is required to admit the offence at the FGC, except in the rare cases where the 
991 s 251(2), CYPF Act. 
992 See Chapters 10 and 11. 
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young person has opted for a defended hearing. The summary of facts is read by the police 
officer, and the young person is asked whether he or she admits the offence. It is at this stage, 
that one would expect the Youth Advocate to act to ensure that the elements of the offence are 
made out, and that there are no defences to the charge. 
While, unsurprisingly, drugs and alcohol were a feature of the summary of facts in all 
offences dealt with at the FGCs observed, there were two FGCs in particular where the young 
people claimed to have been extremely intoxicated at the time of the offence. In both of these, 
the summary of facts provided by the police officer mentioned this level of intoxication. In 
both cases, the Youth Advocates involved seemed to regard this not as a mitigating factor, or 
a reason why the offence might not be made out, but an aggravating factor. In another 
offence, the young person involved was adamant that he had not been party to the actual theft, 
but had joined the offending group after the incident had taken place. Again, the Youth 
Advocate did not mount the obvious argument that the young person had not been party to the 
actual offence. In these sort of cases, the Youth Advocate should discuss the availability of 
these defences with the young person, either in advance of the FGC, or ask for a 'time out' 
during the FGC, if the question of defences arise. 
Examples like these give the impression that in some cases, Youth Advocates appear to regard 
running 'technical defences' as contrary to the best interests of the young person. The 1997 
Report found that: 
[Others] felt that it was not always in the young person's 'best interest' to run 'technical' defences and 
that a sanction might be more beneficial in the long run. They viewed the provision in the 1989 Act 
with respect to accountability as allowing them, on occasions, to dissuade the young person from 
defending him or herself.993 
It appears that some Youth Advocates hold the view that defending a young person is 
'teaching the child that crime is okay if you have good lawyers' .994 This is clearly 
symptomatic of a best interests approach to young people. Wilson notes 'it was suggested [in 
Canada] that it was not in the best interests of the child to have a delinquency charge 
dismissed as a result of quality representation by an astute attorney, as the child might be 
993 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997, 32. 
994 Ellen Marrus, 'Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation 
for Children Accused of Crime' (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 288, 344. 
178 
:, 
given a wrong impression and further delinquency might result' 995 This could just as easily be 
argued in relation to adult clients. Marrus argues the contrary: 
with respect to the argument that getting guilty children off can result in future crime because it 
engenders an attitude of being able to get away with anything as long as you have a good lawyer, it is 
well to remember that such a belief is grounded in reality. By insisting on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the child is learning another, perhaps more important lesson; he or she is valued by the system, 
and that the system, although imperfect, assures that individuals count and that it is better to free a 
guilty person that to convict an innocent one. It has also been shown that when people understand how 
the system works and the rules to be followed, they are more likely to become law-abiding citizens.'996 
Some commentators have also argued that 'technical' defences ignore the rights and needs of 
victims as provided for in the principles of the CYPF Act.997 While the rights and needs of 
victims are undoubtedly important, the FGC remains a state process designed to resolve a 
breach of the criminal law. Again, it would be extremely unusual, if not a prima facie case of 
professional misconduct, for a defence lawyer in a criminal proceedings to fail to run a valid 
defence because of concern for the victim. Further, it is commonsensical that there is little 
benefit to the victim if the young person is subject to an FGC plan for an offence he or she 
was not involved in or was not responsible for. This would also conflict with the notions of 
fairness, justice and participation which processes like the FGC are meant to represent. 
3. The principles of the CYP F Act 
Another argument which has been advanced in relation to the role of the Youth Advocate at 
the FGC is that the unique principles of the youth justice provisions of the legislation, and the 
requirements of the Youth Advocate role somehow 'override' the normal duties of legal 
professionals to the client.998 A Child, Youth and Family representative states his belief that: 
all who have a role determined by statute in the youth justice process are bound by both the general 
principles of the Act and by the principle specifically set out in Part IV. It is therefore incumbent on all 
participants in the FGC process to bring the principles of s 4(f)(l) and (2) to life. In my view it is not 
helpful if key functionaries revert to and are restricted to traditional roles as played out in the traditional 
justice processes. Therefore one should see police and youth advocates to be equally concerned with 
accountability and addressing the underlying causes of offending in every conference999 
995 Larry C Wilson, 'The Role of Counsel in the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 
1029, 1030. 
996 Ellen Marrus, 'Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation 
for Children Accused of Crime' (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 288, 344 (internal references omitted). 
997 Allison Morris, 'Critiquing the Critics: A Brief Response to Critics of Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British 
Journal of Criminology 596. 
998 Note s 107(3) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 which states that 'no partnership deed, 
employment agreement, or other legal arrangement governing the manner in which a practitioner is in practice, 
business, or employment may require a practitioner to act in breach of the practice rules and any part of a deed, 
condition of employment, agreement, or other legal arrangement that purports to require such conduct is void'. 
999 Neil Cleaver, 'Making the Family Group Conference Work'. Paper presented at the New Zealand Law 
Society: Youth Advocates' Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004, 173. 
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Section 5 of the CYPF Act states that the guiding principles are to guide 'any Court which, or 
person who, exercises any power conferred by or under this Act', similarly with section 208. 
Are lawyers acting for a young person exercising a power 'conferred by or under this Act'? 
There is an argument that Youth Advocates appointed by the Youth Court under section 
323(1) are exercising a power under the CYPF Act. However, a privately appointed lawyer 
(admittedly rare in the youth justice system) is not court-appointed. It would seem unlikely 
that lawyers under this section would come under section 5. Even if lawyers and Youth 
Advocates were to be guided by section 5, it seems absurd that a lawyer representing a young 
person should be guided by the victim's interests or community's interests. The duty of the 
lawyer is to the client. The name given to the lawyer in this role is 'Youth Advocate', not 
'Victim Advocate' or 'Public Interest Advocate'. As Wilson argues, 'the lawyer's function as 
advocate is openly and necessarily partisan' .1000 
D. The Appropriate Role for the Youth Advocate 
I. Views of Youth Advocates 
When the views of Youth Advocates were surveyed, contradictions emerge in how the Youth 
Advocates viewed their role at the FGC. 'Traditional' core roles of lawyers in the criminal 
justice system were considered important. 'Protecting rights' was regarded as 'very 
important' by all respondents, while 'provision of information to the young person' and 
'representing the young person' were considered 'very important' by three-quarters of 
respondents. However, three quarters thought it was 'very important' to 'advocate for a 
solution that was in the young persons' best interests'. Similarly, in the 1997 Report, there 
was a high level of consensus amongst Youth Advocates about the importance of 'traditional' 
roles such as protecting rights and providing legal information. 1001 However, in relation to 
outcomes, Youth Advocates consistently rated representing the best interests of the young 
person as of high importance. 1002 
1000 Larry C Wilson, 'The Role of Counsel in the Youth Criminal Justice Act' (2003) 40 Alberta Law Review 
1029, 1032. 
1001 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), 31. 
1002 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997, 31. 
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Despite these seemingly contradictory views expressed by Youth Advocates, the legislation is 
unambiguous that the duties of the Youth Advocate are the same as if the lawyer had been 
retained privately and not court-appointed. 'Paternalistic lawyering' 1003 is not envisaged by the 
CYPF Act. The 1997 Report into the practice of Youth Advocates expressed concern that 
acting in the best interests of the young person and ensuring the outcome was in the best 
interests of the young person were identified by participants as forming part of the core tasks 
of the Youth Advocate. As the authors caution: 
Reference to a client's "best interests" is neither part of an advocate's role vis-a-vis adult clients nor 
part of the philosophy underlying the 1989 Act. It was also clear that 'best interests' was defined in a 
range of very different ways by participants to the research and was sometimes used to justify doing 
whatever particular youth advocates felt was appropriate. 1004 
According to an Australian report into the rights of children and young people: 
A general rule of legal advocacy is that the client sets the goals of representation. Lawyers are 
instructed by the client and, subject to their professional judgment and their duty to the court, advance 
the case in accordance with the wishes and directions of the client. A lawyer acts as adviser and 
advocate - ensuring that the client is informed of relevant considerations and is assisted, through 
discussion of those considerations, to provide informed instructions. However, the decisions concerning 
the case are ultimately those of the client and the representative may be required to advocate a position 
with which he or she disagrees. Lawyers are encouraged to exercise their forensic judgment concerning 
their advocacy but are not required to critically assess the soundness of the judgment of the client. 1005 
2. The appropriate role for the Youth Advocate 
To summarise, what should the proper role of the Youth Advocate be? It is clear that the 
Youth Advocate is appointed to represent the young person in criminal proceedings, and the 
CYPF Act states that the Youth Advocate has the same powers, duties and immunities as if he 
or she had been retained by the young person. The professional standards for lawyers require 
that the lawyer must 'within the bounds of the law and these rules, protect and promote the 
interests of the client to the exclusion of the interests of third parties' .1006 The first duty of the 
Youth Advocate should be to the young person, and Youth Advocates should never argue the 
side of the public interest or the victim's interests. The Youth Advocate should not take a 
'best interests' approach, in particular refraining from suggesting or advocating particular 
courses of action or outcomes, unless the young person requests it. There are many other 
1003 Ellen Marrus, 'Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation 
for Children Accused of Crime' (2003) 62 Maryland Law Review 288, 294. 
1004 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), ix. 
1005 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Australian Law Reform Commission, Seen and 
Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process: Australian Law Reform Commission Report 84 (Sydney: 
Australian Law Reform Commission, 1997), para 13 .3. [Internal references omitted]. 
1006 Rule 6, Conduct and Client Care Rules. 
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professionals such as social workers and youth workers, and also the family and the family's 
supporters, who may concern themselves with the interests of the young person. The main 
duty of the Youth Advocate should be the protection of rights and the provision of 
information about legal issues that might arise in relation to the FGC. In particular, the Youth 
Advocate should intervene if the offence is not made out, or if there is not enough evidence to 
support the admission which the young person proposes to make. 
IV. To REPRESENT OR TO ADVISE? 
A. Introduction 
Some have argued that the traditional role of the lawyer is inconsistent with the FGC model. 
As previously discussed, the FGC model is theoretically premised on informality and group 
consensus decision making. 1007 It will be argued here that the CYPF Act does not and cannot 
disestablish the duties of the lawyer in relation to their clients, but the role of a lawyer in the 
FGC need not be combative or adversarial. 1008 
To say that the lawyer in the FGC should confine himself or herself to the core duties of 
lawyers such as the protection of rights and the provision of legal information is not to 
mandate that Youth Advocates must take a strictly representative role which is not cognisant 
of the differing needs of young people as opposed to adult clients. There is certainly scope for 
a more holistic approach to legal representation taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the FGC. 
B. Representation in Practice 
Theoretically, the FGC is based on a consensus decision making model, with all parties who 
have a stake in the offence invited to negotiate an outcome. 1009 One of the recognised potential 
benefits of such an approach is an increased opportunity for the young person to participate in 
the discussion and negotiation of the outcome.1010 Effective and meaningful participation by 
1007 See Chapters 6(V), and 7. 
1008 Joanna Shapland, 'Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Just Responses to Crime?' in Andrew von 
Hirsch et al (eds.), Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? 
(Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
1009 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
1010 Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998). 
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young people in legal processes which affect them is an important requirement of the CRC. 1011 
Evaluations of youth court practice both in New Zealand,1012 and intemationally, 1013 have 
criticised the lack of participation by the young person. The nature of the FGC (informal, less 
hurried and taking place in 'neutral territory' with family support present) should mean 
increased levels of participation by young people.1014 In reality, this has not been the case. 
Observational research of the FGC has demonstrated that many young people do not feel 
involved in the decision making process or do not understand what went on. 1015 This lack of 
participation is likely to be a symptom of the large caseload of youth justice co-ordinators. 
'Repeat players' such as the police and the youth justice co-ordinator are too often reported as 
being the primary decision makers. 1016 This is unfortunate, as the youth justice FGC represents 
a real opportunity to involve and empower children in decisions regarding them. 
However, the CYPF Act states that a lawyer may be present at the FGC to 'represent' the 
young person.1011 In the particular provisions dealing with Youth Advocates, the legislation 
states that the Youth Advocate may make 'representations on behalf of the child or young 
person' at the FGC. 1018 The dictionary definition of 'represent' is to stand in for as proxy. 1019 
This is indicative of the language of formal criminal proceedings where the lawyer speaks on 
behalf of the accused person. 
What is relevant for the purpose of this discussion, is whether the Youth Advocate helps or 
hinders increased participation by the young person at the FGC. Maxwell has stated that: 
1011 Article 12, CRC. The right to participation was not an issue directly addressed by this research, although it is 
undoubtedly important. To gather valid evidence of the rate of participation in the FGC would require social 
science and interviewing skills outside the scope and expertise of this project. 
1012 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
1013 Ursula Kilkelly, 'Youth Courts and Children's Rights: The Irish Experience' (2008) 8 Youth Justice 39. 
1014 Jane Dalrymple, 'Family Group Conferences and Youth Advocacy: The Participation of Children and Young 
People in Family Decision Making' (2002) 5 European Journal of Social Work 287 
1015 See Chapter 6(V)(E), also Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final 
Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004). 
1016 See Chapter 6(V)(E)(2), also Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final 
Report (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2004). 
1017 s 251(g), CYPF Act. 
1018 s 324(3)(a), CYPF Act. 
1019 Oxford English Dictionary (2"d Edition) (1989). 
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it is clear from both a consideration of the legislation and of the nature of the process that it is critical 
that the youth advocate recognises that the sole justification for their presence, both in court and at the 
family group conference, is to assist the young person to express their views, to advocate on behalf of 
the young person, to respect the young person's views as they would those of an adult client and to 
ensure that the process provides a voice for the young person.1020 
Morris et al argue that a lawyer speaking for the young person is not consistent with the 
philosophy of the CYPF Act. 1021 They argue that if the lawyer represents the young person at 
the FGC, there would be conflict with the principle of taking responsibility: 1022 
Professionals are expected to play a low key role in the family group conference. The youth advocate's 
main role is to advise on legal issues and to protect the young person's rights; they may also express an 
opinion about the proposed penalties if these seem excessive. The social worker, if present, will 
normally only provide background information on the young person and participate in supporting the 
plans of the family and the young person for the future. Practice can, however, vary considerably. 
Conferences are intended to be flexible and responsive to young people, families and victims. All these 
values can be breached at times, especially when professionals do not understand or accept their 
roles_ 1023 
The 1997 Report found that other youth justice professionals sometimes regarded the Youth 
Advocate as a hindrance 'because he/she would highlight legal issues and rights and this was 
seen as conflicting with obtaining a 'good' outcome. 1024 Further, Braithwaite has argued (in the 
more general context of restorative justice) that: 
[P]art of the point of restorative justice is to transcend adversarial legalism, to empower stakeholders to 
speak in their own voice rather than through legal mouthpieces who might have an interest in polarizing 
a conflict.. .A standard that gives legal counsel a right to speak at the conference or circle seems an 
unwarranted threat from the dominant legal discourse to the integrity of an empowering restorative 
justice process. 1025 
1020 Gabrielle Maxwell, 'The Youth Advocate's Role: The Implications of Research Findings' in New Zealand 
Law Society, Youth Advocates' Conference (Wellington: CLE NZLS, 2004), 156. 
1021 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), 25-26. 
1022 s 4(f)(i), CYPF Act. 
1023 Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, 'Restorative Justice in New Zealand: Family Group Conferences as a 
Case Study' (1998) 1 Western Criminology Review available at http://wcr.sonoma.edu/vlnl/morris.html (last 
viewed 2 August 2008). 
1024 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997), 17. 
1025 John Braithwaite, 'Setting Standards for Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 563, 
566. 
184 
C. A More Prescriptive Provision? 
I. Legislative provisions in other jurisdictions 
How might a balance between participation and protection of rights be achieved? Compare, 
for instance, the New South Wales youth justice legislation which states: 
1) Except as provided by subsection (2), a child who is the subject of a conference is entitled to be 
advised (but not represented) by an Australian legal practitioner at the conference. 
(2) The conference convenor may permit a child who is the subject of a conference to be represented 
by an Australian legal practitioner at the conference, either generally or subject to such conditions or 
limitations as may be imposed by the convenor. 
(3) A conference may be adjourned at any time for the purpose of allowing a child to obtain legal 
advice or representation by an Australian legal practitioner.1026 
This legislation specifies that (with exceptions) the child must not be represented but can be 
advised. This would seem to suggest that the lawyer must not speak for the child but that the 
child can seek advice. The manual for conference convenors in New South Wales states that 
'a lawyer may be present to answer the young person's questions but may not speak on the 
young person's behalf' .1021 The manual for conference convenors states that 'the restrictions 
on legal representation are designed to ensure that the conference process is protected from 
becoming legalistic and adversarial and from simply resembling court proceedings' 1028 In the 
South Australian legislation, the young person is entitled to be 'advised' by a legal 
representative during the FGC. 1029 
2. Specifying the lawyer's role 
The current legislation's wording of the lawyer's role in the FGC is not in line with current 
standards for participation by the young person. The Youth Justice Sub-Committee of the 
New Zealand Law Society also argues that 'the youth advocate should play a role in the 
family group conference that enables the young person to have his or her views put forward 
and be a key decision maker' .103° Facilitating the meaningful participation of the young person 
in the FGC is undoubtedly a positive aim and is in line with the participation provisions of the 
CRC. 1031 Protection of rights by the lawyer does not have to mean that the lawyer engages in 
adversarial behaviour. Walgrave sees the role of the lawyer in such processes as being a 
1026 s 50, Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1027 New South Wales Department of Juvenile Justice, Youth Justice Conferencing Policy and Procedures 
Manual (updated to 2005) available at www.djj.nsw.gov.au/pub!ications.htm# (last viewed 1 September 2008), 
para 3.2. 
1028 New South Wales Department of Juvenile Justice, Youth Justice Conferencing Policy and Procedures 
Manual (updated to 2005) available at www.djj.nsw.gov.au/publications.htm# (last viewed 1 September 2008), 
para 3.2. 
1029 s 11(4), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
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protector of rights and a giver of information rather than an advocate in the formal sense of 
the word. 1032 It is true that increased opportunity for meaningful participation by the young 
person is an acknowledged benefit of the conference process and some change in the 
conventional behaviour of lawyers is necessary to facilitate dialogue during the conference, 
for example by encouraging the young person to participate rather than speaking for the 
young person. 1033 Lawyers do not have to be 'berobed, wigged, distant, combative 
presences' 1034 and can take an approach sensitive to the age and culture of the young person. 
V. CONCLUSION: QUALITY OF THE RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
The preceding chapter argued the importance of the young person having access to legal 
assistance at all stages of the FGC process. However, the quality of the right is equally 
important. This chapter examined issues surrounding the duties and role of the lawyer when 
attending the FGC with the young person. Although the CYPF Act is unambiguous as to the 
duties of the lawyer, it appears as if the best interests style of representation persists among 
practitioners. It was argued here that lawyers should confine themselves to their duty of 
protecting the young person's rights and ensuring that their client is fairly treated in 
accordance with the law. Matters relating to the best interests and welfare of the young person 
are properly within the province of other professionals such as social workers. The standards 
of the legal profession do not make exceptions for the youth of the client, and lawyers should 
not advocate for the interests of the victim or the public. 
While it is certain that the lawyer should act to protect the young person's rights, this can be 
achieved while still encouraging the young person to participate in the process. There is also 
confusion over the role that lawyers should take. The CYPF Act states that the lawyer is there 
to 'represent' the young person but this is not in line with the participation rights of the young 
1030 New Zealand Law Society Youth Justice Sub-committee, Best Practice Guidelines for Youth Advocates, 2 
November 1998. 
1031 Article 12, CRC. 
1032 Lode Walgrave, 'Restorative Justice and the Republican Theory of Criminal Justice: An Exercise in 
Normative Theorising on Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite ( eds.), Restorative Justice: 
Philosophy to Practice (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000). 
1033 Allison Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Paula Shepherd, Being a Youth Advocate: An Analysis of Their Role 
and Responsibilities (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1997). 
1034 Joanna Shapland, 'Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Just Responses to Crime?' in Andrew von 
Hirsch et al (eds.), Restorative Justice & Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? 
(Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
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person or the format of the FGC. The lawyer should act in an advisory role, intervening only 
if the young person's rights are being infringed. It would be better if the legislation prescribed 
an advisory role for the Youth Advocate.1035 
1035 See further Chapter 14(11), for the wording of recommended legislative and policy changes. 
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CHAPTER TEN: ESTABLISHING THE 
OFFENCE - THE LEGISLATIVE 
MECHANISMS 
[The question is not whether] this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but what is he, how has he 
become what he is and what best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from 
a downward career. It is apparent at once that the ordinary legal evidence from a criminal court is not 
the sort of evidence to be heard in such a proceeding.1036 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding two chapters have argued the importance of the young person having access to 
quality legal assistance at the FGC. One of the arguments advanced in relation to the 
importance of legal assistance was the lawyer's role in making sure that there was evidence to 
substantiate the offence, and that the young person was legally guilty. The next two chapters 
will examine how the offence is proved in the FGC process. 
The first section discusses the key right (the presumption of innocence) and its particular 
importance to the young person in the youth justice system. Then, the unusual and unique 
way in which the offence is proved under the CYPF Act is considered. 
Aspects of the scheme of the CYPF Act for proving the offence have caused confusion, even 
at a judicial level. The divergent approaches coming from the case law will be considered. In 
essence, it will be argued that the way in which the offence is proved in the FGC process is 
legally sound, if certain conditions are met (e.g. legal assistance). Then, Chapter 11 will 
examine these procedural requirements and how these operate in practice at the FGC. 
IL THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
A. Content of the Right 
In the adversarial criminal process, the accused's guilt is established after a plea of guilty 
(after consultation with a lawyer) or by a finding of guilt after a defended hearing.1037 
1036 Judge Julian Mack, 'The Juvenile Court' (1909) 23 Harvard Law Review 104. 
1037 See generally Janet November, Burden and Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases (Wellington: Butterworths, 
2001), Doyle and Hodge, Criminal Procedure in New Zealand (3rd Edition)(Sydney: The Law Book Company 
Ltd, 1991). 
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Evidence provided by the prosecution must come up to the criminal standard of proof i.e. 
beyond reasonable doubt. 1038 The requirement of putting the prosecution to the proof is central 
to the adversarial process. As McElrea states: 
at the heart of the usual Western concept of criminal justice is the idea of a contest between the State 
and the accused, conducted according to well defined rules of fair play and leading to a verdict, guilty 
or not guilty. One of the most important of these rules is the presumption of innocence - the accused is 
to be found "not guilty" unless the State can prove otherwise. Those found guilty are punished by the 
State, and of course the more punitive the sentencing regime the greater is the incentive for a guilty 
person to rely on the presumption of innocence and put the State to the proof, i.e., not to plead guilty. 1039 
The presumption of innocence, that is the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty 
according to law, is a fundamental principle of the adversarial system. 1040 In Woolmington v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Viscount Sankey famously described the concept of the 
accused being innocent until proven guilty as the 'golden thread' running through the 
common law criminal trial. 1041 
The presumption of innocence 'finds a place in every known human rights document' ,1042 and 
is thus a fundamental principle of international human rights law. The ICCPR states that: 
'everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law' .1043 This longstanding principle is also codified in section 25 
of the NZBOR Act which provides that 'everyone who is charged with an offence has, in 
relation to the determination of the charge ... the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law' .1044 
1038 Janet November, Burden and Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases (Wellington: Butterworths, 2001 ). 
1039 Judge FWM McE!rea, 'Accountability in the Community: Taking Responsibility for Offending' in Judge 
FWM McElrea (ed.), Re - Thinking Criminal Justice - Vol 1: Justice in the Community (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1995), 65. 
1040 David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair Trial - Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001). 
1041 [1935] AC 462, 481. 
1042 Andrew Ashworth, 'Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence' (2006) 10 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 241,243. 
1043 Article 14.2, ICCPR. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 
1984), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (1994). 
1044 s 25(c), NZBOR Act. Cf s 1 l(d), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art 6.2, European Convention on 
Human Rights, and see further Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A 
Commentary (Wellington: Lexis-Nexis, 2005), paras 23.4.2-23.4.15. In relation to the meaning of the word 
charged, see Chapter 8(V)(B)(2). 
189 
In relation to the application of the right to those in the youth justice system, the requirements 
of the ICCPR are mirrored by the Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that 
'every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the following 
guarantees ... to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law' .1045 The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child considers the presumption of innocence to be 'fundamental to the 
protection of the human rights of children in conflict with the law'. 1046 The Beijing Rules also 
emphasise that 'basic procedural safeguards' such as the presumption of innocence shall be 
'guaranteed at all stages of proceedings' .1047 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
issued further guidance, stating that the presumption of innocence in the CRC means that: 
the burden of proof of the charge(s) brought against the child is on the prosecution. The child alleged as 
or accused of having infringed the penal law has the benefit of doubt and is only guilty as charged if 
these charges have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The child has the right to be treated in 
accordance with this presumption and it is the duty of all public authorities or others involved to refrain 
from prejudging the outcome of the trial. 1048 
B. Importance of the Right 
In his paper 'Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence', 1049 Ashworth exammes the 
rationale for the presumption of innocence. He summarises the importance of the presumption 
of innocence as being that the presumption is: 
inherent in a proper relationship between State and citizen, because there is a considerable imbalance of 
resources between the State and the defendant, because the trial system is known to be fallible, and, 
above all, because conviction and punishment constitute official censure of a citizen for certain conduct 
and respect for individual dignity and autonomy requires that proper measures are taken to ensure that 
such censure does not fall on the innocent. 
While the general importance of the presumption of innocence applies to young people as 
well as adults, the presumption may have extra relevance to young people. There is a high rate 
of guilty pleas in youth courts generally. Research into the Children and Young Persons Court 
in 1987 found that the process was akin to an assembly line. Contested cases were extremely 
rare and raising legal issues in these cases was even rarer. 1050 It must be noted that guilty pleas < 
1045 Article 40.2(b)(i), CRC. 
1046 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, 11. 
1047 Rule 7.1, Beijing Rules. 
1048 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, 11. 
1049 Andrew Ashworth, 'Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence' (2006) 10 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 24 l. 
1050 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987), 114-115. 
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are the norm in youth courts across jurisdictions.1051 There is, of course, a prevalence of guilty 
pleas in the lower courts generally.1052 
Further, there may be a presumption of guilt when young people are involved. While the 
media are careful to refer to the actions of adult defendants in cases before the courts as 
'alleged', there is evidence of the use of the term 'offender' instead of alleged offender when 
discussing young people. 1053 Prejudgment by demeanour is also an issue. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child caution that: 
States Parties should provide information about child development to ensure that this presumption of 
innocence is respected in practice. Due to lack of understanding of the process, immaturity, fear or for 
other reasons, the child may behave in a suspicious manner, but authorities must not assume that the 
child is guilty without evidence proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 1054 
In addition, the history of youth justice demonstrates less of a focus on the offence and more 
of a focus on the young person's general situation. 1055 Under the welfare orientated mode of 
youth justice, proving the offence was regarded as secondary. The system focused on the 
young person's problems as a whole, rather than a reaction to a proved offence. One of the 
distinguishing characteristic of a welfare type approach to youth justice was the provision for 
a non-specific complaint system meaning that a child or young person could be brought into 
the court's jurisdiction even if there was no specific offence involved.1056 Rights such as the 
presumption of innocence provide a control on the discretion of youth justice professionals. 
The presumption of innocence and the requirement that the offence be proved lessens the risk 
that criminal proceedings are used solely to intervene in the young person's life, as there must 
be an offence that is proved or capable of being proved. 
1051 Joseph B Sanborn Jnr, 'Pleading guilty in juvenile court: Minimal ado about something very important to 
young defendants' (1992) 9 Justice Quarterly 127. 
1052 Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
1053 'Bail Decision Beggars Belief' Press Release: New Zealand First Party, Thursday 13th December 2007. 
1054 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, 11. 
1055 See Chapter 2(III) and (IV). 
1056 s 31, Child Welfare Act 1925. 
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III. How ARE OFFENCES PROVED IN THE FGC PROCESS? 
A. Introduction 
Aspects of how the offence is proved under the CYPF Act are unusual and unique, and so 
must be considered here in detail. There are considerable differences from the traditional 
adversarial criminal process. 
B. The Court-Referred FGC 
The concept of proof beyond reasonable doubt is arguably the high water mark of the 
adversarial criminal process. However, only less than a third of youth justice apprehensions 
are actually dealt with through prosecution in court. The latest available figures from the 
Ministry of Justice indicate that in 2006, out of the 30,451 apprehensions: 
• 29% were prosecuted 
• 39% were dealt with through the Police Youth Diversion Scheme 
• 23% received a formal police warning 
• 6% were dealt with through an Intention to Charge FGC. 1057 
As this chapter will discuss, even for these one- third of young people who are prosecuted, 
proof through the adversarial process is rare. 
The system in the Youth Court differs markedly from that of the regular criminal court. 
Formal pleas of guilty or not guilty are not taken. For those young people participating in a 
court-referred FGC, formal charges will already have been laid in the Youth Court. There are 
two routes by which a young person may arrive at a court referred FGC. When the young 
person appears in the Youth Court the young person is asked (after first consulting with a 
Youth Advocate), 1058 whether the charge(s) are 'denied' or 'not denied' .1059 
1. Charges 'denied' 
If the young person wishes to deny the charge, the matter will then be subject to a defended 
hearing as for an adult accused. The procedure is the adversarial one set out in the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 .1060 If the charge is not proven, that is clearly the end of the matter. If 
1057 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), 
14. These figures are based on the 30,451 apprehensions of young people occurring in 2006. 
1058 s 323(1), CYPF Act. 
1059 s 246(a) and (b), CYPF Act. 
1060 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 2.3.1. 
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the charge against the young person is proved in the Youth Court, a FGC must be convened to 
make recommendations as to sentencing options. 1061 None of the FGCs in this sample involved 
denied charges. There are no legal issues in how the offence is proved in this type of FGC, as 
the offence has been proven through the normal adversarial process before the FGC considers 
the matter. 
2. Charges 'not denied' 
The more common situation however, is where the 'not denied' procedure is used. All of the 
nine court-referred FGCs in the sample were convened under this procedure. 
This is a model unique to the New Zealand Youth Court. The CYPF Act states that where the 
young person has not opted to deny the charge, the Court 'shall not enter a plea to the charge' 
but must adjourn proceedings to allow a FGC to be convened. 1062 This is known as the 'not 
denied' procedure. The Principal Youth Court Judge has succintly described the concept of 
'not denied' as 'a somewhat odd, but very useful mechanism' .1063 This is not a formal 
admission or plea of guilty but allows the young person to acknowledge there is a 'case to 
answer' and to let the FGC handle the matter. 
At the subsequent FGC, there must be an 'admission of the offence' by the young person. 1064 
At FGCs attended during this research, this legislative requirement was fulfilled by a reading 
of the summary of facts, and the young person being required to indicate his or her 
agreement. 1065 If the young person does not admit the offence or if the FGC is unable to 
ascertain whether the young person admits the offence, the FGC cannot proceed to make a 
recommendation or formulate a plan in respect of the offence. 1066 At all the nine court-referred 
FGCs observed for this research, the young person admitted the offence. 
1061 s 258(e), CYPF Act. 
1062 s 246(b), CYPF Act. 
1063 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Justice: The New Zealand Experience: Past Lessons 
and Future Challenges' Paper Presented at Juvenile Justice: From the Lessons of the Past to a Roadmap for the 
Future, Sydney, Australia, 2003, 21. 
1064 s 259(1), CYPF Act 
1065 See Chapter 11 (II) and (lll). 
1066 s 259(2), CYPF Act. 
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When the recommendations, plans or decisions formulated at the FGC are reported back to 
the Youth Court Judge, the notation 'Proved By Admission at Family Group Conference' 
should be made on the file. 1067 Essentially the 'not denied' concept fulfils two purposes. 
Firstly, the young person is agreeing to let the matter be resolved at the FGC, and secondly, 
the young person is waiving their right to have a defended hearing. Should the young person 
answer 'not denied' to the charge at the Youth Court but change his or her mind and decide 
not to admit the offence at the FGC, the matter is referred back to the Youth Court, for a 
defended hearing to take place.1068 
In summary, there are no legal issues with the 'denied' procedure, as the offence is proved 
through a defended hearing in the usual manner. The issue is really with the 'not denied' 
procedure. There are two undefined concepts here: what does 'admit the offence' mean, and 
what does the notation 'Proved by Admission at Family Group Conference' made by the 
Youth Court Judge mean? Before considering the meaning of these two concepts, it is worth 
discussing the scale of the issue. 
3. How many cases go through the 'not denied' procedure? 
As noted, all of the court-referred FGCs in the sample were as a result of the 'not denied' 
procedure, though patently this sample is not statistically significant. Efforts were made to 
ascertain the percentage of Youth Court cases that involve the 'not denied' procedure. 
Information requests to the Ministry of Justice, Child, Youth and Family, and the Principal 
Youth Court Judge's office yielded only the fact that there are no statistics collected on the 
rate of 'not denied' cases, though all three parties indicated that this was a statistical gap in 
the system. Anecdotally though, all parties indicated that 'denied' cases were rare. The 
Principal Youth Court Judge has also stated that almost all Youth Court cases involve a plea 
of 'not denied' .1069 The Achieving Effective Outcomes report found that in a sample of 1,000 
FGC cases, only two cases involved the young person denying all charges. 1070 The youth 
1067 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008). There is an 
official stamp for this purpose. See Chapter l l(IV). 
1068 As in the ITC FGC, there is no specific provision on what the procedure is if the young person does not 
admit the offence. The FGC cannot then make recommendations and so the non-agreement procedure in s 264 
CYPF Act is presumably employed. 
1069 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Justice: The New Zealand Experience: Past Lessons 
and Future Challenges'. Paper Presented at Juvenile Justice: From the Lessons of the Past to a Roadmap for the 
Future, Sydney, Australia, 2003, 15. 
1070 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 90. 
194 
justice co-ordinators and Youth Advocates (those who were involved in the FGCs which were 
observed) agreed that almost all cases were dealt with through the 'not denied' procedure. 
Child, Youth and Family were also contacted, with a view to obtaining the breakdown of the 
types of FGC convened each year. 1011 Unfortunately, the breakdown of the FGC types is not 
collated. The section number under which the individual FGC is convened is only noted on 
the individual client's file. 1072 
Some limited information is available on the amount of defended hearings. An information 
request to the Ministry of Justice in October 2008 yielded the following information on the 
rate of cases which were finally disposed of at a defended hearing in the Youth Court. 
Table 3: Amount of defended hearings in the Youth Court annually 
Year [June-June] Total Disposals Number of Defended Hearings Percentage 
2008 7696 553 7.1 
2007 7662 583 7.6 
2006 7474 545 7.3 
In summary, though there are no specific figures on the rate of cases dealt with through the 
'not denied' procedure, what can be ascertained is that such cases are in the clear majority, 
when compared with those proved through defended hearings. 
C. The ITC FGC 
Three of the FGCs observed were ITC FGCs. The ITC FGC is held with the purpose of 
resolving the young person's case without formal charges. When the young person has not 
been arrested, but is alleged to have committed an offence, there is a statutory process which 
must be followed before the police may lay a charge in the Youth Court.1073 There is a 
requirement to consult with a youth justice co-ordinator, and if after consultation the police 
still wish to charge the young person, an ITC FGC must be held before a charge is laid in the 
Youth Court. 1074 At an ITC FGC, the FGC participants are tasked with deciding whether a 
1071 See Chapter 5(III)(A) on the categories ofFGC. 
1072 Information request made to Child, Youth and Family in December 2007. 
1073 s 245(1), CYPF Act. 
1074 s 245(1), CYPF Act. 
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charge should be laid in the Youth Court or whether there is another means of dealing with 
the matter,1075 usually through the formulation of a plan which the young person must 
complete within a specified timeframe. 
There is no requirement that the young person be found guilty by a court, but admission of the 
offence by the young person is a pre-requisite for the FGC to proceed to a decision. 1076 Again, 
the legislation does not specify what procedure should be used to ascertain whether the young 
person admits the offence. At the three FGCs, this requirement was satisfied by the police 
officer reading the summary of facts and the young person being required to state whether he 
or she agrees with the summary of facts.1077 As was discussed in an earlier chapter, lawyers are 
rarely present at this type ofFGC. 1078 
Moreover, by admitting the offence at the ITC FGC, the young person is essentially waiving 
the right to have a defended hearing in the Youth Court to resolve the matter. 1079 The police 
essentially agree not to charge the young person if the offence is admitted and a plan put in 
place to address the offending. The legislation does not contain any specific provisions on 
what should happen if the young person chooses not to admit the offence at the ITC FGC. No 
reported instances of this type could be found. Presumably the matter is referred back to the 
police.1080 The police would then have two options: to lay a charge in the Youth Court, or to 
opt not to take the matter further. If the young person then wishes to have the matter dealt 
with through a defended hearing, he or she would have to deny the charge at the initial court 
hearing, and the matter would be set down for a defended hearing. 
D. A Complex Array of Terms 
It is clear from an examination of the CYPF Act that there are a number of different terms 
used in place of the standard 'guilty/not guilty' criminal pleas. 
1075 s 258(b), CYPF Act. 
1076 s 259(1), CYPF Act. 
1077 See Chapter 6(V)(B), and Chapter l(II). 
1078 See Chapter 8(IV). 
1079 Of course in some cases after admitting the offence at the ITC FGC, the FGC may fail to reach agreement. In 
these cases, the matter is referred back to the police. 
1080 Presumably s 264, CYPF Act which is headed 'Procedure where no agreement possible' would apply. In 
these cases the matter is referred back to the referring agency, in this case the police: s 264(1)(e), CYPF Act. 
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• not denied is used to facilitate the referral to the court-referred FGC1081 
• admit the offence is used to acknowledge responsibility for the offence in the FGC1082 
• denied is used when the young person wishes to have the matter determined by a 
defended hearing in the Youth Court1083 
• proved is used when the offence has been established through a defended hearing in 
the Youth Court. 1084 
The key issue, therefore, is whether the 'not denied' procedure (under which the majority of 
charges in the Youth Court are proved through admission at the FGC) means that a lesser 
standard of proof applies to young people in these situations, and consequently whether the 
procedure contravenes the presumption of innocence. 
IV. THE RIGHT IN PRACTICE: CASE LAW 
A. Introduction 
Unlike the subjects of the other chapters e.g. legal assistance, the 'not denied' procedure, and 
especially the meaning of the term 'admit the offence' has come in for judicial scrutiny, and 
thus there is case law available. However, there has been a divergent approach taken by 
judges as to whether the admission at the FGC equates to the criminal standard of proof. One 
school of judicial thought is that the admission made at the FGC does not equate to a 
conventional plea of guilty, and thus cannot support Youth Court orders. The other school of 
thought takes a more pragmatic approach, and considers that the sum total of 'not denied' plus 
the admission made at the FGC plus the 'PAFGC' notation made by the Youth Court Judge 
on the information equates to the criminal standard of proof. 
B. The Legislative Provision 
Section 259(1) of the CYPF Act states that: 
Every family group conference convened ... shall seek to ascertain whether the child or young person in 
respect of whom the conference is held admits any offence alleged to have been committed by that child 
or young person.1085 
1081 s 246(b), CYPF Act. 
1082 s 259, CYPF Act. 
1083 s 246(a), CYPF Act. 
1084 s 258(e) ands 283, CYPF Act. 
1085 [Author's italics] 
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Before considering the meamng of the term 'admits' the offence, it is worth briefly 
considering what the term 'offence' in section 259(1) means. 
A criminal offence is an action prohibited by law which may be prosecuted in a criminal 
proceeding and followed by a criminal sanction. 1086 Subject to certain exemptions,1087 truly 
criminal offences require both actus reus and mens rea. In the adversarial process, a plea of 
guilty means an acceptance of legal fault. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that for 
criminal liability to attach there must be criminal intent.1088 As Simester and Brookbanks state, 
'if a person is not to blame when something goes wrong, the censure of the criminal law is not 
appropriate' .1089 This concept is expressed in the criminal law by means of the maxim actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty). Of course, 
there are limited exceptions to this, notably certain regulatory offences. 1090 
To take two examples of offences which make up a large part of offending by young people, 
and were common in the FGCs observed, 1091 the crime of assault in New Zealand requires both 
the act (the application of force) and the mental component ('intentionally'): 
· .. J 
': 
Assault means the act of intentionally applying or attempting to apply force to the person of another, , , 
directly or indirectly, or threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force to the person of another, if 
the person making the threat has, or causes the other to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, 
present ability to effect his purpose; and to assault has a corresponding meaning.1092 
Similarly, the offence of theft involves not just the physical act of taking, but also the 
necessary dishonest intent and the intent to deprive the owner permanently: 
Theft or stealing is the act of. .. dishonestly and without claim of right, taking any property with intent to 
deprive any owner permanently of that property or of any interest in that property ... dishonestly and 
without claim of right, using or dealing with any property with intent to deprive any owner permanently 
1086 See generally: William Wilson, 'Criminalising Wrongdoing' in William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal 
Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
1087 Andrew P Simester and Warren J Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law (3'd Edition) (Wellington: 
Brookers, 2007), ch 4. 
1088 See generally: George P Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (New York: OUP, 1998). 
1089 Andrew P Simester and Warren J Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law (3rd Edition) (Wellington: 
Brookers, 2007), 12. 
1090 Andrew P Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
1091 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
See Chapter 6(11). 
1092 s 2(1), Crimes Act 1961. 
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of that property or of any interest in that property after obtaining possession of, or control over, the 
prope1iy in whatever manner.1093 
Hence, the standard criminal plea of guilty means acknowledging both elements of the 
offence - the factual scenario and the necessary intent. The nub of the issue here is whether 
the CYPF Act adopts a completely different scheme than the usual concept of legal guilt? 
C. The Case Law: Divergent Approaches 
1. Introduction 
The case law on the meaning of 'admits' in section 259 of the CYPF Act and on the legal 
status of the 'not denied' mechanism has divergent strands. The principal judgments have 
concerned the making of orders under section 283 of the CYPF Act and the making of orders 
for compulsory blood samples under the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 
1995 .1094 Both section 283 of the CYPF Act and section 2 of the CIBS Act require that the 
offence is 'proved' before the relevant order can be imposed. Under section 283 of the CYPF 
Act, the Youth Court has the power to make the standard disposal orders including 
discharge,1095 admonishment,1096 come up if called upon,1097 fines, 1098 reparation,1099 restitution,1100 
forfeiture, 1101 and disqualification from driving. 1102 The more coercive and longer-term orders 
(which may involve custodial sanctions and transfer to the adult criminal justice system) are 
set out in s 283 (k)-(o). These are supervision orders,1103 community work orders,1104 
supervision with activity,1105 supervision with residence, 1106 and conviction and transfer to the 
1093 s 219, Crimes Act 1961. 
1094 Hereinafter the CIBS Act. 
1095 s 283(a), CYPF Act 
1096 s 283(b), CYPF Act. 
1097 s 283(c), CYPF Act. 
1098 s 283(d) and (e), CYPF Act. 
1099 s 283(f), CYPF Act. 
1100 s 283(g), CYPF Act. 
1101 s 283 (h) and (j), CYPF Act. 
1102 s 293A, CYPF Act. 
1103 s 283(k), CYPF Act. 
1104 s 283(1), subject to s 298, CYPF Act. 
1105 s 283(m), CYPF Act. 
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District Court for sentencing.1107 Factors to be taken into account on sentencing are listed ins 
284 of the CYPF Act. These are comparable to those set out in the Sentencing Act 20021108 
and make reference to the effect on victims,1109 the young person's history and social 
circumstances,1110 and the attitude of the young person and their family. 1111 
The key issue in these cases therefore, is whether the admission made by the young person at 
the FGC plus the notation made by the Youth Court Judge at the time the FGC plan is 
reported back, equates to the criminal standard of proof. 
2. A rights based argument 
(i) C v Police 
A High Court decision (C v Police1112) by Hammond J in 2000 was critical of the way in 
which offences are proved through the FGC process. In this case, the judgment emphasised 
the young person's rights as an offender, i.e. that the young person should have the same 
rights under the NZBOR Act as an adult in the same situation. 
In this case, the young person had been convicted and transferred to the District Court under 
section 283(0) of the CYPF Act. This section allows for such an action by a Youth Court 
Judge when 'a charge has been proved before a Youth Court' .1113 The Crown's case was that if 
a 'not denied' court-referred FGC was held, and there subsequently was an application to 
transfer the case to the District Court, the admission made at the FGC was sufficient and 
within the requirements of the NZBOR Act to prove guilt according to law. C had appealed 
on the grounds that the charges had not been proved and that the conviction could not be 
properly entered.1114 There was some confusion over the exact details,1115 but essentially 
1106 s 283(n), CYPF Act. 
1107 s 283( o ), CYPF Act. The young person must be over the age of fifteen. 
1108 s 8, Sentencing Act 2002. 
1109 s 284(f), CYPF Act. 
1110 s 284(b), CYPF Act. 
1111 s 284(d) and (c), CYPF Act. 
1112 [2000] NZFLR 769. 
1113 s 283, CYPF Act. 
1114 [2000] NZFLR 769. 
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Hammond J was asked to consider whether the youth justice concepts of 'not denied' and 
'admitted' could support a conviction, i.e. whether it equated to the criminal standard of 
proof. 
Hammond J stressed the importance of section 25(c) of the NZBOR Act which 'encapsulates 
one of the most fundamental propositions of the rule of law', 1116 that is the right to be 
presumed innocent unless proven guilty according to law. His Honour emphasised that 'a plea 
of "guilty" admits not only the essential facts relied upon by the prosecution, but that all 
necessary elements of the charge, according to law, have been met' .1117 Hammond J went on to 
hold that the concepts of 'not denied' did not mean that a conviction had been entered. 1118 His 
Honour made the valid argument that: 
to rely on a different kind of taxonomy from the tried and tested "guilty, or not guilty" when a youth 
may very well go to prison, is quite unwise. Legal language generally has well settled meanings. That is 
supposed to be one ofthe essential virtues oflaw'. 1119 
In relation to the exact meaning of the term 'admits', Hammond J rightly considered that one 
can admit to the facts of the offence but not the legal responsibility: 
the term "admits" is much more problematical. As I said to counsel during the course of argument, one 
could take the example of a youth who runs away with a soccer ball belonging to a second youth. That 
youth may well "admit" to having "taken" the ball. But whether he admits to having intended 
permanently to deprive that other youth of it, still remains an open question, unless and until, the youth 
pleads guilty to the charge of theft as such. He then pleads to the asportation, with the necessary intent, 
and the legal consequences which flow from those things. 1120 
Hammond J correctly considered that 'a plea of "guilty" admits not only to the essential facts 
relied upon by the prosecution, but that all necessary elements of the charge, according to law, 
have been met' .1121 His Honour therefore found that the fact that the charges were 'not denied' 
or 'admitted' could not support a conviction and remitted the case to the District Court for 
correct pleas to be taken. 
1115 Some of the charges were marked as 'not denied' whereas other charges were marked 'admitted'. 
1116 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 21. 
1117 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 24. 
1118 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 26. 
1119 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 29. 
1120 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 25. 
1121 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 24. 
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Hammond J's analysis is based on the young person's rights as an alleged offender, and the 
importance of the presumption of innocence. His Honour is correct in asserting that the 
presumption of innocence requires that the legal requirements of the particular offence must 
be satisfied. In the true criminal offences such as theft and assault, this means that both the 
actus reus and the mental element must be proved. If the offence is proved through a plea of 
guilty or similar procedure, the accused must acknowledge both factual and legal guilt. 
Factual guilt will not suffice. 
This judgment patently had wide-ranging consequences. If an 'admitted' notation could not 
support a conviction then it could not support the rest of the orders in section 283 of the 
CYPF Act. 
(ii) Police v S 
C v Police was concerned with a situation where a young person was being transferred to the 
adult criminal justice system. The factual scenario in Police v S1 122 is directly relevant to the 
type of FGCs observed for this research, where the matter is resolved purely by means of a 
FGC plan. No s 283 orders were involved. 
The reasoning in Police v S was also based on the principle that the normal standard of 
criminal proof should be met. In this case, the matter had been resolved by means of a FGC 
plan, and later a section 282 discharge. Then, the police issued a databank compulsion order 
under section 39 of the CIBS Act. The young person had answered 'not denied' to the charge 
and had subsequently admitted the charge at a FGC. Ryan DCJ declined to make the order 
requested. The Judge accepted counsel for the young person's argument that there had been 
no finding that the charge was proved for the purposes of the CIBS Act. The Judge was: 
.. not prepared to accept the submission that an admission by a young person at a family group 
conference later confirmed in front of a Youth Court Judge amounts to a finding by that Judge that a 
charge has been proved. That is an inference which simply cannot be drawn given the clear statutory 
intention to provide a means whereby charges against young persons are disposed of without the 
necessity for the charge to be proved.1123 
Counsel for S had stated that 'unless the Court is contemplating the making of an order 
pursuant to s 283 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act, a Youth Court 
1122 [2000] NZFLR 188. 
1123 [2000] NZFLR 188, 191. 
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does not have to make a finding that a charge has been proved' .1124 In this case, a section 283 
order was not being made. Matters had been disposed of through a FGC plan, ultimately 
resulting in a section 282 discharge. Judge Ryan found that there was no 'requirement on the 
Youth Court to make a finding that the charge had been proved where it is contemplated that 
the information will be discharged pursuant to s 282' .1125 His Honour went on to hold that 
there must be a specific finding that the charge was proved. 
(iii) Analysis 
Thus, in both these cases, the judges involved doubted that the admission at the FGC could 
support an order or a conviction, i.e. that the procedure did not equate to the criminal standard 
of proof had been met. Both judges were certain that the normal standard of criminal proof 
applied in the Youth Court. 
3. Youth Court practice 
The alternative view (and that which appears to reflect current Youth Court orthodoxy1 126) was 
that set out in Police v B, 1127 and Police v M 1128 In these cases, it was held that admissions 
made at the FGC equated to a plea of guilty, and thus the requirement to prove the offence 
was met. 
(i) Police v B 
Police v B was subsequent to and had similar facts to C v Police. Here also, a young person 
had committed serious offences and was to be convicted and transferred to the District Court 
under s 283(0) of the CYPF Act. Once more, the issue was whether the admission at the FGC 
equated to plea of guilty, and was sufficient to support a conviction. However, McElrea DCJ 
declined to follow C v Police. His Honour considered that Hammond J's remarks in C v 
Police were obiter dicta as the Youth Court Judge in that case 'had not marked the file in any 
way as having been proved in any form' .1129 In Police v B, McElrea DCJ stated his belief that 
1124 [2000] NZFLR 188, 193. 
1125 [2000] NZFLR 188, 197. 
1126 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008). This document is 
not available to the public. 
1127 [2001] NZFLR 585. 
1128 [2001] DCR385. 
1129 [2001] NZFLR 585, 588. However see paras 11 and 12 of C v Police [2000] NZFLR 769 where it was stated 
that 'the charge was noted as having been "admitted"'. 
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Hammond Jin C v Police was misinformed about the difference between 'not denied' and 
'admitted'. His Honour stated that: 
Counsel for the New Zealand Police had referred to matters being 'not denied' at family group 
conferences, which is nonsense. If they [the charges] are not denied in Court they go to a family group 
conference - the conference must ascertain whether the charge is "admitted" or not.1130 
McElrea DCJ relied on the decision of Police v M 1131 where a clear distinction was drawn 
between the initial 'not denied' mechanism and the act of admitting the offence at the FGC. 
(ii) Police v M 
In Police v M the young person concerned had appeared in the Youth Court charged with 
sexual violation (an indictable charge). He was remanded and indicated a desire to plead 
guilty. A FGC was held to consider jurisdiction, M admitted the charge at the FGC and was 
offered Youth Court jurisdiction. The notation 'Proved by Admission at Family Group 
Conference' was made on the information. The police later made an application under section 
39 of the CIBS Act for a blood sample from the young person. Judge CJ Harding discussed 
Hammond J's analogy of the young person taking the soccer ball. 1132 Harding DCJ concluded 
that: 
The admission of having taken the ball is the initial "not denied", and the admission of the charge of 
theft as such; with the necessary intent and legal consequences, the "P AFGC" notation after the 
admission at the Family Group Conference. 1133 
Like McElrea DCJ in Police v B, His Honour drew a distinction between 'not denied' (being 
that the young person did not deny that the factual scenario took place) and 'admitted' (being 
that the young person admitted all necessary elements of the charge). In Police v M, Harding 
DCJ stated: 
Under s 283 of the CYPF Act, before any "sentencing" option is taken, there must be a finding that the 
charge is proved. Such a finding is made in one of two ways - either by proof to the appropriate 
standard in a defended hearing, or by the Youth Court accepting the admission made in the family 
group conference and confirmed in Court. It is the equivalent in the summary jurisdiction of proof at 
defended hearing or proof by plea of guilty. 1134 
The Judge was satisfied that the admission at the FGC equated to a plea of guilty. 
1130 [2001] NZFLR 585, 588. 
1131 [2001] DCR385. 
1132 [2000] NZFLR 769, para 25. 
1133 [2001] DCR 385,344. 
1134 [2001] DCR 385. 
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(iii) Police v JL 
The reasoning in Police v B and Police v M was followed in Police v JL, 1135 where the young 
person had admitted a charge of robbery at a court referred FGC. This case had an identical 
factual scenario to Police v S, but a different conclusion was reached. 
JL completed the FGC plan successfully and was given a section 282 discharge. 1136 Later, the 
police issued a databank compulsion order under section 39 of the CIBS Act. One of the 
issues considered in the judgment was whether JL's admission at the FGC constituted a 
conviction for the purposes of the CIBS Act. The admission had been made by JL at the FGC 
and was noted by the Youth Court Judge on the information as 'Proven by Admission at 
FGC'. Section 2 of CIBS Act includes in the definition of conviction, 'a finding, by a Youth 
Court, that a charge against a young person is proved'. In the present case, Mill DCJ found 
that on the 'record and circumstances' of the case, the entry by the Judge of the notation 
'proved by admission at FGC' amounted to a finding of proof in the Youth Court and 
therefore a conviction for the purposes of the CIBS Act. 1137 
This is the opposite approach to that taken in Police v S, where the Judge declined a CIBSA 
order under the same circumstances. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
The examination of the case law in the preceding sections demonstrates a divergence in 
judicial opinion on the legal significance of the admission made at the FGC. While Hammond 
J's judgment in Police v C is clearly rights based, the judgments in Police v B, Police v Mand 
Police v JL, take a more pragmatic view. These three decisions rely on there being a definite 
distinction between 'not denied' and 'admitted' charges. The 'not denied' concept is a conduit 
to the court-referred FGC. It means essentially that the young person is waiving his or her 
right to a court hearing and electing to have the matter dealt with by the FGC. The admission 
at the FGC is akin to a guilty plea (acknowledging both elements of the offence). When this 
1135 [2006] DCR 404. 
1136 As 282 discharge means that the 'information discharged ... shall be deemed never to have been laid'. s 
282(2), CYPF Act. 
1137 [2006] DCR 404, para 35. Note that due to the operation of the s 282 discharge, the databank compulsion 
order was held to be of no effect. 
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admission is confirmed in front of a Youth Court Judge, it is argued that this represents proof 
by guilty plea. 
Before considering which is the preferable view, it is necessary to discuss the principles 
underpinning the 'not denied' concept. An obvious question is why it is necessary to have this 
convoluted procedure at all. Why not just require a conventional guilty plea at this first court 
appearance and then remit the matter to the FGC? 
B. Philosophy of the Youth Court 
l. Avoiding stigmatising terms 
The immediately apparent difference between the scheme of the CYPF Act and the practice of 
the adult criminal courts is nomenclature. The Youth Court seeks to avoid the terminology of 
the adult criminal justice system, preferring to avoid terms like 'conviction' and 'guilt'. 1138 
Criminal convictions are rare. 1139 In Timo v Police, Williamson J found that a finding of proof 
in the Youth Court does not mean that a conviction has been entered against that young 
person under section 318( 6) of the Crimes Act 1961.1140 The practice of avoiding these terms 
is consistent with the 'philosophy and enabling jurisdiction' of the Youth Court. 1141 
A high rate of diversion has been accomplished in New Zealand. 1142 Most offending is dealt 
with through warnings by the police or through the Police Youth Diversion Scheme. 1143 As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, around 6% are dealt with through the ITC FGC, thus 
diverting these young people from the courts altogether, 1144 and less than a third are formally 
prosecuted, and of which most are resolved through admission at the FGC followed by a FGC 
plan, rather than through the adversarial process. 1145 
1138 A formal plea of guilty is required in very limited circumstances when a purely indictable offence, other than 
manslaughter is involved. Youth Court jurisdiction may be offered if the young person 'indicates to the Court 
that the young person desires to plead guilty to the offence', s 276( 1 ), CYPF Act. 
1139 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
1140 [1996] 1 NZLR 103, 104. 
1141 C v Police [2000] NZFLR 769. 
1142 See Chapter 5(11). 
1143 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
1144 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
1145 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
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The principles of avoiding convictions and minimising stigmatising terms and procedures are 
undoubtedly positive aspects for young people. In the ITC FGC, the intention is to resolve the 
matter without the case entering the formal court system at all, while the use of the court-
referred FGC allows the matter to be resolved without a formal hearing if the young person 
does not deny the charge, thus avoiding the adversarial process. The CYPF Act discourages 
the use of formal criminal proceedings unless the public interest demands otherwise.1146 In a 
recent House of Lords judgment dealing with the diversion procedures under England and 
Wales' Crime and Disorder Act 1998, it was stated that 'it has long been recognised as 
undesirable in many cases for young off enders to be drawn into the process of the criminal 
courts (including juvenile and youth courts) unless this is really necessary' .1147 The avoidance 
of such terminology is designed to minimise the criminalisation of young people. Studies 
have shown court hearings, sentences, and convictions aid the confirmation of the young 
person into a criminal career. 1148 The sociological theory of' labelling' suggests that: 
identifying a person as 'deviant' can set in motion a process of alienation. The offender finds himself 
cut off from the normative values of society, and forms a social identity or sub-cultural 'out-group' of 
offenders. This group develops their own values which conflict with those of the rest of society. This 
results in an 'amplification of deviance' whereby the deviant group's norms become intolerant to the 
rest of society, law enforcement is increased to express that intolerance, and hostility of the deviant 
group towards law enforcers results in further deviant behaviour.1149 
Luna argues that 'social psychology's "self-categorization" theory suggests that labelling an 
offender as "sick", "demented", "delinquent", and so on, may actually cement his negative 
identity and connection to a criminal lifestyle' .1150 The CRC encourages diversion from formal 
judicial proceedings where relevant, providing human rights and legal safeguards are 
guaranteed. 1151 This applies both to diversion from the court system altogether (like the ITC 
1146 s 208(a), CYPF Act. 
1147 R v Durham Constabulary ex parte R [2005] 2 All ER 369, per Lord Bingham. 
1148 David Farrington 'The Effects of Public Labelling' (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 112, DA 
Andrews, Ivan Zinger, Robert D Hodge, James Bonta, Paul Gendreau and Francis T Cullen, 'Does Correctional 
Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis' (1990) 28 Criminology 
369, Peter R Jones and Brian R Wyant, 'Target Juvenile's Needs to Reduce Delinquency' 6 Criminology & 
Public Policy 763. 
1149 Julia Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), 110 [internal 
references omitted]. 
1150 Erik Luna, 'Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice' (2003) Utah 
Law Review 205, 209. 
1151 Article 40.3(b ), CRC. 
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FGC) and alternative processes within the court system (like the court-referred FGC). 1152 
Similarly, the Beijing Rules encourage diversion from the court system. 1153 
It seems unlikely that Parliament meant to alter completely the notion of legal fault. The 
likely explanation for the change in terminology away from pleas of guilty or not guilty, to 
'denied' and 'not denied' is the avoidance of potentially stigmatising terms. Mike Doolan 
( one of the officials who was heavily involved in the drafting of the CYPF legislation) has 
written 'the family group conference is authorised to find alternatives to prosecution in 
dealing with an offender who admits guilt' .1154 Further, as McElrea DCJ stated in Police v B: 
If the young person admits the matter at the conference, but is later to be offered a chance to formally 
plead, it leaves open the possibility that a plea of Not Guilty will be entered and notwithstanding the 
admissions made at the conference to a victim and apologies tendered and plans solemnly agreed upon 
and drawn up, the Court would have to go through the extraordinary situation of having a defended 
hearing with possibly a different outcome. 1155 
C. Is the Scheme of the CYPF Act Legally Sound? 
The preceding section has identified the reasoning underpinning the unusual way in which the 
offence is proved under the CYPF Act. Does the system of 'not denied' plus 'admits the 
offence' plus 'PAFGC' satisfy the requirement that the offence is proved? 
Hammond J in C v Police is correct in expressing concern about departing from the well 
established concepts of guilty and not guilty when the process can result in significant 
consequences for the young person. As was stated above, as well as the requirements of the 
FGC plan itself,1156 an admission made at an FGC can result in loss of liberty through a Youth 
Court supervision with residence order or even a prison sentence imposed in the District 
Court. Such an admission could also lead to an application for a databank compulsion order 
under the CIBS Act, a serious intrusion on the bodily integrity of the person. 
The importance of the presumption of innocence was discussed earlier and an examination of 
the rationale showed that it was especially important where loss of liberty or punishment 
1152 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007. 
1153 Rule 11, Beijing Rules. 
1154 Mike Doolan, 'The Youth Justice- Legislation and Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea, The Youth 
Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 22. 
1155 [2001] NZFLR 585,588. 
1156 See Chapters 12 and 13. 
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occurs.1157 Hammond J argued in C v Police 'to rely on a different kind of taxonomy from the 
tried and tested "guilty, or not guilty" when a youth may very well go to prison, is quite 
unwise' .1158 Hypothetically, under the CYPF Act, a young person could answer 'not denied' to 
a charge in the Youth Court, be referred to a FGC, fail to complete the FGC plan and then be 
the subject of a Youth Court order under section 283 involving an order of supervision with 
residence. So the young person could potentially receive a custodial sentence possibly without 
acknowledging criminal liability. 
However, making a clear distinction between 'not denied' (essentially a conduit to the FGC) 
and 'admitted' (essentially a plea of guilty), cures the procedure in terms of the presumption 
of innocence. If 'admission' is taken to equate to acknowledgement of the facts and the 
necessary mental element, then the young person is technically pleading guilty, despite the 
different terminology. This interpretation of the legislative provisions, that there is a clear 
difference between a charge which is 'not denied' (which is a conduit to the FGC) and a 
charge which is 'admitted' (which means that the young person has accepted legal liability) 
would mean that the provisions are in compliance with the presumption of innocence. The 
young person would be accepting legal liability in the FGC. 
Importantly though, Police v M also placed the qualifier that the Youth Court Judge must 
accept the admission made at the FGC before the offence is considered to be proved. 1159 The 
'ideal world' procedure as expressed by Harding DCJ in Police v M, where the young person 
opts to answer 'not denied' after consultation with the Youth Advocate, the matter proceeds to 
a FGC also with the Youth Advocate present and the young person admits the charge, 
acknowledging both the factual scenario and the legal liability. The FGC plan is then 
considered by a Youth Court Judge who turns his or her mind to whether proof is available 
and makes the notation of P AFGC on the information. 
Whether the 'ideal world' procedure set out in Police v M is followed m practice, 1s 
considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
1157 Andrew Ashworth, 'Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence' (2006) 10 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 241, 249. 
1158 C v Police [2000] NZFLR 769, para 29. 
1159 See Chapter l l(IV) for more detailed discussion on this aspect. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: ESTABLISHING THE OFFENCE 
This section has considered how the offence is proved under the CYPF Act. A reading of the 
data available from the Ministry of Justice's Case Management System indicates that 
defended hearings are very rare. Proof through the adversarial process is therefore very rare. 
Offences are almost always proved through admission at the court-referred FGC, while 
offences dealt with through the ITC FGC are always proved by admission. The exact legal 
meaning of 'not denied' and 'admitted' has caused some controversy. Hammond J in C v 
Police raised valid concerns about a concept other than the standard concept of legal guilt 
being used to support a court order or conviction and transfer to the adult court. However, the 
interpretation set out in Police v M and approved in Police v B reflects current Youth Court 
practice and appears to be legally sound. This is that the admission at the FGC, confirmed by 
the Youth Court Judge, equates to proof by plea of guilty. 
The next chapter considers practice and procedure at the FGC in relation to the admission. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: ESTABLISHING THE 
OFFENCE - FGC PROCEDURE 
It is good for children to learn to take responsibility for their actions: that is part of growing up to be 
responsible members of society. It is therefore good for children to 'own up' when they have done 
wrong. But it is absolutely vital that children's admissions, like adults, should be voluntary and reliable. 
Comers should not be cut just because the offender is a child 1160 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter concentrated on the overall scheme of the CYPF Act for proving the 
offence. The conclusion was that the convoluted process of 'not denied' plus admission at the 
FGC, plus the Youth Court Judge's notation on the information when the FGC plan is 
reported back at court, could satisfy the requirement that the offence be proved. However, as 
discussed, this conclusion depends on the young person being aware that this admission at the 
FGC equates to an acknowledgement of factual and legal guilt, presence by the Youth 
Advocate at the FGC to ensure that a valid charge exists, and the Youth Court Judge having 
the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the admission is valid. Similar considerations apply 
to the ITC FGC, but of course there is no oversight by the Youth Court Judge in these cases. 
This chapter will examine whether in fact these conditions for the admission of the offence 
are fulfilled at the FGC. 
Two key issues will be discussed: ensuring admissions are reliable, and ensuring admissions 
are voluntary. Reference will be made to practice examples derived from observation of the 
FGC. Then the current safeguards will be discussed and improvements suggested, especially 
with reference to the safeguards for admissions in police custody, and the situation in other 
jurisdictions utilising similar schemes. Specific wording of proposed legislative and policy 
changes is set out in the final chapter. 1161 
IL RELIABLE ADMISSIONS 
A. Accepting Legal Liability 
I. Practice and procedure at the FGC 
Section 259 of the CYPF Act requires that the offence is admitted by the young person before 
the FGC can proceed to the decision making stage. In all of the twelve FGCs, this requirement 
1160 R v Durham Constabulary ex parte R [2005] 1 WLR 1184, para 46, per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
1161 See Chapter 14(III). 
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was fulfilled. This was accomplished by the police officer reading the summary of facts from 
the official police file. This happened in both the court-referred and ITC FGCs. 
The young person was then asked ( either by the youth justice co-ordinator or by the police 
officer) to speak. The terminology used (in both centres) was usually 'Is that how it 
happened?' or 'do you agree with that account?' The young person would then answer yes, or 
even a nod was taken to suffice. The police officer and the youth justice co-ordinator would 
then take a note of this, and the FGC would proceed. A slightly different wording was used 
for the three ITC FGCs in the sample. In the court-referred FGCs, the police officer always 
specified the Crimes Act section under which the young person was charged when reading the 
summary of facts e.g. 'this is a Crimes Act assault under section 196'. Presumably, this was 
because in a court-referred FGC, a formal charge had already been laid in the Youth Court 
and would thus be on the official documentation which the police possess. In the ITC FGC, 
no formal charge has been laid in court and so there was no mention of a specific charge, only 
the summary of facts. 
What is most relevant for the purpose of this discussion however, is that the procedure (in 
both the court-referred and ITC FGCs) was to seek the young person's agreement with the 
summary of facts, rather than an admission of legal liability to a specific charge. Patently, 
there is a clear difference between agreeing with the facts of the incident and admitting legal 
guilt. To take Hammond J's example of the taking of a ball, discussed in the preceding 
chapter,1162 agreeing with the summary of facts would be to agree that the young person took 
the ball, but an admission to theft would require the necessary malicious intent. The problem 
with only requiring agreement with the summary of fact was demonstrated clearly in one of 
these FGCs (an ITC FGC). 
The young person concerned was accused of a burglary on a property of a person ( who was a 
relative). The summary of facts read out by the police officer stated that the young person had 
entered the property (there was no damage carried out to gain entry to the property) and taken 
some property which belonged to the victim. The young person agreed with the summary of 
facts and acknowledged (through a nod) that there had been an entry to the property and that 
some property had been taken. This agreement with the summary of facts was noted by the 
youth justice co-ordinator and the police, and the FGC proceeded. In the latter stages of the 
FGC, there was discussion about what sanction should be imposed on the young person. The 
1162 See Chapter 1 O(IV)(B)(2)(i). 
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police officer commented that the offence of burglary would attract a term of imprisonment of 
up to ten years, in the adult criminal justice system. The young person then became upset, and 
claimed that he did not realise that burglary was what he was being accused of. He claimed 
that the relative knew that he was going to call over to the property that day and had given 
him permission. Further, he claimed he believed that he was allowed to borrow the property. 
Although the offence of burglary plainly requires the offender to have entered the property 
with malicious intent,1163 and theft would also require an intent to deprive the owner 
permanently, 1164 this was glossed over by the other conference participants, and they reminded 
him that he had 'admitted the offence' earlier in the FGC. Obviously, the credibility of the 
young person would be a factor, but clearly there should have been some further investigation 
or clarification if the requirements of the offence did not appear to have been met. A Youth 
Advocate was not present. Had the Youth Advocate been present, he or she would be able to 
clarify the legal situation for the young person. There is a strong argument that the charge 
should have been explained in plain language to the young person at the start ( e.g. you are 
accused of entering your relative's property intending to commit a crime). Then the young 
person could have agreed knowing what he was agreeing to, or disagreed and the matter could 
have gone to court to be resolved. 
This is one particular example where the young person was confident and articulate enough 
to speak up in the FGC and point out that he did not agree with what was being said. But 
given that in all FGCs observed the practice was to seek agreement with the summary of facts 
rather than an admission of legal liability per se, it is likely that other young people may not 
be aware exactly what they are agreeing to. 
2. Reporting back to the Youth Court 
While in the ITC FGC, there is no independent oversight of proceedings, the 'line of defence' 
for the admission made at a court-referred FGC is the fact that the Youth Court Judge is 
required to make a notation (there is apparently an official stamp for this purpose) of 'Proved 
by Admission at the Family Group Conference' (PAFGC) on the information before the 
offence can be considered to be proved. While it seems technically possible that the Youth 
1163 s 231 of the Crimes Act 1961 defines the offence of burglary as 
(1) Every one commits burglary and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years who-
(a) enters any building or ship, or part of a building or ship, without authority and with intent to commit 
a crime in the building or ship; or 
(b) having entered any building or ship, remains in it without authority and with intent to commit a 
crime in the building or ship. 
1164 s 219, Crimes Act 1961. 
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Court Judge could refuse to accept the admission, no recorded instances of this could be 
found. Again, there are no statistics collected on whether the admission is accepted, though 
obviously it must be noted on the information. A search of the case law revealed no reported 
instances of admissions being refused. 1165 None of the youth justice co-ordinators had heard of 
any instance where an admission made had not been accepted. The Principal Youth Court 
Judge's office were also unaware of any such cases. 1166 This would suggest that the PAFGC 
notation is considered a formality rather than a mechanism by which the admission can be 
further scrutinised before the FGC plan is accepted by the Youth Court. 
There is nothing in the CYPF legislation requiring the Judge to make an examination of the 
circumstances surrounding the admission. Youth Court practice, 1167 appears to have divergent 
approaches. Some Youth Court Judges automatically accept admissions made at the FGC, 
while others question the young person whether he or she is content to admit the offence, or 
others rely on the Youth Advocate to bring any issues to the attention of the Court. This 
practice has two potential problems. Firstly, if the safeguard is to check with the young person 
that he or she is content to admit the offence, the same problems exist as in the example given 
above. If the young person is not aware exactly what he or she has agreed to, and has only 
agreed with the summary of facts, this is unlikely to come out in Court. Further, if reliance is 
placed on the Youth Advocate to bring the Judge's attention to any issues with the admission, 
what of the young people who do not have a Youth Advocate present at the FGC? 1168 The 
issue of how safeguards could be improved is dealt with later in this chapter, but one of the 
recommendations is that Youth Court Judges should have the overall responsibility to ensure 
that admissions are reliable, as would be the case with admissions made in police custody. 1169 
B. Particular Issues in the ITC FGC 
While the concerns discussed at section 1 above apply to both types of FGC, there are 
particular issues with the ITC FGC, as it is a pre-trial diversionary process taking place 
completely outside the court system. The New Zealand youth justice system is progressive in 
1165 District Court Reports, Lexis-Nexis New Zealand, Family Law Reports of New Zealand, and the youth 
justice cases available on the Youth Court website http://www.justice.govt.nz/youth/decisions/index.html (last 
viewed 14 November 2008). 
1166 Personal communication, November 2008. 
1167 This was ascertained from observations at Youth Court in 2006, and a personal communication from the 
Principal Youth Court Judge, November 2008 
1168 See Chapters 8 and 9 on the right to legal assistance. 
1169 See Chapter 14(III). 
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diverting the majority of young offenders away from formal court based youth justice towards 
more informal processes.1170 The Youth Aid Section of the New Zealand Police has embraced 
diversion. A comprehensive Police Youth Diversion Scheme has been developed. 1111 
However, there is always a danger that as: 
enthusiasm for the opportunities for constructive work with young offenders at this pre-trial stage 
increases, so too does the temptation to apply it to a greater pool of recipients, including those 
committing very minor infractions of the law or, even worse, those at risk of offending.1172 
The evidentiary requirement, that is, that there is enough evidence to charge the young person, 
is an important safeguard against net widening. In relation to the court-referred FGC, at the 
least a charge must be laid before court, and the Youth Court Judge must accept the plan. The 
situation of the ITC FGC is more complicated, and it suffers from a common defect relating 
to diversion schemes, i.e. a lack of control over whether the offence is provable. 
Diversionary processes like the ITC FGC should only occur in response to behaviour which is 
legally prosecutable. Admission to these types of processes should be through a type of 'but 
for' test. That is, but for the availability of the diversionary process, the young person would 
have been prosecuted or sentenced in court. The importance of the evidentiary requirement is 
to prevent net widening, i.e. to prevent young people corning into the system who would not 
have been there in the first place. The House of Lords decision in R v Durham Constabulary 
and another ex parte R emphasised that the offence must be capable of being proved in 
court. 1173 Under the previous legislation - the Children and Young Persons Act 1974 - there 
was a type of statutory consultation process in order to divert young people from the courts. 
When the police wished to lay a charge against a young person who had not been arrested 
there was a requirement to consult with social workers before doing so. However, the police 
were found to be arbitrarily bypassing these consultation requirements and only diverting 
those young people whom they did not intend to prosecute anyway. 1174 Consequently the 
present system was developed, where if the police wish to lay a charge against a young person 
1170 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
1171 Gabrielle Maxwell, Jeremy Robertson, and Tracy Anderson, Police Youth Diversion- Final Report 
(Wellington: Crime and Justice Research Centre, Victoria University of Wellington, 2002). 
1172 Julia Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
1173 R v Durham Constabulary ex parte R [2005] 1 WLR 1184, para 36, per Baroness Hale. See discussion of the 
facts of this case in Chapter 8(V). 
1174 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Youth Justice in New Zealand: Practice and Policy (Wellington: Institute 
ofCriminology, 1987). 
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who has not been arrested (or a young person who has been arrested and then released1175), 
there is a statutory requirement to consult with a youth justice co-ordinator. An ITC FGC is 
then held. 
Diversion from the formal judicial process is encouraged by the CRC. 1176 However, there is a 
caveat that any such diversionary process (such as the ITC FGC) must respect 'human rights 
and legal safeguards'. 1177 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has stressed that 
diversionary processes should only be used where: 
there is compelling evidence that the child committed the alleged offence, that he/she freely and 
voluntarily admits responsibility, and that no intimidation or pressure has been used to get that 
admission and, finally, that the admission will not be used against him/her in any subsequent legal 
proceeding.1178 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recently stated 'the child must be given the 
opportunity to seek legal or other appropriate assistance on the appropriateness and 
desirability of the diversion offered ... and on the possibility of review of the measure' 1179 The 
issue of legal assistance in the ITC FGC was highlighted in the previous chapter. As discussed 
those young people participating in the ITC FGC rarely have legal assistance. 1180 
The New Zealand situation (perhaps more than the systems of other jurisdictions) involves a 
diversion towards something ( often a significant sanction) rather than a diversion away from 
something. The principal argument in New Zealand is that young people should be dealt with 
at the lowest level possible. While there are valid arguments for diverting young people from 
the formal criminal justice system, young people should not be drawn into the criminal justice 
system through formal or informal means unless the offence is provable. As Kilkelly 
emphasises: 
While it might be argued that children would be better off in a diversionary scheme regardless of what 
rights they must waive, any process which denigrates or sidelines children's due process rights 
represents not just an alternative to the formal juvenile justice system but an inferior alternative. While 
some degree of informality may be permitted in the context of diverting young people away from the 
1175 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008). 
1176 Article 40.3(b), CRC. 
1177 Article 40.3(b ), CRC. 
1178 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 26. 
1179 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, 10. 




formal system, the importance of due process rights should not be undermined. These rights are 
important not just to safeguard the interests of children involved in the diversionary scheme but to 
enhance their faith in the fairness of its procedures. 1181 
C. Concluding Remarks 
The procedure used for admissions at these FGCs is concerning, as the young people were 
asked whether they agree with the summary of facts rather than accepting legal liability. This 
means that some admissions may not be reliable. In the court-referred FGC, mechanisms 
already exist to ensure that admissions are reliable. Youth Advocates should be present, and 
should ensure that the young person understands what the admission entails, and that evidence 
exists to support the admission. The Youth Court Judge should also be responsible for 
checking this, and it should not be left to the FGC participants or to the Youth Advocate. In 
the ITC FGC, Youth Advocates are rarely present, and there is no independent oversight of 
the admission. Possible solutions to this lack of oversight are canvassed at Part IV of this 
chapter. 
Ill. VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS 
When faced with a choice between a formal criminal process (such as court hearings and 
court orders) and a more informal intervention (such as the FGC), there is bound to be 
pressure to accept the more informal option. 1182 There is always concern that there may be 
pressures or inducements to admit the offence, in the belief that it is easier than challenging 
proceedings, or in the belief that a harsher sanction may be meted out if the case goes to 
court. 1183 Both the young people and their families are likely to be intimidated by the threat of 
going to court. 1184 As Polk has argued: 
Confronted with a forced choice between, on the one hand, admitting guilt and being given the chance 
of an "informal" (less coercive) option, especially without the advice of counsel, and, on the other 
hand, deeper penetration within the justice process, the young person may feel little choice but to admit 
guilt when she or he is, in fact, innocent. 1185 
1181 Ursula Kilkelly, Youth Justice in Ireland: Tough Lives, Rough Justice (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 
76. 
1182 Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 141. 
1183 MJA Brown, 'Empowering the Victim in the New Zealand Youth Justice Process -A Strategy for Healing' 
Address to the 81h International Symposium on Victimology, Adelaide, Australia, 1994. 
1184 M Levine, 'The Family Group Conference in the New Zealand Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
Act of 1989 (CYP&F): Review and Evaluation' (2000) 18 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 517. 
1185 Kenneth Polk, 'Family Conferencing: Theoretical and Evaluative Concerns' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994). 
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The FGC procedure is used for admitted offences only.1186 Proponents of the FGC approach 
claim that process is never used when guilt is in dispute and point out that there is an 
opportunity to pursue the matter through the full criminal justice process if there is any 
dispute. The argument runs that if there are any questions of liability then the formal criminal 
justice system is present as a 'backstop'. McElrea argues that: 
A sharp separation is to be found between (a) adjudication upon liability, ie deciding whether a disputed 
charge is proved, and (b) the disposition of admitted or proved offences. The adversary system is 
maintained in full for the former, including the right to trial by jury of all indictable offences, the 
appointment of a Youth Advocate in all cases, and the use of traditional rules concerning the onus and 
standard of proof ( - beyond reasonable doubt) and the admissibility of evidence. 1187 
He further notes that 'the western model of justice is retained for what it does best, 1.e. 
deciding issues of liability' .1188 There is a valid argument that the formal adversarial system is 
present to decide any questions of liability. 
In practice however, 'denied' cases appear to be very rare. 1189 The requirement that the 
offence be admitted was fulfilled at all the FGCs observed for this research. Maxwell et al 
found that out of over 1,000 FGCs, seventy two young people admitted some, but not all, of 
the charges, but only two of these young people denied all charges. 1190 In the FGCs observed 
for this research, there was no evidence of explicit pressure on the young person to admit the 
offence i.e. young people were not told that they must admit the offence. However, there is 
objectively implicit pressure to admit the offence. This requirement was fulfilled at the start of 
the FGC, and never took longer than a minute or two. 1191 There was a strong sense that the 
admission was a formality to be gotten over with without delay. Further, a considerable 
amount of effort goes into organising a FGC. In a typical FGC, there are a number of busy 
people (such as the Youth Advocate, the Youth Aid officer, youth workers and social 
workers) that must find time in their schedules to attend. It was apparent that arranging for the 
young person and their family to attend at a time suitable for all was not an easy task. In at 
least six of the FGCs observed, the young person's parents were living separately and most 
1186 s 259(1), CYPF Act. 
1187 Judge FWM McE!rea 'Restorative Justice - A Peace Making Process'. Paper presented at a LEADR 
International Conference, Perth, Australia, May 1997. 
1188 FWM McElrea, 'A New Model of Justice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The Youth Court in New 
Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 12. 
1189 See Chapter lO(III). 
1190 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 59. 
1191 See Chapter 6(V) for a discussion on the format of the typical FGC. 
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had younger brothers and sisters. Therefore, two different households had to arrange time off 
work or other commitments to attend, as all these FGCs were held during the day. There was 
a strong impression that there was a presumption that the FGC was going to go ahead on the 
day. 
While it is legally possible for the young person to refuse to admit the offence, young people 
will be aware that if the FGC does not go ahead the case will go to court with the attendant 
risk of a more coercive sanction. 1192 Voluntariness 'will always be qualified by enticements, 
inducements, perceived threats and availability of alternative courses of action' 1193A study of 
FGCs in England found that when young people were asked whether their participation was 
voluntary approximately half believed that they had to participate.1194 According to the author 
of this study, there is a real possibility that consent to participate in the FGC may be 
'motivated by the fear that unless they agree to take part in a restorative justice encounter 
'voluntarily', they will be subjected to judicial sanctions' .1195 The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child has recently made comments directed mainly at confessions in police custody but 
relevant also to admissions in this context: 
There are other less violent ways to coerce or to lead the child to a confession or a self-incriminatory 
testimony. The term "compelled" should be interpreted in a broad manner and not be limited to physical 
force or other clear violations of human rights. The age of the child, the child's development, the length 
of the interrogation, the child's lack of understanding, the fear of unknown consequences or of a 
suggested possibility of imprisonment may lead him/her to a confession that is not true.1196 
IV. SAFEGUARDS 
A. Introduction 
The preceding sections have identified two key issues relating to the admission of the offence 
by the young person: ensuring that the admission is an acceptance of legal guilt, and ensuring 
that the admission is voluntary. Bearing in mind that the clientele of the youth justice system 
1192 Christian Eliaerts and Els Dumortier, 'Restorative Justice for Children: In Need of Procedural Safeguards 
and Standards' in Elmar GM Weitekamp and Hans-Jurgen Kerner (eds.), Restorative Justice - Theoretical 
Foundations (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002). 
1193 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 500. 
1194 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 501. 
1195 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491, 501. 
1196 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, 17. 
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are invariably disadvantaged and less educated than non-offending young people,1197 there is a 
responsibility to ensure that young people understand the process and consequences of 
making admissions. The sufficiency of the current safeguards will now be discussed, and 
improvements suggested. 
B. Legal and Other Assistance 
In Police v M, Harding DCJ placed great emphasis on the fact that the finding of a charge 
proved in the Youth Court after an admission at a FGC is only made after specialist legal 
advice provided by a Youth Advocate. His Honour considered essential elements of a FGC as 
he saw it: 'almost inevitably' a Youth Advocate present, discussion of the charge and whether 
the young person 'in that context admits the charge or not' .1198 It is certainly true that the 
presence of a Youth Advocate is a valuable safeguard for the young person. The role of the 
Youth Advocate was discussed in Chapter 9 .1199 As discussed, the Youth Advocate should 
protect the rights of the young person, and ensure that admissions made are voluntary, 
informed, and supported by sufficient evidence. However, not all court-referred FGCs have a 
Youth Advocate present, and there is no formal mechanism by which a Youth Advocate can 
attend the ITC FGC,1200 and the presence of a Youth Advocate does not always ensure that 
rights are protected. 1201 Nonetheless, quality legal assistance is an important safeguard to 
ensure that admissions are voluntary and reliable. 
In theory, one of the strengths of the New Zealand model is that there is an objective 
facilitator (the youth justice co-ordinator). Criticisms have been directed at conferencing 
processes in other jurisdictions that are facilitated by police officers because of concerns 
about objectivity and police domination of the process. 1202 In his or her role as facilitator, it 
could be argued that the youth justice co-ordinator has the duty of ensuring that young 
persons and their family understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings as she or 
he has the statutory responsibility to ensure that the principles of the CYPF Act are being 
1197 Kaye L McLaren, Tough is Not Enough: Getting Smart About Youth Crime (Wellington, Ministry of Youth 
Affairs, 2002). 
1198 Police v M [2001] DCR 385, 343. 
1199 See Chapter 9(11). 
1200 See Chapter S(III) and (IV). 
1201 See Chapter 9(111). 
1202 Ursula Kilkelly, Youth Justice in Ireland - Tough Lives, Rough Justice (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006). 
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'.I 
met. 1203 In Centre 2, the youth justice co-ordinator always made a statement at the start of the 
FGC that 'if X does not want to admit the offence, then we wont go any further, and the 
matter will go back to the court'. Any effort to explain matters to young people and their 
families is a positive development, and some explanations are better than none. But the key 
element lacking was an explanation of what admission of the offence actually means, 1204 while 
in Centre 1 no such explanation was given. Further, youth justice co-ordinators will have put 
considerable effort into organising the conference and so may have a vested interest in the 
conference going ahead on the day, especially in light of the fact that youth justice 
coordinators are often overworked and under-resourced. 1205 In addition, the youth justice co-
ordinator should not compromise impartiality by advising the young person on what choices 
they should make. 1206 
C. Contrast with Admissions made in Police Custody 
Section 208 of the CYPF Act emphasises the importance of protecting the rights of the young 
person during the investigation of the offence1207 and there are extensive provisions dealing 
with the rights of young people when being questioned by the police. 1208 These were discussed 
in detail in an earlier chapter,1209 but to summarise: the young person must be informed of his 
or her rights, especially the right not to accompany the police officer to the station unless a 
formal arrest has been made. 1210 The police must allow the young person to nominate a 
1203 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), 90. 
1204 See II above. 
1205 Cindy Kiro, 'Breathing New Life into the Family Group Conference'. Paper presented at the Te Hokinga 
Mai (Coming Home) Conference, Wellington 25-271h November 2006. 
1206 Joanna Shapland, 'Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Just Responses to Crime?' in Andrew von 
Hirsch et al ( eds.), Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2003). 
1207 s 208(h), CYPF Act. 
1208 ss 215-232, CYPF Act. See also R v Irwin [1992] 3 NZLR 119, Nessa Lynch, 'Young Suspects' (2008) New 
Zealand Law Journal 357. 
1209 Chapter 2(IV). 
1210 These rights are set out ins 215. The police officer must warn the young person that if he or she refuses to 
give his or her name and address they may be arrested; that they are not obliged to accompany the officer to a 
place for questioning, and, if he or she gives his or her consent to do so, that consent may be withdrawn at any 
time; that there is no obligation on the young person to make a statement, and, if he or she consents to making a 
statement, that consent may be withdrawn at any time; that any statement made or given may be used in 
evidence in any proceedings; and that the young person is entitled to consult with and make or give any 
statement in the presence of a lawyer (a barrister or solicitor) and any person nominated by the young person. 
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supportive adult. The duties of this adult are set out in a 1994 amendment to the CYPF Act. 1211 
The persons who may be nominated are specified in section 222 of the CYPF Act. These are 
the parent or guardian of the young person, an adult member of the family, whanau or family 
group of the young person or any other adult selected by the young person. If the young 
person fails to nominate any of the above, any adult nominated for that purpose by the police 
may fulfil the role. 1212 Consequently, there are considerably more protections for the young 
person who makes an admission in police custody when compared to making admissions in 
the FGC, and especially the ITC FGC. This is discussed more thoroughly in the final chapter 
which sets out recommendations to address this disparity. 1213 
D. Comparison with other Jurisdictions 
1. Reliable admissions 
The conclusion on the reliability of admissions was that sufficient safeguards already exist in 
the court-referred FGC (i.e. the Youth Advocate, and scrutiny by the Youth Court judge), and 
it is simply necessary for these safeguards to be vindicated. The concern is with the ITC FGC 
as this takes place completely outside the court system, and there is no independent oversight 
of the ITC FGC. The police investigate and apprehend the young person, refer the young 
person to the FGC, inform the FGC of the charge, and then have the final veto over the FGC 
decision. This is a common issue with police led diversion schemes. 
England and Wales' Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides for a comprehensive system of 
pre-trial diversion, in different format to the ITC FGC, but with the same purpose. 1214 The 
United Kingdom is certainly not a leader in the area of young people's rights in the youth 
justice system,1215 but there are some elements of the police diversion scheme which could 
have relevance for the ITC FGC. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 replaced the former 
1211 s 221, CYPF Act. These include taking reasonable steps to ensure that the young person understands his/her 
s 215 rights and to support the young person during questioning and the making of statements. This provision 
recognises the principle that young people in the police station are vulnerable to police pressure (s 208(h), CYPF 
Act.). 
1212 See R v Kurariki (2002) 22 FRNZ 319. 
1213 See Chapter 14(11) and (III). See also Alisdair Gillespie, 'Reprimanding Juveniles and the Right to Due 
Process' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 1006, 1012. 
1214 See Chapter 5(IV) on the operation of conferencing schemes in other jurisdictions. 
1215 See e.g. Committee on the Rights of the Child (2008), Concluding Observations on the Third and Fourth 
Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, CRC!CIGBRIC0/4. 
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system of cautions in England and Wales with a system of reprimands and warnings. 1216 The 
police administer reprimands and warnings, but there may be a restorative element. Referrals 
are also made to local Youth Offending Teams. In contrast to the lack of guidelines apparent 
in the New Zealand system, there is emphasis on having demonstrable evidence sufficient for 
a court prosecution. The scheme requires that 'the offender admits to the constable that he 
committed the offence' .1217 Like the New Zealand legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 does not define what an 'admission' is. 1218 However, in Durham Constabulary, the 
House of Lords confirmed that it is not enough that some or all of the facts are admitted and 
that the young person must recognise his or her guilt. 1219 The Home Office guidance for the 
scheme provides that 'a reprimand or warning can be given only if the young person makes a 
clear and reliable admission to all elements of the offence. This should include an admission 
of dishonesty and intent, where applicable' .1220 There is a clear requirement to have both 
elements of the offence - mens rea and actus reus. The Home Office guidelines on the final 
warning specify that: 
for action to be taken under the scheme, the evidence must meet the required standard: that it could be used 
and would be reliable, such that a jury or bench of magistrates properly directed in accordance with the law 
would be more likely than not to convict the young person.1221 
There must be a realistic prospect of conviction before a reprimand or final warning may be 
administered. 1222 
Granted, these requirements have not ensured reliable admissions in all cases. Puech and 
Evans found that in some cases there was 'limited attention to police evidence during the 
interview process and the administering of the final warning,' 1223 and caution that 
1216 Kyela Puech and Roger Evans, 'Reprimands and Warnings: Populist Punitiveness or Restorative Justice?' 
(2001) Criminal Law Review 794. 
1217 Section 65(1)(c), Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
1218 Alisdair Gillespie, 'Reprimanding Juveniles and the Right to Due Process' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 
1006, 1012. 
1219 R v Durham Constabulary ex parte R [2005] 1 WLR 1184, para 33, per Baroness Hale of Richmond. 
1220 Home Office/Youth Justice Board, Final Warning Scheme - Guidance for the Police and Youth Offending 
Teams (London: Home Office/Youth Justice Board, 2002), 4.12. 
1221 Home Office/Youth Justice Board, Final Warning Scheme - Guidance for the Police and Youth Offending 
Teams (London: Home Office/Youth Justice Board, 2002), 4.10 [italics in original]. 
1222 s 65(1)(b), Crime and Disorder Act. See also Alisdair Gillespie, 'Reprimanding Juveniles and the Right to 
Due Process' (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 1006, 1012. 
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It is not clear what arrangements exist for reviewing the evidence in cases that receive a warning or 
what quality assurance processes are in place. It remains a matter for concern that there does not appear 
to be a robust internal review system or an external independent review of the evidence, such as that by 
the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] for cases that go to court.1224 
Specific legislative and policy recommendations are dealt with in the final chapter. 1225 
2. Ensuring voluntary admissions 
As discussed above, there is no requirement in the New Zealand FGC process to explain the 
meaning and consequences of the proposed admission to the young person. Some Australian 
jurisdictions have statutory requirements relating to the explanations that must be given to 
young people who are referred for a FGC. Under the New South Wales legislation, before a 
specialist youth police officer refers the young person for a conference, there is a statutory 
duty to inform the young person of 'the nature of the offence and the circumstances out of 
which it is alleged to have arisen', 'that the child is entitled to obtain legal advice and where 
that advice may be obtained', 'that the child is entitled to elect that the matter be dealt with by 
a court', 'what a conference is and the effect of the conference' .1226 Where practicable, this 
explanation must take place in the presence of the young person's caregiver, an appropriate 
adult, or a lawyer. 1221 Under Section 45(3) of the legislation, the conference convenor must 
supply written notice to the child outlining the offence which is to be the subject of the 
conference. 1228 Similarly, in the South Australian scheme, before notifying the youth justice 
co-ordinator of the conference referral, the police officer must explain to the young person the 
nature and circumstances of the alleged offence,1229 the entitlement to have legal advice,1230 and 
the entitlement to have the matter dealt with by a court.1231 If the matter is not going to court 
then the police officer must secure the admission in writing, preferably signed by the young 
1223 Lynn Keightley-Smith and Peter Francis, 'Final Warning, Youth Justice And Early Intervention: Reflections 
On The Findings Of A Research Study Carried Out In Northern England' [2007] 2 Web Journal of Legal Issues 
available online at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2007/issue2/keightleysmith2.html (last viewed 2 November 2008). 
1224 Kyela Puech and Roger Evans, 'Reprimands and Warnings: Populist Punitiveness or Restorative Justice?' 
(2001) Criminal Law Review 794, 800. 
1225 See Chapter 14(III). 
1226 s 39, Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1227 s 39(2), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1228 s 45(3)(a), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1229 s 7(2)(a)(i), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
1230 s 7(2)(a)(ii), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
1231 s 7(2)(a)(iii), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
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person. 1232 Admission of the offence should if practicable occur in the presence of the young 
person's guardian or a nominated responsible adult. 1233 
This research recommends that consideration be given to creating a statutory duty to explain 
to the young person the meaning and consequences of the admission. It is also recommended 
that young people be provided with a plain language explanation of their rights and 
responsibilities in the FGC process. Suggested wording is set out the final chapter. 1234 
V. CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand system places a lot of emphasis on the admission of the offence as a 
procedural safeguard. The FGC only deals with admitted offences. 1235 As has been discussed, 
there is considerable implicit pressure on the young person to admit the offence. The scheme 
of the CYPF Act encourages offences to be dealt with through admission rather than through 
the adversarial process. Consequently, denied charges are extremely rare. Of course, implicit 
pressures to admit the offence are always present in informal diversion schemes. It is 
important to note that the New Zealand system is a diversion towards something (an informal 
community based sanction) rather than a diversion away from the justice system altogether. 
Therefore it is important that the young person's admission is reliable. Under the CYPF Act, 
there are no statutory requirements to inform the young person of his or her right to have the 
matter dealt with by a court. It is apparent that conferencing schemes in other jurisdictions are 
more prescriptive in regard to informing young people about the conference procedure and 
their rights in respect of the procedure and admission of the offence. 
1232 s 7(3)(b), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
1233 s 7(3)(a) and (b), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
1234 See Chapter 14(V). 
1235 s 259(2), CYPF Act. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: LIMITS ON 
SANCTIONS 
It should remain the responsibility of the state towards its citizens to ensure that justice is administered 
by independent and impartial tribunals, and that there are proportionality limits which should not only 
constrain the measures agreed at restorative justice conferences etc. but also ensure some similarity in 
the treatment of equally situated offenders. If the state does delegate certain spheres of criminal justice 
to some form of community-based conference, the importance of insisting on the protection of basic 
rights for defendants is not diminished.1236 
I. INTRODUCTION 
These two final substantive chapters will consider the rights of the young person in relation to 
FGC outcomes. An earlier chapter identified the differences in how the offence is established 
in the FGC process compared to the adversarial criminal process.1237 Similarly, the process by 
which the appropriate sanction for the young person is decided on differs from the traditional 
sentencing process, where the ultimate decision is made by a judge. 
This chapter will consider the aims and powers of the FGC, the content of FGC plans, and 
what restrictions (if any) there are on the sanctions resulting from the FGC. The two key 
issues are the lack of limits on sanctions, and the role of the police in deciding on the 
sanction. Solutions to the lack of limits on sanctions are also discussed, and specific 
recommendations on legislative and policy changes will be set out in the final chapter. 1238 
As well as traditional criminal justice type elements such as community work and reparation 
(which are the subject of this chapter), the FGC plans typically also include measures to 
address the needs of the young person, and/or to address the causes of the offending. This 
issue will be discussed in the next chapter. 
1236 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, 591. 
1237 Chapter 1 O(III). 
1238 Chapter 14(IV). 
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II. THE FGC PLAN 
A. Introduction 
This section will discuss the aims and powers of the FGC in relation to sanctions. This will be 
illustrated by practice examples derived from the observation of the FGC, though reference is 
also made to existing statistics where available. A note on terminology: the term 'sanction' is 
used here for the punishment or accountability element of the FGC plan. This encompasses 
elements like apologies, community work hours, reparation, curfews and non-association 
orders. Sanction is the specific term used in the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act.1239 
Sanction means 'the specific penalty enacted in order to enforce obedience to a law' .1240 
Sentence is the usual criminal justice term i.e. 'the judicial determination of the punishment to 
be inflicted on a convicted criminal' .1241 There has been debate as to what the exact meaning 
of sanction is in this context, specifically whether it means punishment in respect of a 
criminal offence. This was discussed in an earlier chapter.1242 
B. The Court-Referred FGC 
1. Purpose of the FGC 
Nine out of the twelve FGCs observed for this research were court-referred FGCs. 1243 All of 
these were as a result of the 'not denied' procedure, 1244 where the matter is adjourned for a 
FGC to take place. 1245 As was discussed in a preceding chapter, less than 8% of Youth Court 
cases involve a defended hearing,1246 therefore the 'not denied' FGC is the most prevalent type 
of court-referred FGC. This FGC is tasked to 'consider whether the offence alleged to have 
been committed by that young person should be dealt with by the Court or whether the matter 
can be dealt with some other way, and to recommend to the Court accordingly' .1247 If the 
1239 s 208(e) and (t), CYPF Act. 
1240 Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd Edition 1989). 
1241 Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd Edition 1989). 
1242 Chapter 7(11). 
1243 See Chapter 6 for discussion on the observation of the FGC. 
1244 s 246(b)(i) ands 247(d), CYPF Act. 
1245 s 246(b )(ii), CYPF Act. 
1246 See Chapter 1 O(III). 
1247 s 258(d), CYPF Act. The young person must 'admit' the offence: s 259(1), CYPF Act. 
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offence is admitted at the FGC,1248 the FGC will proceed to formulate a plan. In all of the nine 
court referred FGCs, the young person admitted the offence, and agreement was reached on a 
plan.1249 
This plan is then reported back to the Youth Court Judge, who must accept the plan before it 
becomes legally binding. If the Youth Court Judge accepts the plan, there will be an 
adjournment for the plan to be completed. If the agreed actions are completed, the charges 
will be withdrawn or the young person will be given a section 282 discharge (as if the charges 
were never laid). If the plan is not completed successfully, further orders may be made by the 
Youth Court Judge under section 283 of the CYPF Act. The FGC may also recommend that a 
section 283 order be made. 1250 All FGC plans in the sample were accepted by the Youth Court 
Judge involved without modification. 1251 Unfortunately, statistical information is not collected 
on instances where the Youth Court Judge does not accept the plan, 1252 however, the Youth 
Court Bench Book states that in 'about 95%' of cases, the plan recommended by the FGC is 
accepted by the Youth Court Judge.1253 
The second type of court-referred FGC takes place when the charge is admitted in the Youth 
Court or proved through a defended hearing. None of the court-referred FGCs observed for 
this research were in this category. The Youth Court may not make any orders under sections 
282 or 283 of the CYPF Act unless a FGC has had an opportunity to consider the matter. 1254 
The aim of this FGC is 'to consider how the young person should be dealt with for that 
offence, and to recommend [to the Youth Court Judge] accordingly' .1255 Again, there is no 
statistical information on the amount of plans which are accepted by the Youth Court Judge, 
but presumably the acceptance rate discussed above applies to this type of FGC also. 
1248 Chapter 11 (II). 
1249 See Chapter 6(V). 
1250 Statistics on sentencing of young people, including s 283 orders can be found at Jin Chong, Youth Justice 
Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007), Table 5.2). 
1251 This information was obtained by checking with the youth justice co-ordinator involved. 
1252 Information request to the Ministry of Justice, October 2007. 
1253 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 2.3.2. Both 
youth justice co-ordinators stated that in their experience, 'almost all' FGC plans were accepted. 
1254 s 281(1), CYPF Act. 
1255 s 258(e), CYPF Act. 
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2. Legislative guidance 
The legislation is not prescriptive on the content of the FGC plan. Provided the young person 
has admitted the offence, 1256 the FGC can proceed to 'make such decisions and 
recommendations and formulate such plans as it considers necessary and desirable' for the 
young person. 1257 Prima facie, section 260 of the CYPF Act affords the FGC a large measure 
of discretion in determining the content of the plan. However, section 260 - headed Family 
group conference may make decisions and recommendations and formulate plans does 
provide some general guidance. Section 260 (3) of the CYPF Act proceeds to set out some 
possible outcomes for the youth justice FGC. These include guidance that: 
• Any proceedings already commenced against the young person should proceed or 
be discontinued, 1258 
• A formal police caution should be given to the young person, 1259 
• Appropriate penalties should be imposed on the young person, 1260 
• The young person should make reparation to the victim. 1261 
It is notable that all these elements are traditional criminal justice type penalties,1262 however 
this section does not limit the generality of section 260(1). Further, the FGC participants 
'shall have regard' to the general principles set out in section 208 (which is itself subject to 
section 5). These principles were discussed in an earlier chapter. 1263 
3. Practice examples 
The plans are set out here. Only the sanctions are outlined, but these plans also contained 
measures to address needs and to address the causes of offending. 1264 
1256 s 259(2), CYPF Act. 
1257 s 260(1), CYPF Act. 
1258 s 260(3)(a), CYPF Act. 
1259 s 260(3)(b), CYPF Act. 
1260 s 260(3)(d), CYPF Act. 
1261 s 260(3)(e), CYPF Act. 
1262 See discussion about the inclusion of welfare type elements in the FGC plan in Chapter 13(V). 
1263 Chapter 2(VII)(B). 
1264 See Chapter 13, especially (V). 
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Table 4: Plans formulated by the court-referred FGCs 
Offence Sanctions 
Theft and criminal 40 hours community work 
damage $187 reparation 
Apology letter to [victim] 
Curfew from 7pm - 7am except in [parents'] company 
$100 reparation 
Assault 50 hours community work 
Curfew from 7pm - 7am 
Non-association order with [certain individuals] 
Complete a project about effects of offending and present it to [family and victims] 
Criminal damage 
20 hours community work 
Curfew from 7am - 9pm (except in company of [named family members]) 
Not allowed to enter [named geographical location] 
Apology to [victim] 
Burglary 
$500 reparation 
50 hours community work 
Apology to [victim] 
Assault 25 hours community work 
$120 charity donation 
Apology to [victim] 
Assault 40 hours community work 
Gift to victim 
Car conversion 25 hours community work 
$350 reparation 
Apology letter to [victim] 
Curfew from 9pm - 7am 
Criminal damage 45 hours community work 
$225 reparation 
Apology letter to [victim] 
Burglary 30 hours community work 
$119.50 reparation 
Not allowed to enter [named geographical area] except to and from [workplace] 
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C. The ITC FGC 
1. Purpose of the ITC FGC 
Three of the FGCs observed for this research were ITC FGCs. The CYPF Act states that the 
purpose of the ITC FGC is 'to consider whether the young person should be prosecuted for 
that offence or whether the matter can be dealt with some other way, and to recommend to the 
relevant enforcement agency accordingly' .1265 Essentially, the ITC FGC aims to divert the 
young person's case from the Youth Court by finding another means ofresolving the offence. 
This is achieved by the formulation of a plan. If the plan is completed, that will be the end of 
the matter and charges will not be laid. This is due to the principles of the CYPF Act which 
state that formal criminal proceedings should be avoided where possible.1266 The police must 
comply with any reasonable decisions and recommendations formulated by a FGC, 1267 and the 
police must give effect to the outcome of the FGC unless 'clearly impracticable or clearly 
inconsistent with the principles set out in sections 5 and 208' .1268 However, a representative of 
the police is always a member of the conference and thus one of those whose agreement must 
be sought. The police can therefore veto an outcome which they are not in agreement with. 1269 
The FGC could also agree that a charge will be laid in the Youth Court without the need for a 
plan to be formulated. 1270 In the three ITC FGCs observed for this research, a plan was 
formulated which was acceptable to the police, and so agreement was reached. 
2. Plans 
The same legislative principles (discussed at B 2. above) apply to the ITC FGC. The three 
FGC plans are detailed here, again these plans also contained measures to address needs. 
1265 s 258(b), CYPF Act. 
1266 s 208(a), CYPF Act. 
1267 s 267, CYPF Act. 
1268 s 267, CYPF Act. 
1269 s 264, CYPF Act. 
1270 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 2.2. 
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Table 5: Plans formulated by ITC FGCs 
Offence Sanctions 
Burglary $ 200 reparation 
25 hours community service 
24 hour curfew (reviewed after one month) 
Traffic offence 25 hours community work 
7am to 7pm curfew (except in [parents'] company 
Drug offence Complete residential drug and alcohol programme 
Ill. CONTROLS ON SANCTIONS 
A. Introduction 
The FGC plans detailed above demonstrate that FGC plans contain significant levels of 
criminal justice sanctions: monetary, community work, and restrictions on liberty. Before 
considering the key issues relating to limits on these sanctions, it is necessary to examine the 
current legislative controls on the content of the FGC plan. 
B. The Court-Referred FGC 
The intention of the legislature is clear in the court-referred FGC, as the legislative provision 
states that the plan reported back from the FGC is a recommendation to the Youth Court. 
Section 281 (1) states: 
where a charge against a young person is proved before a Youth Court, the Court shall not make any 
order under section 282 or section 283 unless a family group conference has had an opportunity to 
consider ways in which the Court might deal with the young person in relation to the charge. 
In section 284, one of the factors which the Court 'shall have regard to' is 'any decision, 
recommendation, or plan made or formulated by a family group conference' .1271 Since the 
legislation makes it clear that the plan is technically a recommendation, then the legislation 
must have intended that the Youth Court Judge has the ultimate responsibility for the content 
of the FGC plan. Therefore one would expect that FGC plans would be regularly refused or 
modified by the Youth Court Judge. However, this does not appear to be the case. All court-
referred FGC plans in this sample were accepted without modification by the Youth Court 
Judge. Larger scale analysis of this issue is hampered by a lack of statistics, as no accessible 
records are available. Drawing conclusions about court-referred FGC plans is difficult 
because the outcomes are not published despite arguably being a type of Youth Court 
1271 s 284(h), CYPF Act. 
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sentence. The official statistics do give some broad figures on section 283 orders, 1272 but FGC 
outcomes will not be recorded here unless the FGC has recommended a section 283 order be 
imposed, or the Judge uses his or her residual discretion to impose such an order. In the 
interests of openness and transparency, statistics on the penalties imposed by court-referred 
FGCs should be published similar to the Youth Justice Statistics reports. However, as noted 
earlier, almost all plans are accepted by Youth Court Judges. 
The fact that almost all court-referred FGC plans are accepted suggests one or both of two 
situations: first, the FGC participants are already regulating the plan within the limits of what 
is considered acceptable, or second; Youth Court Judges almost automatically accept the plan 
presented to them without examining it for consistency or fairness. On the first point, this 
would suggest that contrary to the assertion that plans are 'limited only by the imagination' 1273 
of their participants, that there is already control by professionals such as youth justice co-
ordinators and police officers who are aware of what the Youth Court Judge will and will not 
accept in the particular case.1274 
On the second point, granted, one of the key policy imperatives underpinning the FGC is to 
give effect to principles of the legislation, such as strengthening families and allowing 
families to participate in decision making. The legislation requires that the Youth Court 
consider every FGC plan presented to it. 1275 The Youth Court Bench Book states that 'the 
starting point should be the presumption that the [FGC] plan is the best outcome, while 
recognising that the Court is there to filter out inappropriate outcomes' .1276 Some appear to 
have the view that the CYPF Act transfers power over decision making from the state to the 
community. This is not the case, but the CYPF Act certainly empowers families to participate 
in decisions. McElrea argues that the Youth Court nearly always accepts the plans agreed to 
by the FGC because of recognition that 'the scheme of the [CYPF] Act places the primary 
power of disposition with the FGC' .1277 It is true that the CYPF Act emphasises the importance 
1272 Jin Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: 1992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
1273 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
1274 See Chapter 6(V). 
1275 s 279, CYPF Act. 
1276 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 5.14. 
1277 Judge FWM Mc Elrea, 'Restorative Justice - A Peace Making Process' Paper presented at a LEADR 
International Conference, Perth, Australia, May 1997. 
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of the involvement of the family in the decision making process, but it is clear that the plan 
formulated by the court-referred FGC is intended to be a recommendation. Judges clearly 
retain the power to refuse or modify the plan. As discussed in Chapter 7, the FGC remains a 
state process, and the family cannot choose to have nothing happen to the young person. 1278 
The Youth Court Bench Book states that ' ... the Youth Court's role with regard to FGCs is 
one of supervision and monitoring, with final decision making control' .1279 
C. The ITC FGC 
The situation of the ITC FGC differs greatly. In this type of FGC there is no judicial 
oversight. It is left entirely to the participants to decide an appropriate sanction between them, 
to which the police officer must agree. The police apprehend the young person, form the 
intention to prosecute the young person, refer the young person for the ITC FGC, and then the 
FGC plan must be acceptable to the police. There is no independent oversight. Again, there is 
no publication of outcomes, and no statistics are available on the levels of sanctions in the 
ITC FGC. 
D. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, an examination of the court-referred FGC demonstrates that the legislative intent 
was that the plan formulated by the FGC was to be a recommendation to the Youth Court 
Judge, with the Judge given the power to modify the plan, or send the matter back to the FGC. 
However, in practice, almost all FGC plans are accepted by the Youth Court Judges. In the 
ITC FGC, there is no independent oversight. In both types of FGC, there is a lack of 
transparency, as statistics on FGC outcomes are not collated, and FGC plans are not publicly 
accessible. 
IV. PARAMETERS OF SANCTIONS 
A. Introduction 
This section will consider two issues in relation to levels on these sanctions: the upper limit of 
sanctions, and disparity between offenders. Reference is made to practice examples from the 
observation of the FGC. It is submitted that the examples discussed are indicative of a lack of 
restrictions on sanctions. 
1278 See Chapter 7(IV). 
1279 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 5.14. 
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B. Upper Limit on Sanctions 
In these FGCs the highest number of community work hours required of a young person was 
fifty hours, and the highest reparation amount was $500 (a court-referred FGC plan). What 
was concerning though, was the lack of a context for these abstract amounts. While these 
amounts in themselves are not high, for instance the average work-related community 
sentence in the adult court system was 116 hours in 2006,1280 investigation of the level ofFGC 
sanctions yielded some concerning issues. Firstly, at no stage during the FGC, was an upper 
limit on sanctions discussed. Secondly, there are no available statistics on the levels of 
sanctions resulting from FGCs with which comparison could be made. Thirdly, there are no 
court only sentences to compare FGC outcomes to, as all cases entering the Youth Court 
system will involve a FGC at some stage. 
First, there does not appear to be an upper limit on the penalties which a FGC could decide 
on. The FGC participants are to be guided by the section 208 principles which state that any 
sanctions 'should ... take the least restrictive form that is appropriate in the circumstances' .1281 
The Crimes Act 1961 sets out maximum penalties for criminal offences generally.1282 
However, in line with the principle that young people who offend are treated differently from 
adult offenders, the CYPF Act places some specific limits on the orders which the Youth 
Court can impose. For instance, section 298 of the CYPF Act deals with community work 
orders. The Youth Court Judge may make a community work order, within the limits of 'not 
less than 20 nor more than 200' hours. However, section 283 ( d) permits the Youth Court 
Judge to 'impose such a fine as could have been imposed by a District Court if the young 
person had been convicted of the offence [in the District Court]'. Similarly reparation may be 
ordered by the Youth Court to 'such sum as it thinks fit' .1283 
As noted, none of the FGC plans studied in the course of this research exceeded 50 hours of 
community service. However, in the 2004 Achieving Effective Outcomes report, it was 
reported that out of a sample of 561 youth justice FGCs, two young people were required to 
1280 Ministry of Justice, Statistical Bulletin (Number 1, December 2007). 
1281 s 208(f)(ii), CYPF Act. 
1282 E.g. s 196, Crimes Act 1961: 'Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year who 
assaults any other person.' 
1283 s 283(£), CYPF Act. 
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complete 'more than 200' hours of work in the community.1284 This is concerning if young 
people were required to complete more hours than the limits specified in section 298 CYPF 
Act. The Achieving Effective Outcomes report does not specify what type of FGCs (court-
referred or ITC FGCs) that were involved. This would suggest one of two situations, either 
the Youth Court was imposing a sanction outside its own powers or this was an ITC FGC. Up 
to twenty five hours of community work was required of seventy nine young people (14%). 1285 
Analysis of whether this is a more widespread issue is hampered by the lack of freely 
available statistics about FGC plans. Even if these are isolated incidences, it is very 
concerning if the FGC was to impose a penalty which was outside the maximum which the 
Youth Court could impose in that situation. 
On a theoretical level, there is no doubt but that sanctions resulting from the FGC should 
never be in excess of that which could be imposed under the law. Most do not doubt that 
sanctions agreed to by informal processes should never go beyond the maximum that could be 
imposed by a court. Braithwaite cautions that: 
The most important way that the criminal justice system must be constrained against being a source of 
domination over the lives of citizens is that it must be constrained against ever imposing a punishment 
beyond the maximum allowed by law for that kind of offence. It is therefore critical that restorative 
justice never be allowed to undermine this constraint. Restorative justice processes must be prohibited 
from ever imposing punishments that exceed the maximum punishment the courts would impose for 
that offence.1286 
However, McElrea argues that it is: 
inherently unfair to criticize family group conference procedures on the grounds that sometimes they 
impose outcomes more onerous than the court would have imposed - just as I think a similar criticism 
of the police diversion process for adults is unfair. In both cases what is overlooked is that sentencing is 
not an exact science and there can be considerable disparity between the sentences imposed by different 
judges in similar cases; we do not therefore say that judges should not be involved in sentencing. In 
point of fact outcomes under the new regime [the CYPF Act] are generally more creative, more 
community-based, less dependant on custodial solutions, than those the courts imposed.1287 
1284 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 63. 
1285 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 63. 
1286 John Braithwaite, 'Setting Standards for Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 563, 
567. 
1287 Judge FWM McElrea, 'A New Model of Justice' in BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The Youth Court in 
New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993), 4. 
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It is a valid assertion that outcomes may be more creative in the FGC than in the traditional 
sentencing model. However, community based and non-custodial does not always equate to 
benevolent or non-coercive.1288 
Further, New Zealand is unusual in the fact that virtually all cases of offending will involve a 
FGC at some stage. Even if the young person was to plead 'denied' and the matter be proved 
through a defended hearing, the Youth Court must then refer the matter to a FGC to make 
recommendations as to what penalty the Youth Court Judge should impose. Therefore there is 
no 'court only' sentencing process to compare the results of the FGC. 
C. Potential for Disparity Between Offenders 
According to Warner, 'when [FGC] outcomes depend on the whims and idiosyncrasies of 
victims and families, disparities in outcomes are inevitable. ' 1289 Previous studies have found 
that FGC outcomes for offences of similar severity varied considerably between regions. 1290 
The potential for inconsistency in FGC plans is evident especially where group off ending 
dealt with at separate FGCs is at issue. Lack of consistency in sanctions is something which 
young people feel aggrieved about. 1291 
The other was the issue of separate FGCs for group offending. Group offending is a common 
feature of youth offending. In one of the FGCs which was observed for this research, separate 
FGCs were held for two young people involved in the same property offence. The victim was 
only able to attend one of the FGCs, and this FGC resulted in twice as much community 
work hours as well as reparation, while the other young person was only required to carry out 
community work. The victim of the offence pushed for a more considerable penalty. This 
seemed unfair as the young people involved were friends, and would obviously discuss what 
penalty they had received. The young person spoke up about this during the FGC. The make 
up of the particular FGC influenced the severity of the outcome. Group offending is a 
1288 See Chapter 7(II). 
1289 Kate Warner, 'Family Group Conferences and the Rights of the Offender' in Christine Alder and Joy 
Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forward or Misplaced Optimism? 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), 148. 
1290 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth 
Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
1291 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
237 
common feature of offending by young people. If markedly disparate outcomes like this 
occur, this is likely to cause resentment, which is contrary to an avowed aim of the FGC 
process, that is reintegration and reconciliation. 
Ashworth has criticised processes like the youth justice FGC on the basis of consistency, 
arguing that 'if different communities can adopt separate standards, the result is likely to be a 
form of 'justice by geography' or 'postcode lottery" .1292 He strongly argues that 'in principle, 
justice should be administered in a consistent manner so that individuals do not find 
themselves subject to variable standards in different locations' 1293 Consistency is one of the 
elements which society expects from a criminal justice system. 1294 Surely it is important that 
young people who commit similar offences in similar circumstances should receive a similar 
sanction? 
Can inconsistency be defended on the basis that the young person and their family has agreed 
to the outcome? Morris and Young argue that '[FGC] outcomes are measured chiefly by the 
satisfaction of the stakeholders in each case, and not by comparison with the outcomes of like 
cases' 1295 and that 'what 1s more important are the reasons for the 
inconsistencies .. .inconsistencies between outcomes which are the result of genuine and un-
coerced agreement between the key parties, including victims may be [right]' .1296 Doubts 
about whether the FGC process is truly voluntary were expressed in an earlier chapter. 1297 
Of course, there is an argument that court based sentences also result in disparity between 
offenders. McElrea argues that: 
Many of the elements of a successful restorative justice conference are already recognised as valid 
elements in mitigation of penalties - remorse meaningfully expressed, apologies made, restitution 
1292 Andrew Ashworth, 'Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward for Criminal Justice?' (2001) Current Legal 
Problems 347, 359. 
1293 Andrew Ashworth, 'ls Restorative Justice the Way Forward for Criminal Justice?' (2001) Current Legal 
Problems 347, 359. 
1294 Richard Delgado 'Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice' (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 751. 
1295 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, 578. 
1296 Allison Morris and Warren Young, 'Reforming Criminal Justice: The Potential of Restorative Justice' in 
Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 
21. 




offered or paid, and the victim's attitude to these elements. These elements therefore can lead to 
different outcomes in otherwise similar cases even under the standard western sentencing model. 1298 
However as Ashworth states in relation to the comparison with court-based system, 'there is 
an important distinction between tribunals responding in a principled manner to relevant 
factual differences between cases, and responding on the basis of their own views and 
preferences' .1299 Further, neutral criminal justice professionals ( e.g. lawyers and judges) are 
much more likely than FGC participants to see the situation in clear cut terms. 
V. ROLE OF THE POLICE 
A. Introduction 
Unlike conferencing schemes in other jurisdictions,1300 the police do not facilitate youth justice 
FGCs under the CYPF Act. However, the police do still have a significant role in the FGC 
process. The role of the police in informing the FGC participants of the charge was discussed 
in Chapter 11. This section will discuss the role of the police in deciding on the sanction 
which the young person receives through the FGC process. 
B. Role of the Police in the FGC 
I. Is it right for a police officer to be involved in deciding on a sanction? 
There are two relevant issues with the role of the police in deciding on a sanction in the FGC. 
The first of these is the role that the police representative has in deciding on the sanction the 
young person should receive. As a full participant of the FGC, the police have a veto over the 
FGC plan. On a theoretical level, as Wonnacott notes, 'it is simply undesirable for a serving 
police officer to be involved in any form of sentencing' .1301 It is a fundamental principle of the 
common law that the roles of the prosecutor and of the judiciary are entirely separate. In 
addition, one of the aims of the 1989 reforms was in part to constrain the amount of discretion 
exercised by professionals such as the police.1302 It does not seem right that the police should 
1298 Judge FWM McElrea, 'Restorative Justice - A New Zealand Perspective' Paper presented at Modernising 
Criminal Justice -New World Challenges, London, 16-20 June 2002, para 14 (c). 
1299 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, 581. 
1300 See further Kathleen Daly and Hennessey Hayes, Restorative Justice and Conferencing in Australia 
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2001). See also Chapter 5(IV). 
1301 Camilla Wonnacott, 'The Counterfeit Contract - Reform, Pretence and Muddled Principles in the New 
Referral Order' ( 1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 27 l, 281. 
1302 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
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have a controlling vote over what penalty the young person receives. While the court-referred 
FGC has some element of judicial oversight, in the ITC FGC, the police investigate the 
offence, apprehend the young person, and then have the final veto on what penalty the young 
person should have. 
This significant power that the police have is concerning when there is evidence that the 
police are reported as being one of the primary decision makers in the FGC. 1303 In the FGCs 
observed in the course of this research, the police officer often took a dominant role. Granted, 
the young person and his or her family do have the option of refusing to agree and sending the 
case back to the referring agency. This did not happen in any of the FGCs observed for this 
research. However, the Achieving Effective Outcomes report reported that in cases where the 
FGC ended in non-agreement, it was 'overwhelmingly' the police who had vetoed the plan. 1304 
2. Using police knowledge 
The second issue is whether the police (with their possible extra knowledge of the young 
person) will seek to extend the process to other alleged offences or anti social behaviours that 
are not the subject of the FGC. Wonnacott rightly argues that a police officer: 
is likely to be privy to prejudicial information and facts about the offender that (for good reason) are not 
available to a court; for instance, that the offender was suspected of another offence, but was not 
prosecuted for lack of admissible evidence. The temptation for the police officer will naturally be to 
impose contractual terms that take into account not only the offences for which the offender was 
convicted, but also those of which he was suspected.1305 
This was a feature of some of the FGCs which were observed during this research. In three of 
the FGCs, it was noted that the police made reference to other unproven offences or 
troublesome behaviours that the young person had allegedly been engaged in. In one 
particular FGC, the police officer (after reading the summary of facts) spoke for a number of 
minutes about the young person's alleged offending in another part of the country, and how 
the local police had been warned to expect trouble when the young person moved into the 
locality. The police officer also informed the FGC about the (alleged) criminal activities of 
the young person's family. There was also discussion about a previous alleged offence in 
which there had not been enough evidence to charge the young person. This appeared to alter 
1303 See Chapter 6(V)(E)(2). 
1304 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 60. 
1305 Camilla Wonnacott, 'The Counterfeit Contract - Reform, Pretence and Muddled Principles in the New 
Referral Order' (1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 271, 280-281. 
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the FGC participants' view of the young person and there appeared to be an assumption that 
this was a repeat offence, despite there being no official record of the previous alleged 
offending. 
Far from there being a prohibition on discussing other alleged offending as there would be in 
a criminal trial, the encouraged restorative practice of the FGC promotes frank discussion and 
does not look at the offence in isolation. Discussing the FGC, Luna notes that: 
Consistent with holism, the FGC recognizes that crime is not an atomised event existing within a 
vacuum but instead an interconnected whole that occurs against a specific background and with 
consequences that extend into the future. The process thus emphasizes the concrete over the abstract, 
allowing the stakeholders to discuss a field of causation preceding the offense and its rippling impact on 
particular persons and collectives.1306 
This is perilously reminiscent of the welfarist response to youth offending. A previous chapter 
identified characteristics of a welfarist approach to youth justice like focussing on the whole 
situation of the young person rather than on the offenceY07 To avoid individualised penalties, 
it is vital that the young person receives a penalty in respect of the admitted offence only. This 
is another argument for a set of guidelines related to particular types of offences so that the 
opportunity for other unproven offences to be taken into account would be lessened. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding sections have identified a number of concerning issues relating to restrictions 
on the level of penalties that can be imposed by the FGC. It will now be proposed that the 
introduction of basic guidelines on the range of penalties could usefully be formulated. 
Specific legislative changes are set out in the fmal chapterY08 
The issue of the upper limit on sanctions in the court-referred FGC is more of a practice issue, 
the FGC should never be permitted to impose a penalty that is outside that which is allowable 
under the CYPF Act, and this should be made explicit in the legislation. As noted, for court -
referred FGCs, the Youth Court Judge should refuse to accept a plan which contains elements 
that are outside the Youth Court's maximum penalties. The situation of the ITC FGC is less 
1306 Erik Luna, 'Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice' (2003) Utah 
Law Review 205,297. 
1307 See Chapter 2(11) and (III). 
1308 See Chapter 14(IV). 
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clear cut as there is no judicial oversight. This is yet another instance which demonstrates the 
need for the young person to have legal assistance during the FGC process. 
Because of their position as investigators and prosecutors, there is a strong case for permitting 
the police to have an informative role only in the FGC. The police could continue their role of 
informing the FGC about the charge and the circumstances of the offending, and police 
officers often played an important part in informing the FGC of available community work 
etc. However, it is submitted that the police should not be allowed to have a vote in the 
decision about what sanction should result. This would work well in the case of the court-
referred FGC, as the decision is remitted to the Youth Court Judge for final approval. The 
situation is more complex in the case of the ITC FGC, because the whole purpose of the FGC 
is to have an agreement with the police not to charge the young person if certain conditions 
are met. Therefore the agreement of the police must be sought. It would be possible to have an 
agreement made at an ITC FGC where there was a victim present, as the public interest 
element would be protected. But because victims are only in attendance at about half of the 
FGCs, the police officer is essentially representing the public interest. It would obviously be 
undesirable for the penalty to be decided solely by the young person and their family. 
To continue on a recurring theme of this research, there is no reason why guidelines to ensure 
that young people are treated fairly and equitably could not co-exist with the legislative goal 
of family empowerment. To suggest guidelines on the levels of sanctions in the ITC FGC 
would not be to impose ready made solutions on the family of the young person. Speaking 
about restorative justice generally, Robinson has proposed a "punishments units" system that 
allows the restorative process greater unfettered discretion in determining the method of 
punishment than in determining its amount' .1309 There would still be room for encouraging 
creativity in terms of the content of the plan for instance, community hours for a community 
agency which the young person has a relationship with, or a donation to a charity which the 
victim of the offence had nominated. 1310 
Further, to promote transparency, statistics should be collated on FGC outcomes, which could 
be made available in the same manner as the youth justice statistics. 
1309 Paul H Robinson, 'The Virtues of Restorative Justice. The Vices of "Restorative Justice"' (2003) Utah Law 
Review 375, 387. 
1310 See further Chapter 14(IV). 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE OBJECTIVES 
UNDERLYING FGC OUTCOMES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This final substantive chapter will consider the objectives underlying outcomes of the youth 
justice FGC, and whether these objectives are in line with a rights based approach to youth 
justice. 
This chapter will begin by discussing the rights of young people in relation to youth justice 
outcomes. Then, the objectives underlying FGC outcomes will be considered. The context of 
the legislative principles will be considered in order to ascertain the legislative intent. It will 
become clear from an examination of the legislative principles guiding FGC outcomes, that 
the underlying objective of the FGC process has altered over the years. At the time of 
drafting, the rights of the young person, especially in relation to a fair and determinate 
sanction, were a concern. Since the inception of the CYPF Act, the principles underlying the 
legislation have taken a different course, especially towards restorative justice, and arguably 
towards the blurring of lines between welfare interventions, and responses to offending. 
The first major issue is theoretical: the compatibility of the increasingly restorative justice 
orientation of the youth justice system with the rights of the young person. This is especially 
important given the likelihood of a legislative amendment to the CYPF Act strengthening the 
position of the victim's interests. While the interests of victims are undoubtedly important, it 
will be argued that the youth justice system must retain the young person as its focus, and that 
the full restorative justice model is not appropriate for youth justice. This discussion is 
principally concerned with the shifting theoretical model of the FGC, but is informed by 
practice examples derived from observation of the FGC. 
The second issue to be considered is whether the separation of welfare issues and responses to 
off ending envisaged by the framers of the CYPF Act has been maintained. While the welfare 
of the young person and their family is certainly important, it will be argued that the lessons 
of past incarnations of youth justice demonstrate that a separation between care and protection 
and responses to criminal offending is vital. This will be illustrated with practice examples 
from the FGC plans. 
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II. A RIGHTS BASED APPROACH TO YOUTH JUSTICE 0UTCOMES 1311 
A. Introduction 
The principles relating to youth justice outcomes corning from domestic and international law 
will now be considered. The most relevant standards are those corning from the CRC, and its 
related standards. 
B. Aims of Youth Justice Outcomes 
By their nature, international law and standards relating to youth justice are drafted generally 
so as to apply to differing national legal systems. However a number of distinct principles 
underpinning youth justice sanctions may be identified. As is the case with the principles 
underpinning the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act, the aims reflect the tension 
between the traditional goals of criminal justice ( e.g. deterrence, crime control and 
rehabilitation) and the particular characteristics of young people ( e.g. vulnerability and 
immaturity). Above all, international law emphasises the importance of treating young people 
who offend differently to adult offenders. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
recently re-stated the reasoning behind the need for a separate youth justice system: 
Children differ from adults in their physical and psychological development, and their emotional and 
educational needs. Such differences constitute the basis for the lesser culpability of children in conflict 
with the law. These and other differences are the reasons for a separate juvenile justice system and 
require a different treatment for children.1312 
The CRC states that young people should be treated in a manner 'consistent with the 
promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth', 1313 and states that 'a variety of 
dispositions .... shall be available to ensure that children are dealt with m a manner 
appropriate to their well-being ... ' 1314 The Beijing Rules also state that the juvenile justice 
system shall emphasize the well-being of the juvenile. 1315 
1311 The term 'outcomes' is used in this chapter to describe the overall elements of the FGC plan - this 
encompasses the sanctions discussed in the preceding chapter and other elements designed to address needs. 
1312 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 10. Note of course that in international law terms the word 'children' 
describes all those under the age of 18 years. 
1313 Article 40.1, CRC. 
1314 Article 40.4, CRC. 
1315 Rule 5.1, Beijing Rules. 
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While it is accepted that a strictly punitive approach to young offenders is not in compliance 
with intemational law, 1316 what the principal aim of the youth justice system should be is not 
explicitly stated. Article 14 ( 4) of the ICCPR states that in the case of young people involved 
in the criminal justice system 'the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age 
and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation', suggesting that rehabilitation should be 
the principal aim of the youth justice system. However, the CRC speaks of the 'desirability of 
promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society'' 317 • 
Is there a difference between rehabilitation and re-integration? Van Bueren explains that the 
term 'rehabilitation' was withdrawn from the draft convention during the second reading of 
the CRC. 1318 The attention of States was drawn to 'the revision of thought which had occurred 
since the adoption of the CCPR' and 'highlighted the risk of States abusing rehabilitation as 
an undesirable form of social control' .1319 It is also because the concept of rehabilitation 
implies that responsibility rests solely with an individual who can be removed from society 
for treatment and once restored, released' .132° Contemporary international standards emphasise 
re-integration rather than rehabilitation. According to Van Bueren, 'the notion of re-
integration has a different starting point. It rejects the assumption that the difficulties which 
children face are necessarily individual and considers the social environment of the child' .1321 
Van Bueren argues that the concept of rehabilitation in the ICCPR should be interpreted as 
'the means by which a child can assume a constructive role in society' .1322 
1316 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 71. 
1317 Article 40.1, CRC. 
1318 Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans and Mi eke Verheyde ( eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the Child 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 12. 
1319 Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans and Mieke Verheyde (eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the Child 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 12. 
1320 Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans and Mieke Verheyde (eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the Child 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 12. 
1321 Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans and Mieke Verheyde (eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the Child 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 12. 
1322 Geraldine Van Bueren, 'Article 40: Child Criminal Justice' in Andre Alen, Johan Vande Lanotte, Eugeen 
Verhellen, Fiona Ang, Eva Berghmans and Mieke Verheyde (eds.), A Commentary on the Rights of the Child 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 13. 
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C. Types of Outcome 
As noted at the start of this section, international standards emphasise general principles 
rather than specifying particular outcomes. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
stated (in relation to diversion) 'it is left to the discretion of States parties to decide on the 
exact nature and content of the measures for dealing with children in conflict with the law 
without resorting to judicial proceedings, and to take the necessary legislative and other 
measures for their implementation' .1323 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child argues that 'it goes without saying' that forced 
labour, corporal punishment or other inhuman and degrading punishments are in violation of 
international standards .1324 Article 40 .1 of the CRC states that: 
States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having 
infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of 
dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of others and which takes into account the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's 
reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society. 
Article 40.4 of the CRC states that: 
A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision orders; counselling; probation; foster 
care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives to institutional care shall be 
available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and 
proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence. 
Deprivation of liberty is to be a last resort, and used in the least restrictive form possible in 
the circumstances. 1325 Custodial interventions should not be imposed 'unless the juvenile is 
adjudicated of a serious act involving violence against another person or of persistence in 
committing other serious offences and unless there is no other appropriate response' .1326 
The recent General Comment issued by the Committee on the Rights of the Child provides 
specific guidance on the aims and objectives of a CRC compliant youth justice system. 1327 The 
General Comment reiterates the importance of key principles. of the CRC such as non-
discrimination and the best interests of the young person. Further guidance was also provided 
1323 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 27. 
1324 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, paras 71 and 73. See also Article 37, CRC. 
1325 Rule l 7(b), Beijing Rules. 
1326 Rule 17( c ), Beijing Rules, see also Rule 18: 'avoid institutionalisation to the greatest extent possible'. 
1327 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007 
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by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in relation to contemporary youth justice 
processes, taking into account the increase in the prevalence of non-court dispositions, and the 
development of interventions such as restorative justice and family group conferencing. 
Above all, the Committee on the Rights of the Child emphasised that when the young person 
is diverted from formal judicial proceedings, human rights and legal safeguards must always 
be respected. 1328 
D. Concluding Remarks 
This section has discussed the benchmarks for outcomes of youth justice processes coming 
from relevant rights standards. There is a clear rationale for a separate system of youth justice. 
Outcomes should be non-punitive and designed to promote the re-integration of the young 
person. Although diversion from formal criminal justice processes is encouraged by the 
international standards, the young person's legal rights must be assured. 1329 
III. OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING FGC OUTCOMES 
A. Introduction 
The CYPF Act contains extensive principles, some relating to the operation of the legislation 
generally,1330 and some to the youth justice system specifically. 1331 It was unusual or perhaps 
unique at the time to have a statement of principles in legislation. It is now a lot more 
common. For example, the Sentencing Act 2002 provides for the 'Purposes of 
sentencing ... ', 1332 and also sets out the principles to be applied when sentencing offenders. 1333 
Statements of principles now appear in the youth justice legislation of other jurisdictions.1334 
The interpretation of the principles underpinning sanctioning of young people under the 
CYPF Act appears to have transformed over the years. Before considering the principles of 
the CYPF Act, it is necessary to consider the problems with the previous system in order to 
1328 Article 40.3(b), CRC. 
1329 See Chapter 4. 
1330 It is important to note that the CYPF Act deals both with children and young people in need of care and 
protection and those who are offending. 
1331 s 208, CYPF Act. 
1332 s 7, Sentencing Act 2002. 
1333 s 8, Sentencing Act 2002. 
1334 Sees 3, Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002(Canada), s 7, Young Offenders Act 1997 (New South Wales). 
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place the principles in context and especially where the rights of the young person fit into the 
legislation. The general theoretical context of the CYPF Act was considered earlier in this 
thesis. 1335 This section will focus specifically on the objectives underlying FGC outcomes. 
B. Identifying the Legislative Intent 
1. Objectives identified during the reform process 
The 197 4 Children and Young Persons Act1336 dealt both with children and young people in 
need of care and protection and those who were offending. Some of the problems with this 
approach in terms of the rights of the young person were set out in a public discussion paper 
prepared in 1984.1337 The 1984 Working Party began by noting that 1979 was the International 
Year of the Child and this had 'focused public attention on the rights of children' .1338 The 1974 
Act was generally welfarist in intent, that is premised on the principle that both those young 
people in need of care and protection and those who were offending were in that situation as a 
result of family difficulties that could be remedied through intervention by social services. 1339 
Lack of concern for the rights of young people stemming from an official attitude of 
paternalism and benevolent intention was one of the hallmarks of welfare based youth justice 
system. According to the 1984 Working Party: 
There has also been a growing realisation that benevolently intended official measures employed to 
rehabilitate children in difficulty can violate the children's civil rights by introducing a level of 
interference within their lives that is out of proportion to the seriousness of the behaviour that initially 
prompted the intervention. Providing justice for children as well as supplying necessary assistance 
requires that those who come to official notice for offending should have the full legal protection of due 
process.1340 
1335 See Chapter 2(VII). 
1336 Hereinafter the 1974 Act. 
1337 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984). This review was carried out by a Working Party within the 
Department of Social Welfare. It comprised DSW employees and Pauline Tapp, a Faculty of Law member from 
the University of Auckland. It was criticised at the time for lacking Maori representation. Note that this 
document deals with care and protection legislation as well as youth offending. Hereinafter the '1984 Working 
Party' in the text. See also Chapter 2(III) and (IV). 
1338 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 1. 
1339 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 35. 
1340 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 1. See generally David Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A 
History of Penal Strategies (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1985), Robert Harris and David 
Webb, Welfare, Power, and Juvenile Justice (London: Tavistock Publications, 1987). 
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The 1984 Working Party argued that the welfare approach to youth offending was misguided 
because the fact that a young person was off ending did not necessarily mean that that young 
person and their family were in need of intervention by social services. 1341 In essence, the 1984 
Working Party argued that 'an offence by a young person should not be used ... to justify the 
taking of extended powers over the young person's life for the purposes of rehabilitation' .1342 
The 1984 Working Party argued for a more justice and rights focused approach, including the 
establishment of a Youth Division of the District Court in which young people would be 
provided with the same basic rights as those given to adults but with special safeguards and 
guarantees recognising the special characteristics of young people. The 1984 Working Party 
also recommended that deprivation of liberty should be a last resort and court orders should 
be determinate.1343 This reflected concerns, especially amongst Maori, that indeterminate 
orders such as guardianship were being used for young people who had committed minor 
offences.1344 The emphasis which the 1984 Working Party placed on 'recompensing the victim 
of the offence and achieving reconciliation between the young person and the victim, and the 
young person and the community' 1345 is possibly the first mention of what is later described as 
a restorative approach to youth offending. 1346 
In December 1986 a Children and Young Person's Bill was brought before Parliament. It was 
based largely upon the recommendations of the 1984 Working Party but met with major 
opposition, especially from Maori and Pacific people who were critical of the mono-cultural 
and 'professionally dominated' provisions. 1347 Opposition was centred mainly on the care and 
protection provision of the Bill.1348 Following the re-election of the Labour government in 
1341 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 35. 
1342 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 35. 
1343 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 35. 
1344 MP Doolan, 'Youth Justice - Legislation & Practice' in BJ Brown and FWM McE!r~a (eds.), The Youth 
Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: Legal Research Foundation, 1993). 
1345 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation: Public Discussion Paper 
(Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984), 35. 
1346 See Chapter 7(11) and Part (IV) of this chapter. 
1347 Mike Doolan, 'Youth Justice Reform in New Zealand' in Julia Vernon and Sandra McKillop (eds.) 
Preventing Juvenile Crime (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991), 123. 
1348 On the youth justice provisions, see the final chapter of Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice 
in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
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1987, the new Minister of Social Welfare, Dr Cullen, set about reviewing the 1986 Bill and 
commissioned a new Working Party. 1349 The main objective was to react to the concerns of 
Maori about the mono-cultural nature of the Bill. In relation to youth justice, contrary to the 
recommendations of the 1984 Working Party, the 1987 Working Party recommended that the 
Youth Court should be a division of the Family Court so as to better address the needs of 
young offenders. 1350 This reflected a more welfarist approach than the 1984 Working Party 
who were concerned about the due process rights of young people. The 1987 Working Party 
also sought to remedy some of the perceived problems with previous diversionary schemes1351 
by recommending the establishment of 'Family Advisory Panels' made up of community 
members and co-ordinated by social workers. These were designed to reduce police powers in 
relation to diversion. 1352 The report of the 1987 Working Party was presented in December 
1987 and a Select Committee worked on re-drafting the Bill for almost two years. Major 
consultations were carried out with Maori and Pacific communities. 
2. Concern for the rights of the young person 
As the Children and Young Person's Bill was concerned with the care and protection of 
young people as well as youth justice, and the care and protection provisions were extremely 
contentious, both the Select Committee submissions and the parliamentary debates were 
predominantly concerned with child protection issues such as mandatory reporting of child 
abuse. Nonetheless, a number of themes relating to the rights of young people in youth justice 
can be identified. Firstly, there was concern that young people would be held accountable. As 
one Member of Parliament argued 'the main point is that young offenders have to face up to 
the fact that there are consequences for their wrongdoings' .1353 This reflected concerns that the 
1349 Department of Social Welfare, Review of the Children and Young Persons Bill: Report of the Working Party 
on the Children and Young Persons Bill (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1987). Hereinafter '1987 
Working Party' in the text. 
1350 Department of Social Welfare, Review of the Children and Young Persons Bill: Report of the Working Party 
on the Children and Young Persons Bill (Wellington, Department of Social Welfare, 1987), 66-67. 
1351 It was reported that the police were bypassing previous diversionary schemes and only referring those young 
people who they did not intend to prosecute anyway. Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New 
Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
1352 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
1353 Chair of the Social Services Select Committee, Judy Keall, 47 NZPD 20 April 1989, 10105. 
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welfarist approach was insulating young people from the effects of their offending. 1354 Further, 
according to the Minister of Social Welfare, the view prevailed that: 
offending behaviour should be dealt with as just that, not as something else. It may be that a young 
person offends against the law for reasons related to family and social circumstances. If so, it may be 
that issues involving the care and control of the young person should be dealt with, but at the same time 
the young person should be held accountable for what he or she has done, and appropriate action should 
be taken. This is necessary for both the young person's own sake and because the community has a 
right to have offences dealt with in an appropriate way. 1355 
During the reporting back to Parliament of the Select Committee on Social Services' report on 
the Bill, it was stated that the youth justice provisions 'are based on the justice model, which 
ensures that children and young people are held accountable for their actions but are dealt 
with in ways that are appropriate for their age and culture' 1356 
Secondly, there was concern that young people should have the protections of due process of 
law. The Minister of Social Welfare stated that the Bill 'provides stronger protection for the 
rights of children and young people who fall foul of the law, or who are suspected of doing 
so' 1357 and that the Bill 'reflects a belief that more attention should be paid to the rights of 
children and young persons ... the right to a fair hearing and appropriate sanctions when they 
have offended against the law' .1358 Annette King argued that 'people are looking for a positive 
alternative to institutional facilities for our children, and they believe that young offenders 
should face due process of law' .1359 Richard Northey identified the 'priorities' of the youth 
justice provisions of the Bill as being firstly to hold the young offender accountable, and 
secondly to protect the rights of the young offender. 1360 
It was considered important, following from the recommendations of the first Working Party 
in 1984, that a young person appearing in the Youth Court should have 'the same rights as an 
adult in a court of law, including the right to legal advocacy and the right to due process' .1361 
1354 Mike Doolan, 'Youth Justice Reform in New Zealand' in Julia Vernon and Sandra McKillop (eds.) 
Preventing Juvenile Crime (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991). 
1355 Hon Dr. M Cullen (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10115. 
1356 Hon Judy Keall (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10105. 
1357 Hon Dr. M Cullen (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10115. 
1358 Hon Dr. M Cullen (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10115. 
1359 Hon Annette King, (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10109. 
1360 Hon Richard Northey (20 April 1986) 47 NZPD 10114. 
1361 Hon Dr. M Cullen (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10115. 
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Thirdly, there was the intention that there should be a strict separation of care and protection 
from youth justice. It was noted that actions had been taken under the criminal law to justify 
unnecessary intervention in the lives of young people and their families. 1362 
3. Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, an examination of the context in which the legislation was enacted 
demonstrates that there was concern that the rights of young people who offend were 
safeguarded. In particular, the dangers of the broadly welfarist Children and Young Persons 
Act 1974 were emphasised: lack of due process, indeterminate sanctions, and using the 
criminal law solely to intervene into the life of young people and their families. 1363 The final 
principles enacted in the legislation will now be discussed. 
C. Objectives of FGC Sanctions 
I. The guiding principles 
As a starting point, it is important to note that the CYPF Act deals both with young people in 
need of care and protection and those who are offending. Consequently, there are a number of 
sets of principles relevant to sanctions scattered throughout the legislation, some applying to 
the whole CYPF Act,1364 and some applying to the youth justice provisions specifically.1365 
Which of these apply to the young person in the youth justice FGC? 
The Long Title of the CYPF Act and sections 4 and 5 of the CYPF Act are relevant to the 
whole piece oflegislation. Section 4 sets out the objects of the legislation, while section 5 sets 
out the principles to be applied in exercise of powers conferred by the CYPF Act. There are 
specific principles guiding youth justice which are set out in section 208 of the CYPF Act. 
Section 260 which sets out the scope of decisions which may be made by the youth justice 
FGC, states that regard must be had to the section 208 principles. 1366 Section 208 is then 
subject to section 5 of the CYPF Act which deals with general principles for the whole 
legislation. For those young people involved in a court-referred FGC, in the High Court case 
1362 Hon Dr. M Cullen (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10115. 
1363 See Part (V) of this chapter. 
1364 The Long Title, s 4-12, CYPF Act. 
1365 s 208, CYPF Act. 
1366 s 260(2), CYPF Act. 
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c; 
of Xv Police, it was held that in making sentencing decisions the Youth Court is guided by 
the youth justice principles set out in section 208 of the CYPF Act, the objects of the CYPF 
Act set out in section 4, the principles applying generally to the CYPF Act set out in section 5 
and the Long Title of the CYPF Act. 1367 In addition to this, there is section 284 of the CYPF 
Act which is headed 'Factors to be taken into account on sentencing'. This section sets out a 
number of factors which the Youth Court Judge 'shall have regard to' 1368 when making an 
order under section 283 of the CYPF Act. 
The fact that a single piece of legislation covers two distinct groups of young people makes 
for a large range of principles. The key issue here is how the concerns relating to the rights of 
young people discussed earlier translated into the final legislation. The principles will now be 
discussed under two main headings - traditional objectives and new objectives. 
2. 'Traditional' objectives 
Many of the principles relating to youth justice sanctions m the CYPF Act are an 
amalgamation of the justice and welfare approaches to youth justice. In relation to the 
objectives of the CYPF Act for young people who offend, section 4(f) states that where 
children and young people commit offences, it must be ensured that they are 'held 
accountable' and encouraged to 'accept responsibility' for their behaviour. These provisions 
reflect the concerns expressed with the welfare approach during the legislative process. There 
was a perception amongst both youth justice professionals and the wider public that the 
system was failing to hold young offenders properly accountable for their offending. 1369 The 
treatment approach had the effect of insulating young people from the consequences of their 
actions. Also indicative of a justice approach is the location of the Youth Court within the 
District Court structure. Under the previous legislation, one court (the Children and Young 
Persons Court) dealt both with those children and young people in need of care and protection 
and those who were offending. The 1984 Working Party believed that young people involved 
in formal court proceedings 'should receive the same due process protections as adults, should 
be dealt with predictably and should receive a disposition similar to that imposed on other 
1367 Xv Police 7/2/05, Courtney and Heath JJ, HC Auckland, CRI 2004-404-374, para 42. 
1368 s 284(1), CYPF Act. 
1369 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion 
Paper (Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 
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juveniles committing the same offence'_ mo The Youth Court is based on justice principles 
with the young person having the same basic rights as an adult in the same situation, e.g. 
proof must be established to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt through a 
defended hearing for contested charges,1371 and young people are legally represented by 
specialised defence counsel. 1372 Another element of a rights based approach is the principle 
that 'the vulnerability of young people entitles a child or young person to special protection 
during any investigation relating to the commission or possible commission of an offence by 
that child or young person' .1373 The translation of concerns about young people's rights into 
the legislation may be seen in the fact that Youth Court orders are determinate, reflecting 
concerns about the use of indeterminate orders under the Children and Young Persons Act 
1974. 1374 For similar reasons, the least restrictive sanction appropriate to the circumstances is 
to be imposed. ms Age is a mitigating factor when deciding whether to impose sanctions and 
what form those sanctions should take place. 1376 
While the CYPF Act has elements of a justice approach, the CYPF Act does not however take 
a strictly punitive or strictly crime control approach to youth offending.1377 As Doolan stated in 
a paper written soon after the CYPF Act was enacted, there was a 'shift towards the principles 
underlying the justice model, but without embracing that model's more doctrinaire aspects' .ms 
That is offending by young people would not be ascribed completely to the choice of the 
young person; the wider circumstance of the young person's offending must be looked at. 
Deprivation of liberty is a last resort in cases where public safety is at risk. 1379 Young people 
are only transferred to the adult criminal justice system in cases involving serious indictable 
1370 Department of Social Welfare, Review of Children and Young Persons Legislation - Public Discussion 
Paper (Wellington: Department of Social Welfare, 1984). 
1371 See Chapters 10 and 11 for criticisms of how most offences are proved through the FGC process. 
1372 s 323, CYPF Act. See Chapters 8 and 9 for discussion on the right to legal assistance in the FGC. 
1373 s 208(h), CYPF Act. 
1374 s 283, CYPF Act. 
1375 s 208(f)(ii), CYPF Act. 
1376 s 208(e), CYPF Act. 
1377 Police v D [2002] DCR 897, per Thorburn DCJ. 
1378 Mike Doolan, 'Youth Justice Reform in New Zealand' in Julia Vernon and Sandra McKillop (eds.) 
Preventing Juvenile Crime (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991), 121. 
1379 s 208(d), CYPF Act. 
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offences.1380 This approach is in sharp contrast with the crime control agenda underpinning 
England and Wales' Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which states that 'it shall be the principal 
aim of the youth justice system to prevent offending by children and young persons' .1381 The 
Canadian Youth Criminal Justice Act also emphasises public safety and the prevention of 
offending. 1382 However as Thomas J noted in Wv The Registrar of the Youth Court (Tokoroa): 
It is accepted that the emphasis in the Act is on restorative justice and the rehabilitation of young 
offenders, but there is also recognition in the legislation and case law that serious offending may call for 
stronger penalties than the Act provides. Section 276, relating to indictable offences, and s 283(0) in 
relation to sentencing options, both recognise that some offences are better dealt with by the District 
Court or the High Court. In addition, s 208(d) in its terms acknowledges that there are limits on the 
desirability of community-based sentences where public safety is involved.1383 
There is no explicit mention of welfare or rehabilitation in the youth justice principles of the 
CYPF Act, apart from a prohibition on using criminal proceedings solely to advance the 
welfare of the young person and their family. 1384 As noted above section 4(f) sets out holding 
young people accountable and promoting a sense of responsibility in young people as 
objectives of the CYPF Act. 1385 However, the second part of section 4(f) requires that young 
people who offend are 'dealt with in a way that acknowledges their needs and that will give 
them the opportunity to develop in responsible, beneficial, and socially acceptable ways' .1386 
Section 4 states that the object of the Act is to 'promote the wellbeing of children, young 
persons and their families by ... ' Section 5 states that 'consideration must always be given' to 
how decisions affecting young people will affect the 'welfare' of the young person' .1387 These 
provisions have been interpreted as requiring a twin focus in FGC plans on holding young 
people accountable and addressing the needs of the young person. 1388 As was discussed 
previously, diversion from the formal criminal justice system had been a feature of the New 
1380 s 290, CYPF Act. 
1381 s 37(1), Crime and Disorder Act 1998. A proposed amendment to New Zealand's CYPF Act did seek to 
make prevention of re-offending an aim of the youth justice system. See Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Amendment Act (No 4) 2004. 
1382 s 3(1), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
1383 [1999] NZFLR 100, para 21. 
1384 s 208(b), CYPF Act. 
1385 s 4(f)(i), CYPF Act. 
1386 s 4(f)(ii), CYPF Act. 
1387 s 5(i), CYPF Act. 
1388 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 2.3.2. 
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Zealand youth justice system for a considerable period of time. 1389 The CYPF Act gave 
statutory recognition to this principle, stating explicitly that formal criminal proceedings 
should not be commenced against young people if there was an alternative means of dealing 
with the matter. 1390 Similarly, community based sanctions are preferred 'so far as that is 
practicable and consonant with the need to ensure the safety of the public' .1391 
3. New objectives 
(a) Family decision making 
The preceding section identified how many of the principles of the CYPF Act embody 
'traditional' criminal justice objectives. However, others of the objectives and principles of 
the CYPF Act were certainly unique in New Zealand law, and arguably unique amongst other 
jurisdictions.1392 A defining feature of the CYPF Act is the emphasis it places on the 
importance of family involvement in decision making and the goal of strengthening and 
maintaining family structures. This objective is set out in no uncertain terms in the Long Title 
of the CYPF Act which describes the legislation as: 
An Act to reform the law relating to children and young persons who are in need of care or protection 
or who offend against the law, and in particular ... to make provision for matters relating to children and 
young persons who are in need of care or protection or who have offended against the law to be 
resolved, wherever possible, by their own family, whanau, hapu, iwi, or family group. 
Section 5 emphasises the importance of participation of family members in decision making, 
the strengthening of family relationships and the stability of the family. 1393 The object of the 
CYPF Act is to 'promote the wellbeing of children, young persons, and their families and 
family groups, by ... ' 1394 The specific principles governing the youth justice provisions of the 
CYPF Act also emphasis the importance of youth justice outcomes which strengthen families 
and empower families to develop their own means of dealing with offending by their young 
people, 1395 and also that sanctions should seek to 'maintain and promote the development of 
the young person within his/her family' .1396 
1389 See Chapter 2(11) and (III). 
1390 s 208(a), CYPF Act. 
1391 s 208(d), CYPF Act. 
1392 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture ~ Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
1393 s 5(a), (b), (c), (d), CYPF Act. 
1394 s 4, CYPF Act. 
1395 s 208(c)(i) and (ii), CYPF Act. 
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What does this mean for the rights of the young person? It seems that this is more about 
family empowerment and family involvement in the decision making process rather than 
handing over the process to the family of the young person. Mike Doolan has argued that the 
intention of the CYPF legislation was less about victims and more about empowering families 
to take responsibility for their children and young people.1397 Of course the cynical view is 
that the family has a limited power to decide on options which are tightly controlled by the 
state, but the family may then be blamed if things go wrong. Is there also a danger that young 
people corning from disadvantaged and dysfunctional families will be doubly penalised? They 
will receive a sanction in respect of the criminal offence and also be disadvantaged by lacking 
a supportive environment in which to fulfil the terms of the FGC plan. FGC plans which 
frequently contain requirements to attend training courses and programmes -inevitably 
requiring the input of family members with ·regard to transport etc.1398 As Khylee Quince 
argues in relation to Maori in the criminal justice system in New Zealand: 'initiatives such as 
the FGC and marae justice programmes are predicated upon the offender coming from a 
functional whanau group, with whom the offender identifies, and who will take responsibility 
for them' 1399 
As was discussed in a previous chapter, 1400 the youth justice process is still firmly a state 
process and the wishes of the family are arguably subject to other goals of the criminal justice 
system like public safety. 1401 For instance, the family of the young person choose that nothing 
would happen to a young person charged. Any plan that the family comes up with in the FGC 
process is subject to veto by the Youth Court Judge (in the case of the court-referred FGC) or 
by the police (in the case of an ITC FGC). 
1396 s 208(f)(i), CYPF Act. 
1397 Mike Doolan, 'Restorative Practices and Family Empowerment: both/and or either/or?' Family Rights 
Newsletter (London: Family Rights Group, 2003). 
1398 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 62. 
1399 Khylee Quince, 'Maori and the Criminal Justice System in New Zealand' in Julia Tolmie and Warren 
Brookbanks (eds.), Criminal Justice in New Zealand (Wellington: Lexis Nexis, 2007), 353. 
1400 See Chapter 7 on the theoretical model represented by the FGC. 
1401 See e.g. Police v Sand M (1994) 11 FRNZ 322. This case involved sexual offending by two Samoan boys 
against a girl who was also from the Samoan community. The families of both the defendants and the 
complainants wished to resolve the matter through the youth justice system and traditional Samoan dispute 
resolution processes. Judge Harvey committed the matter to the High Court for trial, citing inter alia the public 
interest. 
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(b) Victims of offences 
The second novel element of the CYPF Act's principles was the provision relating to victims 
of offences. Section 208 states that 'any measures for dealing with offending by children or 
young persons should have due regard to the interests of any victims of that offending' .1402 The 
inclusion of victims' interests was commensurate with the development of a victims' rights 
movement both in New Zealand and overseas. 1403 Whose interests are paramount though? 
Section 6 of the CYPF Act provides that 'the welfare and interests of the child or young 
person shall be the first and paramount consideration ... ' However, the youth justice 
provisions of the CYPF Act are explicitly exempted from this clause. 1404 As was argued during 
the second reading of the Bill in Parliament: 
In dealing with any offender, the offender's needs are not put first. The code quite clearly sets out that 
the needs of the victim and of the public have to be considered, and if young offenders are to be 
confronted with taking responsibility for offences it is not possible to put their needs first throughout 
the Bill.1405 
D. The 'Evolution' of the Objectives Underlying FGC Outcomes 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, it has been argued that the principles underpinning the youth justice provision of the 
CYPF Act are based generally on justice principles, but also with a requirement to 
acknowledge needs. There is also an emphasis on a diversionary approach. These principles 
were generally an amalgamation of previous approaches from New Zealand and overseas 
jurisdictions. Two novel elements of the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act were the 
emphasis on the consultation and involvement of family and the requirement to have due 
regard to the interests of victims. However, the New Zealand youth justice system is now 
overwhelmingly described as either being based on restorative justice principles or being an 
example of restorative principles in practice. How this 'evolution' in the principles of the 
youth justice system occurred will now be considered. 
1402 s 208(g), CYPF Act. 
1403 Allison Morris, 'Giving Victims a Voice - A New Zealand Experiment' (1993) 32 Howard Journal of 
Criminal Justice 304. 
1404 s 6, CYPF Act. 
1405 Hon Richard Northey (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10104. 
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2. Restorative justice 
The concept of restorative justice was discussed in Chapter 7 .1406 Restorative justice as a 
concept is difficult to define. What is and what is not restorative justice is the subject of much 
debate. 1407 To reiterate, characteristics of restorative justice include the resolution of the 
offence through the involvement of the victim of offence and offender, an intention to repair 
the harm caused by the offence rather than to punish the offender and an aim of reconciliation 
between victim and offender and to re-integrate the offender to the community, rather than to 
punish the offender. 1408 Restorative justice was not truly developed as a concept in 
criminology at the time of the drafting of the CYPF Act. 1409 One of the officials closely 
involved in the drafting of the CYPF Act, Mike Doolan, 1410 makes a frank admission that 
'those of us who were involved in policy development process leading up to the new law had 
never heard of restorative justice (indicating some deficits in our research approach as there 
was a body of literature available on the subject even then) .. '. 1411 
The first major evaluation of the youth justice system (published in 1993) does not appear to 
mention the term 'restorative justice' .1412 Nonetheless, by the time the second major report on 
the CYPF Act's operation was published almost ten years later,1413 it was stated that 'the youth 
justice system has been seen as the first and most fully developed example of a national 
1406 Chapter 7(II). 
1407 See e.g. Paul McCold, 'Towards A Holistic Vision of Restorative Justice: A Reply to the Maximalist 
Model' (2000) 3 Contemporary Justice Review 357, Lode Walgrave, 'How Pure Can a Maximalist Approach to 
Restorative Justice Remain? Or Can a Purist Model Of Restorative Justice Become Maximalist?' (2000) 3 
Contemporary Justice Review 415. 
1408 Gordon Bazemore and Mara Schiff, 'What and Why Now: Understanding Restorative Justice' in Gordon 
Bazemore and Mara Schiff (eds.), Restorative Community Justice: Repairing Harm and Transforming 
Communities (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Company, 2001). 
1409 The roots of restorative justice theory can be found in publications such as Nils Christie, 'Conflicts as 
Property' (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology l, but the concept was not truly developed in criminology 
until the late 1980s with books like John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
1410 His report of an overseas study tour was highly influential on the final legislation. See Mike Doolan, From 
Welfare to Justice (Towards New Social Work Practice with Youth Offenders) (Wellington: Department of 
Social Welfare, 1987). 
1411 Mike Doolan, 'Restorative Practices and Family Empowerment: both/and or either/or?' Family Rights 
Newsletter (London: Family Rights Group, 2003), 1. 
1412 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
1413 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
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system of justice that incorporates restorative justice principles into practice', 1414 and that the 
CYPF Act represented 'the first legislated example of a restorative justice approach to 
offending' .1415 Further, it was stated that 'the objects and principles of the legislation also 
emphasise ... the importance of restorative responses', 1416 and 'the extent to which restorative 
processes were achieved' was regarded as a major benchmark in identifying 'effective 
outcomes' in the youth justice system. 1417 It was argued that the CYPF Act 'focuses on 
repairing harm, reintegrating offenders, and restoring the balance within the community 
affected by the offence' .1418 In addition, the CYPF Act, and especially the youth justice FGC, 
has almost become synonymous with restorative justice in the international literature. 1419 
The assumption that the youth justice system is based on restorative justice principles is also 
prevalent in the case law. In Police v N, Malosi DCJ stated that 'If one likens the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act to a crown, the family group conference is the jewel 
in it. At the seat of this crown is the concept of restorative justice' .1420 In the High Court case 
of RE v Police, Williams J stated that: 
Young persons receive special treatment under our law. Since 1 November 1989, the manner in which 
Courts deal with them has changed. It is a basic change since it requires concentration upon a 
restorative justice system rather than a retributive or deterrent system. The object of the new provisions 
was to enable victims and the community, as well as young persons, to participate in a process which 
would help them and heal the damage caused by their offences. An essential part of this process is a 
negotiated community response at a family group conference. It is a system which operates in a vastly 
different way to that which Courts are required to use in dealing with adult offenders. 1421 
1414 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 1. 
1415 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 8. 
1416 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 21. 
1417 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 297. 
1418 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 8. 
1419 See e.g. Allison Morris and Gabrielle M Maxwell (eds.), Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, 
Mediation and Circles (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2003), Tony F Marshall, 'The Evolution of 
Restorative Justice in Britain' (1996) 4 European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 21, Allison Morris 
and Gabrielle M Maxwell, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: Restorative Justice in Practice?' (2006) 62 Journal of 
Social Issues 239. 
1420 Police v N [2004] NZFLR 1009, per Malosi DCJ, para 23. 
1421 RE v Police [1995] NZFLR 433,434, per Williams J [author's italics]. 
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In a similar vein to the 'discovery' that the youth justice system was based on restorative 
principles, there was also a 'discovery' that the system was based on Maori justice principles 
- although admittedly this is generally the result of misinterpretation by commentators. 1422 It is 
clear that a system based on restorative justice principles was not the intention of the framers 
of the CYPF Act. As Stewart has commented 'the concept of restorative, as opposed to 
adversarial, justice was probably not a foremost concern of the original legislators but this has 
emerged from practice as a key factor in dealing with juvenile offenders' .1423 
Judge FWM McElrea, a proponent of the restorative justice approach, 1424 postulates that the 
goals of restorative justice and the New Zealand youth justice principles intersect on some 
levels. McElrea categorizes three particular elements of the CYPF Act as being restorative in 
nature; the transfer of state power from the courts to the family and community, group 
consensus decision-making in the FGC and the involvement of victims leading to a healing 
process. 1425 Maxwell and Morris consider that: 
Both family group conferences and restorative justice give a say in how the offence should be resolved 
to those most affected by it - victims, offenders, and their "communities of care" - and both give 
primacy to their interests; both also emphasize the need to address the offending and its consequences 
(for victims, offender, and communities) in meaningful ways; reconcile victims, offenders, and their 
communities through reaching agreements about how best to deal with the offending; and attempt to 
reintegrate or reconnect both victims and offenders at the local community level through healing the 
harm or hurt caused by the offending and through taking steps to prevent its recurrence.1426 
This interpretation of the principles of the CYPF Act is a rather subjective view, since neither 
re-integration, repair of harm or hurt or reconciliation is mentioned in the legislation. In 
addition, the principles of the CYPF Act being used by proponents of restorative justice to 
back up the argument that it is restorative could arguably be used to claim that the CYPF Act 
represents a retributive response to crime. Indeed, similar language is to be found in the 
1422 For critique see Chris Cunneen, 'Community Conferencing and the Fiction oflndigenous Control' (1997) 30 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 292, Juan Tauri, 'Family Group Conferencing: A Case 
Study of the Indigenisation of New Zealand's Justice System' (1998) 10 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 168. 
1423 Trish Stewart, 'Family Group Conferences with Young Offenders in New Zealand' in Joe Hudson, Allison 
Morris, Gabrielle Maxwell and Burt Galaway, Family Group Conferences: Perspectives on Policy and Practice 
(New South Wales: The Federation Press/Criminal Justice Press, 1996), 68. 
1424 One of the commentators who first identified the CYPF Act as having restorative characteristics. See further 
BJ Brown and FWM McElrea (eds.), The Youth Court in New Zealand: A New Model of Justice (Auckland: 
Legal Research Foundation, 1993) 
1425 FWM McElrea, 'A New Model of Justice' in FWM McElrea and BJ Brown (eds.) The Youth Court in New 
Zealand: Four Papers Auckland, Legal Research Foundation, 1993. 
1426 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, 'Youth Justice in New Zealand: Restorative Justice in Practice? 
(2006) 62 Journal of Social Issues 239, 243. 
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principles of the Sentencing Act 2002, which lacks the support given to the CYPF Act by 
restorative justice advocates. The principles of the Sentencing Act also mention 
accountability. The section 4(±) principles i.e. accountability, promotion of a sense of 
responsibility and also the interests of victims can also be argued as a retributive response.1427 
Section 7(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act 2002 states one of the purposes of sentencing as being 
'to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the community by 
offending', while section 7(1)(b) seeks 'to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility 
for, and an acknowledgement of, that harm'. The Sentencing Act also mandates that account 
be taken of harm to victims of offences, which is considerably stronger language than that 
used in the CYPF Act. 
As for the contention that restorative justice processes are the way in which young people can 
be facilitated to 'develop in responsible, beneficial, and socially acceptable ways', 1428 this is a 
subjective view also. One could also advance the view that tougher sentencing and more use 
of custody are a more efficacious way of ensuring that young people 'develop in responsible, 
beneficial, and socially acceptable ways' .1429 
E. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, an examination of the context of the legislation and the legislative drafting 
process demonstrates that there was concern for the rights of young people to a fair and 
determinate sanction. The system was intended largely to be based on justice principles, but 
with a requirement that the needs of young people would be acknowledged. The CYPF Act 
does not take a strictly punitive or crime control approach to youth justice and there is a 
preference for diversionary approaches and non-custodial approaches. 
It is clear from an examination of the principles that the underlying philosophy of the youth 
justice provisions of the CYPF Act has evolved considerably since the inception of the 
legislation in 1989. The CYPF Act principles certainly contained some novel elements, but it 
appears as if the inclusion of the family in decision making was considered the key element 
1427 Julian V Roberts, 'Sentencing Reform in New Zealand: An Analysis of the Sentencing Act 2002' 36 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 249. 
1428 s 4(f)(ii), CYPF Act. 
1429 See e.g. 'Youth Justice- Is This as Good as it Gets?' Press Release, New Zealand First Party, 18 April 2007 
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by policy-makers at the time. 1430 The 1993 Family, Victims and Culture report classed 'due 
process' as one of the goals of the CYPF Act. 1431 However, this goal has arguably been 
superseded by values such as restorativeness and repair of harm. 1432 The question of whether 
the move towards restorative practice and values is compatible with the rights of the young 
person will now be considered. 
IV. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
A. Introduction 
The purported benefits of a restorative justice approach to youth offending and for victims of 
crime have been canvassed extensively elsewhere and it is not proposed to revisit them 
extensively here.1433 Rather, the focus here will be on the implications for the rights of the 
young person of a youth justice system incorporating restorative justice aims and processes. 
This examination is pertinent at the present time due to the fact that the legal position of 
victims of offences in the youth justice system is likely to be strengthened in the near future 
through an amendment to the CYPF Act. 1434 In addition, while restorative justice processes 
generally have received criticism from commentators concerned about strict adherence to the 
rule of law,1435 restorative justice processes have not received much attention from those 
concerned with a rights based model of youthjustice.1436 
1430 Mike Doolan, 'Restorative Practices and Family Empowerment: both/and or either/or?' Family Rights 
Newsletter (London: Family Rights Group, 2003). 
1431 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993). 
1432 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
1433 See e.g. Jim Consedine, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lyttleton: Ploughshares 
Publications, 1995), Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, 'The Practice of Family Group Conferences in New 
Zealand: Assessing the Place, Potential and Pitfalls of Restorative Justice' in Adam Crawford and J Goodey 
(eds.), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), Allison Morris and 
Gabrielle Maxwell (eds.), Restoring Justice for Juveniles: Conferences, Mediation and Circles (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001). 
1434 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Amendment Bill (No. 6). 
1435 See e.g. Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, Andrew Ashworth, 'Some Doubts About Restorative Justice' (1993) 4 Criminal Law Fornm 
277. 
1436 Some concerns are raised in Kate Akester, Restoring Youth Justice - New Directions in Domestic and 
International Law and Practice (London: Justice, 2000). 
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B. Potentially Positive Aspects for Young People 
I. Decarcerationldiversion 
As noted, the potentially positive aspects of restorative sanctions for young people have been 
canvassed extensively elsewhere. 1437 These positive aims include non-punitiveness, the aim of 
a reduction in the use of custodial sanctions and the encouragement of community based 
responses. 1438 As noted, unlike the youth justice legislation of some other jurisdictions, the 
CYPF Act does not take a strictly punitive approach to youthjustice. 1439 New Zealand's youth 
justice system has certainly fulfilled the aims of decarceration and community based 
sanctions. 1440 Only a tiny minority of young people are subject to deprivation ofliberty. 1441 This 
is in comparison with much larger numbers of young people in custody in comparable 
Western jurisdictions.1442 
2. Participation 
Another potentially positive aspect of restorative sanctions is participatory practice. 1443 Article 
12 of the CRC mandates that a young person who is 'capable of forming his or her own 
views' has 'the right to express those views freely in all matters' affecting the young person 
with these views being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
1437 See generally Lode Walgrave, ( ed.), Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Potentialities, Risks and Problems for 
Research (Leuven: University Press, 1998), Allison Morris and Gabrielle M Maxwell (eds.), Restorative Justice 
for Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation and Circles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001). 
1438 Jim Consedine, Restorative Justice: Healing the Effects of Crime (Lyttleton: Ploughshares Publications, 
1995), Kate Akester, Restoring Youth Justice ~ New Directions in Domestic and International Law and Practice 
(London: Justice, 2000). Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becraft, 'Trial and Treatment of Youth 
Offenders: Human Rights at the Coalface of Youth Justice'. Paper presented at the Commonwealth Law 
Conference, London, September 2005. 
1439 See e.g. s 3 7(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, where the prevention of re-offending is specified as the 
primary aim of the youth justice system for England and Wales. 
1440 Gabrielle Maxwell, John Robertson and Venezia Kingi, 'Achieving the Diversion and Decarceration of 
Young Offenders in New Zealand' (2002) 19 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 76. 
1441 See Chapter 5(II), also Gabrielle Maxwell, John Robertson and Venezia Kingi, 'Achieving the Diversion and 
Decarceration of Young Offenders in New Zealand' (2002) 19 Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 76, Jin 
Chong, Youth Justice Statistics in New Zealand: I 992 to 2006 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
1442 Zoe Davis and Willan Mahon (eds.), Debating Youth Justice: From Punishment to Problem Solving 
(London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2007) 
1443 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becraft, 'Trial and Treatment of Youth Offenders: Human Rights at 




young person. 1444 Young people are to be given the 'the opportunity to be heard in any judicial 
and administrative proceedings' affecting them. 1445 
Hypothetically, the FGC should provide a more appropriate forum for the young person's 
right to effective and meaningful participation in the youth justice process than the youth 
court. Evaluations of youth court practice both in New Zealand, 1446 and intemationally,1447 have 
criticised the lack of participation by the young person. The adversarial process itself is 
generally not considered to be conducive to participation by the young person. 1448 A pre-CYPF 
Act evaluation found lack of understanding and lack of participation by young people and 
their families. 1449 Cognisant of these difficulties, the CYPF Act has a number of provisions 
designed to promote participation. Section 10 of the CYPF Act states that both counsel and 
the court have a duty to explain the nature of the proceedings and any orders that are to be 
made, in appropriate language. However, a post-CYPF Act evaluation of Youth Court 
practice demonstrated lack of understanding and participation on the part of young people and 
their families. 1450 A more recent evaluation showed that practice had improved overall, but 
young people still rated the process low when asked questions such as 'I understood what was 
going on' and 'I understood what was decided' .1451 
The nature of the FGC (informal, less hurried and taking place in 'neutral territory' with 
family support present) should mean increased levels of participation by young people. 1452 The 
1444 Article 12(1), CRC. 
1445 Article 12(2), CRC. 
1446 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and 
Practice (Wellington: Institute of Criminology, 1987) 
1447 Ursula Kilkelly, 'Youth Courts and Children's Rights: The Irish Experience' (2008) 8 Youth Justice 39. 
1448 Ann Tobey, Thomas Grisso and Robert Schwartz, 'Youths' Trial Participation as Seen by Youths and Their 
Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues' in Thomas Grisso and Robert G Schwartz (eds), Youth 
on Trial - A Developmental Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
1449 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Practice and Policy (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). 
1450 Gabrielle Maxwell and Allison Morris, Family, Victims and Culture - Youth Justice in New Zealand 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/Institute of Criminology, 1993), 152-155. 
1451 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 134. 
1452 Jane Dalrymple, 'Family Group Conferences and Youth Advocacy: The Participation of Children and Young 
People in Family Decision Making' (2002) 5 European Journal of Social Work 287. 
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concepts of taking responsibility and direct accountability rather than the more impersonal 
criminal trial may have advantages from the young person's perspective. Acceptance of 
responsibility takes place in a more supportive environment surrounded by family members 
and other important people from the young person's life rather than through the 'ritual of plea 
taking' 1453 in the court. Instead of pleading guilty in an abstract notion to the charge, there can 
be negotiation and discussion with the victim about the exact circumstances. However, 
evaluations of young people's views of the FGC process and the Youth Court average out as 
similar. The Achieving Effective Outcomes report found that: 
on the whole, young people's views of their experiences in the family group conference and the Youth 
Court are relatively similar. .. In particular, similar proportions agreed with the extent to which they 
were prepared for what would happen, were supported, understood what happened, were treated with 
fairness and respect, agreed with the decisions and were stigmatised and excluded.1454 
While participation was not an area directly addressed by this research,1455 typically, the young 
person did not play a large part in the FGC discussion and decision making. Except for one 
notable FGC, where the young person was confident and articulate, the young people 
generally communicated in monosyllables and nods. It was also typical for the professionals 
and family members to talk over the young person e.g. 'he tends to do this', or 'I know she 
wouldn't be able to do that'. This lack of participation is likely to be a symptom of the large 
caseload of youth justice co-ordinators. With almost 9,000 youth justice FGCs being 
convened per year, 1456 this does not leave much time for the preparation of the young person 
and his or her family. It must also be said that it is a daunting prospect for the young person to 
speak about personal issues in front of strangers such as victims of offences and the police 
officer. This is unfortunate, as the youth justice FGC represents a real opportunity to involve 
and empower young people in decisions regarding themselves. 
C. Appropriateness of a Victim-Centred Approach for Youth Justice 
The potentially positive aspects of restorative sanctions have only been briefly outlined. These 
have received extensive treatment elsewhere. An important question which has not received 
1453 Judge FWM McElrea, 'Accountability in the Community: Taking Responsibility for Offending' in Judge 
FWM McElrea (ed.), Re - Thinking Criminal Justice - Vol I: Justice in the Community (Auckland: Legal 
Research Foundation, 1995), 69. 
1454 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 135. 
1455 To study participation of young people properly would require interviews of young people, and it was not 
possible to gain permission to do this. 
1456 Department of Child, Youth and Family Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2006 (Wellington: 
Ministry of Social Development, 2006). 
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,,, 
as much attention has been the appropriateness of the victim-centred nature of restorative 
justice processes for young people in the youth justice system. 
I. The legislative intent 
Section 208(g) of the CYPF Act requires that due regard be given to the interests of the 
victim of the offence when deciding on measures in response to offending by young people. 
Through their right to attend the FGC, victims are given a direct role in deciding on the 
sanction that should result. The statutory recognition of victims' rights was unusual at the 
time, especially with regard to giving victims an actual say in the formulation of a response to 
offending. Mike Doolan ( one of the officials responsible for the drafting of the legislation) 
explains that the decision to provide for victim involvement was not as a result of a desire to 
introduce a restorative justice based system, but more to allow some public insight into the 
essentially private FGC process. Doolan explains why victims were included in the process: 
Simply, to enable the process to attain public credibility. This was a radical departure from previous 
child welfare decision-making practices. Politicians, police and members of the general public were 
understandably nervous about it. As policy makers, we had the benefit of talking with Maori, Pacific 
Peoples, and other cultural groups about these proposals, which had emerged through public debate 
within these communities about how they might regain the power that was rightfully theirs, and we had 
little doubt that this process would work. It seemed important, though, that the public had some way of 
assessing this for itself, and thus the notion of involving victims arose. It was felt that if victims 
received justice for themselves in this process, if victims saw that the process was rigorous and not a 
soft option, and that if victims were satisfied with the outcomes, then these attitudes would begin to 
permeate New Zealand society. 1457 
This correlates with a view expressed during the parliamentary debates of concern that 
families would have a 'direct say in the solution' choosing themselves who could attend the 
FGC. 1458 This was an insinuation that dysfunctional families would not hold their young 
people sufficiently accountable. Was the inclusion of the victim in the legislation an attempt 
to counter this sort of view? Arguably, this view is evident in the fact that victims do not have 
a right to attend proceedings in the Youth Court, although Youth Court Judges are encouraged 
to use their discretion to permit victims to attend youth court hearings where the victim 
wishes to attend.1459 That is, accountability was not needed as the Youth Court Judge is there 
to ensure the public interest is accounted for. 
1457 Mike Doolan, 'Restorative Practices and Family Empowerment: both/and or either/or?' Family Rights 
Newsletter (London: Family Rights Group, 2003), 3. 
1458 Hon Mr Gerard (20 April 1989) 47 NZPD 10107. 
1459 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008). 
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That was the original intention at the time of the drafting of the CYPF Act. The needs and 
rights of victims of offences are now to the forefront of criminal justice policy. With the 
enactment of the Victims' Rights Act in 2002, the broad principles set out in the Victims of 
Offences Act 1987 - that the sentencing judge should be aware of the harm caused to the 
victim of the offence - have evolved into rights. These include the right to be kept informed 
of the progress of the particular case or prosecution,1460 and a right to have a victim impact 
statement heard during sentencing. 1461 The Sentencing Act 2002 mandates that the needs and 
rights of victims must be taken into account. 1462 
2. Proposed amendments to the CYPF Act 
A proposed amendment to the CYPF Act would replace the current wording of section 
208(g), which states that responses to offending must have 'due regard' to the interests of 
victims with a new provision strengthening the position of the victim. The proposed new 
provision would read: 
In the determination of measures for dealing with offending by children or young persons, consideration 
should be given to the interests and views of any victims of the offending (for example, by encouraging 
the victims to participate in the processes under this Part for dealing with offending) ... and ... any 
measures should have proper regard for the interests of any victims of the offending and the impact of 
the offending on them:. 1463 
This amendment reflects the opinions of 'stakeholders' in the youth justice area whose views 
were canvassed for a Discussion Document released by the Ministry of Social Development. 
In this document it was stated that: 
Some youth justice practitioners felt that as the youth justice system incorporates restorative justice 
principles and practices it should go further in victim empowerment than provisions that apply to adult 
offending. Within the youth justice sector there was also a view current practice had moved ahead of 
the CYPF Act's victim provisions. For instance, it was suggested youth justice co-ordinators are going 
beyond the current requirements in the CYPF Act to ensure the active participation of victims in youth 
justice provisions.1464 
The legislation is becoming more focused on the victim rather than the young offender. How 
compatible is this with the rights of the young person? 
1460 s 12, Victims' Rights Act 2002. 
1461 s 21, Victims' Rights Act 2002. 
1462 s 8(f), CYPF Act. 
1463 Clause 27, Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Amendment Bill (No 6). 
1464 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007), 21. 
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3. Where should the focus lie? 
The place of the victim in restorative justice processes, that is participating in the decision 
around the sanctions to be imposed on the offender, has been criticised elsewhere and would 
apply to young people as well as adult offenders. Some commentators are vehemently 
opposed to the victim having a say in the punishment of the offender. Ashworth argues that 
'the victim's legitimate interest is in compensation and/or reparation from the offender, and 
not in the form or quantum of the offender's punishment' 1465 Ashworth argues that victims 
should not have a say in the punishment of offenders or the decision to prosecute or not to 
prosecute. 1466 Cavadino and Dignan agree with Ashworth that victims should not be able to 
influence the severity of the sentence 'we wish victims to have a real say in what reparation 
they should receive, not in what retributive ( or denunciatory, deterrent or incapacitatory 
penalty the offender should suffer' 1467 
In terms of international law, neither the CRC nor the Beijing Rules or Riyadh Guidelines 
explicitly mention restorative justice, but the recent General Comment issued by the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child appeared to endorse restorative justice as one method of 
diverting young people from formal judicial proceedings. 1468 Some of the proclaimed 
objectives of restorative justice i.e. re-integration and reconciliation would appear to be in 
accordance with international standards. However, it is less clear whether the victim-centred 
focus of restorative justice would be in compliance, as Article 3 of the CRC mandates that the 
best interests of the young person is a primary consideration. As discussed above, 
international standards encourage an approach centred on the re-integration of the young 
person and the promotion of the young person's wellbeing. 1469 Where do the traditional goals 
of criminal justice like accountability and public safety fit into this approach? There is less 
emphasis on this issue. Young people who offend should be dealt with in a manner which 
'reinforces the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others' .1470 
1465 Andrew Ashworth, 'Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice' (2002) 42 British Journal of 
Criminology 578, 584. 
1466 Andrew Ashworth, 'Some Doubts About Restorative Justice' (1993) 4 Criminal Law Forum 277, Andrew 
Ashworth, 'Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing' (1993) Criminal Law Review 498. 
1467 Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, Reparation, Retribution and Rights (1997) 4 International Review of 
Victimology 233, 238 [italics in original]. 
1468 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, paras 10 and 27. 
1469 See Chapter 4. 
1470 Article 40.1, CRC. 
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Presumably accountability to victims and the public can be read into this. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has stated that a non strictly punitive approach can be introduced 'in 
concert with public safety' 1471 but is then silent on how public safety can be ensured. Further, 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated recently that 'the protections of the best 
interests of the child, means, for instance, that the traditional objectives of criminal justice 
(repression/retribution) must give way to rehabilitation and restorative justice objectives in 
dealing with child offenders. 1472 
There exists conflicting objectives relating to sanctions in the youth justice system. There are 
perennial tensions in youth justice between differing objectives such as rehabilitation of 
young people and the public interest. 1473 While 'intuitively it seems right, not only that 
wrongdoers should be penalised, but also that the victims who have suffered at their hands 
should be helped and compensated for the wrong done to them', 1474 the rationale for a separate 
youth justice system is the distinctive characteristics of young people compared to adults in 
the same situation. A victim centred approach is not in line with recognition of special 
characteristics of young people. The youth justice system should be offender focused, 
however that is not to say that victims could not be involved or could not receive reparation or 
repair of harm. The rights of the victim of the offence are more in being involved and 
empowered through the process. If the victim can receive reparation or compensation for the 
offence through the youth justice process that is a positive aspect, but the repair of harm to the 
victim should not be the primary focus of the youth justice system. 
Whose interests would be paramount? While the CRC recognises that young people must be 
held accountable to the community for offending, the youth justice system must be young 
person centred, 1475 and the best interests of the young person must be a primary 
1471 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 4 b. 
1472 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para 4 b. 
1473 See e.g. Barry Goldson (ed.), The New Youth Justice (Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing, 2000), John 
Muncie (ed.) Youth and Crime (2"d Edition) (London: Sage, 2004), John Pitts, The New Politics of Youth Crime: 
Discipline or Solidarity (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), Julia Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime 
(Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
1474 Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, 'Reparation, Retribution and Rights' (1997) 4 International Review of 
Victimology 233, 235. 
1475 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007. 
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consideration. 1476 It is doubtful whether a move towards a victim-centred, increasingly 
restorative justice approach would be in compliance with the requirement to have a young 
person-centred youth justice system. 
D. Remorse and Re-integration 
The rationale for a separate youth justice system is that young people's capacities for self 
control etc. are less than those of adults. The formulaic nature of FGCs may lessen their 
restorative power. 1477 As Braithwaite argues: 
Apology, forgiveness and mercy are gifts; they only have meaning if they well up from a genuine desire 
in the person who forgives, apologizes or grants mercy. Apart from it being morally wrong to impose 
such an expectation, we would destroy the moral power of forgiveness, apology or mercy to invite 
participants in a restorative justice process to consider proffering it during the process. People take time 
to discover the emotional resources to give up such emotional gifts. It cannot, must not, be expected. 
Similarly, remorse that is forced out of offenders has no restorative power. 1478 
Mike Doolan rightly argues that 'some caution needs to be applied in considering the full 
restorative model as a response to offending by young people, particularly where the young 
persons lack capacities of personal insight, guilt and remorse that makes the restorative 
approach such a powerful influence on offenders generally' 1479 
In a study of youth justice conferences in England, Zemova reported that facilitators often 
seemed to cajole apologies from young people.1480 This was also the case in five of the FGCs 
observed, in one case going as far as the youth justice co-ordinator announcing that it was 
now time to apologise. The Principal Youth Court Judge Becroft has spoken of how many of 
the persistent youth offenders lack remorse or victim empathy.1481 This raises questions about 
how appropriate it is to mainstream restorative justice for young people who offend. As 
Weijers argues: 
1476 Article 3.1, CRC. 
1477 See Chapter 6(V). 
1478 John Braithwaite, 'Setting Standards for Restorative Justice' 42 British Journal of Criminology 563, 571. 
1479 Mike Doolan, 'Restorative Practices and Family Empowerment: both/and or either/or?' Family Rights 
Newsletter (London: Family Rights Group, 2003), 3. 
1480 Margaret Zernova 'Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family 
Group Conferences' (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 491. 
1481 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'Youth Offending: Factors That Contribute and How the 
System Works'. Paper presented at the Child and Youth Offenders: What Works? Symposium, Wellington, 22 
August 2006. 
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using young persons who have committed a serious crime simply as a tool for restoration of their 
victims will be counter-productive in the end. Far from offering restoration, this kind of 
instrumentalism, which does not look seriously at the precarious position and role of the young 
offender, can offer at best some sort of material reparation of the harm done. Since it denies the 
complex and precarious moral and emotional expectations involving the role of the (young) offender in 
any restorative process, it seems unlikely that the things that are really crucial for restoration- that is 
recognition of personal responsibility for the wrongdoing, some sort of repentance for that wrongdoing 
and some convincing sort of apology - can be reached. All of these things pre-suppose an active and 
positive, moral and emotional involvement of the young offender which in tum presupposes that he is 
taken seriously, as a responsible, almost fully responsible, moral agent. 1482 
Re-integration of the young person to the community is another aim of restorative justice. 
Promotion of re-integration is of itself a worthy aim. However, the very term re-integration 
assumes that the young person is integrated to the community in the first place. Because of 
New Zealand's 'graduated' youth justice system, most offending is dealt with through 
warnings and the Police Youth Diversion Scheme. Those young people who reach the stage 
of the youth justice FGC have therefore either offended at a more serious level or are 
recidivists. Many of these young people are characterised by poor educational opportunities, 
poverty and unsupportive families. 1483 Restorative justice is predicated on the offender taking 
responsibility for his or her actions. Especially in the case of young people, society bears 
responsibility for ensuring that young people are integrated to the community in the first 
place.1484 The authors of the Achieving Effective Outcomes report concluded that 'it appears 
that well-socialised young people from strong family backgrounds are most likely to respond 
positively to the family group conference' .1485 
V. 'ADDRESSING NEEDS' ORA WELFARIST RESPONSE TO OFFENDING? 
A. Introduction 
The earlier discussion about the context of the legislative reforms and the legislative process 
itself, 1486 revealed that the framers of the CYPF Act were clearly concerned with the excesses 
1482 Ido Weijers, 'Restoration and the Family: A Pedagogical Point of View' in Lode Walgrave (ed.), Restorative 
Justice and the Law (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2002), 69. 
1483 See further the non-governmental report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Action for 
Children and Youth Aotearoa, Children and Youth in Aotearoa 2003 (Wellington: Action for Children and 
Youth Aotearoa, 2003). 
1484 See United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines), G.A. 
res. 45/112, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 201, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), also the CRC Article 24 
(standards for health), Article 27 (standard of living), Articles 28&29 (education) and Articles 33-35 (protection 
from harm). 
1485 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice -Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004), 236. 
1486 See Part (III), above. 
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of the welfarist approach to youth justice. Under the previous legislation (the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1974), there was blurring between young people in need of care and 
protection and those who were offending. Young people in need of assistance were seen to be 
'tainted' by association with the criminal courts. Equally, there were concerns that young 
people who were offending were not being held sufficiently accountable.1487 The new 
legislation had a clear policy imperative that the care and protection system would be separate 
from the youth justice system, and that the fact that the young person had committed a 
criminal offence would not be a pretext for intervention into the life of the young person or 
their family with welfarist intent. 1488 
This section will argue that despite this legislative separation, youth justice FGC plans are 
being used to address welfare issues. In relation to a child or young person who comes to the 
notice of the authorities for a purely care and protection reason (such as neglect or abuse) 
there are strict conditions for compulsory state intervention. However, in the case of young 
people who offend, despite there being an interface between the care and protection and 
criminal systems for cases where this is necessary, there is a lower standard for intervention 
and welfare type responses are being included in FGC plans. 
B. Examples of Welfare Interventions in the FGC Plan 
All twelve of the FGCs observed had elements which were designed to intervene in the young 
person's welfare. 
Table 6: Examples of welfare interventions in FGC plans 
Element No ofFGC plans (n=l2) 
Educational 7 
Counselling/Psychologist 5 
Drug and alcohol counselling/programmes 12 
Living arrangements 5 
Mentoring/ Assign social worker 10 
Employment/Work and Income 4 
Some examples of particularly onerous welfare interventions included: 
1487 Allison Morris and Warren Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Wellington: 
Institute of Criminology, 1987). See Chapter 2(VI). 
1488 s 208(b), CYPF Act. 
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• Requirement to attend school every day 
• Requirement to reside with a particular parent/family member 
• Requirement to undergo a medical check-up 
• Requirement to undergo psychological evaluation 
• Requirement to 'talk more' with family members 
C. The Deed and the Need? 
The examples provided above demonstrate that FGC plans generally contain measures which 
go beyond a penalty for offending. The Youth Court Bench Book states that: 
The [FGC] plan should address both the "deed" and the "need"; the consequences and causes of 
offending. That is, the young person should be held accountable for the offending but a comprehensive, 
rehabilitative plan should be formulated to prevent further offending and to allow the young person to 
develop in a socially beneficial way without further offending.1489 
Where does the authority for this requirement arise? The assertion that the legislation has a 
twin focus on the deed and the need has become an accepted mantra. On analysis of the 
legislative provisions, this may not be the case. Neither the specific section dealing with the 
content of youth justice FGC plans, nor the specific principles governing the youth justice 
section of the CYPF Act provide for FGC outcomes which aim to further the welfare of the 
young person or rehabilitate the young person. In section 260, which sets out some possible 
outcomes for the youth justice FGC, provisions to address the needs of the young person are 
not mentioned. Admittedly, the section does not aim to limit the generality of FGC 
outcomes,1490 but the list of possible outcomes is arguably indicative of a legislative intention 
to focus on responses to offending rather than welfare needs. 1491 The possible outcomes listed 
focus on the traditional criminal justice type penalties such as reparation and police 
cautions. 1492 Section 260(2) requires that the FGC participants should have regard to the 
general principles guiding youth justice which are set out in section 208. These specific 
principles governing youth justice do not mention rehabilitation or welfare as a principle of 
the youth justice system (apart from the prohibition on using criminal justice proceedings 
solely to advance the welfare of the young person or his or her family). In the section 208 
1489 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008), para 2.3.2. 
1490 s 260(3), CYPF Act. 
1491 The possible outcomes listed in s 260(3) are: that proceedings be continued or discontinued, that a formal 
police caution be administered, that an application for a s 67 declaration be made (in the case of a child), that 
appropriate penalties be imposed or that reparation be made to the victim of the offence. 
1492 s 260(3), CYPF Act. 
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principles which are to guide youth justice, it is clearly stated that 'criminal proceedings 
should not be instituted against a child or young person solely in order to provide any 
assistance or services needed to advance the welfare of the child or young person, or his or 
her family, whanau or family group' .1493 There are a number of provisions encouraging youth 
justice outcomes which 'strengthen the family' 1494 of the young person and 'take the form 
most likely to maintain and promote the development', 1495 of the young person within his/her 
family. In summary, the context of the legislation (considered earlier in this chapter) and the 
final legislation demonstrate a concern that responses to offending, and care and protection 
interventions be kept separate. 
Best practice standards for youth justice, like the Youth Court Bench Book1496 and the 
Achieving Effective Outcomes Report1497 derive this twin emphasis from section 4(f) of the 
CYPF Act. Section 4 of the CYPF Act sets out the General objects of the CYPF Act. Section 
4(f) provides that where children and young people commit offences, they are to be held 
accountable and encouraged to accept responsibility for their actions and dealt with 'in a way 
that acknowledges their needs and that will give them the opportunity to develop in 
responsible, beneficial, and socially acceptable ways' .1498 A requirement to deal with a young 
person in a way that acknowledges the needs of the young person is significantly different 
from a requirement to address those needs. Acknowledge means to recognise, allow or accept, 
1499 while address means to tackle, or to deal with. 1500 
There could potentially be an argument that welfare type measures are implemented as 
'voluntary' add-ons to youth justice FGC plans. However, see the earlier discussion as to how 
voluntary the FGC process really is. 1501 In the FGCs observed for this research, the legislative 
1493 s 208(b ), CYPF Act. 
1494 s 208(c)(i), CYPF Act. 
1495 s 208(f)(i), CYPF Act. 
1496 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008). 
1497 Gabrielle Maxwell et al, Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth Justice - Final Report (Wellington: Ministry 
of Social Development, 2004). 
1498 s 4(f)(ii), CYPF Act [author's italics]. 
1499 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Edition 1989). 
1500 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Edition 1989) 
1501 See Chapter 7(III). 
275 
requirements were explained to the FGC participants as 'accountability' and 'addressing 
needs' with equal emphasis given to both elements. 'Addressing needs' was explained by the 
youth justice co-ordinator as addressing problems which the young person had with alcohol, 
drugs or education. Certainly in the youth justice FGCs observed by the author, there was no 
distinction made between elements of the plan that must be fulfilled and those that were 
voluntary. 
D. The Envisaged Interface between Youth Justice and Care and Protection 
So far it has been argued that there is shaky legislative basis for including measures designed 
address the welfare of the young person in the youth justice FGC plan. It will now be argued 
that there already exists a clear process if the young person meets the legislative standard for a 
care and protection intervention. There is an objective standard for a young person in need of 
care and protection so why should the standard for welfare interventions be less for a young 
person who has offended? 
1. Care and protection interventions in the youth justice system 
While there is a separation between the systems responding to young people who offend and 
those who are in need of care and protection, there is a recognition that young people who 
populate the youth justice system may be also be in need of care and protection. In 
furtherance of this objective there are legislative provisions setting out what should happen if 
a young person in the youth justice system appears to be in need of care and protection. 1502 
Should care and protection provisions arise during a youth justice FGC, care and protection 
outcomes may be formulated with prior consent of a Care and Protection Co-ordinator.1503 As 
the Principal Youth Court Judge has stated: 
The New Zealand system avoids an unhelpful rigorous split between the youth justice and care and 
protection provisions by allowing a cross-over between the two parts. This flexibility, which allows 
room for discretion as to whether an incidence of offending is really care and protection based. This 
enables the justice system to concentrate on justice issues and avoid getting involved in care and 
protection work, which it is poorly equipped to carry out. 1504 
The grounds for care and protection are set out in section 14 of the CYPF Act. These include 
situations where the child or young person is being, or likely to be harmed, ill-treated, abused 
1502 s 280, CYPF Act. 
1503 s 208(1), CYPF Act. 
1504 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, 'A Report Card on How our Legal Systems deal with the 
Inter-Relationship Between Child Protection and Youth Crime'. Paper presented at the AIJA Youth Justice and 
Child Protection Conference, Hobart, Tasmania, 3 April 2006. 
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or deprived,1505 the child or young person's development or wellbeing is being or likely to be 
seriously and avoidably harmed or impaired, 1506 or the parents or caregivers are unwilling or 
unable to care for the child or young person.1507 Offending of itself is not a ground for care and 
protection for young people. The situation for child offenders (those aged between ten and 
fourteen years) differs in this respect. 1508 
Section 280 of the CYPF Act provides the interface between the care and protection system 
and the youth court system. The Youth Court Judge has three options when it appears to the 
Court that the young person is in need of care and protection. The Judge may make a referral 
to a care and protection co-ordinator under section 19(1),1509 adjourn proceedings until the 
outcome of the section 19 reference is known, or if there has been a section 67 Family Court 
declaration as a result of the section 19 reference, dismiss proceedings. 
2. Justification for separating care and protection from youth justice 
The provisions of the CYPF Act were formulated at a time where there was concern about the 
level of state intervention in the lives of young people and their families. Years of welfarist 
based policies had led to injustices where young people were taken away from their families 
on grounds of offending. 1510 Therefore, standards were set in legislation as to the level at 
which the State may intervene to protect the welfare of the young person, in order to give 
protection from paternalistic intervention into the lives of young people and their families. 
Consequently, the CYPF Act contains detailed guidance as to the circumstances when the 
state may intervene for care and protection reasons. The level that is set is high, with onerous 
obligations before the state may intervene. So why should young people who offend be any 
different? Certainly if the young person fits the criteria for a care and protection process to be 
initiated, that is the correct path. But why should there be a lesser standard for intervention in 
the case of a young person in the criminal justice system? Certainly there is room for 
1505 s 14(l)(a), CYPF Act. 
1506 s 14(l)(b), CYPF Act. 
1507 s 14(1)(f), CYPF Act. 
1508 s 14(e), CYPF Act. The procedure in relation to child offenders is set out in Chapter 5(11). 
1509 E.g. New Zealand Police v SMT 11/12/06, Becraft DCJ, YC Porirua CRI-2006-291-222 (violence and drug 
use in the home, truancy), Police v MR 4/9/07, Geoghan DCJ, YC Rotorua, CRI-2007-263-109(concems about 
the young person's education). 
1510 See Chapter 2(III) and (IV). 
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improvement with the way in which referrals between the youth justice system and the care 
and protection system are handled. The Youth Court Bench Book states that the section 280 
procedure has been fraught with delays. 1511 
Further, the Youth Court does not have power to make welfare orders. The orders which the 
Youth Court may make are set out in section 283 of the CYPF Act and are of a criminal 
justice nature. However, the Youth Court regularly accepts the plans formulated by court-
referred FGCs to implement measures which 'address needs'. When accepted by the Youth 
Court these recommendations are legally binding. This feature of Youth Court practice again 
ties into the contention that the FGC plan is voluntary or is imposed by the Court. 1512 
E. Strengthening Families and Community Based Sanctions 
So far it has been argued that measures to address the welfare needs of the young person 
should not be imposed as part of a youth justice process unless it fits the criteria for a care and 
protection process to be initiated. That is not to say that sanctions cannot be designed. to 
strengthen families or maintain and promote the development of the young person within their 
family. There is a difference between welfare interventions and community based, non-
punitive sanctions such as those encouraged by the CYPF Act. 
Furthermore, section 260 of the CYPF Act which deals with the outcomes of the FGC, 
provides that 'the conference shall have regard to the principles set out in section 208' .1513 The 
guiding principles set out in section 208 (while subject to section 51514), do not mention 
addressing the needs of the young person. Section 5(d) states that 'consideration must always 
be given' to how a decision affects the welfare of the child or young person. The section 208 
principles emphasis the importance of strengthening families so that they may find solutions 
to offending by their children and young people,1515 and also the importance of non-restrictive 
community based and family based sanctions where practicable. 1516 These principles are based 
1511 Youth Court Bench Book (Wellington: Institute of Judicial Studies, 2005, updated to 2008). 
1512 See Chapter 7 (III). 
1513 s 260(3), CYPF Act. 
1514 Section 5 sets out the general principles to be applied in the exercise of powers under the CYPF Act, e.g. that 
consideration should be given to the wishes of the child or young person and that decisions should be made and 
implemented within a time frame appropriate to the child or young person. 
1515 s 208(c), CYPF Act. 
1516 s 208(d) and(±), CYPF Act. 
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on the rationale that young people are less culpable and more amenable to growing out of 
crime. Imprisonment of young people has been shown to increase the incidences of 
offending,1517 and is contrary to international standards for youth justice.1518 Young people are 
best served by community sanctions unless public safety is at risk. 
F. Concluding Remarks 
This move towards a twin focus on the 'need' and the 'deed' means that the FGC process can 
be compared to the former welfarist movement where actions purported to promote the 
rehabilitation and best interests of the young person could tum out to be intrusive and 
coercive in nature. The purportedly restorative justice orientated nature of FGC practice is 
polarized from the failed rehabilitation model by its proponents. McElrea strongly argues that: 
It needs to be stressed that restorative justice is not simply the old argument for "rehabilitation rather 
than punishment", dressed up in new language. That type of paternalistic approach has had its day and 
failed ... Amongst other faults it ignores the desire of others to see justice done and it can interfere with 
important rights of offenders, eg to an outcome that is not disproportionate to the offence and which 
terminates within a limited period.1519 
However, Daly argues that this 'oppositional contrast' between the rehabilitative ideal and the 
restorative ideal embodied in the FGC is wrong. 1520 She proposes that ideas of: 
reintegrating offenders by members of relevant communities of care tap into a stronger vision of 
rehabilitation, in which broader networks of people associated with a lawbreaker, not just state actors, 
get involved and have a role. Thus, restorative justice should not be viewed in opposition to retributive 
or rehabilitative justice. Instead, this recent justice practice borrows and blends many elements from 
traditional practices of retributive and rehabilitative justice in the past century, and it introduces some 
new terms. 1521 
Especially with regard to the fact that victims are not present at all FGCs, 1522 there is a danger 
that FGCs facilitated by a welfare agency (Child, Youth and Family) and held on the premises 
of a welfare agency can descend into a social welfare case meeting. Whatever the arguments 
1517 Department of Corrections, About Time: Turning People Away From a Life of Crime and Reducing Re-
offending (Wellington: Department of Corrections, 2001). 
1518 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's rights in juvenile justice, 
CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007. 
1519 Judge FWM McElrea, 'Restorative Justice - A New Zealand Perspective' Paper presented at Modernising 
Criminal Justice -New World Challenges, London, 16-20 June 2002, para 10. 
152° Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite ( eds.), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 34. 
1521 Kathleen Daly, 'Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice' in Heather Strang 
and John Braithwaite (eds.), Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 35 [internal 
references omitted]. 
1522 See Chapter 6(IV). 
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that the young people who populate the youth justice system are characterised by welfare 
needs,1523 the purpose of the criminal jurisdiction is not to treat. It is notable that the major 
reforms of the youth justice system carried out through the CYPF Act were intended in part to 
address the deficiencies of the welfare-focused youth justice system. Reform and 
rehabilitation of the young person's general situation was the focus rather than the actual 
offence committed. 
Parallels may be drawn between the welfarist approach and the present approach. The 
language of 'wrap around services', 'integrated service delivery', 'working together' suggests 
there is increasingly less focus on the actual offence and more on the general situation of the 
young person. 1524 There is evidence of a move towards a closer relationship between the care 
and protection and youth justice systems. The Government's Youth Offending Strategy makes 
three recommendations about addressing the needs of the young person in the youth justice 
FGC which would bring the two systems closer together. Firstly, 'the development of a new 
process for joint educational/vocational and health assessments prior to some youths' first 
FGC, followed by appropriate intervention from both sectors to address identified needs', 1525 
secondly that 'YJCs [youth justice co-ordinators] ensuring that care and protection concerns 
are addressed within the FGC convened to address the offending. At the least, a decision 
should be taken at the time a youth justice FGC is being convened as to whether a care and 
protection FGC is also required' 1526, thirdly 'upskilling YJCs so that they are able to convene 
both youth justice and care and protection FGCs'. 1527 The Principal Youth Court Judge has 
also commented that the Youth Court should have some of the powers of the Family Court 
(e.g. the power to make orders for counselling and guardianship).1528 
1523 Kaye L McLaren, Tough is Not Enough: Getting Smart About Youth Crime (Wellington: Ministry of Youth 
Affairs, 2002). 
1524 See e.g. the papers delivered at Working Together: A practical conference on offending by young people in 
New Zealand, Town Hall, Wellington, 27 & 28 November 2007. www.yoc.org.nz (last viewed 12 March 2008. 
1525 Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Justice, Youth Offending Strategy (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development and Ministry of Justice, 2005), 47. 
1526 Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Justice, Youth Offending Strategy (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development and Ministry of Justice, 2005), 47. 
1527 Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Justice, Youth Offending Strategy (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development and Ministry of Justice, 2005), 47. 
1528 Principal Youth Court Judge Andrew Becraft, Presentation to Criminal Justice Class on the Work of the 
Youth Court, University of Otago, April 2007. 
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Thomas Bernard has demonstrated the cyclical nature of youth justice policy through the 
twentieth century. 1529 In the welfarist approach, there were concerns that young people were 
not be held accountable and were 'treated' for crime rather than receiving a fair penalty.1530 
However, in the youth justice FGC it seems as if young people are being held accountable 
through penalties like community work and reparation and receiving welfare interventions. 
Thereby the net of social control over young people and their families is increased rather than 
decreased as was the intention of the CYPF Act. 1531 
VI. CONCLUSION: OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING FGC OUTCOMES 
This chapter has considered the objectives underlying FGC outcomes, and criticised the 
increasing orientation of the system towards restorative justice and the blurring of lines 
between care and protection and responses to offending. 
An examination of the context and the intent of the legislation demonstrates that there was 
concern firstly, that young people would be held accountable rather than 'treated' for criminal 
behaviour, secondly, for the rights of young people to a fair and determinate sanction for 
offending and thirdly, that the criminal justice system was not to be used to intervene in the 
lives of young people and their families for welfare purposes. The CYPF Act as enacted 
reflects many of these concerns. There is a clear separation between young people in need of 
care and protection and those who are offending. The CYPF Act as enacted is indicative of 
justice principles, but one which would acknowledge the needs of young people. 
The principles underpinning youth justice sanctions appear to have changed focus in the years 
since the inception of the CYPF Act. The 'discovery' that the youth justice system is based on 
restorative justice principles has shifted emphasis from a broadly justice focus, to an emphasis 
on restorativeness, re-integration, reconciliation and repair of harm. The compatibility of a 
restorative justice orientated youth justice system with the rights of the young person was 
considered. As noted, it was not the original intention of the legislature to establish a system 
based on restorative principles, although elements of restorative practice have developed as a 
matter of practice and the restorative orientation of the system is likely to be strengthened 
1529 Thomas J Bernard, The Cycle of Juvenile Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 
1530 Harry Hendrick, Child Welfare: Historical Dimensions, Contemporary Debate (Bristol: The Policy Press, 
2003). 
1531 See e.g. the Long Title of the CYPF Act 'to make provision for matters relating to children and young 
persons who are in need of care and protection or who have offended against the law to be resolved, wherever 
possible, by their own family, whanau, hapu, iwi, or family group' 
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with a legislative amendment giving more recognition of victim's interests. It was argued that 
although the restorative justice model could have some advantages for young people (for 
example non-punitiveness and participatory practice) the emphasis of the youth justice system 
must be the young person rather than the victim of the offence. It was further argued that the 
full restorative justice model, with its emphasis on remorse and responsibility, may not be 
suitable for young people, who lack the maturity and independence of older offenders. 
The second issue to be considered was the separation of care and protection proceedings from 
criminal off ending. The backlash against a youth justice system solely focused on the 
rehabilitation of offenders has produced the lesson that 'progressive sentiments are no 
guarantee that reforms will not be corrupted and serve punitive ends' .1532 It is clear that the 
framers of the legislation envisaged a strict separation of care and protection proceedings 
from youth justice proceedings. A discrete procedure is in place if care and protection 
concerns arise during youth justice matters. However, it appears to be accepted best practice 
that there be a twin focus on accountability and addressing needs. Closer examination of the 
legislative provisions reveals a shaky legal foundation for this policy. 
The next chapter entitled 'The Way Forward' will draw together the recommendations made 
throughout the substantive chapters and comment on the future direction of the youth justice 
system. 
1532 Sharon Levrant et al, 'Reconsidering Restorative Justice: The Corruption of Benevolence Revisited?' (1999) 
45 Crime & Delinquency 3, 7. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE WAY 
FORWARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has analysed the youth justice FGC from the perspective of the young person's 
rights. This concluding chapter will draw together the recommendations that have been made 
throughout this research. 
There is a strong argument that the youth justice FGC has the potential to hold young people 
accountable in a culturally flexible process that can also help to address the needs of such 
young people. The informality of the FGC process may also be conducive to increased 
participation by young people. However, the principal message of this research is that 
increased informality and flexibility should not be to the detriment of human rights and basic 
criminal procedure. The FGC process may have benevolent intentions, but like any criminal 
justice process, it also has the potential for coerciveness and unfairness. The challenge is to 
ensure that the young person has basic protections like the right to a lawyer and an 
expectation of fair and reasonable outcomes. 
This thesis has made some significant criticisms of the theory and practice of the FGC. 
However, it is apparent that the FGC will remain an integral part of the New Zealand youth 
justice system for the foreseeable future. 1533 Thus, this chapter takes a pragmatic approach to 
recommending legislative and policy changes to better safeguard the rights of the young 
person in the youth justice FGC. Further, as this thesis commenced with a review of the 
problems relating to previous incarnations of youth justice in New Zealand, it is appropriate 
to question the objectives which now appear to underlie FGC practice, that is restorative 
practice and welfare objectives. Specific legislative and/or policy changes are then advocated. 
Overall, the principal recommendation is that young people receive a statement of their rights 
when agreeing to participate in the FGC process. An analogy will be drawn here with the 
scheme for ensuring that young people are aware of, and understand their rights, when being 
1533 A call for submissions on an update of the CYPF Act has revealed strong support for the FGC model: 
Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families Act 1989: Overall Summary of Submissions (Wellington: Allen and Clarke Policy and Regulatory 
Specialists, 2007). 
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questioned by the police. Finally, as review and reform of the CYPF legislation (and a change 
of government) is ongoing at the time of writing, it is appropriate to conclude with a brief 
consideration of the broader legislative context, and the place of the rights of the young 
person in this future. 
II. LEGAL ASSISTANCE AT THE FGC 
A. Access to Legal Assistance 
Chapter 8 of this thesis argued for the right to legal assistance in the youth justice FGC. As 
discussed, the right to legal assistance is a cornerstone of the protections for the accused in the 
adversarial system. Although the FGC takes place outside the formal court-based system, it 
was emphasised that legal assistance is important for young people in these situations as the 
FGC involves admitting liability for, and receiving a sanction in respect of, a criminal 
offence. 
Although both types of FGC under discussion (the ITC FGC and the court referred FGC) 
involve the admission of liability and the possibility of sanctions, essentially only those young 
people referred to a FGC by the Youth Court can benefit from state funded legal assistance 
under the Youth Advocate scheme. This is despite the fact that the ITC FGC lacks any 
judicial or independent oversight, thus making the case for legal assistance even stronger. 
This thesis recommends that all young people participating in a youth justice FGC should 
have access to legal assistance, by extending the current Youth Advocate scheme (which 
provides for attendance by the Youth Advocate at the court-referred FGC), to the ITC FGC, 
especially in cases where large amounts of reparation are being sought, or it is very likely that 
the case will eventually end up in court. 
The discussion in Chapter 8 demonstrated that section 323 of the CYPF Act already envisages 
Youth Advocates attending youth justice FGCs. The current section 323 reads: 
a Youth Advocate appointed to represent a child or young person in any proceedings, may, if requested 
to do so by the child or young person ... attend any family group conference held under Part 4 in respect 
of the child or young person, and may make representations on behalf of the child or young person at 
any such conference. 
Under the current statutory provision, the Youth Advocate's attendance at the FGC has two 
legislative hurdles to overcome. First, the Youth Advocate must be 'appointed to represent a 
child or young person in any proceedings'. In the case of the court-referred FGC, the situation 
is straightforward: all young people appearing in the Youth Court are automatically appointed 
a Youth Advocate to represent them. However, in the case of a young person referred to an 
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ITC FGC, the case will not have been before the Youth Court and consequently a Youth 
Advocate will not be appointed. There does not appear to be any formal mechanism by which 
a Youth Advocate can be appointed for an ITC FGC, 1534 although the legislation does not 
preclµde their attendance. Possible solutions to this problem are canvassed later in this 
"-
section. 
Even when a Youth Advocate has been appointed in the Youth Court, that person does not 
always attend the FGC. This leads into the second 'legislative hurdle' which section 323 
imposes: the Youth Advocate must be 'requested to do so [attend the FGC] by the child or 
young person'. Of course, in order for a young person to request the Youth Advocate' s 
attendance, he or she must appreciate that such a request can be made, and appreciate how the 
Youth Advocate can assist in these matters. At the least, the young person referred by the 
Youth Court will have met his or her Youth Advocate in court. However, the young person 
referred to an ITC FGC needs information about where he or she can access legal advice. At 
present, there is no formal mechanism by which a young person can receive advice about 
where to access legal assistance. Child, Youth and Family have a number of pamphlets which 
are distributed to young people and their families in advance of the FGC, but there is no 
mention of how to access legal assistance. This research recommends that it should be made 
an explicit requirement that the youth justice co-ordinator must explain to the young person 
and their family that legal advice is available. Suggested wording is discussed at the end of 
this section. 
An interesting comparison may be drawn with the statutory requirements relating to the right 
to legal advice and assistance when the young person is questioned by the police. In a recent 
(August 2008) pre-trial ruling given by the Court of Appeal, the Court was required to 
consider, inter alia, the extent and quality of the young person's right to legal assistance 
during police questioning. 1535 
R v Z concerned a young person jointly accused in connection with a homicide. Z made 
admissions in the course of a police interview and reconstruction, after waiving his right to a 
lawyer, although he had been repeatedly informed of his right. Section 215 of the CYPF Act 
1534 There is no legislative provision, and the youth justice co-ordinators involved in this research were not aware 
of any protocol, though they were aware of some anecdotal evidence that Registrars had appointed Youth 
Advocates for ITC FGCs. 
1535 R v Z [2008] NZCA 246. See also Nessa Lynch, 'Young Suspects' (2008) New Zealand Law Journal 357 
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prescribes a comprehensive scheme of rights when the young person is being questioned by 
the police, e.g. the right to have a lawyer present and the right to the presence of a nominated 
adult. 1536 Glazebrook J (for the Court) interpreted section 215 with regards to section 208(h) of 
the CYPF Act.1537 The police officer must ensure that the young person understands the right 
to legal advice. Her Honour differentiated the scheme of the CYPF Act from section 23(a) of 
the NZBOR Act, stating that while the NZBOR Act assumes that adult suspects will have 
some knowledge of what a lawyer is and what lawyers do, the CYPF Act proceeds on the 
assumption that young people will have limited experience and understanding of the role and 
functions of a lawyer and how to access legal advice. 1538 Thus, the mere provision of 
additional information is not sufficient, there must be an explanation of the right. The police 
officer must explain in a manner appropriate to the age and understanding of the particular 
young person, that he or she has the right to instruct a lawyer, the type of assistance the 
lawyer could provide and the mechanics of instructing a lawyer. The young person must 
understand the right, thus being in a position to decide whether to exercise that right. 
Further, while giving Z his rights, the police officer had attempted to explain the role of the 
lawyer using phrases like they 'help you in court', and 'a lawyer is someone you speak with 
in court and they help you'. Woodhouse J in the High Court was not satisfied that Z 
understood that he had a right to have a lawyer present during the questioning and 
reconstruction, and how a lawyer could assist at this stage. Again, Glazebrook J emphasised 
the importance of section 208(h), CYPF Act, and the requirement that the young person's 
rights be explained to him or her. Glazebrook J stressed that there is an obligation on the 
police to explain how a lawyer could help in the interview process. From the words which the 
police officer used, Z may have got the impression that lawyers could only help out in court 
and not that a lawyer could also advise during the questioning process. Glazebrook J 
considered that it was ' ... obvious that [Z] was labouring under the misapprehension that 
lawyers helped and advised only in court' .1539 As Ellen France J (writing separately) stated 
' ... Z should have been told that a lawyer could talk to him about matters such as whether or 
not he should speak to the police, how he answered questions, and generally that the lawyer 
1536 See Chapter 3(VII). 
1537 This section states that the vulnerability of young people during the investigation of offences requires special 
protection. 
1538 NZCA 246, para 37. 
1539 NZCA 246, para 77. 
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could tell him about his options' .1540 This judgment illustrates on a practical level what type of 
language the police should employ when explaining the right to the young person, in order to 
comply with the requirements of the CYPF Act. Both Glazebrook J and Ellen France J were 
approving of the Canadian scheme, whereby the police are required to explain in plain 
language how lawyers can assist during police questioning. 1541 
This approach by the Court of Appeal is based on the young person having a dual status as 
offender (i.e. having the same minimum rights as an adult in the same situation, but also 
having certain extra rights /protections based on his/her status as young person). 1542 Not only 
were the police obliged to inform the young person of their right to a lawyer as the police 
would be required to when questioning an adult, the police were also required to take extra 
steps to ensure understanding.It is clear that this approach (requiring that the young person 
receives information about his or her rights in clear language, and taking reasonable steps to 
ensure that the young person understands the rights) is equally applicable to the youth justice 
FGC. As noted, the FGC is a process which involves admitting liability for, and receiving a 
sanction in respect of, a criminal offence. Like the young person being questioned by the 
police, the young person at the FGC is also vulnerable to implicit pressure to admit the 
offence. This is especially relevant for the ITC FGC, given that this process is tightly 
controlled by the police - the police apprehend the young person, decide to take action against 
the young person, refer them for an ITC FGC, and the final decision must be acceptable to the 
police before it becomes binding. Legal assistance is a safeguard against uninformed 
admissions and decisions by the young person. Furthermore, the judgment in R v Z placed 
considerable emphasis on the fact that young people are not generally familiar with the 
functions of lawyers, especially how lawyers can be of use outside the courtroom. This is 
equally applicable to the youth justice FGC. As the FGC differs in format from the criminal 
trial, it is unlikely that the young person will be aware of the fact that he or she can have a 
lawyer present at the FGC and how a lawyer could help at this time, unless the young person 
receives information about this. Overall, it is recommended that the young person receives 
plain language information about the availability and benefits of having a lawyer present. A 
draft statement of rights is provided later in this chapter. 
1540 NZCA 246, para 148. 
1541 [2008] NZCA 246, para 78. 
1542 See discussion of the theoretical frame of reference for this thesis: Chapter 3 (III). 
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It is relatively simple to propose that each young person referred to a FGC should have the 
benefit of specialised legal assistance in the form of the Youth Advocate. Moving to the 
practicalities, it should not be necessary in all cases for the Youth Advocate to actually attend 
the FGC in every case. In some cases, matters may be simple, for example when the young 
person decides in advance to deny the matter at the FGC, and therefore the FGC will not be 
able to proceed. In some cases, the young person may decide that he or she is clear on the 
issues and has enough family support to go to the FGC without the Youth Advocate present. 
A corollary of the right to legal assistance must always be the ability to waive that right 
(providing of course, clear information has been provided about this right). In other instances, 
it may be sufficient for the young person and their family to receive some advice in advance 
of the FGC. Consideration should be given to providing a telephone advice service for young 
people about their rights and obligations at the FGC. This is provided to a limited extent by 
the Youth Law Service in Auckland, but this is a small resource. The latest available statistics 
from the Ministry of Justice indicate that in 2006, out of the 30,451 police apprehensions of 
young people, 6% were referred for an ITC FGC. This indicates that there were about 1,800 
ITC FGCs held that year. 
In the case of the court-referred FGC, the solution is relatively straightforward. The young 
person has already been appointed a Youth Advocate. The issue lies with improving practice 
so that young people understand their right to have a lawyer present, and the benefits of 
having a lawyer present at the FGC. The situation of the ITC FGC is more complicated, as 
there is presently no formal process by which a lawyer may be appointed for the young 
person, although the legislation does not preclude this. There is anecdotal evidence that the 
Youth Court Registrar may be asked by the youth justice co-ordinator to appoint a Youth 
Advocate in ITC FGC cases where the matter is serious or where large amounts of reparation 
are being sought. 1543 This is not a formal scheme and is not an adequate best practice model. 
This research recommends that the Youth Advocate Scheme should be extended to the ITC 
FGC. Like the Police Detention Legal Assistance scheme model, young people should be 
given a list of Youth Advocates and facilitated to contact a lawyer on the list. The referring 
agency or the youth justice co-ordinator should be given the legal duty to ensure that this 
requirement is adhered to. This is the model that is used in other jurisdictions.1544 
1543 p I . . f h . . d. b ersona commumcat10n rom yout 1ust1ce co-or mator, Septem er 2008. 
1544 See e.g. s 7(2), Young Offenders Act 1993 ands 45(g), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
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B. Quality of Legal Assistance 
The second major issue relating to the right to legal assistance is the quality of the legal 
assistance. The CYPF Act clearly states that when representing and advising the young 
person, the Youth Advocate has the same duties, powers and responsibilities as if he or she 
was engaged privately to represent or advise the young person. 1545 However, during this 
research, some of the Youth Advocates were seen to take a best interests approach to 
representing the young person. Examples of this approach included advocating that the young 
person would benefit from community service, and not arguing available defences to the 
charge. In two cases, the Youth Advocate actively disadvantaged the young person by 
pointing out the effect the offending had on the victim, or 'picking holes' in the young 
person's story about the circumstances of the offence. The recommendation in response to the 
best interests approach is that Youth Advocates should adhere to the statutory requirements, 
and the standards for the profession set out in the Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care Rules 
2008. 1546 If a practitioner is engaged to represent a young person, that young person should be 
represented to the same standard as an adult client. The legislation clearly envisages the 
young person as being capable of exercising the right to a lawyer. 1547 The main duty of the 
Youth Advocate should be the protection of rights and the provision of information about 
legal issues that might arise in relation to the FGC. In particular, the Youth Advocate should 
intervene if the offence is not made out, or if there is not enough evidence to support the 
admission which the young person proposes to make. Granted, the format and circumstances 
of the FGC require a more informal and less adversarial approach than a District Court jury 
trial, but the young person should not be any worse off than an adult client. Determining the 
best interests of the young person are is not the function of the Youth Advocate. This is the 
province of social and youth workers and the family of the young person. 
1545 s 324(1), CYPF Act. 
1546 See Preface to the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers ' Whatever legal services your lawyer is 
providing, he or she must ... protect and promote your interests and act for you free from compromising 
influences or loyalties', also Rule 5 ' a lawyer must be independent and free from compromising influences or 
loyalties when providing services to his or her client', Rule 5 .2 'The professional judgment of a lawyer must at 
all times be exercised within the bounds of the law and the professional obligations of the lawyer solely for the 
benefit of the client', Rule 5 .3 ' A lawyer must at all times exercise independent professional judgment on a 
client's behalf. A lawyer must give objective advice to the client based on the lawyer's understanding of the 
law'. 
1547 See Chapter 3 (III). 
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C. Recommendations: The Right to Legal Assistance 
1. That there be a legislative requirement that the young person is informed of, and 
reasonable steps taken to ensure that the young person understands, the right to legal 
assistance in the FGC process, 
Suggested change to the legislation: 1548 
'(i) the youth justice co-ordinator must inform the young person that he or she is 
entitled to have a Youth Advocate or other barrister or solicitor present at the family 
group conference 
(ii) The youth justice co-ordinator must take reasonable steps to ensure that the young 
person understands this entitlement. ' 
2. That the state-funded Youth Advocate scheme is extended to cover the ITC FGC. This 
would be a policy decision, and would probably require that the youth justice co-
ordinator applies to the Registrar to appoint a Youth Advocate in the ITC FGC, 
3. That a statement is included in the advice letter relating to the youth justice FGC e.g. 
'The FGC is a process that involves admitting and receiving a sanction for a criminal 
offence. Therefore it is important that you understand your rights and responsibilities. 
If you have attended Court a Youth Advocate will have been appointed for you. You 
can have this Youth Advocate attend the FGC if you wish. This is free of charge. 
Please contact the youth justice co-ordinator if you wish the Youth Advocate to 
attend', 1549 
4. Youth Advocates should give the same standard of legal advice and representation as 
they would to an adult client. This is a matter of adhering to the professional standards 
and should be part of the training for Youth Advocates. 
III. ESTABLISHING THE OFFENCE 
Chapters 10 and 11 of this thesis critiqued how the offence is established in the FGC process. 
As the process is different in the two types of FGC under discussion, these will be considered 
separately. 
1548 The most appropriation section for the insertion of this new provision would probably be s 250 -
Consultation on convening of family group conference. 




A. The Court-Referred FGC 
As discussed, an unusual and unique means of establishing the offence arises under the CYPF 
Act. Instead of the conventional plea of guilty or not guilty, the terms 'denied' or 'not denied' 
are used. Chapter 10 linked the origin of these concepts to the criminological theory of 
labelling; a desire to avoid stigmatising terms.1550 
Unfortunately, specific figures on the rate of 'not denied' in the Youth Court are not 
collected,1551 but it is possible to extrapolate from the existing figures, that almost all young 
people do not deny offences. In these cases, the offence is then established by the young 
person admitting the offence at the FGC. This thesis has criticised the concepts of 'not 
denied' and 'admitted' as being vague and imprecise. Even at judicial level, there is confusion 
as to whether these concepts equate to an acknowledgment of legal and factual guilt. 1552 While 
it is important that the young person is legally guilty when the matter is disposed of through 
an FGC plan, it is even more important when the admission is used to support conviction and 
transfer to the adult criminal justice system or the taking of a blood sample. At present, the 
process is convoluted: the young person answers 'not denied', then referred to the FGC, 
where he or she must 'admit' the offence. Two options to address the problems of the present 
system will be canvassed here. One would involve abolishing the 'not denied' concept 
altogether, the other involves clarifying the present scheme. No objections are raised to the 
converse situation, that is when the young person indicates that the charge is denied, and the 
matter is put down for a defended hearing. 
Firstly, at present, to equate to an acknowledgment of legal guilt, the young person answers 
'not denied' at the initial Youth Court hearing (apparently regarded as an acknowledgment of 
being responsible or factual guilt), must 'admit' the offence at the FGC (apparently analogous 
with acknowledgement of legal guilt including the necessary mental state) and then the 
admission made at the FGC is nominally approved by the Youth Court Judge at the reporting 
back stage, by means of the notation 'Proved by Admission at the Family Group Conference' 
on the information. It seems under the current system that the Youth Court Judge must accept 
the admission made at the FGC before accepting the plan. This seems unnecessarily 
complicated, and has caused judicial confusion. 
1550 See also Chapter 2(III)(B) on the previous statutory regime. 
1551 Personal communication from the Ministry of Justice, October 2008. 
1552 See Chapter 10. 
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The present system, with its language of 'admit the offence' rather than 'guilty' would seem 
to be influenced by the criminological theory of labelling. This theory was in vogue during 
the time the CYPF legislation was being developed. At that time, young people were being 
dealt with through slightly modified versions of the District Court. There were valid concerns 
that young people would be tainted by association with the terms and format of the adult 
criminal justice system. However, the Youth Court has carved out a distinct path separate 
from the adult criminal justice system, staffed by specially selected and trained judges, aided 
by specially selected and trained lawyers, and generally considered to be a model of best 
practice for youth courts. It is submitted that the practice of the Youth Court is not 
stigmatising in nature, and if the sum total of 'not denied' plus 'admit the offence' plus 
'proved by admission at family group conference' equals a plea of 'guilty', then it is 'six of 
one, and half dozen of the other'. Further, at the time the CYPF Act was drafted, practice 
under the welfare based Children and Young Person's Act was categorised by high rates of 
guilty pleas in the Children and Young Persons Court. It is arguable that the framers of the 
CYPF Act wished to remedy this high guilty plea rate by moving the acceptance of 
responsibility to a different and more supportive forum - the FGC, where discussion of the 
circumstances of the offence could take place before the young person committed to accepting 
responsibility for the offence. However, in the FGCs observed during this research, the 'admit 
the offence' phase was always carried out first (indeed the legislation seems to require this), 
and thus became a formality, like the much maligned court based guilty plea of former times. 
It would be considerably simpler if the 'not denied' plus 'admit at FGC' could be combined 
into a normal guilty plea at this first Youth Court hearing, thus avoiding the convoluted 
process of 'not denied' and 'admit the offence'. There is a strong argument that a formal 
guilty plea should be taken when there is the possibility of a court ordered sentence such as a 
supervision with residence order. It is arguable that all court referred FGCs result in a court 
order, especially in relation to the risk of conviction and transfer to the District Court. It 
seems that under the present system, this is possible without a proper acknowledgement of 
legal and factual guilt. It would be better to have a clear understanding of a guilty plea rather 
than this undefined admitted/not denied concept. There are some considerable advantages to 
this approach. If the young person pleads guilty before the FGC, the Youth Court Judge then 
has the responsibility of ensuring that there is sufficient evidence to support the plea. It is 
unclear under the present scheme whether the Youth Court Judge has responsibility for 
ensuring that the evidence supports the admission - although this would be the orthodox view 
of the judge's responsibility in the criminal trial process. It was noted earlier that the framers 
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of the CYPF Act probably intended that the FGC process would provide a more supportive 
environment for the young person to raise objections to the charge rather than the Youth 
Court. If the legislation was changed to require a guilty plea before the FGC is convened, 
there could still be a 'safety valve' of allowing the young person to change their plea if further 
information emerged at the FGC. Discussion about the circumstances of the offending would 
still be best practice at the FGC. The model of entering a formal plea of guilty before referral 
to a FGC is that which is used in other jurisdictions which utilise conferencing. 1553 
Secondly, if the 'not denied' model is retained, clearer information should be given to young 
people and their families about the process, especially that admitting the offence is taking 
legal responsibility for the offence. As discussed in Chapter 9, observation of the FGC 
process indicates that practice is to seek the young person's agreement with the summary of 
facts, rather than an admission of the offence in the legal sense of the word (i.e. accepting 
responsibility for the actus reus with the necessary mens rea). At the present time, as set out 
above, the system is overly complicated even for lawyers and judges, not to mind young 
people and their families. Again, legal assistance is important at this stage. The Youth 
Advocate should ensure that the elements of the offence are made out, no defences arise from 
the facts, and assist the young person in understanding that accepting both legal and factual 
guilt is involved. Further, when the FGC record is returned to the Youth Court, the Judge 
should ensure that there is sufficient evidence to support the admission. 
B. The ITC FGC 
The ITC FGC raises further questions. In the court-referred FGC, the admission is at least 
nominally subject to scrutiny by the Youth Court Judge when the FGC plan is referred back to 
the Youth Court. However, the ITC FGC takes place completely outside the court system. 
There is thus no independent oversight of the admission made by the young person. As the 
ITC FGC involves a police referral, the police are essentially in control at all stages of the 
process. The police apprehend and question the young person, refer the young person to the 
FGC, are present at the FGC when the young person is required to decide whether to admit 
the offence, and then are required to agree to the FGC plan or decision before it becomes 
binding. The young person is thus subject to implicit pressure by the police to admit the 
offence, as in the case of police questioning in custody. However, there is a marked contrast 
between the regime of protection for the rights of young people in police custody versus the 
ITC FGC. While being questioned in police custody, the young person has a right to legal 
1553 E.g. under the Young Offenders Act 1993 (South Australia). 
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assistance, the right to a presence of a nominated adult, and these rights must be explained to 
the young person and his or her nominated adult. 1554 In the ITC FGC, there are no such 
requirements or rights, despite the fact that in the ITC FGC, not only are admissions involved, 
but also the possibility of a sanction. 
Granted, such concerns are always present in diversion schemes, where there will be implicit 
pressure on the young person to admit the offence and receive a diversion rather than have the 
matter proceed to court. Some of the arguments for diversion were set out in Chapter 2 
including that diversion avoids delay, avoids the formal criminal justice system and promotes 
positive outcomes for young people. Unfortunately, favouring diversion appears to have 
polarised practice and policy in New Zealand to the point that it is 'diversion good - court 
bad', and it is considered in the interest of the young person to admit the offence. While well 
operated diversion schemes undoubtedly have benefits for young people, it is not in the 
interests of young people, or victims or society at large, for the young person to admit to 
something for which he or she is not responsible. Further, although the Youth Aid section of 
the New Zealand Police is rightly recognised as progressive, well trained and responsive to 
young people, in schemes like the ITC FGC, there are always dangers in having police control 
of the process without proper safeguards to ensure that admissions are reliable. Deficiencies 
in investigatory practice, and supporting evidence may go unchecked. 
What safeguards, then, could be introduced to ensure reliable admissions? Again, as discussed 
above, the provision of legal assistance in the ITC FGC would be a valuable safeguard to 
ensure reliable admissions. The presence of a lawyer at the FGC could be a check on ensuring 
that the proposed admission is supported by sufficient evidence. Further, it should be made 
clear to the young person that he or she is accepting liability for a criminal offence, and that 
there will not be any detriment if the young person chooses to deny the offence and proceed to 
the court system.1555 Consideration could also be given to having an independent review 
mechanism for the evidence supporting admissions made during the ITC FGC. 
1554 See the discussion at Part (II) above in relation to the right to legal assistance 
1555 Cf the duty on the conference convenor under the New South Wales legislation to explain the young person's 
right to elect to have the matter dealt with by a court if the young person does not wish to proceed: s 45(3)(g), 
Young Offenders Act 1997. 
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C. Recommendations: 
1. That there be a change in legislation requiring a guilty plea in the Youth Court 
before the matter is referred to the FGC. The present section 246 reads: 
(a) If, after consulting with the barrister or solicitor representing the young 
person or with a Youth Advocate, the young person denies the charge, then the 
charge shall be dealt with in accordance with sections 273 to 276 of this Act: 
(b) In any other case the Court shall not enter a plea to the charge but shall-
(i) Direct a Youth Justice Co-ordinator to convene a family group conference 
in relation to the matter; and 
(ii) Adjourn the proceedings until that family group conference had been held. 
The terminology could be changed from 'denies' to 'not guilty' in (a), and (b) 
could be changed to read 'if the young person pleads guilty to the charge', 1556 
2. Whether or not the legislation is revised to abolish the 'not denied' concept, the 
exact meaning of 'not denied' and 'admit the offence' should be clarified, perhaps 
through a Youth Court Practice Note, 
3. The safeguards for the young person in the ITC FGC should be reviewed, with 
reference to the section 215 safeguards for young people being questioned in 
police custody. 
IV. OUTCOMES OF THE FGC 
This thesis considered three major issues in relation to the outcomes of the youth justice FGC, 
including the nature of FGC outcomes, the limits on sanctions, and the underlying objectives 
ofFGC outcomes. Recommendations on these three issues will be considered in tum. 
A. The Nature of the FGC Process 
Chapter 7 of the thesis examined the theoretical foundations of the FGC model. On a 
theoretical level, contentions of coerciveness or unfairness are often countered with the 
assertion that the FGC process is voluntary or a private family matter. It is important to note 
that the FGC is a process which is involved in deciding on sanctions in respect of a criminal 
1556 If this was done it would vitiate the need for s 259 which requires the FGC to ascertain whether the young 
person admits the offence, although it would still apply to the ITC FGC. 
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offence. Although the participation of the young person and their family is seen as necessary 
and desirable, entry to and exit from the process is tightly controlled by the State. Importantly, 
non-adherence to the decisions made by the FGC may have serious consequences for the 
young person, including the imposition of s 283 orders. 
However, the informal nature of the FGC process means that young people and their families 
can misunderstand the nature of the process. This is a side-effect of the fact that the FGC 
process is operated by Child, Youth and Family rather than through the courts system. Young 
people and their families are likely to know Child, Youth and Family as a social agency 
concerned with care and protection rather than criminal proceedings. In a wider context, there 
is a strong argument for the separation of offending from care and protection proceedings, 
through separate legislation, though this would necessitate the establishment of a new agency 
to facilitate youth justice FGCs. A full consideration of this topic would be outside the scope 
of this research. For the purposes of this research, it is recommended that it is made clear to 
young people and their families that the result of a youth justice FGC, although designed to 
promote re-integration, is a criminal sanction, designed to resolve a breach of the criminal 
law, breach of which can result in more serious action including court orders or in some cases 
conviction and transfer to the District Court. A draft information statement is included later in 
this chapter. 
B. Limits on Sanctions 
Chapter 12 of this thesis considered the issue of limits on the sanctions resulting from the 
youth justice FGC. In essence, it is apparent that the FGC has significant powers but few 
limits. Court-referred FGC plans are nominally approved by the Youth Court Judge, but there 
is no independent oversight of the ITC FGC. 
The first criticism that was made was the lack of an upper limit for FGC sanctions. 
Consideration be given to making an explicit upper limit on FGC sanctions in the CYPF Act. 
This should at least be the limit on sanctions the Youth Court is permitted to order. The FGC 
should not be permitted to recommend or decide on amounts of community hours or fines 
which are in excess of those which can be ordered by the Youth Court.1557 For instance, in the 
South Australian legislation, there is a limit ( albeit a significant amount of hours - 300) on the 
amount of community service hours the family conference can require the young person to 
1557 s 298(1), CYPF Act. 
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complete. 1558 The family conference 'must have regard to' sentences imposed by the Court in 
comparable cases. 1559 Similarly, the New South Wales legislation requires that sanctions 
contained in conference plans are 'not more severe than those that might have been imposed 
in court proceedings for the offence concerned' .1560 A change to the legislation could be 
simply done. The most relevant statutory provision is section 260(3)(d), which currently 
states that the FGC can 'recommend appropriate penalties that might be imposed on the 
young person'. The phrase 'penalties may not exceed those that can be imposed by the Youth 
Court' could easily be added here. At the least, the FGC should not be able to decide on a 
sanction in excess of that which could be imposed by the Youth Court ( currently 20-200 
hours community work),1561 although the Youth Court can impose the same level of fines as 
the District Court.1562 Consideration should be given to imposing a definite limit on the 
sanctions which an ITC FGC can decide on, as there is no judicial or independent oversight of 
this type of FGC. 
The second issue is the potential for disparity between similarly situated offenders. At present, 
there are no formal mechanisms for ensuring a basic level of equality and consistency 
between similarly situated offenders. This research recommends that consideration be given 
to the introduction of broad guidelines as to range of sanctions, to encourage a basic level of 
consistency and equality. When sanctions are decided upon by individual groupings of 
people, subject only to the (fairly vague) principles of the CYPF Act, there are bound to be 
differences between similar offences and offenders. 
Further, the current practice is that the police officer is the person who ensures the 'public 
interest' is taken into account at the FGC, especially when the victim is not present. In 
practice, this means this depends heavily on what the particular police officer believes the 
public interest is in the particular circumstance. Police officers will obviously vary in 
personality and outlook. Criticisms were also made in this research about the role of the 
police officer in the process.1563 It was recommended that consideration should be given as to 
1558 s 12(1)(c), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
1559 s 12(2), Young Offenders Act 1993. 
1560 s 52(6)(a), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1561 s 298, CYPF Act. 
1562 s 283(d), CYPF Act. 
1563 See Chapter 12. 
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whether it is appropriate for a police officer to be involved in deciding what sanction the 
young person should receive. On principle, the police officer's role should be limited to 
informative only. The idea of a set of guidelines as to what level of sanction is appropriate for 
the particular type of offence would minimise the potential for large discrepancies based on 
the make up of the particular FGC or views of the particular victim or police officer. 
How would such guidelines work? A possible model would be minimum and maximum 
amounts for typologies of offences. Offences committed by young people are generally quite 
predictable: assaults, burglaries, shoplifting and vandalism feature heavily. These minimum 
and maximum amounts could be based on 'punishment units' 1564 rather than number of 
community work hours or monetary figures. The FGC could then decide what type of 
outcome ( e.g. where or what form the community service could take, or to what charity a 
donation could be made). There would still be room within this maximum/minimum for 
variation based on the circumstances, but at least a basic level of equality and consistency 
could be introduced so as to avoid 'justice by geography'. These guidelines should apply only 
to sanctions such as community work, reparation or payment to/work for the victim. It is 
difficult, if not impossible to quantify outcomes such as personal apologies and letters of 
apology. Introduction of these guidelines would probably be better served by a Practice Note 
from the courts or a policy decision rather than legislative change. 
C. The Policy Imperatives Underlying the FGC 
The objectives underlying FGC outcomes were also considered. From an examination of the 
context of the legislation, it is apparent that the principles underlying sanctions under the 
CYPF Act have evolved since the enactment of the legislation. It is arguable that the framers 
of the CYPF Act were concerned with the excesses of the welfarist approach to youth justice, 
and intended to ensure that young people's due process rights were protected, and that the 
criminal justice system was not permitted to intervene on welfare grounds. Since the inception 
of the CYPF Act, there has been a 'discovery' that the legislation is based on restorative 
justice principles, to the point that the FGC is almost synonymous with restorative justice. 
While it is arguable that the restorative justice model has some advantages for the rights of the 
young person, for example, an emphasis on community based sanctions and the opportunity 
for meaningful participation, it is doubtful that the victim-centred nature of the full restorative 
model is appropriate for the youth justice system, which should be centred on the young 
1564 Paul H Robinson, 'The Virtues of Restorative Justice. The Vices of "Restorative Justice"' (2003) Utah Law 
Review 375. 
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person. Further, it is also debatable whether the full restorative model, with its emphasis on 
remorse is appropriate for young people who often lack emotional maturity. More generally, 
there are considerable doubts about the value of the FGC process if the victim of the offence 
is not present (as is the case in about half ofFGCs). What is the value of the FGC if the victim 
is not present? Is it worth putting resources into such a process to have what essentially 
becomes a private decision making process between the young person, their family and the 
police or Youth Court? Family empowerment is a valid aim, but consideration should be 
given to whether this could be achieved in other ways ( e.g. through encouraging greater 
family participation in the Youth Court), if the victim does not wish to participate. 1565 This is 
certainly a subject worthy of further investigation. 
Finally, there should be caution in relation to the practice of the FGC containing measures to 
address the welfare needs of the young person. While it is arguable that the FGC plan could 
contain measures which would address the cause of the offending (like an alcohol education 
programme, for instance) FGC plans should not address purely welfare issues like place of 
residence and educational issues. If the young person's situation is serious enough to warrant 
a care and protection intervention, there is a clear process in the CYPF Act to facilitate this. 
No change to legislative provisions are needed as the CYPF Act already states that criminal 
proceedings should not be used to intervene for care and protection reasons. 
D. Outcomes of the FGC: Recommendations 
1. That there be more information given to young people and their families about the 
nature of the FGC process and outcomes, 
2. That there be an upper limit on the sanctions which result from the FGC i.e. that 
no more than the Youth Court can impose in the case of community work, and a 
definite figure in the case of the ITC FGC, 
Suggested wording: 
s 260 Family group conference may make decisions and recommendations and 
formulate plans 
(1) Subject to section 259(2) of this Act, a family group conference convened 
under this Part of this Act may make such decisions and recommendations and 
1565 See Chapter 13(IV). 
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formulate such plans as it considers necessary or desirable in relation to the child 
or young person in respect of whom the conference was convened. 
(2) Except as provided in section 258(a)(ii) of this Act, in making such decisions 
and recommendations and formulating such plans, the conference shall have 
regard to the principles set out in section 208 of this Act. 
(3) Delete: [ Without limiting the generality of subsection (1) of this section, a 
family group conference may-] 
(a) Recommend that any proceedings commenced against the child or young 
person for any offence should proceed or be discontinued: 
(b) Recommend that a formal Police caution should be given to the child or young 
person: 
( c) Recommend that an application for a declaration under section 67 of this Act 
should be made in respect of the child: 
( d) Recommend appropriate penalties that might be imposed on the young person, 
subject to ( 4) 
(e) Recommend that the child or young person make reparation to any victim of 
the offence, subject to ( 4) 
(4) A family group conference held under s 258(b) cannot recommend penalties 
in excess of 20 hours community work or $500 reparation 
3. That guidelines be developed for FGC outcomes to promote consistency and 
equality, 
4. That consideration be given to the role of the police officer in the FGC process, 
5. A review of the value of 'victimless' FGCs. 
V. THE FGC CHECKLIST 
In summary, it would be a good idea if each young person referred for a youth justice FGC 
received a clear written statement about their rights. Best practice is for youth justice co-
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ordinators to spend considerable time prepanng participants in advance of the FGC. 1566 
Considerable time and resources are expended encouraging family members to attend and 
participate at the FGC (and rightly so). At least some of this effort should go into ensuring 
that young people understand their rights in the process. 
Again, parallels may be drawn with the scheme for ensuring that young people are aware of, 
and understand, their rights during police questioning and investigation. There is a strong 
argument that similar principles should apply to the young person in the FGC. The young 
person is in a situation where he or she is on the 'back foot', in a room with powerful adults 
(such as the police, social workers etc). Yes, the family of the young person is present, but the 
machinations of the CYPF Act are complicated, the family is not in a position of power, and 
many families will have had negative experiences with Child, Youth and Family in the past. 
The principal issue is that the family of the young person cannot choose to have nothing 
happen to the young person and so is automatically in a position to be reluctant to stand up to 
authority figures. Young people are in a similar state of vulnerability as in police questioning, 
being asked to admit liability for a criminal offence and being censured for this offence; 
should not the same arguments for a clear statement of rights, and ensuring explanations 
apply? 
The Child, Youth and Family brochure entitled Youth Justice: Family Group Conferences, 1567 
contains valuable information about the FGC process, including typical FGC procedure and 
outcomes. However, the brochure does not give any advice about legal rights. 
The FGC Checklist- Essential Points 
1. The FGC is a process which involves admitting liability for a criminal offence, and 
receiving a sanction in respect of a criminal offence. It is important that you 
understand your rights and responsibilities, 
2. The FGC is not compulsory, 
3. You must admit the offence before the FGC proceeds. This means that you accept that 
you committed the physical act ( e.g. taking goods from a shop) and the legal 
responsibility (that you meant to take them permanently), 
1566 Marlene Levine, Aaron Eagle, Simi Tuiavi'i and Christine Roseveare, Creative Youth Justice Practice 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency/ Children, Young Persons and Their Families Service, 1998). 
1567 Child, Youth and Family, Youth Justice: Family Group Conferences (CYF 33). Information leaflet dated 
June 2001, available online at http://www.cyf.govt.nz/Brochures.htm (last viewed 3 August 2008) 
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4. At this stage, if you do not want to admit the offence, the matter will go back to the 
Youth Court. There will not be any adverse consequences if you don't want to admit 
the offence, 
5. Legal advice: You are allowed to have a Youth Advocate to advise you during the 
FGC. A Youth Advocate is a special lawyer for young people. If you have already 
been to Court you will have been allocated a Youth Advocate. If you want, you can 
have your Youth Advocate present at the FGC. This is free of charge, 
6. Outcomes of the FGC: A plan will be drawn up which is presented to the Youth Court 
( or the police). If you don't agree with the plan, you can opt out and the case will go 
back to the Youth Court or to the police. Nothing worse will happen if you don't want 
to agree. However, the plan is legally binding and if you don't complete what you 
agreed to, you could end up going back to the Youth Court, and the Youth Court 
might impose a formal order on you. 
The above proposal would be in the form of information explaining legal rights which would 
be provided to the young person. In the alternative, consideration could be given to conferring 
a legal duty on the referring agency (i.e. the police or the Youth Court Judge), or indeed the 
youth justice co-ordinator, to explain the relevant rights. For example, under the New South 
Wales youth justice legislation, the referring entity (in this case a specialist youth justice 
police officer) has a statutory duty to explain matters to the young person such as 'that the 
child is entitled to obtain legal advice and where that advice may be obtained' 1568 and 'what a 
conference is and the effect of the conference' .1569 These explanations must take place, if 
practicable, in the presence of a nominated adult or legal advisor. 1570 Again, comparison can be 
made with sections 10 and 11 of the CYPF Act which place a legislative duty on the Youth 
Court or Family Court, and the counsel representing the young person, to inform and ensure 
the young person's understanding. There is a strong argument that these provisions should be 
extended to the FGC also. 
Suggested wording of new legislative section: 
Duty of youth justice co-ordinator to explain proceedings 
1568 s 39(1)(b), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1569 s 39(1)(d), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
1570 s 39(2), Young Offenders Act 1997. 
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(1) Where, in any family group conference convened under Part IV of this Act child or 
young person, or any parent or guardian or other person having the care of a child or 
young person, is referred for a family group conference, the youth justice co-ordinator 
shall: 
(a) Explain in a manner and in language that can be understood by the child 
or young person or other person the nature of the process 
(b) Satisfy himself or herself that the child or young person or other person 
understands the proceedings; and 
(c) Where the FGC makes any decision, recommendation or plan explain to 
the child or young person to whom the decision, recommendation or plan 
relates and to any parent or guardian or other person having the care of the 
child or young person, in a manner and in language that can be understood by 
that child or young person or other person,-
(i) The nature and requirements of the decision, recommendation or 
plan, 
(ii) Any provisions for variation of the decision, recommendation or 
plan. 
VI. THE WIDER LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
The preceding sections have drawn together the strands of recommendations relating 
specifically to the youth justice FGC. It seems appropriate at this juncture to make some 
comment on the broader context of the youth justice legislation, especially as review and 
reform of the CYPF legislation is ongoing at time of writing, and a new government has just 
been elected. While there are no proposed reforms which would directly affect the youth 
justice FGC, it is necessary ( and also for completeness of this research) to briefly consider the 
future directions of the youth justice legislation. This thesis will conclude by proposing an 
amendment to the legislative principles guiding youth justice. 
A. The Future Direction of the CYP F Act 
The CYPF Act, although innovative and unique at the time of drafting, is now almost twenty 
years old and ripe for reform. In April 2007, a discussion document on reform of the CYPF 
Act was published.1571 Stakeholder and public submissions were called for and a summary of 
1571 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). · 
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the submissions was published in December 2007 .1572 This process has already resulted in 
draft legislation,1573 and there is likely to be additional reform in the coming years. There are 
some constructive aspects for young people's rights. For example, the proposed legislation 
would include seventeen year olds within the ambit of the youth justice system. This would be 
a very positive development. Not only would this mean that New Zealand would be in 
compliance with the CRC, it would also bring the youth justice system in line with other legal 
age limits like the voting age and the age at which alcohol may be purchased. 1574 There are 
other reform proposals not yet translated in legislation. One positive proposal would be the 
strengthening the right to participation. Some Australian jurisdictions have taken a more 
prescriptive approach to participation in their legislation. 1575 
As to the policy imperatives underpinning youth justice, New Zealand is unusual amongst 
similar western jurisdictions in resisting 'get tough' policies for youth justice.1576 his may 
change as the political landscape alters. 2008 was an election year, and youth crime and 
justice has emerged as a principal election issue. 1577 As Pitts argues: 
'Youth crime', the political issue, is characteristically mobilised by opposition parties during elections 
to highlight the social disintegration and moral decay fostered by the government's complacency and 
inaction, or its muddle- headed policies which reward moral turpitude and discourage moral continence 
among the young. Incumbent governments usually turn to 'youth crime' when the economy is faltering 
and they need to deflect attention to an alternative arena in which they can mount dramatic, but 
inexpensive, demonstration of their political grit. 1578 
As noted earlier, a Bill which would have lowered the age of criminal responsibility and 
made it easier for young people to be prosecuted as adults was defeated in Parliament. 1579 
1572 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act 1989: Overall Summary of Submissions (Wellington: Allen and Clarke Policy and Regulatory 
Specialists, 2007). 
1573 CYPF Amendment Bill (No 6). 
1574 Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Children and Youth in Aotearoa 2003 (Wellington, Action for 
Children and Youth Aotearoa, 2003). 
1575 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
1576 John Muncie, 'The Globalisation of Crime Control - The Case of Youth and Juvenile Justice' (2005) 9 
Theoretical Criminology 35. 
1577 John Key, '2008: A Fresh Start for New Zealand'. Speech made by the leader of the New Zealand National 
Party, 29th January 2008. 
1578 John Pitts, The New Politics of Youth Crime -Discipline or Solidarity? (London: Palgrave, 2001), 2. 
1579 Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill. 
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There is pressure however to increase the powers of the Youth Court to deal with serious 
offending. 1580 At present, the highest tariff order in the Youth Court is three months in 
duration. 1581 Youth justice professionals have argued that the current orders are not long 
enough to help young people address issues with alcohol, drugs and behavioural disorders. 1582 
It is important that young people receive support, but a balance must be struck with avoiding 
the negative effects of custody. Better use could be made of non-custodial orders, such as 
supervision with activity. At the time of writing, the majority of party policy documents 
indicate a preference for increasing the ambit and severity of youth justice powers. For 
example, the National Party (newly elected to government at the time of writing) would 
'create a tough new range of sentencing options for dealing with the hardcore group of young 
criminals' and introduce longer residential sentences for young offenders. 1583 Only time will 
tell how this policy will translate into action. 
B. Promoting Rights-Based Youth Justice 
Specific changes to legislation and policy have been recommended earlier in this chapter. The 
discussion will move now to the wider context of the legislation, particularly the principles 
guiding youth justice. 
Section 208 of the CYPF Act provides for certain principles which guide youth justice 
proceedings. These were discussed in detail earlier in this thesis, and include a requirement 
that measures have 'due regard to the interests of victims' 1584 and that 'unless the public 
interest requires otherwise, criminal proceedings should not be instituted against a child or 
young person if there is an alternative means of dealing with the matter' .1585 Section 208(h) 
states the principle that 'the vulnerability of children and young persons entitles a child or 
young person to special protection during any investigation relating to the commission or 
possible commission of an offence by that child or young person'. However, there is no 
1580 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
1581 s 290, CYPF Act. 
1582 Ministry of Social Development, Safeguarding our Children: Updating the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2007). 
1583 New Zealand National Party, 2008: Policy on Youth Justice available at 
http://www.national.org.nz/ Article.aspx? ArticleID=28243 (last viewed 5 October 2008). 
1584 s 208(g), CYPF Act. 
1585 s 208(a), CYPF Act. 
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mention of the rights of the young person during the disposal, diversion, prosecution, or trial 
on criminal matters. It is submitted that a statement emphasising the importance of the rights 
of young people at all stages of the youth justice system should be added to section 208. 
Before considering the wording of the proposed principle, it is necessary to consider the value 
of such a principle. It is certainly arguable that guiding principles of this nature are vague and 
idealistic. However, it is worth considering again the issue of the rules governing the 
investigation of offences involving young people and the questioning in police custody. As 
noted, section 208(h) sets out the principle that special protection is required for young people 
in these situations. This guiding principle has had a significant effect on judicial interpretation 
and application of the statutory requirements for the rights of young people during police 
questioning. It is a simple principle but provides a context for the other legislative principles, 
and is regularly used to interpret other sections. 1586 
As to the wording of a new guiding principle, New Zealand could look to the legislation of 
other jurisdictions. For example, under the Canadian legislation, a principle guiding the Act is 
that: 
(d) special considerations apply in respect of proceedings against young persons and, in particular, 
(i) young persons have rights and freedoms in their own right, such as a right to be heard in the 
course of and to participate in the processes, other than the decision to prosecute, that lead to 
decisions that affect them, and young persons have special guarantees of their rights and 
freedoms. 1587 
Or indeed to look back, a statement of principle which was proposed during the legislative 
process of the CYPF Bill in the 1980s is still relevant more than twenty years later: 
A child or young person suspected of offending should be accorded the same legal protections as an 
adult suspect, save in so far as that child or young person may need extra protection by reason of his or 
her age, maturity or level of understanding. 1588 
This statement refers only to children and young people 'suspected' of offending, but there is 
no reason why this could not be extended to all children and young people at all stages of the 
youth justice system. 
1586 s 208 of the CYPF Act has been used in determining rights and interpreting provisions in many cases 
including The Queen v Z [2007] NZCA 401, R v Patea-Glendinning [2006] DCR 565, R v Kurariki (2002) 22 
FRNZ 319, R v T(1997) 1 NZLR 341. 
1587 s 3(d), Youth Criminal Justice Act 2002. 
1588 Warren Young and Neil Cameron, Submissions on the Children and Young Persons Bill: Submission to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Social Services (Submission number SS/89/108/89), para 3.1. 
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Suggested wording of a new guiding principle: 
a child or young person dealt with under Part IV of this Act should be accorded the 
same legal protections as an adult in the criminal justice system, save in so far as that 
child or young person may need extra protection by reason of his or her age, maturity 
or level of understanding. 
In conclusion, amendment of the guiding principles in section 208 of the CYPF Act such as 
that just proposed, would provide an interpretative tool for the legislative provisions, and a 
statement of principle to guide policy and practice 
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Information sheet for parents/caregivers - research into family group conferences 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate I 
thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind 
and I thank you for considering my request. 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is part of research required for a doctorate in Law at the University of Otago. 
It is going to look at whether young people's rights are properly protected in the family 
group conference and whether any improvements could be made in the law or in 
procedure to improve the process for young people. 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
I am looking for families that will allow me to sit in and observe their family group 
conference. I would also like to talk to the young person on their own afterwards to get 
their views. 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to: 
Give your permission for me to sit in on your family's conference. I don't need to be 
present during the family discussion time and I won't be contributing to the discussion in 
any way. 
Afterwards, if the young person agrees, I would like to talk to them on their own to ge~ 
their views on what took place at the conference. 
There are no known risks in participating in this project. 
Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You can change your mind at any time without any disadvantage to your family. 
Wbat Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
The project will involve collecting information on whether the young person's legal 
rights are protected during the conference, the level of participation by the young person 
and the plan agreed to by the conference. The names or any other personal details of the 
participants or any other identifying details of the incident involved will not be recorded. 
If the young person is willing, he/she will have the opportunity to give his/her views on 
the conference in an interview with the researcher. The precise nature of the questions 
asked is not set out in advance but will depend on the way the interview develops. 
Although the Human Ethics Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in 
the interview, it cannot review in advance the precise questions to be asked. In the event 
that the line of questioning does develop in a way that the young person is not happy 
with, they have the right not to answer the question or to withdraw from the interview 
without disadvantage of any kind. 
The results of the project may be published and will be available in the library but every 
attempt will be made to preserve anonymity. 
You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should you wish. 
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned above 
will be able to gain access to it. At the end of the project any personal information will be 
destroyed immediately except that, as required by the University's research policy, any 
raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for 
five years, after which it will be destroyed. 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about the project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:-
Nessa Lynch 
Faculty of Law 
or Mark Henaghan/Geoff Hall (supervisors) 
Faculty of Law 
University Telephone Number: 03 479 8799 University Telephone Number: 03 479 8857 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics 
' Committee 
Information Sheet for Young People- Research into Family Group Conferences 
I am writing a report for my university studies. Some of the report is going to be about 
what young people's views are on how they were treated at the conference and whether 
they feel involved in the decision. This report may help to improve the way young people 
are treated in the future. 
Your participation in this is totally voluntary, which means you don't have to take part if 
you don't want to. Nothing will happen if you decide you don't want to be involved. 
I would like to sit in on your family group conference if that's alright with you and 
your family. I'd also like to talk to you on your own afterwards to get your views. Ill be 
writing up a report on this, it will be read by my University supervisors and it will be in 
the library afterwards but I won't use your name or any details that might identify you. I 
won't share anything you tell me with the youth justice co-ordinator, the police officer or 
your parents. 
If you change your mind at any stage, I can stop the interview or leave the conference. 
Your parents might give me permission but if you don't want to talk to me that's fine. 
You can ask any questions you like and you can have a copy of the report when it is 
finished. You can contact me at any stage afterwards if you have any concerns. 
Nessa Lynch 
Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
Office Phone: 03 479 8799 
---· ·---·-~---~~-·-~-----------
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Questionnaire for Youth Advocates 
1. Attendance at the FGC 
When you are appointed to represent a young person do you attend the FGC? 
Never 
If the young person requests 
Always 
Reasons why you do attend the FGC - please tick those that apply 
Part of the youth advocate role 
Young person requests 
Family requests 
Offence is a serious one 
Legal issues present 
Other (please specify) 
Reasons why you do not attend FGCs - please tick those that apply 
Remuneration too low 
Services not needed 
Young person did not ask you 
Time was inconvenient 
Pressure of other work 
Matter was clear cut 
Not part of the youth advocate role 
Other (please specify) 
2. Intention to Charge FGC 
Do you ever attend Intention to Charge FGCs? 
,, ' 
The youth advocate scheme should be extended to cover the Intention to Charge 
FGC? 
Agree__ Disagree __ _ 
3. Role of Youth Advocate in relation to the FGC 
Listed are a number of possible roles for the youth advocate in the FGC itself. 
Please rate importance on a scale of 1 (very important) 2 (important) 3 (not 
important) 
Protect the young person's rights 
Provide information to the young person 
Represent the young person 
Ensure the victim gets reparation 
Ensure the summary of facts is correct 
Advise the family during family discussion time 
Ensure the outcome is as lenient ·as possible 
Ensure the outcome is realistic 
Ensure outcome will be acceptable to the Judge 
Ensure the young person speaks 
Provide support for the young person 
Speak up for the young person 
Ensure the principles of the CYPF A are adhered to 
Advocate for a solution that is in the yp's best interest_ 
Ensure that the plan provides for the yp's needs 
Ensure that the outcome is restorative 
Suggest possible outcomes 
Defend the young person 
4. Are there any other comments you would like to make on the role of the youth 
advocate in the youth justice family group conference? · · 
------------------- ·-·-------
